North Sea heli ditching: Oct 2012
That sounds all very sensible and one would therefore invite comment as to why 1) EC do not advocate such a process for all and 2) why its not adopted as industry standard
As far as I am aware none of the OEMs require HUMS download on every return to base, and the legislation is a political compromise, requiring HUMS download only every 25 hrs.
Of course many of the turnrounds conducted at base are rotors running. On the L2, rotors running HUMS download is not possible. That was to be carried over to the EC225 and it was only when Bristow, as the launch oil and gas customer, made a big fuss and demanded the ability to rotors run download, and paid for it, did it become available on the EC225.
So in answer to your question, yes the download of HUMS on every return to base should be mandated by the OEM and by industry standard. That it is not is a sad reflection of just how seriously it is taken by the politicians and accountants! Although it has to be said that a conscientious operator should be doing it anyway, regardless of its legal obligations.
HC - I don't doubt any of it... although strange isn't it.
Wonder how many shafts they going to have to save to get back the price of one complete EC225.. and that is CHC. The industry has lost more, Eurocopter much much more, and all for saving a few hours in tech.
Doesn't anyone ever stick their hand up and say, this is stupid? Clearly not.
Wonder how many shafts they going to have to save to get back the price of one complete EC225.. and that is CHC. The industry has lost more, Eurocopter much much more, and all for saving a few hours in tech.
Doesn't anyone ever stick their hand up and say, this is stupid? Clearly not.
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Any thoughts on what impact this will have on the new EC175? Loss of brand confidence? or perhaps boost in sales as people choose it as an alternative to the 225? On thing for sure is that EC will hopefully be paying special attention to preventing anything similarly embarrassing happening to their new product whether through extra stress testing of MGB's, avoiding manufacturing processes that might be cutting corners now speculated as possible contributors, or a change in the thoroughness of their testing regime (EMLUB). Hopefully some good can be forced out of this B*lls up.
So in helicopter deathmatch, which one would win in 'Tiger' Vs 'Hangar Door'?
Or to put it another way, Hangar door defo.
See, if we were not so obsessed with safety we would have just flown it, but as it is, we have had to buy some more rolls of blade tape to patch it up...
Last edited by HeliComparator; 15th Nov 2012 at 19:01.
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When the remanufactured shaft is brought online, I definitely think it a good idea that safety obsessed Bristow and HC do all the test flying, somewhere between 300 and 2000hrs should be fine - ta.
I wonder if the helicopter safety steering group that meet today have grasped the concept that if you are collecting data to monitor a situation its only of any use if its downloaded and looked at.....
Although according to this:-
http://www.oilc.org/hssg_may_newsletter_-_g-red.pdf
Eurocopter issued specific instructions to analyse data after every return to the hangar, not exceeding 5 flight hours. Yet G-CHCN's data from the first 2 sectors of that day covered 3hours and 50mins of flight and yet it was on a 3rd flight due to cover 226 miles. So how was that ever going have had its data looked at every 5 hours??
Although according to this:-
http://www.oilc.org/hssg_may_newsletter_-_g-red.pdf
Eurocopter issued specific instructions to analyse data after every return to the hangar, not exceeding 5 flight hours. Yet G-CHCN's data from the first 2 sectors of that day covered 3hours and 50mins of flight and yet it was on a 3rd flight due to cover 226 miles. So how was that ever going have had its data looked at every 5 hours??
Last edited by Pittsextra; 15th Nov 2012 at 20:28.
Pitts, again not being intimately familiar with particulars on this airframe, does the notice establish clear "Go-No Go" criteria?
Can it?
Can it?
Pitts, I think the chronology was such that the notice you refer to was issued shortly after the ditching, and it was some time later that EC decided that the problem only affected a limited number of shafts, thenceforth the statement about HUMS downloads / durations ceased to apply to non-affected shafts. Of course, as we now know, this was a mistake!
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Puma helicopter model involved in ditching 'grounded until February' | Aberdeen & North | News | STV
This is on STVs website today, nothing we dont know but its now been published by them with interview
This is on STVs website today, nothing we dont know but its now been published by them with interview
The model of Super Puma helicopter which was forced to ditch into the North Sea last month is not expected to fly again until February.
A problem in the aircraft's gearbox caused the CHC-owned helicopter to ditch while carrying an oil crew from Aberdeen to a rig 86 miles north-west of Shetland when it ditched at around 3.30pm on October 22.
The 17 passengers and two crew were taken off their liferaft by a rescue craft launched from the Nord Nightingale vessel, which was close to the scene.
A report by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) found that a problem with the main gearbox lubrication system caused the pilots to take action.
Manufacturers Eurocopter said safety is its number one priority and the company apologised for the disruption caused to the oil industry.
The latest ditching, which involved and EC225 Super Puma, was the fourth serious helicopter incident in three years.
In May, all 14 passengers and crew members on a Super Puma helicopter were rescued after it ditched about 30 miles off the coast of Aberdeen. It was on a scheduled flight from Aberdeen Airport to a platform in the North Sea.
On April 1 2009, 16 people died when a Super Puma plunged into the sea off the Aberdeenshire coast. The gearbox of the Bond-operated helicopter failed while returning from the BP Miller platform.
The tragedy happened about six weeks after another Bond Super Puma with 18 people on board ditched in the North Sea as it approached a production platform owned by BP. Everyone survived the incident.
A problem in the aircraft's gearbox caused the CHC-owned helicopter to ditch while carrying an oil crew from Aberdeen to a rig 86 miles north-west of Shetland when it ditched at around 3.30pm on October 22.
The 17 passengers and two crew were taken off their liferaft by a rescue craft launched from the Nord Nightingale vessel, which was close to the scene.
A report by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) found that a problem with the main gearbox lubrication system caused the pilots to take action.
Manufacturers Eurocopter said safety is its number one priority and the company apologised for the disruption caused to the oil industry.
The latest ditching, which involved and EC225 Super Puma, was the fourth serious helicopter incident in three years.
In May, all 14 passengers and crew members on a Super Puma helicopter were rescued after it ditched about 30 miles off the coast of Aberdeen. It was on a scheduled flight from Aberdeen Airport to a platform in the North Sea.
On April 1 2009, 16 people died when a Super Puma plunged into the sea off the Aberdeenshire coast. The gearbox of the Bond-operated helicopter failed while returning from the BP Miller platform.
The tragedy happened about six weeks after another Bond Super Puma with 18 people on board ditched in the North Sea as it approached a production platform owned by BP. Everyone survived the incident.
Lone/HC - look at the data.
The helicopter steering newsletter is dated May 2012 in response to G-REDW. You can read it for yourself on the newsletter but it says effectively (and I assume it mirrors advice from the EC service bulletin 45-001??) that EC225 data needs to be downloaded on return to the hangar and in any event not more than 5 hours flight time.
So when G-CHCN shunts on a 200+nm flight having already flown 3hours and 50 minutes how was that ever going to have been done?
The helicopter steering newsletter is dated May 2012 in response to G-REDW. You can read it for yourself on the newsletter but it says effectively (and I assume it mirrors advice from the EC service bulletin 45-001??) that EC225 data needs to be downloaded on return to the hangar and in any event not more than 5 hours flight time.
So when G-CHCN shunts on a 200+nm flight having already flown 3hours and 50 minutes how was that ever going to have been done?
Lone :-
I believe it does. The newsletter of May 2012 specifically talks of the new thresholds (which would be the RED threshold alarms introduced after G-REDW). It says if these are pinged then you need to contact EC to get clarity to enable the flight.
In the AAIB report of the CHC October crash the data that was available had someone plugged in is very clear that at least a call to EC would have had to have been made.
not being intimately familiar with particulars on this airframe, does the notice establish clear "Go-No Go" criteria?
In the AAIB report of the CHC October crash the data that was available had someone plugged in is very clear that at least a call to EC would have had to have been made.
Pitts, CHC were not doing it because the requirement to download at least every 5 hours was only applicable to those aircraft fitted with the 'suspect' shafts. None of those aircraft remained at Aberdeen, so there was no requirement under AD 2012-0115E to continue such monitoring. Bristow and Bond elected to continue with downloading after every flight, CHC appear to have reverted to the old regime, which still remained in accordance with EC's maintenance regulations. Had CHC continued with downloading after every flight then it is almost certain that the incident would not have happened, but they were not required to do so, as the inital problem that beset G-REDW problem had been fixed......
Last edited by PlasticCabDriver; 16th Nov 2012 at 10:35.
Here is an extract from AD 2012-0225-E. It appears to answer the questions from your last and previous posts (I think! Your questions are less than precise).
In May 2012, an EC 225 LP helicopter carried out an emergency ditching in the North Sea after warning indication of MGB loss of oil pressure and subsequent additional red alarm on the MGB emergency lubrication system.
A full circumferential crack of the lower vertical shaft of the MGB bevel gear occurred in the area where the two sections of the shaft are welded together. As a result, the vertical shaft ceased to drive the main and backup oil pumps, leading to warning indications of the loss of the MGB main and standby oil lubrication systems. The crew activated the MGB emergency lubrication system and, following a subsequent warning indicating failure of that system, performed a controlled ditching into the sea.
Results from the investigation of the failed shaft revealed that the crack had initiated from an oxidation pit found in the chamfer of the vertical shaft welding stop hole. This bore hole is fitted with a plastic plug under which the corrosion became trapped into a confined area of the hole chamfer whose shape had been previously modified by a production change in the manufacturing process of the MGB bevel gear. A thorough review of the production files identified the S/Ns of vertical shafts manufactured after the production change as a batch of potentially affected parts.
Although the corroded vertical shaft failed after a low number of accumulated flight hours, the investigation showed that failure could not be precluded at any specific value of accumulated flight hours, therefore the crack could have initiated at low MGB torque levels. This is the reason why AS 332 models might be affected in the same way as EC 225 helicopters.
The investigation also determined that, prior to the flight during which the helicopter ditched, the Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM) system installed on the helicopter had identified a rising trend in certain monitoring parameters associated with the MGB oil pump drive system.
To address the unsafe condition of MGB bevel gear vertical shaft failure, EASA issued Emergency AD 2012-0115-E, which superseded previously issued EASA AD 2012-0107, EASA AD 2012-0104 and EASA Emergency AD 2012-0087-E.
EASA AD 2012-0115-E applied to all AS 332 and EC 225 helicopters equipped with potentially affected shafts, identified by S/N. The AD required for those helicopters, when equipped with a serviceable VHM system and flying over water in either Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or at night, to download and review some VHM data at different intervals, depending on helicopters models. For helicopters without VHM, or with an unserviceable VHM system, the AD imposed a restriction, to limit flight over water operation to day visual flight rules (Day VFR) only.
Since that AD was issued, a report was received following the ditching in the North Sea of another EC 225 LP helicopter. The helicopter ditched under the same warning circumstances as it occurred for the instance in May 2012, i.e. indication of MGB loss of oil pressure and subsequent red alarm on the MGB emergency lubrication system activated by the crew.
The affected helicopter was equipped with a MGB bevel gear vertical shaft with a S/N outside the identified batch of potentially affected parts and was therefore not subject to the VHM monitoring required by EASA AD 2012-0115-E. While the investigation is still at an early stage, the cause of this new ditching seems to result from the failure of that vertical shaft. Additionally, the analysis of the data recorded by the VHM system of the helicopter, prior to the flight during which it ditched, also showed some VHM rising trends.
For the reasons described above and pending further results from the investigation, this new AD retains the requirements of AD 2012-0115E, which is superseded, extends its Applicability to all vertical shafts, regardless of S/N, reduces the time intervals for downloading and reviewing the VHM data and requires this for any flight over water. Furthermore, for helicopters without a VHM system installed, and helicopters with an unserviceable VHM, this AD prohibits flight over water.
A full circumferential crack of the lower vertical shaft of the MGB bevel gear occurred in the area where the two sections of the shaft are welded together. As a result, the vertical shaft ceased to drive the main and backup oil pumps, leading to warning indications of the loss of the MGB main and standby oil lubrication systems. The crew activated the MGB emergency lubrication system and, following a subsequent warning indicating failure of that system, performed a controlled ditching into the sea.
Results from the investigation of the failed shaft revealed that the crack had initiated from an oxidation pit found in the chamfer of the vertical shaft welding stop hole. This bore hole is fitted with a plastic plug under which the corrosion became trapped into a confined area of the hole chamfer whose shape had been previously modified by a production change in the manufacturing process of the MGB bevel gear. A thorough review of the production files identified the S/Ns of vertical shafts manufactured after the production change as a batch of potentially affected parts.
Although the corroded vertical shaft failed after a low number of accumulated flight hours, the investigation showed that failure could not be precluded at any specific value of accumulated flight hours, therefore the crack could have initiated at low MGB torque levels. This is the reason why AS 332 models might be affected in the same way as EC 225 helicopters.
The investigation also determined that, prior to the flight during which the helicopter ditched, the Vibration Health Monitoring (VHM) system installed on the helicopter had identified a rising trend in certain monitoring parameters associated with the MGB oil pump drive system.
To address the unsafe condition of MGB bevel gear vertical shaft failure, EASA issued Emergency AD 2012-0115-E, which superseded previously issued EASA AD 2012-0107, EASA AD 2012-0104 and EASA Emergency AD 2012-0087-E.
EASA AD 2012-0115-E applied to all AS 332 and EC 225 helicopters equipped with potentially affected shafts, identified by S/N. The AD required for those helicopters, when equipped with a serviceable VHM system and flying over water in either Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or at night, to download and review some VHM data at different intervals, depending on helicopters models. For helicopters without VHM, or with an unserviceable VHM system, the AD imposed a restriction, to limit flight over water operation to day visual flight rules (Day VFR) only.
Since that AD was issued, a report was received following the ditching in the North Sea of another EC 225 LP helicopter. The helicopter ditched under the same warning circumstances as it occurred for the instance in May 2012, i.e. indication of MGB loss of oil pressure and subsequent red alarm on the MGB emergency lubrication system activated by the crew.
The affected helicopter was equipped with a MGB bevel gear vertical shaft with a S/N outside the identified batch of potentially affected parts and was therefore not subject to the VHM monitoring required by EASA AD 2012-0115-E. While the investigation is still at an early stage, the cause of this new ditching seems to result from the failure of that vertical shaft. Additionally, the analysis of the data recorded by the VHM system of the helicopter, prior to the flight during which it ditched, also showed some VHM rising trends.
For the reasons described above and pending further results from the investigation, this new AD retains the requirements of AD 2012-0115E, which is superseded, extends its Applicability to all vertical shafts, regardless of S/N, reduces the time intervals for downloading and reviewing the VHM data and requires this for any flight over water. Furthermore, for helicopters without a VHM system installed, and helicopters with an unserviceable VHM, this AD prohibits flight over water.
Last edited by JimL; 16th Nov 2012 at 08:06.
It's interesting (depressing!) how thoughtless and parochial these ADs have been. Because the events happened over water, it is over water flight that has been targeted. But would you rather have to ditch on a nice day in N Sea, or be faced with a Land Immedately when flying IMC over mountainous terrain with cloud on the surface? Oh, that seems to be OK according to the AD!
HC,
I find it completely unsurprising that such decisions are made; one only has to examine the structure of EASA to see that there is no Operations Division or Operational Policy unit - as there are in other Authorities.
The decisions made in this AD are analogous to those that were made in the ARRIEL 2 AD - which excluded twin-engine helicopters from the requirement to implement TU166.
Jim
I find it completely unsurprising that such decisions are made; one only has to examine the structure of EASA to see that there is no Operations Division or Operational Policy unit - as there are in other Authorities.
The decisions made in this AD are analogous to those that were made in the ARRIEL 2 AD - which excluded twin-engine helicopters from the requirement to implement TU166.
Jim