Helicopter EMS Operations At Night In Questionable Weather
Thread Starter
Helicopter EMS Operations At Night In Questionable Weather
I ran across this today....refers to an IIMC event in Idaho. The Crew encountered IMC weather at night, climbed to altitude, filed IFR, and returned home safely.
Sounds like a simple straight forward deal does't it?
As I read the report....a question came to me.
Why did the Debrief lead to a decision to review Emergency Procedures....and no referral to Weather Analysis and Preflight Planning?
Sounds like a simple straight forward deal does't it?
As I read the report....a question came to me.
Why did the Debrief lead to a decision to review Emergency Procedures....and no referral to Weather Analysis and Preflight Planning?
Date: March 13, 2012
Weather: Night, Intermittent Rain, Snow
Team: Pilot, Nurse, Paramedic. No injuries reported. No patient.
Description:
The night of March 13, 2012, the aircraft was responding to a
request for an interhospital transfer for which conditions at both
destination and Boise were VMC. En route, they skirted intermittent
squalls. Approximately half way to their destination, they observed a
wall of unreported IMC and made the decision to abort the flight and
return to Boise. On return, they encountered IMC that had developed
behind them. Rather than land at night in uncertain terrain, the pilot
made the decision to initiate a climb to 10,000 feet, file and execute
an IFR approach to Boise. The aircraft is single pilot IFR rated, and
the pilot is IFR current.
Additional Info:
The crew debriefed immediately following the flight. In addition
program leadership and the operator conducted an in-depth debriefing.
Based upon this flight, a review of in-flight emergency procedures for
all team members is being conducted.
Weather: Night, Intermittent Rain, Snow
Team: Pilot, Nurse, Paramedic. No injuries reported. No patient.
Description:
The night of March 13, 2012, the aircraft was responding to a
request for an interhospital transfer for which conditions at both
destination and Boise were VMC. En route, they skirted intermittent
squalls. Approximately half way to their destination, they observed a
wall of unreported IMC and made the decision to abort the flight and
return to Boise. On return, they encountered IMC that had developed
behind them. Rather than land at night in uncertain terrain, the pilot
made the decision to initiate a climb to 10,000 feet, file and execute
an IFR approach to Boise. The aircraft is single pilot IFR rated, and
the pilot is IFR current.
Additional Info:
The crew debriefed immediately following the flight. In addition
program leadership and the operator conducted an in-depth debriefing.
Based upon this flight, a review of in-flight emergency procedures for
all team members is being conducted.
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If this had been the usual combination of Bell 206 and VFR rated pilot we would have been reading the latest US HEMS NVFR fatal accident report. Seems to me that the only review needed is one of questionable met interpretation for safe NVFR flight. Other than that the pilot appears to have exercised the sensible IFR option that was open for a safe return to base.
It seems like a straightforward correct decision on behalf of the pilot; he had the right equipment, the right judgement and the right skills.
I do not understand the reason for having to debrief the mission at all, and where is the report coming from, perhaps a certain web site ran by medical prima donnas?
I do not understand the reason for having to debrief the mission at all, and where is the report coming from, perhaps a certain web site ran by medical prima donnas?
Avoid imitations
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Epiphany and Tottigol, my thoughts echo yours.
There was a bad weather contingency plan, which worked safely.
If it was the first time it had happened on the unit, then no doubt it was worth a debrief, but surely it's nothing to get too excited about.
The problem comes when there is no IFR backup.
There was a bad weather contingency plan, which worked safely.
If it was the first time it had happened on the unit, then no doubt it was worth a debrief, but surely it's nothing to get too excited about.
The problem comes when there is no IFR backup.
Thread Starter
Every flight should have a debrief.....and that is a standard policy amongst most EMS Operations.
IIMC is an emergency.....no matter the outcome.
As has been noted.....Icing...and we might remember Mountains, large very dark places with big hills, forests...lakes and mountains.
The report noted the debrief lead to a review/discussion of Emergency Procedures....did something prompt that to happen as a result of something happening during the flight?
As I like prevention over cures.....I would have been asking myself how I got into that predicament after I got back to my Tea Cup!
IIMC is an emergency.....no matter the outcome.
As has been noted.....Icing...and we might remember Mountains, large very dark places with big hills, forests...lakes and mountains.
The report noted the debrief lead to a review/discussion of Emergency Procedures....did something prompt that to happen as a result of something happening during the flight?
As I like prevention over cures.....I would have been asking myself how I got into that predicament after I got back to my Tea Cup!
Avoid imitations
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The report noted the debrief lead to a review/discussion of Emergency Procedures....did something prompt that to happen as a result of something happening during the flight?
As long as pilots are required to launch into marginal conditions, especially by night, this sort of thing is always a possibility. As this crew do appear to have been equipped and prepared for IMC, they were well placed to deal with it.
Or was there more to it?
SAS and I flew for the same program (although not at the same time), and we exchanged our opinions (which are on the same level regarding EMS).
What I was trying to get to, regards the needs for the pilots to justify EVERY single decision they take to other non qualified passengers.
What I was trying to get to, regards the needs for the pilots to justify EVERY single decision they take to other non qualified passengers.
Thread Starter
Tott and I agree on that facet of EMS particularly. Some programs the Pilot is like a rag between two Pit Bull Dawgs....getting pulled and chewed on from opposite directions.
I see the Debrief as a means of identifying what went right, what went less than right...and what was down right wrong about the Flight and the performance of the crew, aircraft, ATC, ground units, Unit Protocols and everything else that factors into improving the operation.
It should not be a bitch session, a "Gotcha Time" or anything other than an objective review of the evolution to see if improvements can be made.
Pilots should be able to defend their decisions just as the Med Crew and support staff should be able to do as well.
At the Operation Tott and I were at....that was not necessarily the case due to some "Personalities" on the Med Crew side of the house. Pilots were on a revolving door at that place....as anyone with any experience or skill that did not get on the "A Team" way of doing business soon got the shift. We had one guy who had been an FAA Inspector and was retired from the Government who got the heave ho.
When I left, the Helicopter Operator's Base Manager left as well....me by choice and him by management decision for a change.
I see the Debrief as a means of identifying what went right, what went less than right...and what was down right wrong about the Flight and the performance of the crew, aircraft, ATC, ground units, Unit Protocols and everything else that factors into improving the operation.
It should not be a bitch session, a "Gotcha Time" or anything other than an objective review of the evolution to see if improvements can be made.
Pilots should be able to defend their decisions just as the Med Crew and support staff should be able to do as well.
At the Operation Tott and I were at....that was not necessarily the case due to some "Personalities" on the Med Crew side of the house. Pilots were on a revolving door at that place....as anyone with any experience or skill that did not get on the "A Team" way of doing business soon got the shift. We had one guy who had been an FAA Inspector and was retired from the Government who got the heave ho.
When I left, the Helicopter Operator's Base Manager left as well....me by choice and him by management decision for a change.
