Bell 412 crash near Escravos? (July 2004)
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Bell 412 crash near Escravos? (July 2004)
Back in July of 2004, a Bell 412EP operated by Pan African Airways crashed off the coast of Escravos. This was a medivac flight from an offshore oil rig with 4 pob (one American and three Nigerians) -- apparently en route to Port Harcourt. Has anyone heard what happened? Thanks in advance.
Last edited by Yoshi 51; 15th Jul 2008 at 19:02. Reason: Misleading title and incorrect date
that crash
Some floating wreckage was recovered.
The rest is somewhere on the bottom in about a thousand feet of water.
A sub-surface search was attempted....and on the first try a One Million Dollar ROV was lost.
To my knowledge....no formal report was published.
Perhaps some one in Houston (Bristow/Air Log/OLOG) can catch us up to date.
The rest is somewhere on the bottom in about a thousand feet of water.
A sub-surface search was attempted....and on the first try a One Million Dollar ROV was lost.
To my knowledge....no formal report was published.
Perhaps some one in Houston (Bristow/Air Log/OLOG) can catch us up to date.
Join Date: Apr 2008
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Agree with Alouette
Please, next time you post stuff like this put the date in the "title" line. You just scared the s..t out of me
We are just coming up to the 4th anniversary.
Unfortunately since nothing was found in the many thousands of feet of water, any report is going to be pure speculation anyway based on a piece of tail rotor with traces of door paint and a door with traces of tail rotor paint, one body (friend of injured person) with severe water impact injuries but no signs of injury consistent with wearing a seatbelt and a separate uninflated lifejacket. CVR & FDR pingers were never located.
What is not pure speculation is that this was another unfortunate occurrence of dubious Oil Company Medevac Dispatch Policy and GOM Pilot "press-on-itis" being dragged into Nigerian Airspace.
The weather in PH on the 24th had been incredibly rainy and was inevitably going to be followed by typical tree fog during the period of darkness as the temperature fell to meet the dew point. This happened just after midnight!
It was highly unlikely that the aircraft would make it back to PH before mid morning the next day.
The crew launched at about 2300 that evening without calling PAAN Management for guidance.
The crew elected not to stop at Funiwa for fuel on the leg to the Sedco Energy and were reliant from that point onwards on fuel from the Sedco rig to make it back to anywhere dry!
The fuel installation on the Energy crapped out after only 400lbs had been delivered. The crew in their zeal to get the injured person to shore elected to then go to Funiwa Platform with barely one way fuel on board to that location.
Nothing more was heard from 5N - BDZ.
There were many many occasions available to "Break the Chain" of events and delay the flight until daybreak on the 25th, starting pre launch on the 24th right up to launch from the Sedco Energy.
As stated, we can only speculate as to what event - mechanical or Human factors was the cause - BUT - whatever it was, it had would have been almost certainly less traumatic occurring in daylight rather than in the middle of a black night 80 NM from shore.
The injured man had crushed a couple of fingers and his life only came under threat when he boarded that Helicopter.
The use of the 412 for such a flight followed on from the prior procedure of postioning a worn out Bristow 212 from Warri to Escravos for night standby.
That expected a Warri based crew who rarely if ever flew into Port Harcourt, the Chevron field, and the Texaco field to make a Night IMC flight using strange landing areas into Port Harcourt without benefit of weather reporting and almost certainly no landing aids.
When it was my turn in the barrel....I did so knowing there was no way I would even consider making the flight until daylight and even then with the possibility of not doing so if the weather was unsatisfactory. Very few of the pilots differed from that view.
The company management had definitely put some heads on the chopping block while keeping a very great distance from the risk themselves.
That expected a Warri based crew who rarely if ever flew into Port Harcourt, the Chevron field, and the Texaco field to make a Night IMC flight using strange landing areas into Port Harcourt without benefit of weather reporting and almost certainly no landing aids.
When it was my turn in the barrel....I did so knowing there was no way I would even consider making the flight until daylight and even then with the possibility of not doing so if the weather was unsatisfactory. Very few of the pilots differed from that view.
The company management had definitely put some heads on the chopping block while keeping a very great distance from the risk themselves.
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When it was my turn in the barrel....I did so knowing there was no way I would even consider making the flight until daylight and even then with the possibility of not doing so if the weather was unsatisfactory. Very few of the pilots differed from that view.
The same (deceased) Captain also accepted tasking for a 412 to fly from Escravos to Delta South Platform at 0200 on a very stormy night several months earlier to pick up a man with an upset stomach. I was the duty Night Pilot with a loosely nominated co-pilot. We had both been flying all the previous day. He had not attempted to wake the co pilot and said he would come with me as my co pilot instead. He had not bothered to inform the Duty Engineer, Duty Air Traffic or Refueler so we were the only 2 en route to the heliport.
I informed him that he was "out of his tree" since the Delta South deck is an obstructed 25 feet by 25 feet maximum and I was not going there under any circumstances. I suggested moving the sick person by boat to Okan and we could do the pick up from there when ATC and the Engineer had arrived.
He proceeded to untie a Bell 407 and launch off into the storm on his own.
He returned 50 minutes later visibly shaken with an even more shaken passenger who probably decided never to report to the sick bay ever again.
I reported the incident to Senior Airlog Management - (I use that term loosely for the people in those days - things have happily changed) who chose to ignore the report.
