Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
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10watt, what i can figure out is that a helicopter engaged on police work has crashed into a pub in Glasgow. other than the act of crashing i am unable to ascertain any other reason for the position.
regards tet
regards tet
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Thanks Shwan, just bringing it into the discussion because for now at least, the Glasgow crash also 'was not caused by any problem with the helicopter'.
To put a theory on Potomac like some are doing here with Glasgow, The Potomac ac lifted at 2304, crashed at 2311 (7 mins). The Low Fuel warning (if it illuminates) on a 680 litre tank requires you to land within 8 mins! How accurate is that 8 mins?
Perhaps they are closer than at first look!
To put a theory on Potomac like some are doing here with Glasgow, The Potomac ac lifted at 2304, crashed at 2311 (7 mins). The Low Fuel warning (if it illuminates) on a 680 litre tank requires you to land within 8 mins! How accurate is that 8 mins?
Perhaps they are closer than at first look!
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
10Watt
Could someone briefly sum up the known facts please ?
Also, is anyone allowed to say what the aircraft was doing there ?
Could someone briefly sum up the known facts please ?
Also, is anyone allowed to say what the aircraft was doing there ?
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...-SPAO%20v2.pdf
I'm sure if anyone knew it would have been mentioned already. (Along the river a recognised route back to base?). You'll have to wait like the rest if us and if known it will come out in further reports.
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According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact.
The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact.
The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact.
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Quote:
According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact.
The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact.
That's an interesting statement from EC, can't see them saying "95 liters of fuel at impact unless they were certain!
According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact.
The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact.
That's an interesting statement from EC, can't see them saying "95 liters of fuel at impact unless they were certain!
Edit: And it wasn't EC who said it. It was the AAIB.
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Actually, we could do with some clarification there.
Lemain seems to be assuming that PieChaser is wrong, and I suspect that assumption is based on Lemain having read the AAIB statement.
Perhaps, just perhaps, PieChaser may be quoting from a statement issued by EC?
Lemain seems to be assuming that PieChaser is wrong, and I suspect that assumption is based on Lemain having read the AAIB statement.
Perhaps, just perhaps, PieChaser may be quoting from a statement issued by EC?
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BBC News - Glasgow helicopter crash: Legal action begins against Bond Aviation Group
Legal action begins against Bond Aviation Group
What's in your cockpit?
The following article is from 2005. Nearly 1 decade ago....
Presented to International Helicopter Safety Symposium
Montreal QC
Sept. 2005
Roy G. Fox
Bell Helicopters Textron Inc.
The single most-important improvement in helicopter safety
could be driven by documented information of what happened
(or not) in the cockpit during an accident sequence.
Accident investigators and regulators don’t know details.
Pilot error is largely based on circumstantial evidence, and
ends up with accident causes such as “failed to maintain
RPM,” “failed to maintain clearance,” “fuel exhaustion,”—
the list goes on.
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS
The helicopter industry, including the regulatory side, needs
to work on these major roadblocks. For example, HUMS—
possible maintenance credits and alerting a pilot of an impending
problem—is always a good subject for a lively discussion.
We need research and trial programs to build a
more robust and useful HUMS, to be able to validate that the
HUMS indication occurs XX hours before a catastrophic
component failure. With such confidence, the pilot should
be alerted that the helicopter requires an inspection before
another flight. We in the industry and the regulatory agencies
must work together to find ways to make improvements
and also make use of technologies developed from outside of
aviation.
The largest single problem that prevents helicopters from
rising to the safety level of the airlines is that we do not
know what is happening in the cockpit. If you don’t
understand what happened in a crash, you cannot fix
anything and these human error accidents continue year after
year. We must find a way to document what is happening in
the cockpit, and that information must be retained in crash survivable
media or transmitted outside of the aircraft.
Many contend that we already have Flight Data Recorders
(FDRs) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVRs) to provide this
information. This comment is misleading. Reference 14
discussed the fallacy of this, as very few helicopters have
FDRs. Since the FDR requirement of 14CFR135 is for
multi-turbine powered helicopters with 10 or more
passengers, the maximum number of helicopters meeting
those requirements (including those not operating under
14CFR135) would be only 6.5% of the U.S. civil helicopter
fleet.
The helicopter industry needs a Cockpit Information Recorder
(CIR) to provide information inside the cockpit before
and during a crash. This information will allow the
accident investigators to understand what actually happened
(or not) in those human and unknown caused accidents.
Once we can document and understand the actions and sequences,
we can make the appropriate corrections. This
knowledge on every helicopter accident can save costs/time
of accident investigations, reduce regulatory concerns, and
speed up corrections to the field. Most importantly, it would
allow us to correct and mitigate the human error accidents
and raise helicopter safety to a new level. Reference 14 describes
these benefits and issues regarding a CIR. A CIR
should contain:
• A still color camera (day/night)
• An area microphone
• A GPS
• Data processing/memory capability
• Crash survivable recorder.
A CIR unit would likely contain the first four items and provide
output to existing crash-survivable recorders. A typical
still shot photo would include the
instrument panel and the pilot’s controls (cyclic, collective,
and pedals). A CIR could be a “poor man’s FDR/CVR.”
Further in the future, we should make the CIR wireless. An
onboard transmitter would be added to transmit analyzed
critical data to a satellite, to a land line via Internet to the
Operator’s PC and the Manufacture’s PC.
The PC would be programmed to determine if a crash occurred (e.g.,
analysis of GPS data for anomalies). If analysis indicates a
crash and no human action occurred from the operator in a
few minutes, the PC would automatically notify the Search
and Rescue function. The PC alert message would provide
aircraft identification, time of last contact, and
longitude/latitude of the wreckage. This would shorten
rescue response time, which increases the probability of
survival. This satellite transmission approach is already
being used now for helicopter flight following with a small
GPS unit. The automotive industry has this GPS tracking
and crash alerting capability (when airbag deploys) in GM’s
OnStar® system in many of their automobiles.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS
Helicopter safety has been improving over the years. The
accident frequency appears to be flat or even increasing.
The accident rates due to airworthiness issues remain very
low and consistent year-to-year. Industry will continue to
keep airworthiness issues corrected. The largest single potential
area to make significant improvement in safety is in
understanding what went on in the cockpit of each accident
helicopter. Once we can document the cockpit information
and sequence, we can finally understand and aggressively
attack those accident causes. A Cockpit Information Recorder
(CIR) tied to a crash-survivable recorder can allow
quicker, more complete, less costly accident investigations.
This would allow safety problems to be corrected in weeks,
not years. The CIR provides the potential to reduce our
helicopter accident rate by at least half if not two-thirds.
The CIR can provide facts and understanding, which is required
to go to the next plateau level of safety.
Presented to International Helicopter Safety Symposium
Montreal QC
Sept. 2005
Roy G. Fox
Bell Helicopters Textron Inc.
The single most-important improvement in helicopter safety
could be driven by documented information of what happened
(or not) in the cockpit during an accident sequence.
Accident investigators and regulators don’t know details.
Pilot error is largely based on circumstantial evidence, and
ends up with accident causes such as “failed to maintain
RPM,” “failed to maintain clearance,” “fuel exhaustion,”—
the list goes on.
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS
The helicopter industry, including the regulatory side, needs
to work on these major roadblocks. For example, HUMS—
possible maintenance credits and alerting a pilot of an impending
problem—is always a good subject for a lively discussion.
We need research and trial programs to build a
more robust and useful HUMS, to be able to validate that the
HUMS indication occurs XX hours before a catastrophic
component failure. With such confidence, the pilot should
be alerted that the helicopter requires an inspection before
another flight. We in the industry and the regulatory agencies
must work together to find ways to make improvements
and also make use of technologies developed from outside of
aviation.
The largest single problem that prevents helicopters from
rising to the safety level of the airlines is that we do not
know what is happening in the cockpit. If you don’t
understand what happened in a crash, you cannot fix
anything and these human error accidents continue year after
year. We must find a way to document what is happening in
the cockpit, and that information must be retained in crash survivable
media or transmitted outside of the aircraft.
Many contend that we already have Flight Data Recorders
(FDRs) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVRs) to provide this
information. This comment is misleading. Reference 14
discussed the fallacy of this, as very few helicopters have
FDRs. Since the FDR requirement of 14CFR135 is for
multi-turbine powered helicopters with 10 or more
passengers, the maximum number of helicopters meeting
those requirements (including those not operating under
14CFR135) would be only 6.5% of the U.S. civil helicopter
fleet.
The helicopter industry needs a Cockpit Information Recorder
(CIR) to provide information inside the cockpit before
and during a crash. This information will allow the
accident investigators to understand what actually happened
(or not) in those human and unknown caused accidents.
Once we can document and understand the actions and sequences,
we can make the appropriate corrections. This
knowledge on every helicopter accident can save costs/time
of accident investigations, reduce regulatory concerns, and
speed up corrections to the field. Most importantly, it would
allow us to correct and mitigate the human error accidents
and raise helicopter safety to a new level. Reference 14 describes
these benefits and issues regarding a CIR. A CIR
should contain:
• A still color camera (day/night)
• An area microphone
• A GPS
• Data processing/memory capability
• Crash survivable recorder.
A CIR unit would likely contain the first four items and provide
output to existing crash-survivable recorders. A typical
still shot photo would include the
instrument panel and the pilot’s controls (cyclic, collective,
and pedals). A CIR could be a “poor man’s FDR/CVR.”
Further in the future, we should make the CIR wireless. An
onboard transmitter would be added to transmit analyzed
critical data to a satellite, to a land line via Internet to the
Operator’s PC and the Manufacture’s PC.
The PC would be programmed to determine if a crash occurred (e.g.,
analysis of GPS data for anomalies). If analysis indicates a
crash and no human action occurred from the operator in a
few minutes, the PC would automatically notify the Search
and Rescue function. The PC alert message would provide
aircraft identification, time of last contact, and
longitude/latitude of the wreckage. This would shorten
rescue response time, which increases the probability of
survival. This satellite transmission approach is already
being used now for helicopter flight following with a small
GPS unit. The automotive industry has this GPS tracking
and crash alerting capability (when airbag deploys) in GM’s
OnStar® system in many of their automobiles.
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS
Helicopter safety has been improving over the years. The
accident frequency appears to be flat or even increasing.
The accident rates due to airworthiness issues remain very
low and consistent year-to-year. Industry will continue to
keep airworthiness issues corrected. The largest single potential
area to make significant improvement in safety is in
understanding what went on in the cockpit of each accident
helicopter. Once we can document the cockpit information
and sequence, we can finally understand and aggressively
attack those accident causes. A Cockpit Information Recorder
(CIR) tied to a crash-survivable recorder can allow
quicker, more complete, less costly accident investigations.
This would allow safety problems to be corrected in weeks,
not years. The CIR provides the potential to reduce our
helicopter accident rate by at least half if not two-thirds.
The CIR can provide facts and understanding, which is required
to go to the next plateau level of safety.
Last edited by blackdog7; 11th Jan 2014 at 07:40.
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I remember vividly the last hoo-hah about CVRs, many years ago. The idea was considered provocative and intrusive by many pilots. Out of interest, looking only at EC 135 pilots here on public service duty (police and ambulance), would pilots welcome the CIR or not? For the purposes of this, let's assume that the equipment and operation of it is entirely 'invisible' and requires no operator input.
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Lemain
Do you really think I would post a quote unless it was from a creditable source?
It's directly from Airbus/EC website, hence it's significance!!
EC135 T2i Accident (Nov. 2013) - Airbus Helicopters
Thanks Airpolice.
Do you really think I would post a quote unless it was from a creditable source?
It's directly from Airbus/EC website, hence it's significance!!
EC135 T2i Accident (Nov. 2013) - Airbus Helicopters
Thanks Airpolice.
Last edited by PieChaser; 11th Jan 2014 at 09:46. Reason: Add link
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Piechaser -- The source is 'credible' enough but the report is wrong. Here is the Airbus text, from our link:
Now, if you click on the link to the AAIB report you'll see that the AAIB SB said "Once removed from the building, approximately 95 litres of fuel were drained from the fuel tank system"
So Airbus have misreported the AAIB. I'm not trying to score points, people lost their lives here. But there is potentially a large difference between having drained approximately 95l and a statement that there was approximately 95l on board. Of course they could both be true....and one hopes that they are....but in this field of engineering one has to be absolutely pedantic.
December 9, 2013
The AAIB today issued a Special Bulletin recounting factual details surrounding the accident in Glasgow that occurred on November 29, 2013.
According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact.
The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact.
The AAIB today issued a Special Bulletin recounting factual details surrounding the accident in Glasgow that occurred on November 29, 2013.
According to initial evidence collected following the incident, the aircraft struck the roof of The Clutha Bar with “a high rate of descent and low/negligible forward speed” without rotation of the main rotor or the Fenestron tail rotor. As previously reported, all rotor blades remained attached upon impact.
The helicopter fuel tank system contained approximately 95 liters of fuel at impact.
So Airbus have misreported the AAIB. I'm not trying to score points, people lost their lives here. But there is potentially a large difference between having drained approximately 95l and a statement that there was approximately 95l on board. Of course they could both be true....and one hopes that they are....but in this field of engineering one has to be absolutely pedantic.
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Piechaser -- The source is 'credible' enough but the report is wrong. Here is the Airbus text, from our link:
Airbus know very well how much fuel was in each tank at point of impact.
There is a report coming out very shortly, so let's just hope everything will become much clearer and a design change will be made.
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There is a report coming out very shortly, so let's just hope everything will become much clearer and a design change will be made.
What exactly needs a design change? and why?......I must have missed something.
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A design change????.......
Two transfer pumps and fuel pipe to each supply tank from the main tank.
One pipe and one transfer pump (low fuel level) to two supply tanks, is a risky game.
One pipe and one transfer pump (low fuel level) to two supply tanks, is a risky game.