Controls Full and Free
Guest
Posts: n/a
I heard a story some time ago of an instructor giving a guy a check ride in an As350 , where the cyclic came off in his hand as the mechanic had forgotten to install the pip pins. Think no one was hurt.
hmm some Christmas present.
NTSB Identification: FTW90LA044 . The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 41204.
Accident occurred Monday, December 25, 1989 at GRAND PRAIRIE, TX
Aircraft:AEROSPATIALE AS-350B, registration: N249HS
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
INITIAL LIFTOFF AND HOVER WERE NORMAL, HOWEVER, AS THE PILOT, WHO WAS FLYING FROM THE LEFT SEAT, WAS PREPARING TO TAKEOFF, HIS CYCLIC DISCONNECTED AND CAME OUT OF THE FLOOR MOUNT. THE PILOT YELLED TO THE RATED PASSENGER TO TAKE THE CYCLIC AND HE LOWERED COLLECTIVE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL WITH THE PEDALS. THE AIRCRAFT SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED HARD IN A TAIL LOW ATTITUDE, SEVERING THE TAILBOOM. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE 'PIP' PIN WHICH NORMALLY SECURED THE CYCLIC TO THE CONTROL MOUNT WAS MISSING AND NOT FOUND. EXAMINATION OF THE COMPONENTS DID NOT REVEAL ANY EVIDENCE OF WORKING, ELONGATION, OR DAMAGE IN THE HOLES WHERE THE PIN WOULD HAVE NORMALLY BEEN INSTALLED. AUDIT OF THE MAINTENANCE RECORDS OF THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HAD BEEN DELIVERED FROM THE MANUFACTURER 2 DAYS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT, REVEALED THAT THE DUAL CONTROLS HAD RECENTLY BEEN INSTALLED AND INSPECTED AT THE FACTORY.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows.
MANUFACTURER'S FAILURE TO PROPERTY INSTALL THE LEFT SIDE COMPONENTS OF THE DUAL CONTROL SYSTEM FOLLOWING ITS REMOVAL FOR ADDITIONAL COMPLETION WORK PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF THE AIRCRAFT. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE OF QUALITY CONTROL PERSONNEL TO DETECT THE OVERSIGHT.
hmm some Christmas present.
NTSB Identification: FTW90LA044 . The docket is stored on NTSB microfiche number 41204.
Accident occurred Monday, December 25, 1989 at GRAND PRAIRIE, TX
Aircraft:AEROSPATIALE AS-350B, registration: N249HS
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
INITIAL LIFTOFF AND HOVER WERE NORMAL, HOWEVER, AS THE PILOT, WHO WAS FLYING FROM THE LEFT SEAT, WAS PREPARING TO TAKEOFF, HIS CYCLIC DISCONNECTED AND CAME OUT OF THE FLOOR MOUNT. THE PILOT YELLED TO THE RATED PASSENGER TO TAKE THE CYCLIC AND HE LOWERED COLLECTIVE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL WITH THE PEDALS. THE AIRCRAFT SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED HARD IN A TAIL LOW ATTITUDE, SEVERING THE TAILBOOM. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE 'PIP' PIN WHICH NORMALLY SECURED THE CYCLIC TO THE CONTROL MOUNT WAS MISSING AND NOT FOUND. EXAMINATION OF THE COMPONENTS DID NOT REVEAL ANY EVIDENCE OF WORKING, ELONGATION, OR DAMAGE IN THE HOLES WHERE THE PIN WOULD HAVE NORMALLY BEEN INSTALLED. AUDIT OF THE MAINTENANCE RECORDS OF THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HAD BEEN DELIVERED FROM THE MANUFACTURER 2 DAYS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT, REVEALED THAT THE DUAL CONTROLS HAD RECENTLY BEEN INSTALLED AND INSPECTED AT THE FACTORY.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident/incident as follows.
MANUFACTURER'S FAILURE TO PROPERTY INSTALL THE LEFT SIDE COMPONENTS OF THE DUAL CONTROL SYSTEM FOLLOWING ITS REMOVAL FOR ADDITIONAL COMPLETION WORK PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF THE AIRCRAFT. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE OF QUALITY CONTROL PERSONNEL TO DETECT THE OVERSIGHT.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: mostly in the jungle...
Age: 59
Posts: 502
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Gang,
there is nothing wrong with the R22 pedals or the R44 ones. I found out the wrong way too how important a full motion check is. Luckily I was still on the ground before a testflight with a mechanic who pointed out that the pedals are in the wrong way.
However I do not see a need to change the design.
Just stick to the POH and you will find our BEFORE starting up, that the pedals are in the wrong way!!
If I fly with passengers I ALWAYS remove all dual controls, if you know about the collective, you just make sure it is engaged correctly when you put it back in.
I also fly a EC120B and for different reasons the duals stay in there. So for a Pax flight only the cyclic comes out, the pedals are turned forward and generally they are no problems, besides I tell the passenger beside me NOT to play with the pedals. The real pain in the neck is the collective, as it is a major procedure to remove it. It ALWAYS gets in the way when you pull up and it hits the passengers left thigh, restricting the movement.
Why can other manufacturers not pick up on Robinsons simple system. It takes about 4 times as long to remove just the cyclic from the EC120 as it takes to remove or put in ALL dual controls in a Robinson!!!
Anyway, JUST GO THROUGH THE PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST, AND EVERYTHING SHOULD BE READY AND SAFE!
(Wrongly rigged Helos are exempted!!)
3top
there is nothing wrong with the R22 pedals or the R44 ones. I found out the wrong way too how important a full motion check is. Luckily I was still on the ground before a testflight with a mechanic who pointed out that the pedals are in the wrong way.
However I do not see a need to change the design.
Just stick to the POH and you will find our BEFORE starting up, that the pedals are in the wrong way!!
If I fly with passengers I ALWAYS remove all dual controls, if you know about the collective, you just make sure it is engaged correctly when you put it back in.
I also fly a EC120B and for different reasons the duals stay in there. So for a Pax flight only the cyclic comes out, the pedals are turned forward and generally they are no problems, besides I tell the passenger beside me NOT to play with the pedals. The real pain in the neck is the collective, as it is a major procedure to remove it. It ALWAYS gets in the way when you pull up and it hits the passengers left thigh, restricting the movement.
Why can other manufacturers not pick up on Robinsons simple system. It takes about 4 times as long to remove just the cyclic from the EC120 as it takes to remove or put in ALL dual controls in a Robinson!!!
Anyway, JUST GO THROUGH THE PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST, AND EVERYTHING SHOULD BE READY AND SAFE!
(Wrongly rigged Helos are exempted!!)
3top
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Sunrise, Fl. U.S.A.
Posts: 467
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interestingly enough, today: (From Aero-News)
AD: Eurocopter
Case Highlights Dangers of Unsecured Objects in Cockpit
AD NUMBER: 2002-13-11
MANUFACTURER: Eurocopter France
SUBJECT: Airworthiness Directive 2002-13-11
SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters that requires installing front and side covers to protect the yaw control.
This amendment is prompted by a report of a mobile phone falling between the windshield canopy (canopy) and the cabin floor jamming the yaw control pedal. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an object from sliding between the canopy and the cabin floor, loss of yaw control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
FMI: www.avantext.com/DailyADIndex.ASP?AD=20021311
AD: Eurocopter
Case Highlights Dangers of Unsecured Objects in Cockpit
AD NUMBER: 2002-13-11
MANUFACTURER: Eurocopter France
SUBJECT: Airworthiness Directive 2002-13-11
SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters that requires installing front and side covers to protect the yaw control.
This amendment is prompted by a report of a mobile phone falling between the windshield canopy (canopy) and the cabin floor jamming the yaw control pedal. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an object from sliding between the canopy and the cabin floor, loss of yaw control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
FMI: www.avantext.com/DailyADIndex.ASP?AD=20021311
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Blackpool, UK
Posts: 187
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'm with Nick on the pedal design - why make parts interchangeable if they're not?! Poor design in my book. You wouldn't want two wires in a plug the same colour and expect to test which one was live everytime you had to rewire it would you?
As for scary stories - what about the story of an R22 pilot flying solo with dual controls in. Alledgedly left his Pooleys under the pax seat and needed a frequency in flight - so he opened the seat with his left hand .. and it fell forward and wedged itself neatly under the cyclic's t-bar... he was now heading for Vne fast and had to increase nose down attitude in order to un-hook the seat from under the t-bar.....
Yikes....
As for scary stories - what about the story of an R22 pilot flying solo with dual controls in. Alledgedly left his Pooleys under the pax seat and needed a frequency in flight - so he opened the seat with his left hand .. and it fell forward and wedged itself neatly under the cyclic's t-bar... he was now heading for Vne fast and had to increase nose down attitude in order to un-hook the seat from under the t-bar.....
Yikes....
Last edited by RotorHorn; 10th Jul 2002 at 16:16.
Join Date: Oct 2000
Posts: 88
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Back in 1990, PHI had a dreadful accident involving dual controls. This is how it was told to me:
Over the weekend, one of their Bo-105's had been used for training. Sunday night, the duals were removed. Monday morning, the ship was scheduled for a sunrise charter departure (empty, as fortune would have it).
In the Bolkow, the cyclic and collective sticks are removed but the pedals are left in. However, underneath the floorboards, the pushrod control tube that goes from the pedals to the centre bellcrank is removed, rendering them useless. A bar is clamped across the pedals, turning them into a footrest. A mechanic who had never done that particular job before had pulled the sticks, blocked the pedals and removed a control tube from under the cabin. So far, so good.
In the morning, as the pilot attempted to lift off, before he could even get into a hover he realized that he had no yaw control - the pedals were locked. Oops!
Departure time was now past and suddenly everyone was under the gun, as things go when you try to leave right on the dot and then get delayed. A mechanic (different from the one that originally removed the duals) hurried out and dropped the belly pan. Sure enough, the tail rotor pushrod tube was still in place. So he removed it, assuming the night mechanic had simply forgotten to. What he unfortunately did not notice though, was that the lateral cyclic pushrod tube was missing! The two pushrods are very close together, separated by a small bulkhead and similar in length. The cyclic tube had been mistakenly removed by the first mechanic when the duals were taken out. (I know it does not sound logical, but the Bo-105 MR control tubes run over to the left-hand side of the ship, then aft, then up to the trans.)
So the pilot fires it up again. Sure enough, this time he has pedals. Great! Off he goes, behind schedule now. As soon as he gets airborne he realizes that he has no lateral cyclic control. But it's too late. The ship rolled over and cartwheeled down the ramp. The pilot was killed.
During the "first-flight-of-day" pre-start checklist in the Bo-105, there is an item called the "Hydraulic Block Test." In the primary hydraulic system, there are six microswitches that would detect a jam and cause an automatic switchover to the secondary system. Performing the test isolates and verifies that each of the microswitches are working properly and the "Hydraulic Block" caution light comes on. With the lateral cyclic tube disconnected, the Hydraulic Block Test could not have been adequately performed. The two microswitches on the lateral cyclic could not have been checked.
BTW, even if the pilot of PHI's Bolkow did check for freedom of movement, the force-trim springs on the cyclic would have given him the illusion that the linkages were all there.
So it's not just a question of "full and free travel," eh? The controls will move very freely...especially when they're not hooked up. Remember, Mr. Murphy is there, waiting for just the slightest bit of complacency on our part.
(Sorry this is so long.)
Over the weekend, one of their Bo-105's had been used for training. Sunday night, the duals were removed. Monday morning, the ship was scheduled for a sunrise charter departure (empty, as fortune would have it).
In the Bolkow, the cyclic and collective sticks are removed but the pedals are left in. However, underneath the floorboards, the pushrod control tube that goes from the pedals to the centre bellcrank is removed, rendering them useless. A bar is clamped across the pedals, turning them into a footrest. A mechanic who had never done that particular job before had pulled the sticks, blocked the pedals and removed a control tube from under the cabin. So far, so good.
In the morning, as the pilot attempted to lift off, before he could even get into a hover he realized that he had no yaw control - the pedals were locked. Oops!
Departure time was now past and suddenly everyone was under the gun, as things go when you try to leave right on the dot and then get delayed. A mechanic (different from the one that originally removed the duals) hurried out and dropped the belly pan. Sure enough, the tail rotor pushrod tube was still in place. So he removed it, assuming the night mechanic had simply forgotten to. What he unfortunately did not notice though, was that the lateral cyclic pushrod tube was missing! The two pushrods are very close together, separated by a small bulkhead and similar in length. The cyclic tube had been mistakenly removed by the first mechanic when the duals were taken out. (I know it does not sound logical, but the Bo-105 MR control tubes run over to the left-hand side of the ship, then aft, then up to the trans.)
So the pilot fires it up again. Sure enough, this time he has pedals. Great! Off he goes, behind schedule now. As soon as he gets airborne he realizes that he has no lateral cyclic control. But it's too late. The ship rolled over and cartwheeled down the ramp. The pilot was killed.
During the "first-flight-of-day" pre-start checklist in the Bo-105, there is an item called the "Hydraulic Block Test." In the primary hydraulic system, there are six microswitches that would detect a jam and cause an automatic switchover to the secondary system. Performing the test isolates and verifies that each of the microswitches are working properly and the "Hydraulic Block" caution light comes on. With the lateral cyclic tube disconnected, the Hydraulic Block Test could not have been adequately performed. The two microswitches on the lateral cyclic could not have been checked.
BTW, even if the pilot of PHI's Bolkow did check for freedom of movement, the force-trim springs on the cyclic would have given him the illusion that the linkages were all there.
So it's not just a question of "full and free travel," eh? The controls will move very freely...especially when they're not hooked up. Remember, Mr. Murphy is there, waiting for just the slightest bit of complacency on our part.
(Sorry this is so long.)
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: the other America
Posts: 103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As Grainger said
Putting the controls on the desk was my way of avoiding any doubt when hiring from a couple of places where I wasn't so well known. (Can't be accused of "letting your mates have a go" if the controls are on the desk.)
I queried the boss (looks like he's giving his mates a go boss) and was told his machine, he wants to break it................The boss didn't seem to want to know.
From then on I started to take the duals into the office whenever the OWNER or anyone else I didn't know/trust was taking the ac away.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Scone, NSW
Posts: 13
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Control locks
The aircraft was an AS 350B2, left-hand drive conversion for logging. Throttle quadrant on the floor to left of pilot seat, next to the door.
We went out to do a refresher emergencies check, so the front bench seat was out, the single seat was in, plus the duals. For the first part of the trip i sat in the left seat, with the checking instructor in the right. When it was time for the autos, we swapped seats so he could control the throttles.
On downwind, he pulled back the throttle for the first auto, I put the lever down, and turned the corner, adjusted flight path etc for my usual perfect auto. Everything looks good, here comes the flare, milk it for all it's worth, small collective check .... and the collective will not come up. Shout "It's locked! The collective's locked!!" as I push the bird level with a bit of remaining airspeed and pull the lever up like crazy, to no avail.
The instructor reaches for the collective lock, which is a tin-pot mod of springy metal on the side of the lever (not over the tip) which, when the lever hit the floor, sprung itself into position. The keyhole is shaped so that the lever must be pushed down to release it, so he is pushing down while I am pulling up.
I won. No lever.
We hit the ground flat, at about 10 knots, bounced over a taxyway (which was about 3 inches above the surrounding grass) and narrowly missed going down a ditch on the other side. Screech to a stop in a cloud of dust. Unstrap, walk around to the left door, free the collective lock, and bend the bluddy thing flat to the floor where it would never interfere again.
I rang the Eurocopter rep (French) and roared up him that such a mod would ever be allowed to fly. He said "It is a Canadian mod, and nothing to do wiz me!"
But the amazing thing was being able to pull off an auto without any collective at all. Says heaps for their product.
We went out to do a refresher emergencies check, so the front bench seat was out, the single seat was in, plus the duals. For the first part of the trip i sat in the left seat, with the checking instructor in the right. When it was time for the autos, we swapped seats so he could control the throttles.
On downwind, he pulled back the throttle for the first auto, I put the lever down, and turned the corner, adjusted flight path etc for my usual perfect auto. Everything looks good, here comes the flare, milk it for all it's worth, small collective check .... and the collective will not come up. Shout "It's locked! The collective's locked!!" as I push the bird level with a bit of remaining airspeed and pull the lever up like crazy, to no avail.
The instructor reaches for the collective lock, which is a tin-pot mod of springy metal on the side of the lever (not over the tip) which, when the lever hit the floor, sprung itself into position. The keyhole is shaped so that the lever must be pushed down to release it, so he is pushing down while I am pulling up.
I won. No lever.
We hit the ground flat, at about 10 knots, bounced over a taxyway (which was about 3 inches above the surrounding grass) and narrowly missed going down a ditch on the other side. Screech to a stop in a cloud of dust. Unstrap, walk around to the left door, free the collective lock, and bend the bluddy thing flat to the floor where it would never interfere again.
I rang the Eurocopter rep (French) and roared up him that such a mod would ever be allowed to fly. He said "It is a Canadian mod, and nothing to do wiz me!"
But the amazing thing was being able to pull off an auto without any collective at all. Says heaps for their product.
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Blackpool, UK
Posts: 187
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Flare Dammit's anecdote illustrates a handy hint - when you're checking for 'full and free' motion do what I do - watch the pitch on the main rotor blades and see if it changes whilst you're doing all that waggling... if they ain't moving, they ain't connected
