Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub
Thanks for the concise summary. You should refer other late-entries to that post of yours 
Wow, that's really fast! My PPL autorotations had the throttle rolled off (to ~2000rpm) and I'd put pitch down + cyclic way back to prevent nose dive and then get back on pitch a little or otherwise RRPMs would skyrocket. Next check flight I ask and wait a bit with the pitch to see the initial RRPM decay..
So it was by no means a landing but a crash onto a rel. sturdy roof.
Wouldn't that be a very scary sound, two engine going slient? That would override any lights for me. Would "3 seconds till pitch full down at hard engine out" be too slow an reaction in an EC135?
Jeez, not even half a minute? Scary 
Once the rotor stalled the air resistance would slow rotor rotation to effectively zero in less than ten seconds.
The free fall time from 1000 feet is less than 10 seconds, however the aerodynamic resistance of the falling helicopter would probably slow the descent rate to around 20 seconds to impact the ground from 1000 feet. Hence the single return from the aircraft on ground radar showing a height of 400 feet after consistently being tracked at 1000 feet, i.e. it was pinged by radar mid fall.
The prime switches were switched on (possibly mistaken fro the fuel transfer switches). When the engines failed due to fuel starvation, they ran down immediately and without warning due to the prime pumps operating to remove any entrapped air in the fuel being supplied to the engines. The rotor speed decayed significantly faster than in simulated or practise autorotations.
Code:
the battery may not have been capable of carrying the system load so effectively all the lights went out in the cockpit.
SAS: When a police cab sucks fuel at base, it is recorded by the cops (a) on their fuel bowser gauge and (b) in the paperwork.
You can tell when you're up around the 400kg mark in an EC135 as you pull power - it feels sluggish and heavy!
Stashing fuel at ad hoc sites isn't necessary for city operators and for rural operators like myself (when we tried ad hoc sites of stashed fuel) they are more bother than the worth of it because of security issues and contamination issues. We ditched those ideas years ago. No police chopper is ever very far away from a proper refuelling depot.
I would go out on a limb here and say " a lot" of police pilots fly to the limits of their MLA simply because the job demands this. I cannot ever recall one incident where any single police helo landed on below minima's. Bottom line is, the cops are a canny lot and NEVER miss a trick (they have seen too much!) and if they EVER saw such an activity - they would raise hell! They would certainly make sure that pilot was suitably rebriefed by the chief pilot ASAP.
Hence my Q:
IF.....IF all appropriate captions were on AND audio alert......why did the TFO's NOT comment on it????
You can tell when you're up around the 400kg mark in an EC135 as you pull power - it feels sluggish and heavy!
Stashing fuel at ad hoc sites isn't necessary for city operators and for rural operators like myself (when we tried ad hoc sites of stashed fuel) they are more bother than the worth of it because of security issues and contamination issues. We ditched those ideas years ago. No police chopper is ever very far away from a proper refuelling depot.
I would go out on a limb here and say " a lot" of police pilots fly to the limits of their MLA simply because the job demands this. I cannot ever recall one incident where any single police helo landed on below minima's. Bottom line is, the cops are a canny lot and NEVER miss a trick (they have seen too much!) and if they EVER saw such an activity - they would raise hell! They would certainly make sure that pilot was suitably rebriefed by the chief pilot ASAP.
Hence my Q:
IF.....IF all appropriate captions were on AND audio alert......why did the TFO's NOT comment on it????
Skadi,
"Fortyodd2, Are You really sure about that? AFAIK the caption illuminates as soon as the pumps were switched off".
Yes I am sure - very sure. It's what happens every day when I carry out the Check A. I run each pump in turn, prime and transfer, looking for the captions, looking for the Amps indication and listening for the pump running. Once I've done that, I put the nav and boarding lights on and walk around the aircraft to ensure they are working and am back in the pilots seat about 30 seconds before the TX Pump captions come on.
SASless, you are preaching to the converted as far as the organisation having sufficient access to fuel - we are continually being told that "someone is working on it".
Did they really have 400Kgs on board? Well, we will never know for certain but we know that they had 76.4 afterwards and we know that they flew for 1:37 which at an average 3 per min gives 367.4 - so yes a "potential" deficit of 24 kgs. However, 3 per min is a planning figure only - a lot of hovering earlier in the sortie and 2 long legs at cruise power to factor in as well. As I've said many times before in this and the 135 thread, it is a system and you have to take notice of all components of that system. It is no good relying on the gauge when the warnings, captions, crew members, clock and the hairs on the back of your neck are screaming at you that all is not well.
As TC has already said, at police units it is the pilot and crew that do the refuel - we carry out a check each time to see that the amount of litres put in = the expected amount of Kgs seen on the display.
Rather than "was there somewhere else they could have gone for fuel" we should be asking "Why they stayed airborne to carry out another task instead of routing directly back to base after their journey to the East and back?"
"Fortyodd2, Are You really sure about that? AFAIK the caption illuminates as soon as the pumps were switched off".
Yes I am sure - very sure. It's what happens every day when I carry out the Check A. I run each pump in turn, prime and transfer, looking for the captions, looking for the Amps indication and listening for the pump running. Once I've done that, I put the nav and boarding lights on and walk around the aircraft to ensure they are working and am back in the pilots seat about 30 seconds before the TX Pump captions come on.
SASless, you are preaching to the converted as far as the organisation having sufficient access to fuel - we are continually being told that "someone is working on it".
Did they really have 400Kgs on board? Well, we will never know for certain but we know that they had 76.4 afterwards and we know that they flew for 1:37 which at an average 3 per min gives 367.4 - so yes a "potential" deficit of 24 kgs. However, 3 per min is a planning figure only - a lot of hovering earlier in the sortie and 2 long legs at cruise power to factor in as well. As I've said many times before in this and the 135 thread, it is a system and you have to take notice of all components of that system. It is no good relying on the gauge when the warnings, captions, crew members, clock and the hairs on the back of your neck are screaming at you that all is not well.
As TC has already said, at police units it is the pilot and crew that do the refuel - we carry out a check each time to see that the amount of litres put in = the expected amount of Kgs seen on the display.
Rather than "was there somewhere else they could have gone for fuel" we should be asking "Why they stayed airborne to carry out another task instead of routing directly back to base after their journey to the East and back?"
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Did the pilot die instantly, has this been established? What would the immediate actions be in this situation were the pilot still alive upon impact? I'm thinking about fuel pump switches etc. The report seems based upon the position of various switches, could these not have been thrown either immediately prior to impact or just after?
*Im not a RW pilot*
*Im not a RW pilot*
Quick reply.....the Prime switches should not have been on....the Transfer Switches should have been on but were not.
That combined with the fuel left in the Main Tank suggests the Transfer Switches were Switched Off inflight rather than an after landing action as you suggest.
I am sure the AAIB is working their way through all the possible scenario's.
That combined with the fuel left in the Main Tank suggests the Transfer Switches were Switched Off inflight rather than an after landing action as you suggest.
I am sure the AAIB is working their way through all the possible scenario's.
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ex-matelot
The impact forces were sufficient to ensure that no one would be conscious or at all likely to regain consciousness after the accident.
It is unlikely that any switches were operated after the second engine failed.
Would a fixed wing pilot take his hands from the controls to operate switches in the cockpit if the plane had stalled and was in a spin?
One's immediate instinct is to keep hands on with the flying controls and try to sort things out that way.
The impact forces were sufficient to ensure that no one would be conscious or at all likely to regain consciousness after the accident.
It is unlikely that any switches were operated after the second engine failed.
Would a fixed wing pilot take his hands from the controls to operate switches in the cockpit if the plane had stalled and was in a spin?
One's immediate instinct is to keep hands on with the flying controls and try to sort things out that way.
FO2, qte` ..or you have a leak`...-or you have a blockage..??
Assuming you have neither,then the next caption is `eng fail`..
In most other helos and fixed wing (1-4 engines) ,it is usual practice to turn on the `booster` for t/o,ldg,and other conditions requiring high power/high workload,and only turn them off when in a safe condition,power reduced/cruise/safe height; then,if there has been an EDP failure,it is not so dramatic an event.
So ,you are reliant upon the EDP to do all the work at all the critical points of t/o,hover/lo speed/app. and landing....
I know you`ll say `that`s the ECway,in the ACM,taught in G/school,extra wear,etc,but surely you must have thought about it....and if you have,have you challenged it..?
After all,EC say/imply the `transfer` pumps are automatic,so there should be no reason to turn off ,unless the main tank is really dry....If this is incorrect/for media , then it should be challenged robustly.
On operating the A/P ;on engagement of `height hold`,is there a `manoueuvre` button on the collective to allow for short term transient height changes /power
changes.? Same for height hold disengagement..? If the lever is moved down,against any friction,and then released, will the collective move up again to restore the original datum...? ie series actuators or series/parallel..?
Assuming you have neither,then the next caption is `eng fail`..
In most other helos and fixed wing (1-4 engines) ,it is usual practice to turn on the `booster` for t/o,ldg,and other conditions requiring high power/high workload,and only turn them off when in a safe condition,power reduced/cruise/safe height; then,if there has been an EDP failure,it is not so dramatic an event.
So ,you are reliant upon the EDP to do all the work at all the critical points of t/o,hover/lo speed/app. and landing....
I know you`ll say `that`s the ECway,in the ACM,taught in G/school,extra wear,etc,but surely you must have thought about it....and if you have,have you challenged it..?
After all,EC say/imply the `transfer` pumps are automatic,so there should be no reason to turn off ,unless the main tank is really dry....If this is incorrect/for media , then it should be challenged robustly.
On operating the A/P ;on engagement of `height hold`,is there a `manoueuvre` button on the collective to allow for short term transient height changes /power
changes.? Same for height hold disengagement..? If the lever is moved down,against any friction,and then released, will the collective move up again to restore the original datum...? ie series actuators or series/parallel..?
Sycamore,
"....or you have a blockage" - in which case the engine failing would have been the first symptom rather than a caption.
With regard to the Engine driven pumps, it's not the EC way, it is the Turbomeca way and, I believe that it's also the way that P&W do it on the "P" versions.
EC do not say or imply that the Tx Pumps are automatic.
The autopilot is a 3 axis one so there is no collective part to it - all "manoeuvres" are accomplished with the cyclic with the pilot adjusting the power. As for a "temporary" disconnect of the holds, this is achieved by the pilot moving the cyclic - once it's "let go of", the holds are once again engaged.
"....or you have a blockage" - in which case the engine failing would have been the first symptom rather than a caption.
With regard to the Engine driven pumps, it's not the EC way, it is the Turbomeca way and, I believe that it's also the way that P&W do it on the "P" versions.
EC do not say or imply that the Tx Pumps are automatic.
The autopilot is a 3 axis one so there is no collective part to it - all "manoeuvres" are accomplished with the cyclic with the pilot adjusting the power. As for a "temporary" disconnect of the holds, this is achieved by the pilot moving the cyclic - once it's "let go of", the holds are once again engaged.
FO2, thanks again,wasn`t sure if it was 3 or 4 axis..
AoF
It's an interesting and possibly important point that you made a few pages back about the TFOs. While this was a single pilot aircraft, three very experienced people were watching this happen and that makes very little sense to me.
I would also expect you to have been challenged quite robustly by most of the Observers/TFOs who were lucky enough to fly with you.
It's an interesting and possibly important point that you made a few pages back about the TFOs. While this was a single pilot aircraft, three very experienced people were watching this happen and that makes very little sense to me.
I would expect the front seat TFO to challenge me with every appearance of a caution or warning, particularly if I seemed to be doing nothing about it.
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While this was a single pilot aircraft, three very experienced people were watching this happen and that makes very little sense to me.
Only one of these three 'very experienced people' (were they?) was a pilot! TFOs can be keen and knowledgeable, but they aren't professional pilots. They don't HAVE to be keen and/or knowledgeable on aviation. (Do they pass tech exams on the EC135???) They just have to fulfil THEIR role!
If you want to make a case for 'many eyes', then you need a second pilot. I'm afraid it's that simple! Don't you dare try to fudge the issue.
Either accept you're happy with one pilot making all the aviation decisions and soaking up all the pressure, or provide a second! To pretend otherwise is unfair on the police officers on board!
That's not right!
Next you'll be expecting hosties to express opinions over engine failures in jetliners!
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Thank you for the earlier replies.
We've been here for 113 pages and I'd like to stick with this...
I understand this depends on many things including the attitude of the aircraft, but at what main tank fuel level do you start to see either transfer pump cavitate?
Or, at 76kg in the main tank would you already be seeing Transfer Pump Cautions?
We've been here for 113 pages and I'd like to stick with this...
I understand this depends on many things including the attitude of the aircraft, but at what main tank fuel level do you start to see either transfer pump cavitate?
Or, at 76kg in the main tank would you already be seeing Transfer Pump Cautions?
Purveyor of Egg Liqueur to Lucifer
Oh dear Tandem, you'll be telling us they are just passengers next 
I guess you're also thinking of the savings that can be made of both time and money in CRM training
I guess you're also thinking of the savings that can be made of both time and money in CRM training
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time of xfer pump switchoff
IF (big if) it is assumed that the supply tanks were full when the xfer pumps were turned off, is it fair to say, working backwards from 2222 that the xfer pumps were turned off around 2150? That would be about the time it was leaving Dalkeith?
Is it also correct to say that if your turn the xfer tanks off then you WILL run dry after around 30 minutes if you take no further action?
Is it also correct to say that if your turn the xfer tanks off then you WILL run dry after around 30 minutes if you take no further action?
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Just thinking out loud, what would the endurance be with just supply tanks feeding the engines? I.e. From full to engine out. Both Xfer pumps as we know we're off, what I'm thinking is if the accident time of 22:22 minus supply tank only endurance aligns with a key point, maybe transition from cruise to the first observation task or non urgent orbit task.
FS
Sorry Sky, was writing this whilst you posted!!
FS
Sorry Sky, was writing this whilst you posted!!
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Oh dear Tandem, you'll be telling us they are just passengers next
If you want a second pair of eyes on the flying sh1t, employ a second pilot. Otherwise accept that one person soaks up all the pressure!
One or the other!
Even hosties aren't passengers. They even do CRM! EVERYBODY knows that don't they??
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 17th Feb 2014 at 23:49.
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where would you aim for?
Difficult to picture the scene presented to the pilot of Glasgow, from say 400' above the Holiday Inn late on a Friday evening but if you needed to get down immediately in a handful of seconds, where would you go for? The bridge over the river, the river itself or the largish Clyde St/Gorbals St junction outside the Clutha?
Leaving aside the details of any mishandling of the fuel and fuel system, the reasons for which I doubt we can ever know without full data and voice recording (don't hold your breath) I think the final trajectory of the flight begins to make more sense in the light of the recent report.
The first thing that struck me was the Nr warning described as "intermittent". That surely is significant. An intermittent Nr warning suggests Nr alternating just above and just below the min limit (whatever that is). It does not seem to indicate a single failure to reduce collective, ie a failure to establish an autorotation. It is far more characteristic of someone milking the Nr for range to the limit.
Further, if one assumes that control was lost (not, I think, an unreasonable assumption) the only significant parameters affecting the subsequent trajectory are drag vs. gravity in the vertical and the previous heading in the lateral.
From this I suggest that the final track of the helo is that which the pilot set up/was left with when control as lost.
From the data in the AAIB report it would seem that they'd just crossed a park/were just crossing a park on a roughly westerly track and closing on the river which to my mind would offer the only realistic landing space available. If at 1000' as radar suggests over the park or just before it a jink left then tight to make the river might well be too ambitious as well as ending up in fairly a fairly congested part of the Clyde, bridge wise. However stretching the glide straight ahead to aim between the bridge by the Clutha bar and the pedestrian footbridge some way beyond would look much more feasible. The trajectory the aircraft took would offer a good shortest track onto the river, but if the range was just too much and the NR couldn't last their resting place is a logical place to end up.
Odd noises as reported. heaven knows what a helo sounds like becoming chronically overpitched in flight. I don't doubt it is odd, even to the public. As the overpitching would be likely to occur in this (hypothetical) scenario later in the event rather than earlier as desperation set in it would account for the relative integrity of the airframe as opposed to a freefall from 1000ft which would surely result in total destruction.
I thus suggest an auto entered acceptably, a decision that max range technique should make the longer stretch of river beyond the Clutha bar and a decision not to 180 into the park or jink into the river to the left with close set bridges, a later realisation that they were falling short, milking Nr to stretch and eventually in desperation slipping below the 85% range Nr to the non recoverable figure of - what is it - 83%? and losing it.
Even so, I doubt we'll ever know. Of much more concern are the anomalies with fuel quantity, warnings and the configuration of the fuel pumps which we've repeatedly been told simply couldn't have happened, yet clearly did. That would seem to suggest Human Factors as the focus, as ever.
If this accident doesn't bring in mandatory data recording I'll be very surprised.
The first thing that struck me was the Nr warning described as "intermittent". That surely is significant. An intermittent Nr warning suggests Nr alternating just above and just below the min limit (whatever that is). It does not seem to indicate a single failure to reduce collective, ie a failure to establish an autorotation. It is far more characteristic of someone milking the Nr for range to the limit.
Further, if one assumes that control was lost (not, I think, an unreasonable assumption) the only significant parameters affecting the subsequent trajectory are drag vs. gravity in the vertical and the previous heading in the lateral.
From this I suggest that the final track of the helo is that which the pilot set up/was left with when control as lost.
From the data in the AAIB report it would seem that they'd just crossed a park/were just crossing a park on a roughly westerly track and closing on the river which to my mind would offer the only realistic landing space available. If at 1000' as radar suggests over the park or just before it a jink left then tight to make the river might well be too ambitious as well as ending up in fairly a fairly congested part of the Clyde, bridge wise. However stretching the glide straight ahead to aim between the bridge by the Clutha bar and the pedestrian footbridge some way beyond would look much more feasible. The trajectory the aircraft took would offer a good shortest track onto the river, but if the range was just too much and the NR couldn't last their resting place is a logical place to end up.
Odd noises as reported. heaven knows what a helo sounds like becoming chronically overpitched in flight. I don't doubt it is odd, even to the public. As the overpitching would be likely to occur in this (hypothetical) scenario later in the event rather than earlier as desperation set in it would account for the relative integrity of the airframe as opposed to a freefall from 1000ft which would surely result in total destruction.
I thus suggest an auto entered acceptably, a decision that max range technique should make the longer stretch of river beyond the Clutha bar and a decision not to 180 into the park or jink into the river to the left with close set bridges, a later realisation that they were falling short, milking Nr to stretch and eventually in desperation slipping below the 85% range Nr to the non recoverable figure of - what is it - 83%? and losing it.
Even so, I doubt we'll ever know. Of much more concern are the anomalies with fuel quantity, warnings and the configuration of the fuel pumps which we've repeatedly been told simply couldn't have happened, yet clearly did. That would seem to suggest Human Factors as the focus, as ever.
If this accident doesn't bring in mandatory data recording I'll be very surprised.