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Old 24th Sep 2013, 13:32
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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Hmmm, have u been at the rugby with me silsoe? I get better at all three as the night wears on as well...
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 13:44
  #22 (permalink)  
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Why is texting a even being discussed here?

Let's back up and consider a few things......

The Nimrod did not check the fuel.
The Nimrod did not catch on to the low fuel state until he had departed.
The Nimrod called the Ops Center and hid the seriousness of the situation.
The Nimrod took off knowing he had scant fuel to make it to the fuel point.
The Nimrod ran out of fuel, was unable to do a EOL.
The Nimrod KILLED himself and three other People.

You Nimrods are talking about texting!

You should be talking about all of the factors that led to four dead.

Wake up and smell the coffee folks.....is this the limit of your abilities to analyze information and decide what is important?

We had an incident a few months back that involved a fatality in downtown London that involved Texting and lots of bad decision making just as this accident pointed out as well.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 13:58
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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The Nimrod was taken out of service a few years ago.

People can talk about what they like. Don't get grumpy just because you get out of bed and see that a thread that you've started hasn't turned out the way you wanted.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 14:26
  #24 (permalink)  
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Don't you find it a bit odd....that after a guy kills his passengers and destroys an aircraft because he with malice aforethought runs it out of fuel and fails to carry out an EOL....that the focus of discussion is on Texting?

We saw a similar reaction to the 109 fatal crash in London a few months back.

What I see is generation of young folks that let their Thumbs do their thinking for them.

Yes it is early....but with a good cuppa in my hand....life is rosy.

As you well know.....to be called a Nimrod is not flattering....especially if earned.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 15:09
  #25 (permalink)  

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Don't you find it a bit odd....that after a guy kills his passengers and destroys an aircraft because he with malice aforethought runs it out of fuel and fails to carry out an EOL....that the focus of discussion is on Texting?
Not really, don't just give us a link to the report, have the decency to read it yourself and you'll realise straight away why there's this focus on texting.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 18:51
  #26 (permalink)  
 
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There are many distractions out there. I flew over a moose the the other day and watched it run for a few seconds, was that a distraction? Yep. Potentially fatal? Perhaps in the wrong situation. Fortunately I did not disregard my priorities (like checking for wires) to watch the thing. Texting can be a disctraction as can giving tours, looking something up in an AFD, giving a news cast, a screaming patient, some of the beaches we fly over and innumerable other things. As a professional pilot you have to know to first take care if the priorities, then if the situation permits. allow yourself to undertake a task such as texting, looking something up in an AFD, giving a tour, giving a newscast, etc.

Frankly, if a saw a guy loose his priorities, chatting with his girlfriend etc. I'd be upset.

But I've sent and recieved such texts as just leaving SMF ETA 1800. In cruse flight with the priorities taken care of there is nothing wrong with it.
If a pilot doesnt have enough maturity to know the difference he ought not to be flying, or driving for that matter.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 19:07
  #27 (permalink)  

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Has anyone else actually read the report?
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 19:35
  #28 (permalink)  
 
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We are talking about texting because while it may not be THE cause of this particular crash it is being cited as a contributory factor and it's a factor which has not been sufficiently addressed within the [helicopter] community.

Everything is relative. If you're flying in a remote location with no control zones and minimal work loads and want to send a three word text (as 500guy suggested) then the text debate most likely seems mute. But change some of those factors and you can quickly arrive at a more convincing argument with regard to the wisdom of texting while flying.

I can see how texts can be convenient but I also see that using existing mobile technology, keying in words manually, and becoming engrossed in texting for up to a minute or more is, in the wrong set of circumstances, a potential risk.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 21:08
  #29 (permalink)  
 
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Having read the report i can only think that the pilot had much too much on his mind and should not have been working that day.

It is very difficult, however, to make the call and say: " I have some issues and don't feel I should work today."

A tragic combination of events took place here.

Food for thought for us all.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 21:20
  #30 (permalink)  
 
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I think we all agree, it's just how we are expressing it that is different.

I was focusing on texting as there were two posts, #2 & 9 I think that specifically asked why we should be allowed to txt, and shouldn't it be banned.

But I 100% agree with you Sasless! it is simply not prioritizing that is causing the problem. Short of fuel, simple problem, simple solution, land the damn helicopter!

500 and Grenvill, I agree with you guys as well! obviously I'm not quite young enough! I don't think I've ever spent a minute sending a txt, if it's going to take me that long! I'll ring the guy as there are going to be more questions! more texts.....
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 21:37
  #31 (permalink)  
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If you cannot take care of what can only be considered one of the most basic tasks ever taught a Pilot.....checking the Fuel Quantity....especially after being told to do so.....everything else is just noise.

How was this Nimrod allowed to get to where he was?

What kind of system allows such utter incompetence to exist?

How did the Med Crew not tweak to something being wrong with this guy long before the day of the accident even?

I hope there is a good reason why the Training Crew did not fuel the aircraft at the end of their flight?

Why there was not an SOP in place at the Base to ensure the aircraft was prepared for service 24/7 unless certain defined events had occurred also seems missing.

If a Pilot cannot be trusted to check the fuel quantity.....what does that tell us about the Pilot, Base, Operator, Customer and FAA?

Sorry folks.....there are no excuses or alibi's for what happened.

The Guy was a Killer.....the only thing missing was the Gun, Knife, Axe or Chain Saw.....he used a Helicopter instead.
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Old 24th Sep 2013, 22:37
  #32 (permalink)  

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How did the Med Crew not tweak to something being wrong with this guy long before the day of the accident even?

I hope there is a good reason why the Training Crew did not fuel the aircraft at the end of their flight?

Why there was not an SOP in place at the Base to ensure the aircraft was prepared for service 24/7 unless certain defined events had occurred also seems missing.
SASless, in answer to your questions, the report says,

"When the mechanic arrived, he encountered the accident pilot, whom he described in a post accident interview as being in a normal mood, chipper, and ready to go. About 0730, the departing flight nurse encountered the accident pilot and described him as his normal, boisterous self. "

"The last NVG training flight in the helicopter was completed about 0300 on August 26, 2011. The Air Methods instructor who was providing the training reported that he did not have the helicopter refueled after the last flight because the EMS pilot on duty needed to determine the amount of fuel required when the helicopter was returned to EMS service."

"Regarding the accident helicopter, the night shift pilot reported that the NVG training had been completed, the helicopter needed to be reconfigured for medical work by the mechanic, and the helicopter was low on fuel and needed to be refueled before it was used....
...The helicopter mechanic arrived about 0700 and began to reconfigure the accident helicopter for EMS work ... "



Of course having read the report that you linked for us, you'd know all this .... wouldn't you
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Old 25th Sep 2013, 14:00
  #33 (permalink)  
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If you like, I'll post a link to the NTSB documents genereated

during their investigation. The links in this accident chain go back a very long way.

My opinion is that the texting issue is a simplistic novelty that is an expression, a symptom, of an actual underlying cause- distraction.
My recollection is that the duty pilot being relieved that morning reminded the accident pilot that the accident aircraft did not have usual mission SOP fuel state. But, it was not the assigned aircraft at that point, so the information was not acted on while fresh. Another aircraft was used until ater in the day, when the crew changed aircraft, moving onto the accident aircraft without bringing it up to what I understand is the typical SOP fuel level at the base. Incidentally, that typical SOP fuel load is approximate amount reported on the first leg. At that point, I suspect the pilot was aware that the aircraft had less than half the fuel planned and reported, and "The wishing, and hoping, and dreaming, and praying" started. It's possible that the pilot thought there was fuel at an airport near the transferring facility (15 or so minutes away), but no discussion mentioning that delay or possibility is documented. My recollection is that the pilot had previously been assigned that base, and might have been aware of that possible fuel source... Facilities directories don't clarify that availability.
The patient transfer flight was initiated after a comparatively brief interval, meaning that the relatively new HEMS pilot might have departed before the issues were addressed by anybody. Yes, texting was an indicator of where the pilot's attention was being diverted from the immediate hazard, but the flight plan filed admitted that the legal fuel reserve requirement did not exist.
The caution panel was set for night light levels and the low fuel segment may not have been visible when it illuminated.
Every issue existing is covered by some company document or another that duty pilots routinely sign to indicate compliance.
The pistol is loaded, aimed, cocked, and finger on the trigger...

Full down autorotations are exceptional at present. Autorotational descents are timidly entered in fixed training scenarios, in which the engine is producing significant thrust. There is a world of difference between the training scenarios typical and a complete power loss at cruise airspeed. Training that tippy-toes around at training airspeed and altitudes trains pilots to the wrong immediate actions in the real world. I can't recall the last "power chop" in cruise...

Last edited by Devil 49; 25th Sep 2013 at 14:11.
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Old 25th Sep 2013, 14:19
  #34 (permalink)  
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Devil,

If the guy had to sign off on Shift Change Forms that he had checked the fuel....and changed aircraft later in the day.....does that not require yet another round of box ticking after the action is performed?
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Old 25th Sep 2013, 15:42
  #35 (permalink)  

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If the guy had to sign off on Shift Change Forms that he had checked the fuel....and changed aircraft later in the day.....does that not require yet another round of box ticking after the action is performed?
SASless, why do you continue to ask questions that are answered in the report that you linked to in post #1, instead of stating what was found?

"Company procedures required that the pilot perform a preflight inspection of the helicopter, which included checking the fuel quantity, before it was returned to service. The mechanic did not know whether the pilot performed a preflight inspection of the helicopter before departing on the accident trip. Examination of the helicopter’s daily flight log revealed that the pilot did not sign it as required by the GOM to indicate that he had completed the preflight inspection. The pilot also did not take fuel samples from the helicopter on the day of the accident as required by the GOM. Further, three “conform your aircraft” (CYA) entries dated August 26, 2011, were made by the mechanic in the helicopter’s maintenance logbook, but the pilot did not initial the CYA entries as required by the GOM."
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Old 25th Sep 2013, 15:49
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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It’s pretty obvious that the guy had his head so far up his own arse he couldsee what he had for lunch that day.

Humans make mistakes, and I'll give him the first few as human errors, butwhen he made the decision to continue to his destination knowing he would bewell below min fuel that was not a mistake, that was a conscious andunforgivable violation of law and policy that killed him and the whole crew. Unfortunatelyhe took the other poor souls along for the ride.

The texting itself is a symptom of his mental state and ambivalence, andwhile it may be a contributing factor it is certainly not by any means thecause or even a cause of the accident.
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Old 25th Sep 2013, 16:08
  #37 (permalink)  
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No, but the signed brief specifically includes fuel

One signs a form documenting preflight inspection specific to each aircraft flown, although it's heavily oriented towards maintenance status. The preflight checklist does not include fuel quantity.
The company requires a risk assessment matrix prior to each flight that includes fuel aboard vs required minimum. A statement of fuel aboard duration and planned ETE are required in company flight plan. The accident pilot discussed the fuel situation with flight following prior to departure on the final leg, admitting that his initial estimate was incorrect. Then, the last plan filed included a self admitted violation of regulation and policy in that it does not abide by the required minimum reserve, and still proved incorrect in calculating fuel aboard duration and duration.
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Old 25th Sep 2013, 16:26
  #38 (permalink)  

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Pretty blunt summing up 500. IMHO the texting has to be considered to be a major contributing cause, especially during the period identified when the preflights & prep were being carried out as well as in flight. Maybe not the actual physical act of texting, but the effect that the text conversations must have been having on the individual throughout the day.

"His wife was pregnant with their first child, his father had recently undergone cardiac surgery, and he had recently moved to a new city but was still commuting to his old base in St. Joseph. In addition, on the day of the accident, he was making social plans to meet his coworker for dinner after his work shift."

A text may take a second or 2 to read, but then you have to assess and react to it depending on it's subject matter. If the message is, 'Dinner is ribs tonight and it's on me', no worries ... If it's, 'Dad's feeling a bit weak and gone to bed early', it puts the mind into a different frame.

All of the company's flight crew were CRM trained and current, yet right from the very start, the cheese slices can be seen to line up.
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Old 25th Sep 2013, 16:50
  #39 (permalink)  

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Is anyone reading the report?

Devil
One signs a form documenting preflight inspection specific to each aircraft flown, although it's heavily oriented towards maintenance status. The preflight checklist does not include fuel quantity.
"Company procedures for performing a preflight inspection required the pilot to confirm that there was an adequate quantity of fuel on board by turning on the helicopter’s master electrical switch and observing the fuel quantity gauge."

"The pilot’s second missed opportunity was immediately before the flight to Harrison County Community Hospital began when he should have completed the before-takeoff confirmation checklist, which included checking the fuel quantity. 24"

24 The Air Methods GOM, page B-7/R-5/01-15-11, states, “A before start/before takeoff confirmation checklist will be provided and affixed to each instrument panel in plain view of the pilot. The confirmation checklist will include essential items that will be confirmed by the pilot before each start and takeoff. Prior to start and liftoff each pilot will verbally challenge him or herself and respond verbally to each item on the confirmation checklist to ensure that each item is complete.”
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