in my opinion, NVD's are a "must" technology for this type of work
Well, the IAA and operator disagree with all of you. No NVD, yet a cloud break at night at a rocky shoreline and driving in the dark at a few hundred feet looking for a helipad was risk-assessed as acceptable even for a routine refuelling stop. NVD was not specified in the contract and the successful bidder was under no obligation at his own financial burden to provide it. If the next contract has NVD then I'm sure the successful bidder will provide them and the appropriate procedures to match.
Thankfully, the IAA has the experience of the UK AAIB assisting it, so no doubt the root causes will be found in due course. As in the Sumburgh accident, I'd be interested in how the procedures utilized the installed equipment, the automation and training to ensure a safe operation, including when to reject and return to base. Has the operator changed any procedures in the interim, or are they waiting for an official IAA/AAIB report?