HEMS crash.
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HEMS crash.
An EMS EC135 crashed last night in Wisconsin, USA. All three on board were killed.
Thoughts and prayers with the ones left behind.
Alt3.
http://www.nbc15.com/home/headlines/18842074.html
Thoughts and prayers with the ones left behind.
Alt3.
http://www.nbc15.com/home/headlines/18842074.html
The aircraft was owned by Air Methods, INC., the pilot was employed by AMC and the medical crew were employees of the medical facility.
Weather reports about the time of the crash reported to be:
Here are the METARS for around that time frame:
METAR KLSE 110253Z AUTO 00000KT 4SM -RA BR SCT013 OVC035 10/08 A2972 RMK AO2 RAB0154 SLP063 P0004 60008 T01000078 56015
METAR KLSE 110353Z AUTO 00000KT 8SM -RA FEW014 OVC050 10/08 A2970 RMK AO2 SLP056 P0008 T01000078
SPECI KLSE 110430Z AUTO 04004KT 6SM -RA BR BKN014 BKN032 OVC050 09/07 A2968 RMK AO2 P0003
METAR KLSE 110453Z AUTO 00000KT 6SM -RA BR SCT014 BKN032 OVC048 09/07 A2967 RMK AO2 SLP048 P0005 T00940072
SPECI KLSE 110541Z AUTO 35004KT 7SM -RA BKN014 OVC030 09/08 A2966 RMK AO2 P0001
METAR KLSE 110553Z AUTO 01004KT 7SM -RA BKN014 OVC030 09/08 A2966 RMK AO2 SLP044 P0002 60023 T00940078 10117 20094 401720067 56018
The terrain in that area is about 1100 FT AGL
Ground search crews were hampered by dense fog which obscured the elevated terrain.
Weather reports about the time of the crash reported to be:
Here are the METARS for around that time frame:
METAR KLSE 110253Z AUTO 00000KT 4SM -RA BR SCT013 OVC035 10/08 A2972 RMK AO2 RAB0154 SLP063 P0004 60008 T01000078 56015
METAR KLSE 110353Z AUTO 00000KT 8SM -RA FEW014 OVC050 10/08 A2970 RMK AO2 SLP056 P0008 T01000078
SPECI KLSE 110430Z AUTO 04004KT 6SM -RA BR BKN014 BKN032 OVC050 09/07 A2968 RMK AO2 P0003
METAR KLSE 110453Z AUTO 00000KT 6SM -RA BR SCT014 BKN032 OVC048 09/07 A2967 RMK AO2 SLP048 P0005 T00940072
SPECI KLSE 110541Z AUTO 35004KT 7SM -RA BKN014 OVC030 09/08 A2966 RMK AO2 P0001
METAR KLSE 110553Z AUTO 01004KT 7SM -RA BKN014 OVC030 09/08 A2966 RMK AO2 SLP044 P0002 60023 T00940078 10117 20094 401720067 56018
The terrain in that area is about 1100 FT AGL
Ground search crews were hampered by dense fog which obscured the elevated terrain.
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Is there any indication of whether they were IFR or VFR? The EC135 is a very capable SPIFR machine, and if I were flying it at night in marginal weather, returning to base at an airport, I would almost always file IFR, even with good weather, just for the practice. I have no details at all on this accident, though. If I understand the press releases correctly, they were about 4 miles from their home base, but I'm not certain of that.
Wisconsin accident
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Ground search crews were hampered by dense fog which obscured the elevated terrain.
A sad day and I wish it didn't happen.
Sasless wrote, "The terrain in that area is about 1100 FT AGL."
You've got me stumped on this one. Did you mean 1100' ASL or maybe that terrain around the airport is 1100' AAE.
Regardless, it's sad news but what's really sad is that it's not a surpise and with the current mentality in US medevac helicopter operations and current FAA regulations it won't be a surpise next time either.
bb
You've got me stumped on this one. Did you mean 1100' ASL or maybe that terrain around the airport is 1100' AAE.
Regardless, it's sad news but what's really sad is that it's not a surpise and with the current mentality in US medevac helicopter operations and current FAA regulations it won't be a surpise next time either.
bb
Late night post....and did not catch the elevation error!
I believe what was being implied was the higher ground between the takeoff point and the destination rose 1100 feet above the takeoff point.
Tragic as this accident is....as all are....the FAA changes to operational control and weather review by operators has made a difference in the accident rate for EMS operators.
I posted the weather without comment as I felt it would be useful to those who care to examine such tragic events with an eye towards trying to understand how something like this can happen....perhaps to them in the future.
The value of a CVR and data recorder's value to investigators cannot be over stated.
Perhaps what is needed now is a recorded telephone line at the operators dispatch office so investigators can hear the conversation between the pilot and the person exercising operational control over the aircraft.
I believe what was being implied was the higher ground between the takeoff point and the destination rose 1100 feet above the takeoff point.
Tragic as this accident is....as all are....the FAA changes to operational control and weather review by operators has made a difference in the accident rate for EMS operators.
I posted the weather without comment as I felt it would be useful to those who care to examine such tragic events with an eye towards trying to understand how something like this can happen....perhaps to them in the future.
The value of a CVR and data recorder's value to investigators cannot be over stated.
Perhaps what is needed now is a recorded telephone line at the operators dispatch office so investigators can hear the conversation between the pilot and the person exercising operational control over the aircraft.
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That's already very common. Most dispatch phone lines, at least for larger operators, are recorded 24/7, as are the radio communications. I'm pretty sure Air Methods records theirs. I have no idea whether he called in to dispatch before launching back to base.
I agree with Flungdung - SPIFR is far less stressful, and often less busy, than trying to scudrun in the dark, at least for me.
I agree with Flungdung - SPIFR is far less stressful, and often less busy, than trying to scudrun in the dark, at least for me.
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hi sasless,
not trying to be smart but isn't it the pilot who, in the end, exercises operational control over the aircraft???
i am certainly not speculating on this tragedy but taking history into account i hope there are lots of alarm bells ringing.
another case of the rescuer becoming the victim.
i'm with you oogle, i wish it didn't happen.
not trying to be smart but isn't it the pilot who, in the end, exercises operational control over the aircraft???
i am certainly not speculating on this tragedy but taking history into account i hope there are lots of alarm bells ringing.
another case of the rescuer becoming the victim.
i'm with you oogle, i wish it didn't happen.
Under FAR Part 135 require an Operator to maintain operational control over all aircraft and flights. In the past that was ignored by both the FAA and Operators less Operations Manuals and 135 Ops Specs setting forth the weather minima and related information by which the Pilot-In-Command was to conduct the flight.
After several years of high loss rates of aircraft and personnel the FAA was criticized by the NTSB and industry critics for failing to ensure Part 135 Dispatch requirements were being complied with. That brought about the creation of centralized dispatch centers for the various EMS operators.
Since that occurred, the EMS accident rate has improved greatly.
Industry practice has been to consider the EMS flight as Part 135 (Air Taxi rules if you will) but revert to the more liberal Part 91 (Non-commerical rules) for the flight home after dropping off the patient(s). The weather minima for Part 91 regarding night flight and weather minima are much less restrictive than under Part 135.
Picking a stat off the top of my head....if my memory serves me right....80% of fatal accidents occur "after" dropping off the patient and as the aircraft is on its way home or to a refuelling point prior to the flight home.
CFIT accidents resulting from indavertent IMC while operating VFR continue to plaque the industry for a number of reasons. We have a lot of "dark" areas with few or no weather reporting thus unexpected weather can be a direct result of that. Throw in uneven terrain and no NVG's....and the trap is set.
Despite some operator's propaganda...."IFR" programs sometimes really are not as the budget does not provide adequate training or opportunity to stay "current and proficient" although by means of a checkride to minimum standard every six months makes one legally "current".
There is a world of difference between doing a practice approach on the way to the fuel point without screens or foggles and encountering IIMC at night while being only legally current.
Planned SPIFR beats heck out of scud running but as an industry that is what happens more often than not. Being fully equipped....including training and real currency is the cornerstone of SPIFR but that is the hard part to maintain in a working EMS operation.
The price we pay for falling short of the mark is dear.
After several years of high loss rates of aircraft and personnel the FAA was criticized by the NTSB and industry critics for failing to ensure Part 135 Dispatch requirements were being complied with. That brought about the creation of centralized dispatch centers for the various EMS operators.
Since that occurred, the EMS accident rate has improved greatly.
Industry practice has been to consider the EMS flight as Part 135 (Air Taxi rules if you will) but revert to the more liberal Part 91 (Non-commerical rules) for the flight home after dropping off the patient(s). The weather minima for Part 91 regarding night flight and weather minima are much less restrictive than under Part 135.
Picking a stat off the top of my head....if my memory serves me right....80% of fatal accidents occur "after" dropping off the patient and as the aircraft is on its way home or to a refuelling point prior to the flight home.
CFIT accidents resulting from indavertent IMC while operating VFR continue to plaque the industry for a number of reasons. We have a lot of "dark" areas with few or no weather reporting thus unexpected weather can be a direct result of that. Throw in uneven terrain and no NVG's....and the trap is set.
Despite some operator's propaganda...."IFR" programs sometimes really are not as the budget does not provide adequate training or opportunity to stay "current and proficient" although by means of a checkride to minimum standard every six months makes one legally "current".
There is a world of difference between doing a practice approach on the way to the fuel point without screens or foggles and encountering IIMC at night while being only legally current.
Planned SPIFR beats heck out of scud running but as an industry that is what happens more often than not. Being fully equipped....including training and real currency is the cornerstone of SPIFR but that is the hard part to maintain in a working EMS operation.
The price we pay for falling short of the mark is dear.
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That is the key, as SASLess says, the difference between current and proficient can be huge, the extra stability gadgets of an IFR ship can help but again if they are not regularly practised can be possible hinderence or distraction.
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Old Skool:
Could'nt agree with you more. It should be required for pilots at an IFR program to conduct a full IFR flight by day and night once during every shift ,if not more,irrespective of the weather. This will increase familiarity with the equipment, the air traffic system and the process. A bi annual check ride certainly keeps you legal but not necessarily safe.
Could'nt agree with you more. It should be required for pilots at an IFR program to conduct a full IFR flight by day and night once during every shift ,if not more,irrespective of the weather. This will increase familiarity with the equipment, the air traffic system and the process. A bi annual check ride certainly keeps you legal but not necessarily safe.
The lost aircraft had landed at another HEMS operation to unload the patient they had been dispatched to carry. I wonder if there was any contact between the two crews. If so, I would bet there would have been some discussion about weather if only to invite the visiting pilot to the office for a weather check and cup of coffee.
An interesting question.....what if you landed to drop off a patient and while shut down you discovered the host operation had cancelled flight operations based upon the existing weather? Would you takeoff or beg a bed for the night until weather improved?
Just what-if'ing here....not making any suggestions regarding the accident in question.
An interesting question.....what if you landed to drop off a patient and while shut down you discovered the host operation had cancelled flight operations based upon the existing weather? Would you takeoff or beg a bed for the night until weather improved?
Just what-if'ing here....not making any suggestions regarding the accident in question.
"Just a pilot"
My understanding is it was an IFR EC135 enroute home at 2230 local (2-3 hours after sunset) from a refueling stop at the KLSE for the leg to Madison WI, after transporting a patient to La Crosse.
The topos of the area show hills rising approx 500-600 feet above the airport of last departure, approx 4-5 miles from the airport, roughly N-S, course roughly SE. Very little cultural lighting indicated on the charts in the area of the hills, 5-10 miles across and wooded hills probably obscuring what little might have been there. City of La Crosse West of hills, small towns/lightly populated farmland East, going from light into dark, with little to see across the hills.
A direct line from KLSE to Madison goes across the area of the crash, with a local roadway in the valley bottom, elevation rises 300' or so either side. The "talking heads" report impact near the top of one, wreckage down the slope.
I'm suspicious of the METAR, as some of the automated obs I see bear little resemblance to the cockpit view. I understand that there's software that averages the trend and reports a calculated number for vis. Viewing public sector loops for clouds shows bands E-W moving North into the area about this time.
Before y'all get all bent around IFR, equipment, proficiency and requirements, and given I've never flown in the upper Midwest:
It's VFR/MVFR 95% of the time where I am. When it's IMC, it would take longer to file and fly than transport by ground, so there'd be little obvious revenue gain/business justification.
IFR capability increase the safety of the leg home, if I stayed current and proficient. I wouldn't be able to stay current in normal ops, I'd have to do training legs w/safety pilot, prohibitive as we have staffing issues now. Requiring IFR would eliminate most programs here for very little real gain. Besdies which, I can recover to base a lot cheaper by ground than training costs alone (one time in the last year, for example).
As to the reported crisis in US EMS, I don't have the numbers, but my guess is that we're safer than air taxi as a whole. Air ambulance accidents make good press, and, largely, are fairly well equipped and staffed. Nights and recovery legs do feature far too heavily in the accidents reported for me to be casual about that. It's interesting that the last two fatals in the company were IFR Twins, late day/early night, attempting the return to base VFR, and perhaps encountering weather. Were they both at the end of a long day shift? I don't know.
I've never been pressured in any way to complete a leg in 7 years with the company, period. Management, at every level, will come down like the proverbial ton of bricks on anybody disputing an abort/decline.
I detest the "talking box" fix. Give me a well equipped airframe; good, timely data; Night vision goggles; and night scheduling with scientific, physiologic considerations.
The topos of the area show hills rising approx 500-600 feet above the airport of last departure, approx 4-5 miles from the airport, roughly N-S, course roughly SE. Very little cultural lighting indicated on the charts in the area of the hills, 5-10 miles across and wooded hills probably obscuring what little might have been there. City of La Crosse West of hills, small towns/lightly populated farmland East, going from light into dark, with little to see across the hills.
A direct line from KLSE to Madison goes across the area of the crash, with a local roadway in the valley bottom, elevation rises 300' or so either side. The "talking heads" report impact near the top of one, wreckage down the slope.
I'm suspicious of the METAR, as some of the automated obs I see bear little resemblance to the cockpit view. I understand that there's software that averages the trend and reports a calculated number for vis. Viewing public sector loops for clouds shows bands E-W moving North into the area about this time.
Before y'all get all bent around IFR, equipment, proficiency and requirements, and given I've never flown in the upper Midwest:
It's VFR/MVFR 95% of the time where I am. When it's IMC, it would take longer to file and fly than transport by ground, so there'd be little obvious revenue gain/business justification.
IFR capability increase the safety of the leg home, if I stayed current and proficient. I wouldn't be able to stay current in normal ops, I'd have to do training legs w/safety pilot, prohibitive as we have staffing issues now. Requiring IFR would eliminate most programs here for very little real gain. Besdies which, I can recover to base a lot cheaper by ground than training costs alone (one time in the last year, for example).
As to the reported crisis in US EMS, I don't have the numbers, but my guess is that we're safer than air taxi as a whole. Air ambulance accidents make good press, and, largely, are fairly well equipped and staffed. Nights and recovery legs do feature far too heavily in the accidents reported for me to be casual about that. It's interesting that the last two fatals in the company were IFR Twins, late day/early night, attempting the return to base VFR, and perhaps encountering weather. Were they both at the end of a long day shift? I don't know.
I've never been pressured in any way to complete a leg in 7 years with the company, period. Management, at every level, will come down like the proverbial ton of bricks on anybody disputing an abort/decline.
I detest the "talking box" fix. Give me a well equipped airframe; good, timely data; Night vision goggles; and night scheduling with scientific, physiologic considerations.
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"If one thinks safety is expensive, try the price of an accident" (no idea who coined it).
I've been taught the total average cost of helicopter accidents is 10 times the obvious direct loss/es. Should make decisions easy about IFR ops, currency, etc.
It's in the math.
I've been taught the total average cost of helicopter accidents is 10 times the obvious direct loss/es. Should make decisions easy about IFR ops, currency, etc.
It's in the math.
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Having an IFR machine for EMS is an advantage for a few programs, not so much for others. It depends on how the program is run. If the program does almost all transfers, between large cities, then it can work. If the program is doing mostly scene flights, it makes no sense at all, because you simply cannot file IFR and do a 10 minute, or shorter, flight to a scene, and then to a hospital, under the present setup. Having an IFR aircraft just for the return home simply makes no economic sense. I think the pressure to fly any time for EMS has gone away, and the only pressure on the pilot is what he places on himself. Gethomeitis is as strong in EMS as in any other sector, I believe. I don't know how to eliminate that, or to insure good decision making all the time. Good judgment comes from learning from bad decisions, and if we're lucky we survive the bad decisions we make and learn from them. If we're not, the bad decisions kill us. Night flight requires more concentration and care, but people get sick and injured at night, and if we want to provide the care, we have to fly at night, or else just shut down all night operations and ignore the sick and maimed, as they seem to do across the pond. Helicopters are not raining from the night sky here. There are far more EMS helicopters flying in the US than there are helicopters in Europe, and an accident a year, or fewer, isn't that surprising. The US has decided, for better or for worse, that the benefits outweigh the costs, and night flights will continue. We just have to be very careful about conducting those flights. I don't think company policies or hospital pressure has much to do with it any longer, it's just a matter of making the pilots realize that they aren't lifesavers, they're just moneymakers for the companies. That's the hard part.
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We are a SPIFR HEMS program and have been for the last 14+ years. Personally I have flown for 6+ years DPIFR on the NSea and the last 10+ yrs SPIFR HEMS USA.
SPIFR at night is far more comfortable than SPVFR at night. We recently went from a SPIFR EC145 to a SPVFR BK117, and not having the ability to go IFR if neccesary was a little nerve racking. However if one adjusts ones personal minima and behaves more conservatively then it can be done safely.
R H I am curious about your background. Do you have any SPIFR experience?
SPIFR at night is far more comfortable than SPVFR at night. We recently went from a SPIFR EC145 to a SPVFR BK117, and not having the ability to go IFR if neccesary was a little nerve racking. However if one adjusts ones personal minima and behaves more conservatively then it can be done safely.
R H I am curious about your background. Do you have any SPIFR experience?
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SPIFR vs SPVFR night, etc.
FAA have advocated for years that pilots get their instrument rating and keep it current, both fixed and rotary wing. Why operators are not interested in this, across the board, is obviously economic, but also somewhat naive.
Considering night EMS is certainly a bit hectic at times being IFR current provides a much safer option for those night flights that wind up involving unanticipated weather.
The big deal about taking an operation IFR is not how many IFR flights one makes for an EMS operator, it's the number of VFR flights that go on the basis of having the ability to bail out IFR if necessary. The straight forward IFR flights emerge as a matter of course.
Properly managed (i.e. dispatched, followed, supported in real time etc.) HEMS SPIFR should enable return on investment, greater safety, and greater completions for the sake of patients and business.
I think it's all a matter of time before SPIFR becomes a night requirement.
Considering night EMS is certainly a bit hectic at times being IFR current provides a much safer option for those night flights that wind up involving unanticipated weather.
The big deal about taking an operation IFR is not how many IFR flights one makes for an EMS operator, it's the number of VFR flights that go on the basis of having the ability to bail out IFR if necessary. The straight forward IFR flights emerge as a matter of course.
Properly managed (i.e. dispatched, followed, supported in real time etc.) HEMS SPIFR should enable return on investment, greater safety, and greater completions for the sake of patients and business.
I think it's all a matter of time before SPIFR becomes a night requirement.