Land the Damn Helicopter!
Is this a normal collection of tall tales from 2000 hours in the charter world?
Precautionary landings experienced from the back seat shooting aerials.
Last incident was four years ago, touch wood.
Police ride along mission, AS355 elevated temp in something or other, immediate land in field at night and go home. (crack in exhaust found)
Media mission, AS355 oil indication problem, shut down one engine increase speed do a few orbits and figure out if we can continue to film, then return to base.
Media mission AS355 tail rotor chip light, travel and land near lunch, check chip, eat chips, and take off again. (repeat 2 more times in next 24 hours) Tail rotor gearbox replaced following day.
Media mission, R44, loud bang followed by smoke filling cockpit, immediate landing in long grass. (landing light blew)
Survey mission, AS350 failed electric fuel pump, travel and land close to the pie shop, eject passengers then fly back to base.
Media Ride along, Sea King, immediate landing due to reduction in control as well as vibration apparently due to foreign body standing on wheel strut.
One unplanned landing mid mission due to deteriorating weather.
One curtailed mission when pilot "had enough" after 6 hours of busy shot gathering/flying.
Scores of landings off field to clean the lens. Usually briefed in advance as to where landings can or cant occur.
Flights that were on the edge or marginal
In the '90s, SAR, dramatic reconstruction of night rescue over coastal cliff, strong winds driving rain, poor visibility, pilot described conditions as atrocious.
Media Mission, R44 in worst weather conditions experienced on Irish coast in years. Local SAR had cancelled training missions and critisised producer for flying.
Media Mission AS355, shooting presenter with dialogue on boat off Belgium coast in nil wind calm seas and fog. White out in one direction coast visible in the other. (pilot described as most nerve wracking and difficult flying he had ever done)
Media mission Bell 206, 5 pob, doors off, standing on skid shooting two presenters in rear, high and a little slow, 1.5 spins. Carry-on with a little more speed.
Media mission BO 105 almost hit trees on take off due to being overloaded, mission continued.
Media mission AS355 loud bang heard whilst over a bay, aircraft handling normally, continue mission, later fully examined by engineers, nothing found.
Media mission, AS350 persistent thin smoke/haze in cockpit, no sign of flames so continue with mission. 2 liters of oil found in rear bellypan a day later.
Media mission AS355 landed with very low fuel remaining at foreign domestic airport after primary and secondary airfields found to be closed.
Precautionary landings experienced from the back seat shooting aerials.
Last incident was four years ago, touch wood.
Police ride along mission, AS355 elevated temp in something or other, immediate land in field at night and go home. (crack in exhaust found)
Media mission, AS355 oil indication problem, shut down one engine increase speed do a few orbits and figure out if we can continue to film, then return to base.
Media mission AS355 tail rotor chip light, travel and land near lunch, check chip, eat chips, and take off again. (repeat 2 more times in next 24 hours) Tail rotor gearbox replaced following day.
Media mission, R44, loud bang followed by smoke filling cockpit, immediate landing in long grass. (landing light blew)
Survey mission, AS350 failed electric fuel pump, travel and land close to the pie shop, eject passengers then fly back to base.
Media Ride along, Sea King, immediate landing due to reduction in control as well as vibration apparently due to foreign body standing on wheel strut.
One unplanned landing mid mission due to deteriorating weather.
One curtailed mission when pilot "had enough" after 6 hours of busy shot gathering/flying.
Scores of landings off field to clean the lens. Usually briefed in advance as to where landings can or cant occur.
Flights that were on the edge or marginal
In the '90s, SAR, dramatic reconstruction of night rescue over coastal cliff, strong winds driving rain, poor visibility, pilot described conditions as atrocious.
Media Mission, R44 in worst weather conditions experienced on Irish coast in years. Local SAR had cancelled training missions and critisised producer for flying.
Media Mission AS355, shooting presenter with dialogue on boat off Belgium coast in nil wind calm seas and fog. White out in one direction coast visible in the other. (pilot described as most nerve wracking and difficult flying he had ever done)
Media mission Bell 206, 5 pob, doors off, standing on skid shooting two presenters in rear, high and a little slow, 1.5 spins. Carry-on with a little more speed.
Media mission BO 105 almost hit trees on take off due to being overloaded, mission continued.
Media mission AS355 loud bang heard whilst over a bay, aircraft handling normally, continue mission, later fully examined by engineers, nothing found.
Media mission, AS350 persistent thin smoke/haze in cockpit, no sign of flames so continue with mission. 2 liters of oil found in rear bellypan a day later.
Media mission AS355 landed with very low fuel remaining at foreign domestic airport after primary and secondary airfields found to be closed.
Last edited by mickjoebill; 8th Aug 2013 at 03:44.
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A lot of them could very easy end as a statistic!
I slowly realise why insurance is so high for helicopters.
Some people need to ged rid of the "I need this job done - whatever it takes" attitude.
All you* need is to bring all back safely!
Even military pilots cancel SAR missions when there is something wrong with the helicopter (OEI for example).
Do you* really think your job is more important than someones (yours, the PX and someone you might hit on the ground) life?
*I do not mean someone specific when I write you!
Question: How do flightschools handle this? Do they teach students anything about it? (risk management or whatever you want to call it) My school and after that my company had regular days where accidents and incidents were presented and discussed. Most of them covered this topic. Pilots pushing to far!
I slowly realise why insurance is so high for helicopters.
Some people need to ged rid of the "I need this job done - whatever it takes" attitude.
All you* need is to bring all back safely!
Even military pilots cancel SAR missions when there is something wrong with the helicopter (OEI for example).
Do you* really think your job is more important than someones (yours, the PX and someone you might hit on the ground) life?
*I do not mean someone specific when I write you!
Question: How do flightschools handle this? Do they teach students anything about it? (risk management or whatever you want to call it) My school and after that my company had regular days where accidents and incidents were presented and discussed. Most of them covered this topic. Pilots pushing to far!
Last edited by Stallion85; 4th Aug 2013 at 04:36. Reason: missed word
Question: How do flightschools handle this? Do teach students anything about it? (risk management or whatever you want to call it) My school and after that my company had regular days where accidents and incidents were presented and discussed. Most of them covered this topic. Pilots pushing to far!
An old thread about it: CPL Human Factors & TEM has some more links.
GAPAN Australia have a TEM training package available, sponsored by CASA.SafeSkies had a presentation in 2011.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
It also comes down to a fundamental lack of imagination and curiosity in some cases. If you can't imagine how a CWS caption or some other indication of a problem can become a smoking hole in the ground (with you in the middle of it) in 30 seconds or less, you probably shouldn't be flying. That very old adage about helicopter pilots looking old and worried because "if something hasn't gone wrong, it's about to" will keep you alive.
As for the "illegal landing" conundrum, again if you don't have the intellectual capacity to make the correct decision between selecting a potentially life saving course of action (landing), or having a legal dialogue over your choice of landing site, you should turn in your license now, or at least the captaincy part.
As for the "illegal landing" conundrum, again if you don't have the intellectual capacity to make the correct decision between selecting a potentially life saving course of action (landing), or having a legal dialogue over your choice of landing site, you should turn in your license now, or at least the captaincy part.
If you can't imagine how a CWS caption or some other indication of a problem can become a smoking hole in the ground (with you in the middle of it) in 30 seconds or less, you probably shouldn't be flying.
.
A real pilot :
http://www.dailyrecord.com/article/2...nclick_check=1
And what the authorities think of it :
"The pilot simply made the responsible decision to touch down until the rain let up, according to police, who said firefigthers and police responded as a precuation."
.
A real pilot :
http://www.dailyrecord.com/article/2...nclick_check=1
And what the authorities think of it :
"The pilot simply made the responsible decision to touch down until the rain let up, according to police, who said firefigthers and police responded as a precuation."
.
Last edited by HeliHenri; 5th Aug 2013 at 13:24.
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Avoid imitations
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Name one Warning Caption that meets the 30 second Criteria you just set forth!
Shy,
We are not talking about "worrying" here.....this was the statement I took issue with.
Hit the Stop Watch and count off 30 Seconds.....can you point out exactly which CWS Panel Segment Light you would classify as such a Situation?
We are not talking about "worrying" here.....this was the statement I took issue with.
If you can't imagine how a CWS caption or some other indication of a problem can become a smoking hole in the ground (with you in the middle of it) in 30 seconds or less, you probably shouldn't be flying.
Hit the Stop Watch and count off 30 Seconds.....can you point out exactly which CWS Panel Segment Light you would classify as such a Situation?
Last edited by SASless; 7th Aug 2013 at 22:54.
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That was possibly a bit of an over dramatic statement but "Rotor Brake ON" on a S-76 with an electric rotor brake might do it for you.
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Knowing when to put the aircraft on the ground in a given situation comes under the realm of 'risk management'. One of the problems faced in a situation is that without knowing the real risks, the pilot is not able to properly evaluate different courses of actions or outcomes. The pilot tends to revert to their training when faced with an in flight dilemma, so if they have not been taught what to do, they have nothing to call on. Training schools need to spend more time teaching 'blogs' how to manage risk. It is risk misperception and not high risk tolerance that is associated with exposure to hazardous aviation events. In other words " the pilot does not go out there with the intention of killing themselves and their passengers". "Keep the RPM in the green"
I rode with some exceptions to that concept.....as they intentionally tried to commit suicide and murder all at the same time. They did not realize what it was they were doing....but the result would have been the same.
Training cannot teach Judgement.
It is the lack of judgement that kills more pilot than the lack of training.
Training can instill bad Monkey Memory as well as good Monkey Memory.
One can read a checklist.....but you do not need a Checklist to "Think".
Reason and Judgement can overcome lack of training.....especially if the problem does not find itself neatly listed in the Checklist or Training Syllabus.
I have seen the Rote Memory......Follow the Checklist....comply with Company SOP mindset kill folks in the Simulator (Thankfully....it was only the Sim).
Training cannot teach Judgement.
It is the lack of judgement that kills more pilot than the lack of training.
Training can instill bad Monkey Memory as well as good Monkey Memory.
One can read a checklist.....but you do not need a Checklist to "Think".
Reason and Judgement can overcome lack of training.....especially if the problem does not find itself neatly listed in the Checklist or Training Syllabus.
I have seen the Rote Memory......Follow the Checklist....comply with Company SOP mindset kill folks in the Simulator (Thankfully....it was only the Sim).
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I am not talking about 'check lists' I am talking about ' risk management'. Get blogs involved in the flight decisions, pre, during and post. Put them into situations where they need to evaluate the situation, fly them into deteriorating weather, get them to react fully to a caution light by flying the aircraft to the ground. There are plenty of situations you can give blogs (safely) that will allow them to build some basic judgmental/decision making skills. At the moment we tend to send them out without anything. Keep the RPM in the green.
How does One "manage" something One does not "control"?
Last edited by SASless; 8th Aug 2013 at 15:11.
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interesting thread here guys.
after experiencing my first (and only, so far) autorotation landing i am sure that this is an option that most pilots use as a last resort. am i wrong on this?
i am not a pilot but i did stay at a holiday inn last night.
sorry...i am not a pilot but i do build robinsons for a living here in torrance and there is nothing but extreme care and multiple oversight that goes into every single part that makes up your R22, R44 or R66.
things can and do still go wrong but, in most cases, you guys still have an option that most fixed wing pilots don't.
gotta go with the "land the dang thing" attitude.
walk away and "grab a pint" sounds good to me. easier on the families on the ground, too.
happy flying guys.
after experiencing my first (and only, so far) autorotation landing i am sure that this is an option that most pilots use as a last resort. am i wrong on this?
i am not a pilot but i did stay at a holiday inn last night.
sorry...i am not a pilot but i do build robinsons for a living here in torrance and there is nothing but extreme care and multiple oversight that goes into every single part that makes up your R22, R44 or R66.
things can and do still go wrong but, in most cases, you guys still have an option that most fixed wing pilots don't.
gotta go with the "land the dang thing" attitude.
walk away and "grab a pint" sounds good to me. easier on the families on the ground, too.
happy flying guys.
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Let me add my welcome to rhcemployee.
You must catch-up with one of our members "Vertical Freedom" as he is a keen Robinson fan and would love to know more about your experience building Robinsons and in particular about the "extreme care and multiple oversight that goes into every single part that makes up your R22, R44 or R66" -
I assume you mean a practice autorotation? To answer your question, it is a technique primarily used in response to an engine failure in single-engine helicopters but is also used to address other emergencies including engine overspeed (governor failure), some occasions of tail rotor failure and other technical failures, such as engine fire, in which disengaging the engine would be appropriate.
Regarding landing in response to weather and technical problems, as opposed to pushing on, I'm glad to see several common sense responses.
New pilots, and a few not so new, please remember some of the wise remarks made in recent posts. If weather or technical issues are closing in on you, reducing your options or exerting unacceptable pressure on you - LAND!
You must catch-up with one of our members "Vertical Freedom" as he is a keen Robinson fan and would love to know more about your experience building Robinsons and in particular about the "extreme care and multiple oversight that goes into every single part that makes up your R22, R44 or R66" -
after experiencing my first (and only, so far) autorotation landing i am sure that this is an option that most pilots use as a last resort.
Regarding landing in response to weather and technical problems, as opposed to pushing on, I'm glad to see several common sense responses.
New pilots, and a few not so new, please remember some of the wise remarks made in recent posts. If weather or technical issues are closing in on you, reducing your options or exerting unacceptable pressure on you - LAND!
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Anthony, you have raised a topic very close to my heart; autorotation.
You listed some of the reasons a helicopter pilot would autorotate, they are all associated with an emergency. Therefore it is understandable that autorotations are associated with very scary things happening and therefore create very high heart rates when conducting them. We only teach autorotations as a reaction to an emergency and in my mined this is wrong.
Autorotation is a normal phase of flight, it is a method used to reduce height quickly for reasons other than emergency. Therefore if we taught autorotation as a normal phase of flight, then said to blogs; look we can also use autorotation in an emergency, would this not change the helicopter pilots perception of autorotation? In other words it would not be associated with 'I'm about to die'
but just putting the helicopter in another normal phase of flight.
Apart from what I have just said about autorotation being a normal phase of flight, Can I just point out that you do not autorotate in the event of a governor failure, or in the event of an overspeed, or at any time other than as stated in the POH. These are not emergency s that require that sort of reaction.
One of the major causes of accidents is the pilot over reacting to benign indications in the cockpit.
Keep you RPM in the green.
You listed some of the reasons a helicopter pilot would autorotate, they are all associated with an emergency. Therefore it is understandable that autorotations are associated with very scary things happening and therefore create very high heart rates when conducting them. We only teach autorotations as a reaction to an emergency and in my mined this is wrong.
Autorotation is a normal phase of flight, it is a method used to reduce height quickly for reasons other than emergency. Therefore if we taught autorotation as a normal phase of flight, then said to blogs; look we can also use autorotation in an emergency, would this not change the helicopter pilots perception of autorotation? In other words it would not be associated with 'I'm about to die'
but just putting the helicopter in another normal phase of flight.
Apart from what I have just said about autorotation being a normal phase of flight, Can I just point out that you do not autorotate in the event of a governor failure, or in the event of an overspeed, or at any time other than as stated in the POH. These are not emergency s that require that sort of reaction.
One of the major causes of accidents is the pilot over reacting to benign indications in the cockpit.
Keep you RPM in the green.