Question for the offshore experts
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26500 lbs
Yes but you are still flying by sole reference to instruments below Vmini and no matter how many people tell me 'it's OK' I want to see that in writing. I'm one who has been once bitten and is now most definitely twice shy.
G.
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Geoffers,
yep I agree with you. I think it is now on the operators to lobby the manufacturers to be a little more proscriptive in their writing. We all know the reality, but as you rightly state, that in a blame culture it is a nasty game when things go wrong, and every word will be looked at.
yep I agree with you. I think it is now on the operators to lobby the manufacturers to be a little more proscriptive in their writing. We all know the reality, but as you rightly state, that in a blame culture it is a nasty game when things go wrong, and every word will be looked at.
Extra-special dispensation .......
Call me a cynic .....CYNIC!.......but I wonder if this wool-ey(?), grey area exists to enable the O&G sector to operate and therefore to provide the tax required for this country to be so wasteful in e first place.........
The question has been asked numerous times before and has deliberately not been dealt with. Stemming from the days of old - that 'fudge' might have worked - I was hoping EASA would have meant we got a bit more grown-up about it........or atleast meant OEMs print lower Vmini............
The question has been asked numerous times before and has deliberately not been dealt with. Stemming from the days of old - that 'fudge' might have worked - I was hoping EASA would have meant we got a bit more grown-up about it........or atleast meant OEMs print lower Vmini............
Therefore as long as one is visual at TDP, which is a height reference over the deck
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Blame EHEST
I wouldn't have started this thread if it weren't for the fact that in the same week I was part of a CRM class discussion about the Haughey accident in Norfolk and then handed a copy of HE9.
EHEST selected an incident that was used to highlight autopilot mismanagement but in fact that particular flight began to unravel as a result of no visual references below Vmini. I was surprised that nothing was made of this so maybe you are right, maybe there has been an industry conspiracy to ignore this little wrinkle?
David Beaty (author of the 'must read' THE NAKED PILOT) would turn in his grave as he laid bare the origins of todays AAIB in a former conspiracy connected to the De Havilland Comet. That one involved the manufacturer, regulator, government and operator so we know that the system is quite capable if given enough rope. Thank goodness those days are past.... probably.
Christopher Tugendhadt (head of the CAA in the '80's) wrote a speech that was so revealing I kept a copy. He stated that the country was obliged to the helicopter industry for delivering the ability to produce oil and gas from the North Sea and that the quasi-military operations necessary were a tribute to the industry's resourcefulness - words to that effect anyway.
G
EHEST selected an incident that was used to highlight autopilot mismanagement but in fact that particular flight began to unravel as a result of no visual references below Vmini. I was surprised that nothing was made of this so maybe you are right, maybe there has been an industry conspiracy to ignore this little wrinkle?
David Beaty (author of the 'must read' THE NAKED PILOT) would turn in his grave as he laid bare the origins of todays AAIB in a former conspiracy connected to the De Havilland Comet. That one involved the manufacturer, regulator, government and operator so we know that the system is quite capable if given enough rope. Thank goodness those days are past.... probably.
Christopher Tugendhadt (head of the CAA in the '80's) wrote a speech that was so revealing I kept a copy. He stated that the country was obliged to the helicopter industry for delivering the ability to produce oil and gas from the North Sea and that the quasi-military operations necessary were a tribute to the industry's resourcefulness - words to that effect anyway.
G
Originally Posted by [email protected]
visual with what exactly?? You will have no visual horizon in the dark without NVD and that is the point about visual flying - you have to be able to control the attitude of the aircraft without reference to the instruments, otherwise you are instrument flying.
Here's another little 'fizzing grenade' for the discussion:
In the AW139 (and other types), arguably every Class 1 departure (Clear Area, Helipad, Offshore), even in CAVOK conditions, is with 'sole reference to instruments'.
Otherwise, how else can one fly the profile accurately? You certainly can't by looking out of the window.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
visual with what exactly?? You will have no visual horizon in the dark without NVD and that is the point about visual flying - you have to be able to control the attitude of the aircraft without reference to the instruments, otherwise you are instrument flying.
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Crab,
without wanting to be drawn into an overly pedantic argument, after several thousand such departures, in my view there are enough visual references and light right next to you on the rig/ship to allow you to visually set an attitude up to and immediately after TDP. Whilst not always guaranteed a clear horizon ahead, the point is that at TDP you are still visual with the rig structure, deck lights, and this is sufficient to set the correct attitude and make an immediate transfer on to instruments. This is more challenging on small decks and bow decks, however we train all crews to be visual with the deck up to TDP and thereafter fly solely on instruments as per an ITO once there are no more visual cues. Of the thousands conducted every winter, the fact remains very very few issues are encountered. What is interesting is when there is an incident, is to know why it went wrong and i would argue that it is very likely an incorrect technique/handling being the root cause. This may be triggered by AFCS mismanagement other technical failures or CRM breakdown. It is here the focus should be. However the point remains that assuming one is stable up to TDP, it is thereafter an ITO, and this is not beyond the limits of the aircraft or the crews if trained properly. We have all the means and facilities to carry this out perfectly safely and have done for many years. Can it be safer? Yes probably. Have all the risks been correctly identified and mitigated? Possibly - no. I do not believe being more restrictive to night operations is the answer. Correct training and testing of skills and techniques and an clear allowance in the RFM is effectively what is required to clear up the argument.
without wanting to be drawn into an overly pedantic argument, after several thousand such departures, in my view there are enough visual references and light right next to you on the rig/ship to allow you to visually set an attitude up to and immediately after TDP. Whilst not always guaranteed a clear horizon ahead, the point is that at TDP you are still visual with the rig structure, deck lights, and this is sufficient to set the correct attitude and make an immediate transfer on to instruments. This is more challenging on small decks and bow decks, however we train all crews to be visual with the deck up to TDP and thereafter fly solely on instruments as per an ITO once there are no more visual cues. Of the thousands conducted every winter, the fact remains very very few issues are encountered. What is interesting is when there is an incident, is to know why it went wrong and i would argue that it is very likely an incorrect technique/handling being the root cause. This may be triggered by AFCS mismanagement other technical failures or CRM breakdown. It is here the focus should be. However the point remains that assuming one is stable up to TDP, it is thereafter an ITO, and this is not beyond the limits of the aircraft or the crews if trained properly. We have all the means and facilities to carry this out perfectly safely and have done for many years. Can it be safer? Yes probably. Have all the risks been correctly identified and mitigated? Possibly - no. I do not believe being more restrictive to night operations is the answer. Correct training and testing of skills and techniques and an clear allowance in the RFM is effectively what is required to clear up the argument.
Chaps, I do get that - but by your own admission
therefore you make the transition on instruments but not the vertical or rearwards climb, exactly as I expected and exactly what I have done in the past from rigs, grey funnel liners, cliffs, mountains etc.
It is that transition (below Vmini unless there is a strong wind) that is the fudged issue - we all know it but Geoffers has highlighted that there is an anomaly between what is done and what is approved/legal.
The military teach and test an IFTO - civil IR training and examination does neither (apparently because RFMs don't allow it) yet it is a widely used procedure.
This is more challenging on small decks and bow decks, however we train all crews to be visual with the deck up to TDP and thereafter fly solely on instruments as per an ITO once there are no more visual cues
It is that transition (below Vmini unless there is a strong wind) that is the fudged issue - we all know it but Geoffers has highlighted that there is an anomaly between what is done and what is approved/legal.
The military teach and test an IFTO - civil IR training and examination does neither (apparently because RFMs don't allow it) yet it is a widely used procedure.
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Oh Crab - we do train it old boy. Very regularly, and test it. I have been through the same training system as you, and managed to transition into civilian ways later in my career, so drop the old civi vs military crap. I have no idea what your idea is of the civil training that goes on in the offshore companies, but dont be too amazed when you hear that we do train our crews in all the skills they need and the standard of training is exceptional amongst all the North Sea companies. I say North Sea companies, as I will not comment on the other areas of the world in which I have no experience. And please don’t tell me that the so-called “mandated IFTO” training in the RAF had prevented a disorientation on takeoff and fudged technique resulting in CFIT because we both know that is not true.
Transition below VMini is not the inherent problem in itself. All crews are trained and capable of this and do it regularly. There are areas of flight that contain a higher risk level than others, but the departure on instruments when flown correctly and as trained, with correct technique and CRM is a safe procedure. Things do go wrong in this world for all sorts of reason, but this is a very rare event during a departure. The crux of this argument is a pedantic one and over the details of fluffy wording in a manual that may or may not mean a crew if operating legally, not one of military trained crews being better than civil. Geoffers made a very good point and the real difference in the civilian world is the very real threat of litigation when things go wrong and this is what needs to be addressed. I dont even think it is very clear or even likely that a crew will be judged flying illegally in a court because they conducted a departure at night, however as Geoffers says, it is in theory a possibility and maybe better to get that clarification that in writing. I dont think any of us who fly regularly offshore at night believe a departure from a rig at night to be an unacceptably risky or dangerous activity.
Transition below VMini is not the inherent problem in itself. All crews are trained and capable of this and do it regularly. There are areas of flight that contain a higher risk level than others, but the departure on instruments when flown correctly and as trained, with correct technique and CRM is a safe procedure. Things do go wrong in this world for all sorts of reason, but this is a very rare event during a departure. The crux of this argument is a pedantic one and over the details of fluffy wording in a manual that may or may not mean a crew if operating legally, not one of military trained crews being better than civil. Geoffers made a very good point and the real difference in the civilian world is the very real threat of litigation when things go wrong and this is what needs to be addressed. I dont even think it is very clear or even likely that a crew will be judged flying illegally in a court because they conducted a departure at night, however as Geoffers says, it is in theory a possibility and maybe better to get that clarification that in writing. I dont think any of us who fly regularly offshore at night believe a departure from a rig at night to be an unacceptably risky or dangerous activity.
Last edited by 26500lbs; 14th Dec 2015 at 17:07.
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CAP 1145
CAP 1145 came out of a fatal accident. There are many changes introduced by CAP 1145 that in some ways are similar to the dilemma that we face with Vmini. Everyone agrees that it's do-able and what is more is necessary. This is an opportunity to get rid of some 'grey' areas before an accident sets one group of lawyers against another and forces one more CAP.
So who is going to step forward. Will a solution appear in the FCOM? My guess is that this would be unlikely. The OEM has it in the Part 1 of his RFM as a limitation and would be sticking his neck out to embrace a zero Vmini.
Maybe HeliOffshore should lead this particular matter as it is an operating difficulty peculiar to this sector of the business and they are in a position to convince the regulators that a 'Letter of No Objection' to a zero Vmini provided it is trained for and featured in all OPC's. We have a history of successfully dealing with this phase of night ops so I don't see a big problem.
Clearly this site is visited by members of the offshore community beyond us aviators so we can't run and hide. They will want to look after their interests and should be happy if we are seen to be treating this matter seriously and professionally.
G.
So who is going to step forward. Will a solution appear in the FCOM? My guess is that this would be unlikely. The OEM has it in the Part 1 of his RFM as a limitation and would be sticking his neck out to embrace a zero Vmini.
Maybe HeliOffshore should lead this particular matter as it is an operating difficulty peculiar to this sector of the business and they are in a position to convince the regulators that a 'Letter of No Objection' to a zero Vmini provided it is trained for and featured in all OPC's. We have a history of successfully dealing with this phase of night ops so I don't see a big problem.
Clearly this site is visited by members of the offshore community beyond us aviators so we can't run and hide. They will want to look after their interests and should be happy if we are seen to be treating this matter seriously and professionally.
G.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
... civil IR training and examination does neither ...
Nice patronising replies gents but you can dismount those high horses.
We know the techniques are taught and tested in the offshore world.
The point of this thread is that those procedures are in contravention of the RFM - ie at TDP you are transferring to instruments to control the helicopter BELOW Vmini.
We know the techniques are taught and tested in the offshore world.
The point of this thread is that those procedures are in contravention of the RFM - ie at TDP you are transferring to instruments to control the helicopter BELOW Vmini.
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Seeing as there has been reference to the Haughey accident, in view of the last few posts it's probably worth mentioning that the pilots involved might not have been required to pass an OPC.
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Shy T
I'm not sure the OPC is relevant in the context of the Haughty departure as nobody to my knowledge has a night take off in zero vis in their Ops Manual. Maybe the SAR boys have one but no CAT organisation would be allowed to abuse Vmini to that extent - legally..... unless, as we have pointed out, you are working from an offshore platform of some kind in which case legality seems to be a peripheral issue.
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Geoffers, yes I agree, i was responding to post #33 regarding the reference to role training. There is no role training required by law in the private category. My annual LPC is the only "training" I get and paradoxically it's just about the only time I operate single pilot!
The AAIB, in the G-LBAL accident report, noted that some private owners require two pilots up front but those SPIFR pilots are not required to be tested in the multi-crew role and they aren't unless an external auditor is used by the operator. It's a ridiculous anomaly still to be addressed by EASA.
It's little wonder that the AAIB found that there were no formal briefings or "standard" callouts between the crew, again as noted on G-LBAL's CVR. Essentially, two SPIFR pilots can be put together and left to get on with it. How well it works depends on the individuals concerned rather than subsequent training, regulation or testing.
Additionally, if the aircraft is certificated for SPIFR and is not operated under an AOC, the second pilot is not recognised as such by the CAA, he is at best a pilot's assistant and cannot claim any time as crew.
Apologies for the thread drift!
The AAIB, in the G-LBAL accident report, noted that some private owners require two pilots up front but those SPIFR pilots are not required to be tested in the multi-crew role and they aren't unless an external auditor is used by the operator. It's a ridiculous anomaly still to be addressed by EASA.
It's little wonder that the AAIB found that there were no formal briefings or "standard" callouts between the crew, again as noted on G-LBAL's CVR. Essentially, two SPIFR pilots can be put together and left to get on with it. How well it works depends on the individuals concerned rather than subsequent training, regulation or testing.
Additionally, if the aircraft is certificated for SPIFR and is not operated under an AOC, the second pilot is not recognised as such by the CAA, he is at best a pilot's assistant and cannot claim any time as crew.
Apologies for the thread drift!
Last edited by ShyTorque; 15th Dec 2015 at 06:18.
