S76 crash Myanmar
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Secondary Drowning?
Regarding the “drowning” confusion after “rescue”, an areato consider may be secondary-drowning?
The report identifies that lifejackets worked, but this maybe specific to the inflation component only. Another important part is thespray-hood which is pulled over the face to prevent saltwater inhalation. Ifthese were not fitted, or couldn’t be deployed on the lifejackets used, thehour in the water until rescue could have been significant with regard to "drowning"?
The report identifies that lifejackets worked, but this maybe specific to the inflation component only. Another important part is thespray-hood which is pulled over the face to prevent saltwater inhalation. Ifthese were not fitted, or couldn’t be deployed on the lifejackets used, thehour in the water until rescue could have been significant with regard to "drowning"?
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The accident report, in the Conclusions/Causes section, states that “the take-off procedure in performance class 2 with exposure time (in all take-off/landing conditions) does not guarantee a safe emergency forced landing.” Mars points out that it appears a fly-away could have been achieved if a PC1 take-off procedure had been followed.
There is another thread called PC1 Operations Offshore that was active for a brief period during September and October. That thread included some discussion about PC1, PC2, and PC2e. The accident report mentions PC1, but it wasn’t used? It seems like the requirement to operate PC1, PC2, or PC2e has been somewhat fluid over the past several years. During that time period the PC2d (Defined Limited Exposure) concept was introduced. On the PC1 Operations Offshore thread I asked if anyone had heard any more about PC2d, but there was no response. Anyone know what the current law of the land is regarding offshore operations?
There is another thread called PC1 Operations Offshore that was active for a brief period during September and October. That thread included some discussion about PC1, PC2, and PC2e. The accident report mentions PC1, but it wasn’t used? It seems like the requirement to operate PC1, PC2, or PC2e has been somewhat fluid over the past several years. During that time period the PC2d (Defined Limited Exposure) concept was introduced. On the PC1 Operations Offshore thread I asked if anyone had heard any more about PC2d, but there was no response. Anyone know what the current law of the land is regarding offshore operations?
Thread Starter
Depends on the "land". PC2 is standard. Contrary to the authors of the report, a safe forced landing is expected on water. Witness the unfortunate EC225. Most customers want some kind of exposure mitigations, like HUMS, track-record reliability of engines, maybe training. Some thinking that limiting the exposure may sell, hence the PC2de concept with exposure from 0 to 9 seconds- pick your payload and take your chances. Much easier to sell PC1 in the North Sea with constant wind, low temperatures, than in the tropics with zero wind, hot, and a PC1 payload of pingpong balls. This takeoff had the potential of a zero exposure, but the pilot elected otherwise possibly for the reasons tha PC1 is very difficult offshore - obstructions, shifting wind, consideration for skill of copilot, etc.
Last edited by malabo; 15th Nov 2012 at 02:44.
PC2 DLE is a smoke screen put up by the OEMs to somehow make industry feel better about being continually sold under powered helicopters by the very same OEMs. The regulators and the oil and gas industry should get together to make PC1 mandatory by 2015 where it can be achieved while maintaining some operational payload viability and by 2020 globally.
New engine technology with proper "super contingency" ratings, even if it resulted in the rejection of the good engine after returning to base, would be a great improvement on today's old engines with a bolted on FADEC being "sold" as new.
New engine technology with proper "super contingency" ratings, even if it resulted in the rejection of the good engine after returning to base, would be a great improvement on today's old engines with a bolted on FADEC being "sold" as new.
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Before this degenerates into a bun fight we need to scotch the notion that this is a call for PC1 offshore. The PC2e thread has covered that in extensive detail and explained why it just isn't possible. The reference is to the CAT A Helideck profile and not operating in PC1 (yes there is a difference).
In another thread there has been a reference to risk assessment and 'necessary risk' as opposed to 'un-necessary risk'. We often discuss these issues in analogy but rarely do we have a chance to examine case histories. It would appear that we are now provided with an opportunity.
Risk Assessment 1 - EASA and FAA:
The turbine burst problem on the ARRIEL 2 has been know for some time and, in 2010 EASA issued an AD calling for the implementation of modification TU166. The FAA followed with their own AD in 2011. The mindset of the airworthiness autorities is summed up by the decision to apply the AD only to SE helicopters in spite of the phenomena being seen in twins:
Clearly, EASA and the FAA had conducted a risk assessment which led to the conclusion that there was no urgency with twins because they could sustain an engine-failure without incident. That would imply that there is a false assumption among Authorities that twins always operate in PC1 - this despite the fact that:
(a) the FAA have no requirement other than a soft rule in Part 29 which prohibits flight into the HV diagram (which therefore requires the helicopter to apply CAT A procedures) thus ignoring operations in the GOM; and
(b) EASA has provisions for the Approval of operations with Exposure.
There is clear a lack of understanding that these twins are primarily used for offshore operations in which exposure is accepted. Coincidentally, EASA replaced this AD with another in April 2012 which has required all ARRIEL twins to be modified by today.
Risk Assessment 2 - the Operator:
As was previously stated, the Operator must have been aware of the issue with respect to ARRIEL 2 engines; they could have either implemented the modification (which had been available for several years) or restricted their operations, with helicopters that had ARRIEL engines fitted, to PC2e (Sikorsky had provided these). At the very least, they might have put out a training directive that all pilots were to be made aware of the issue and that the PC2e Helideck procedure were to be part of the OPC. In addition, there should have been a pilot education programme on minimising exposure - as was required in ACJ-2 to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.517 sections 4 and 5:
Risk Assessment 3 - the Pilot:
As this has already been set out in a previous post, there is no need to repeat facts surrounding the decision that was made - it was a matter of a simple risk assessment and aeronautical decision making. However, it is accepted, as has been hinted at by 'Peter' and 'Malabo', that the crewing might have had an impact on decisions made. If that is the case, then the Operator has to examine what might have to be done to ameliorate this issue so that operations can be conducted to an acceptable level in the future.
So there we have it; three major holes in the Swiss cheese - and all related to Human Factors.
Mars
In another thread there has been a reference to risk assessment and 'necessary risk' as opposed to 'un-necessary risk'. We often discuss these issues in analogy but rarely do we have a chance to examine case histories. It would appear that we are now provided with an opportunity.
Risk Assessment 1 - EASA and FAA:
The turbine burst problem on the ARRIEL 2 has been know for some time and, in 2010 EASA issued an AD calling for the implementation of modification TU166. The FAA followed with their own AD in 2011. The mindset of the airworthiness autorities is summed up by the decision to apply the AD only to SE helicopters in spite of the phenomena being seen in twins:
Several cases of Gas Generator (GG) Turbine Blade rupture occurred in service on ARRIEL 2 twin engine applications and recently one on a single engine helicopter. For the case occurring in flight on a single engine helicopter (ARRIEL 2B1 engine), the pilot performed an emergency autorotation, landing the helicopter without further incident.
(a) the FAA have no requirement other than a soft rule in Part 29 which prohibits flight into the HV diagram (which therefore requires the helicopter to apply CAT A procedures) thus ignoring operations in the GOM; and
(b) EASA has provisions for the Approval of operations with Exposure.
There is clear a lack of understanding that these twins are primarily used for offshore operations in which exposure is accepted. Coincidentally, EASA replaced this AD with another in April 2012 which has required all ARRIEL twins to be modified by today.
Risk Assessment 2 - the Operator:
As was previously stated, the Operator must have been aware of the issue with respect to ARRIEL 2 engines; they could have either implemented the modification (which had been available for several years) or restricted their operations, with helicopters that had ARRIEL engines fitted, to PC2e (Sikorsky had provided these). At the very least, they might have put out a training directive that all pilots were to be made aware of the issue and that the PC2e Helideck procedure were to be part of the OPC. In addition, there should have been a pilot education programme on minimising exposure - as was required in ACJ-2 to Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 3.517 sections 4 and 5:
4. Include take-off and landing procedures in the operations manual, where they do not already exist in the Helicopter Flight Manual.
5. Establish training for flight crew which should include the discussion, demonstration, use and practice of the techniques necessary to minimise the risks;
5. Establish training for flight crew which should include the discussion, demonstration, use and practice of the techniques necessary to minimise the risks;
As this has already been set out in a previous post, there is no need to repeat facts surrounding the decision that was made - it was a matter of a simple risk assessment and aeronautical decision making. However, it is accepted, as has been hinted at by 'Peter' and 'Malabo', that the crewing might have had an impact on decisions made. If that is the case, then the Operator has to examine what might have to be done to ameliorate this issue so that operations can be conducted to an acceptable level in the future.
So there we have it; three major holes in the Swiss cheese - and all related to Human Factors.
Mars
PC2 DLE is a smoke screen put up by the OEMs to somehow make industry feel better about being continually sold under powered helicopters by the very same OEMs.
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The PC determines what happens after an engine fails in terms of obstacle clearance, etc.
PC1 includes a guarantee that if an engine fails at any stage of the flight you can either land or carry on under control without damaging anything inside or outside the aircraft. The problem is that the standard also includes the size of the landing site, the weather and even the data provided by the manufacturer, not just the engines.
PC2 is a hybrid of PC3 which morphs into PC1 when the pilot judges that enough speed has been gained to comply with the standard. This is where the exposure time comes in. However, to provide maximum protection, machines operating under PC2 must be certified in the Category A airworthiness standard.
So does this mean that, if you are sitting on a rig in a PC2 machine (i.e. the 212) and you have enough of a headwind to stop you having to dive for the sea if an engine quits, that you are automatically PC1? No, because the guarantee isn't there.
Phil
PC1 includes a guarantee that if an engine fails at any stage of the flight you can either land or carry on under control without damaging anything inside or outside the aircraft. The problem is that the standard also includes the size of the landing site, the weather and even the data provided by the manufacturer, not just the engines.
PC2 is a hybrid of PC3 which morphs into PC1 when the pilot judges that enough speed has been gained to comply with the standard. This is where the exposure time comes in. However, to provide maximum protection, machines operating under PC2 must be certified in the Category A airworthiness standard.
So does this mean that, if you are sitting on a rig in a PC2 machine (i.e. the 212) and you have enough of a headwind to stop you having to dive for the sea if an engine quits, that you are automatically PC1? No, because the guarantee isn't there.
Phil
Last edited by paco; 17th Nov 2012 at 03:25.
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Performance = $$$$
This whole PC issue could be boiled down to a simple equation based on Mass Management.
At one end of the spectrum we see those who operators that mandate Cat A WAT use offshore. They believe, often mistakenly, that this is the silver bullet. They believe that Cat A will deliver 100% safe ops but as has been inferred already, the offshore environment if full of trips and traps that make using the WAT weights a good step in the right direction but in those cases where the turbulence, turbine exhausts and obstructions make even the WAT Mass too much to manage safely it will be necessary to limit the Mass further. In mature markets where this is understood there is a voluntary code (called the IVLL or Installation & Vessel Landing Limitations) that provide decrements to the WAT Mass according to defined circumstances. This removes from the market place the temptation for one operator to take on a task that another has refused on safety grounds related to mass management.
At the other end of the spectrum we see markets distorted by oil companies that are so focussed on the payload that they even encourage operators to strip their aircraft of vital equipment in order to maximise payload, they expect a 12 seat helicopter to carry 12 pax at any time of day or night in any conditions all year round. Needless to say the Transport Managers in these organisations could not even spell Cat A let alone understand it.
Clearly there is a lot to do to educate the market but in very simple terms if I was given a magic wand and invited to change one thing in our world I would make it impossible for a helicopter to take off above the Cat A WAT Mass.
G.
At one end of the spectrum we see those who operators that mandate Cat A WAT use offshore. They believe, often mistakenly, that this is the silver bullet. They believe that Cat A will deliver 100% safe ops but as has been inferred already, the offshore environment if full of trips and traps that make using the WAT weights a good step in the right direction but in those cases where the turbulence, turbine exhausts and obstructions make even the WAT Mass too much to manage safely it will be necessary to limit the Mass further. In mature markets where this is understood there is a voluntary code (called the IVLL or Installation & Vessel Landing Limitations) that provide decrements to the WAT Mass according to defined circumstances. This removes from the market place the temptation for one operator to take on a task that another has refused on safety grounds related to mass management.
At the other end of the spectrum we see markets distorted by oil companies that are so focussed on the payload that they even encourage operators to strip their aircraft of vital equipment in order to maximise payload, they expect a 12 seat helicopter to carry 12 pax at any time of day or night in any conditions all year round. Needless to say the Transport Managers in these organisations could not even spell Cat A let alone understand it.
Clearly there is a lot to do to educate the market but in very simple terms if I was given a magic wand and invited to change one thing in our world I would make it impossible for a helicopter to take off above the Cat A WAT Mass.
G.
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"they expect a 12 seat helicopter to carry 12 pax at any time of day or night in any conditions all year round. Needless to say the Transport Managers in these organisations could not even spell Cat A let alone understand it."
Ain't that the truth.
Phil
Ain't that the truth.
Phil
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Thanks for the clarification PACO!!
hmmm doesn't that sound just like the executive/corporate flying... What a small world! 
they expect a 12 seat helicopter to carry 12 pax at any time of day or night in any conditions all year round.
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Soave -
Why stop there, in the world of Private ownership it has been known for the 12 seat helicopter to be in 8 seat configuration and STILL carry 12 pax - (13 actually, there was one in the co pilot's seat).
Fortunately there was no one counting when they disembarked at Battersea, and no, it wasn't me chief.
I believe they were operating within the WAT though - it was a short flight and a few kids.
G.
Fortunately there was no one counting when they disembarked at Battersea, and no, it wasn't me chief.
I believe they were operating within the WAT though - it was a short flight and a few kids.
G.
Just a slight correction to PACO's commentary: an aircraft is certificated in Category A or B (or in some cases both); it operates in Performance Class 1, 2 or 3 in accordance with the Operational Requirements of the State (if they have them).
There is no such thing as a Performance Class 2 helicopter!
From ICAO:
The subdivisions of PC2 are all about what is permitted to happen when the engine fails "early during the take-off manoeuvre or late in the landing manoeuvre".
However, this is a diversion from the thread which is, in my humble opinion, about the potential consequences when risk assessment is not performed to a professional standard.
Jim
There is no such thing as a Performance Class 2 helicopter!
From ICAO:
Operations in performance Class 2. Operations with performance such that, in the event of critical engine failure, performance is available to enable the helicopter to safely continue the flight to an appropriate landing area, except when the failure occurs early during the take-off manoeuvre or late in the landing manoeuvre, in which cases a forced landing may be required.
However, this is a diversion from the thread which is, in my humble opinion, about the potential consequences when risk assessment is not performed to a professional standard.
Jim
Last edited by JimL; 17th Nov 2012 at 07:17. Reason: Correcting the text in inverted commas.
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Why stop there, in the world of Private ownership it has been known for the 12 seat helicopter to be in 8 seat configuration and STILL carry 12 pax - (13 actually, there was one in the co pilot's seat).
