NTSB Calls for Radar Altimeters for EMS Helicopter Night Ops
WAAS ( Wide Area Augmentation System ) is a kind of Differential GPS, other than that the correction is sent to the receiver by a geostationary satelite, not by a groundstation. And it works only in the US Hemisphere ( +/- 10ft accuracy )
skadi
skadi
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tottigol said, "However, it must be mentioned that any type of precision approach would have not saved that crew."
I apologize for not making my case clear enough. The reason for the accident was that an EMS crew was yet again flying inside a cow while VFR, and the accident was predictable because of that, at least a percentage of such flights is guaranteed to crash in those circumstances. Just look at the accident record.
The fact that there are NO instrument approaches is certainly a cause, because nobody will file into IFR unless he could let down at the other end, so we all bumble along below the weather, or low to the ground and every now and then, we make a fireball. We have no instrument procedures, routes SIDS or approaches, so we blast off into conditions that will crash a percentage of us, and then we get the NTSB asking us to carry rad alts!
I assert (I hope more clearly) that the direct cause of the terrible number of Offshore and EMS accidents is the entire lack of IFR procedures, routes and approaches to support our missions, missions that are of necessity conducted in VFR when everybody knows they are flown without adequate reference to the horizon, ground or obstructions. They are legal VFR only because the FAR is simply wrong in depending on visibility when it is flight reference that we need.
I find it confusing that you believe that an operator might not equip his aircraft with the right IFR equipment. The reason why I am confused is because you think I mean it to be optional, where I mean it to be required to meet the regulations for IFR operations. To fly along along helicopter SIDS, routes and approaches and to do our jobs at night in rural areas. The operator does not have to equip, he can limit himself to day only, and he will simply go out of business as a result. And that is quite fine.
I apologize for not making my case clear enough. The reason for the accident was that an EMS crew was yet again flying inside a cow while VFR, and the accident was predictable because of that, at least a percentage of such flights is guaranteed to crash in those circumstances. Just look at the accident record.
The fact that there are NO instrument approaches is certainly a cause, because nobody will file into IFR unless he could let down at the other end, so we all bumble along below the weather, or low to the ground and every now and then, we make a fireball. We have no instrument procedures, routes SIDS or approaches, so we blast off into conditions that will crash a percentage of us, and then we get the NTSB asking us to carry rad alts!
I assert (I hope more clearly) that the direct cause of the terrible number of Offshore and EMS accidents is the entire lack of IFR procedures, routes and approaches to support our missions, missions that are of necessity conducted in VFR when everybody knows they are flown without adequate reference to the horizon, ground or obstructions. They are legal VFR only because the FAR is simply wrong in depending on visibility when it is flight reference that we need.
I find it confusing that you believe that an operator might not equip his aircraft with the right IFR equipment. The reason why I am confused is because you think I mean it to be optional, where I mean it to be required to meet the regulations for IFR operations. To fly along along helicopter SIDS, routes and approaches and to do our jobs at night in rural areas. The operator does not have to equip, he can limit himself to day only, and he will simply go out of business as a result. And that is quite fine.
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Nick,
You seem to be saying that all HEMS and Public Transport flight at night should be done under IFR, and that this would prevent accidents. I agree that to be instrument rated would prevent some accidents, but only those that are caused by pilots flying in conditions that they are ill equipped for (poor weather). Therefore I think, IMHO, the observing of MET and performance regulations for those flying at night (and day) along with common sense and knowing your own limitations, would have the same, if not a greater, effect on the accident rates.
You seem to be saying that all HEMS and Public Transport flight at night should be done under IFR, and that this would prevent accidents. I agree that to be instrument rated would prevent some accidents, but only those that are caused by pilots flying in conditions that they are ill equipped for (poor weather). Therefore I think, IMHO, the observing of MET and performance regulations for those flying at night (and day) along with common sense and knowing your own limitations, would have the same, if not a greater, effect on the accident rates.
Nick,
As usual you are way ahead of the industry and government when you propose such a system. The system you describe would be a giant step in the right direction but it would require far more than you describe.
Step one is dragging the helicopter industry into believing it is necessary and will ad to their bottom line. Then the industry will have to embrace the collateral issues of training and standards for the crew and aircraft.
The mindset of the industry today is still hung up on "that is how we always dunnit" and that should be good enough for us today.
The concept of taking a six month checkride to 135 standards and considering the pilot current, competent, and safe is sheer dreaming on the part of the operators and the FAA.
It is a far different thing to fly IFR/IMC on a near daily basis as compared to finding yourself looking for a way out of the cow's stomach without finding yourself in a pile of poop at the end of it.
The US Helicopter Industry is just not ready to latch on to what you suggest unfortunately.....and the FAA sure isn't going to devote the money to implementing such a project.
All one has to do is look at the Gulf of Mexico in a historical perspective and compare the Bell 47 days to today. The vast preponderance of flight operations are the same in concept.......VFR/VMC or VFR/IMC. There is some improvement with the latest generations of aircraft but the infrastructure is still in the 60's.
As usual you are way ahead of the industry and government when you propose such a system. The system you describe would be a giant step in the right direction but it would require far more than you describe.
Step one is dragging the helicopter industry into believing it is necessary and will ad to their bottom line. Then the industry will have to embrace the collateral issues of training and standards for the crew and aircraft.
The mindset of the industry today is still hung up on "that is how we always dunnit" and that should be good enough for us today.
The concept of taking a six month checkride to 135 standards and considering the pilot current, competent, and safe is sheer dreaming on the part of the operators and the FAA.
It is a far different thing to fly IFR/IMC on a near daily basis as compared to finding yourself looking for a way out of the cow's stomach without finding yourself in a pile of poop at the end of it.
The US Helicopter Industry is just not ready to latch on to what you suggest unfortunately.....and the FAA sure isn't going to devote the money to implementing such a project.
All one has to do is look at the Gulf of Mexico in a historical perspective and compare the Bell 47 days to today. The vast preponderance of flight operations are the same in concept.......VFR/VMC or VFR/IMC. There is some improvement with the latest generations of aircraft but the infrastructure is still in the 60's.
My apologies to Mr.Lappos again, it seems as if we are both stating the evidence but we are not listening to one another.
I'll try to summarize my thoughts.
Unless some higher authority (did I mispell that?) ENFORCES tighter safety rules by creating minimum certification standards for certain types of operations (EMS, OffShore...) the operators themselves, or some of them shall not find it necessary to adapt and evolve.
I totally agree with Mr.Lappos on the IFR part and on pretty much everything else he says regarding this subject; however, until such entities as FAA,NTSB, State Boards and why not.............Pilot Unions slam a fist on the table and say stop this nonsense, we shall consistently incur in mishaps such as those in argument in this thread.
In my words, you can't fix stupid but you can keep them from flying.
I'll try to summarize my thoughts.
Unless some higher authority (did I mispell that?) ENFORCES tighter safety rules by creating minimum certification standards for certain types of operations (EMS, OffShore...) the operators themselves, or some of them shall not find it necessary to adapt and evolve.
I totally agree with Mr.Lappos on the IFR part and on pretty much everything else he says regarding this subject; however, until such entities as FAA,NTSB, State Boards and why not.............Pilot Unions slam a fist on the table and say stop this nonsense, we shall consistently incur in mishaps such as those in argument in this thread.
In my words, you can't fix stupid but you can keep them from flying.
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IFR for night EMS flights just isn't practical. It's not that easy to draw up an IFR approach to an accident scene that just came into existence. The only way to get to the scene and land at it is VFR. With the coverage available in most of the US, it's only a 10 or 15 minute flight to a scene, rarely more than 30 miles, and there is no way to predict where the next accident scene will be. Landing at the unprepared scene involves checking for wires and all sorts of obstacles, none of which have ever been TERPed or ever will be. No terrain database will ever have all the obstacles and wires down around the scene. Big ones, maybe, but light poles, trees, local power and telephone lines, etc. just can't be kept up with. IFR is a nice concept, but it's not a panacea, or even close to one. The cost is also prohibitive. People are upset about the cost of a flight in a 206, nevermind a two pilot IFR machine. There is simply no way there will ever be the numbers of EMS helicopters available if they're all required to be to be IFR, because the companies will just abandon most bases. The cost to the individual citizens has to be considered, because it affects everyone, either through insurance premiums or taxes. We can have lots of cheaper, less capable helicopters or fewer more capable ones, and with fewer helicopters, fewer people will be helped. I think the current situation is the best we can realistically hope for, giving the most aid to the most people at the lowest cost. Some accidents will happen, but accidents will always happen. Technology, by itself, is not the answer.
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tottigol,
You state it precisely, and I agree:
Unless some higher authority ENFORCES tighter safety rules by creating minimum certification standards for certain types of operations (EMS, OffShore...) the operators themselves, or some of them shall not find it necessary to adapt and evolve.
But the weak link is that enforcing an IFR rule where the current, airplane IFR system does not serve the mission is actually just grounding night operations, an unnecessary disservice to the public.
I see the solution as two-fold:
1) Create the system that guides helicopters into the bad weather and that provides safe let-down from that same weather.
2) Then demand that this new system be used, with no skunking around underneath the ceiling at night.
Fly-for-fun,
You have it backwards. I do not think an instrument rating is much of a safety device unless it is connected to an instrument system that actually works. The weather is too bad to fly VFR in, because the IFR system stinks, not because the weather is too bad to fly IFR in.
Until we get smart enough to learn to blame (and therefore fix) the system we are in, and not the pilots who fly it, we are doomed to watch the accident rate stay where it is, and we doom our customers to either suffer the consequences or stay away from us.
You state it precisely, and I agree:
Unless some higher authority ENFORCES tighter safety rules by creating minimum certification standards for certain types of operations (EMS, OffShore...) the operators themselves, or some of them shall not find it necessary to adapt and evolve.
But the weak link is that enforcing an IFR rule where the current, airplane IFR system does not serve the mission is actually just grounding night operations, an unnecessary disservice to the public.
I see the solution as two-fold:
1) Create the system that guides helicopters into the bad weather and that provides safe let-down from that same weather.
2) Then demand that this new system be used, with no skunking around underneath the ceiling at night.
Fly-for-fun,
You have it backwards. I do not think an instrument rating is much of a safety device unless it is connected to an instrument system that actually works. The weather is too bad to fly VFR in, because the IFR system stinks, not because the weather is too bad to fly IFR in.
Until we get smart enough to learn to blame (and therefore fix) the system we are in, and not the pilots who fly it, we are doomed to watch the accident rate stay where it is, and we doom our customers to either suffer the consequences or stay away from us.
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Tip of the hat to Gomer Pylot for getting to the meat of the EMS end of this.
I consider a radalt a primary flight instrument. If you’re working for a company that doesn’t have them installed in their aircraft, my opinion is find another job because that company obviously doesn’t give a crap about you. In New Mexico, a radalt is about half the time useless because of the mesa-like slabsided terrain. They worked great in most of the other places I’ve flown, but then again, they don’t tell you anything about what’s ahead.
PHI requires us to have an operable radalt while flying NVGs, BUT it does not have to be operable if we are unaided. I can see where I’m going – have to have it. Can’t see where I’m going – not necessary. This is the present state of parts of the regulatory world.
Regarding total IFR for EMS, the industry doesn’t need an IFR route structure nor does it need big multi-engined helicopters to do the work.
A route and approach structure means you have to go to the same places all the time, like a oil platform or hospital. EMS doesn’t work like that a lot of times and if you shoot an approach to one place, then decide to fly VFR over to where you really need to be – at the accident scene, then aren’t you in essence abrogating the whole IFR thing, because that short VFR segment into crap weather, (you flew over there IFR right?) is where were killing ourselves in the first place
.
We give a patient a fast ride to the hospital because we can go in a straight line most times and avoid ground traffic. There isn’t a lot of patient care going on – pain management via drugs, oxygen, etc. the crew isn’t doing surgery back there. We don’t need a bigger faster helicopter because it doesn’t mean anything in the larger context. A larger cabin is nice for the crew, but once everyone is situated no one moves around. And if they did have a larger cabin, they would just try to carry more stuff anyway.
Twenty more knots of ground speed might save me 5 minutes enroute over 60 nm, but I can probably get off faster because I’m flying a Astar and can get it ready to fly in like a minute and a half vs cranking two, etc, and making those checks.
And the difference in cost of an Astar and say an Agusta 109E, which the competition uses right up the road in Santa Fe? Millions to buy and who knows how much more to operate. To do the exact same job.
And that’s what we would all need in terms of aircraft, 109E or EC-135 as minimum to do IFR so we can have enough useful load to install the automation and hopefully carry a paying patient. And that’s with only one pilot.
Or you can fix the regulations. Make NVGs mandatory for night operations. Raise the night minimums. Make mandatory enhanced ground proximity warning systems. All of which allow you to keep your present aircraft, only loose maybe 20 pounds of useful load and cost a whole lot less to buy and operate than a new twin.
Mr. Lappos also said: I assert (I hope more clearly) that the direct cause of the terrible number of Offshore and EMS accidents is the entire lack of IFR procedures………
The major cause of accidents in EMS? Pilots not saying NO enough and not turning around soon enough. Night EMS accidents? Not being able to see where they are going.
If you want to spend money on something useful, invent something I can strap on my head and see through clouds, day or night, all the way to the ground. Wouldn’t need any IFR stuff then would I?
I consider a radalt a primary flight instrument. If you’re working for a company that doesn’t have them installed in their aircraft, my opinion is find another job because that company obviously doesn’t give a crap about you. In New Mexico, a radalt is about half the time useless because of the mesa-like slabsided terrain. They worked great in most of the other places I’ve flown, but then again, they don’t tell you anything about what’s ahead.
PHI requires us to have an operable radalt while flying NVGs, BUT it does not have to be operable if we are unaided. I can see where I’m going – have to have it. Can’t see where I’m going – not necessary. This is the present state of parts of the regulatory world.
Regarding total IFR for EMS, the industry doesn’t need an IFR route structure nor does it need big multi-engined helicopters to do the work.
A route and approach structure means you have to go to the same places all the time, like a oil platform or hospital. EMS doesn’t work like that a lot of times and if you shoot an approach to one place, then decide to fly VFR over to where you really need to be – at the accident scene, then aren’t you in essence abrogating the whole IFR thing, because that short VFR segment into crap weather, (you flew over there IFR right?) is where were killing ourselves in the first place
.
We give a patient a fast ride to the hospital because we can go in a straight line most times and avoid ground traffic. There isn’t a lot of patient care going on – pain management via drugs, oxygen, etc. the crew isn’t doing surgery back there. We don’t need a bigger faster helicopter because it doesn’t mean anything in the larger context. A larger cabin is nice for the crew, but once everyone is situated no one moves around. And if they did have a larger cabin, they would just try to carry more stuff anyway.
Twenty more knots of ground speed might save me 5 minutes enroute over 60 nm, but I can probably get off faster because I’m flying a Astar and can get it ready to fly in like a minute and a half vs cranking two, etc, and making those checks.
And the difference in cost of an Astar and say an Agusta 109E, which the competition uses right up the road in Santa Fe? Millions to buy and who knows how much more to operate. To do the exact same job.
And that’s what we would all need in terms of aircraft, 109E or EC-135 as minimum to do IFR so we can have enough useful load to install the automation and hopefully carry a paying patient. And that’s with only one pilot.
Or you can fix the regulations. Make NVGs mandatory for night operations. Raise the night minimums. Make mandatory enhanced ground proximity warning systems. All of which allow you to keep your present aircraft, only loose maybe 20 pounds of useful load and cost a whole lot less to buy and operate than a new twin.
Mr. Lappos also said: I assert (I hope more clearly) that the direct cause of the terrible number of Offshore and EMS accidents is the entire lack of IFR procedures………
The major cause of accidents in EMS? Pilots not saying NO enough and not turning around soon enough. Night EMS accidents? Not being able to see where they are going.
If you want to spend money on something useful, invent something I can strap on my head and see through clouds, day or night, all the way to the ground. Wouldn’t need any IFR stuff then would I?
"Just a pilot"
“We have met the enemy, and he is us”- Walt Kelly, as true now as it ever was.
We, the pilots, are the undisputed major cause of accidents. We screw up in singles and twins; VFR and IFR; day time, but most especially- nights. If you’d like a list, I can make it, no problem-
SPIFR crash in Pennsylvania, 2 years ago, and there’s much more IFR, if you want’em, single pilot and 2-pilot crews. IFR is not a silver bullet.
EMS VFR twins lost, more or less recently, in the Potomac and near offshore, Pacific Northwest. I worked with a pilot who shut down an engine and mismanaged his remaining engine in such a basic way as to be unbelievable of a Commercial-level pilot, and he had a 12,000 hour helo multi trying to point out his problem all the way down into the Gulf. Twins are more complicated.
The two accidents, in the GoM and Alabama being currently discussed in another thread, one each day and night, single engine are also typical. I don’t know what caused either, but a reasonable inference would include significant contribution of human error. It’s interesting that the AEL accident occurred in a system that required management review and approval prior to dispatch.
The only thing I’m sure of out of all this is that equipment isn’t the answer, because it isn’t the problem. Pilots exceeding their equipment’s capacity- yes that is a problem, implicitly encouraged by employers eager to get every penny possible. Take a risk often enough, over a long enough period, and it becomes procedure- REAL pilots can do it. And then it kills you, and everybody says stuff like “Well, why would a rational pilot accept a departure that required a 200 foot night transition under landing heavy traffic, over water?” It was SOP, lots of people did it.
We’ve all seen guys report for work bragging or complaining about how little rest they’ve had. My opinion is that this is an especial problem in EMS. I know pilots who consider nights to be off-duty days, and make no attempt to rest. Add an institutionalized disregard for circadian rhythm and sleep disruption, and it’s no wonder EMS crash at a rate 4 times higher at night. We do the hardest part of our job at our poorest.
I’ve worked with pilots who consider the GPS a go/no-go item, but have no idea what the local lat/long is- they’re functional illiterates, in this sense. They just punch the numbers in and go.
The Pennsylvania/CJ SPIFR crash report is especially appropriate, right here and right now. My reading of the NTSB report leads me to believe that the accident pilot had no idea what his autopilot was doing, and it killed him. I think this indicates the trap we face- we rely on equipment we don’t understand: GPS; autopilots; radar, and we’re failing to respect the fact that every time we takeoff, we’re making a life and death decision. We are the problem. Read the accident reports.
I think rad alts are a reasonable requirement, and my employer has required them for years. I’d rather have some logical, scientific scheduling that includes physiological considerations when the night duty roster is set. Until we get better pilots, we’d better learn how to work the ones we have better. Burdening them with more equipment to manage isn’t an answer. Encouraging the illusion of greater capability with that equipment is a definite increase in risk.
We, the pilots, are the undisputed major cause of accidents. We screw up in singles and twins; VFR and IFR; day time, but most especially- nights. If you’d like a list, I can make it, no problem-
SPIFR crash in Pennsylvania, 2 years ago, and there’s much more IFR, if you want’em, single pilot and 2-pilot crews. IFR is not a silver bullet.
EMS VFR twins lost, more or less recently, in the Potomac and near offshore, Pacific Northwest. I worked with a pilot who shut down an engine and mismanaged his remaining engine in such a basic way as to be unbelievable of a Commercial-level pilot, and he had a 12,000 hour helo multi trying to point out his problem all the way down into the Gulf. Twins are more complicated.
The two accidents, in the GoM and Alabama being currently discussed in another thread, one each day and night, single engine are also typical. I don’t know what caused either, but a reasonable inference would include significant contribution of human error. It’s interesting that the AEL accident occurred in a system that required management review and approval prior to dispatch.
The only thing I’m sure of out of all this is that equipment isn’t the answer, because it isn’t the problem. Pilots exceeding their equipment’s capacity- yes that is a problem, implicitly encouraged by employers eager to get every penny possible. Take a risk often enough, over a long enough period, and it becomes procedure- REAL pilots can do it. And then it kills you, and everybody says stuff like “Well, why would a rational pilot accept a departure that required a 200 foot night transition under landing heavy traffic, over water?” It was SOP, lots of people did it.
We’ve all seen guys report for work bragging or complaining about how little rest they’ve had. My opinion is that this is an especial problem in EMS. I know pilots who consider nights to be off-duty days, and make no attempt to rest. Add an institutionalized disregard for circadian rhythm and sleep disruption, and it’s no wonder EMS crash at a rate 4 times higher at night. We do the hardest part of our job at our poorest.
I’ve worked with pilots who consider the GPS a go/no-go item, but have no idea what the local lat/long is- they’re functional illiterates, in this sense. They just punch the numbers in and go.
The Pennsylvania/CJ SPIFR crash report is especially appropriate, right here and right now. My reading of the NTSB report leads me to believe that the accident pilot had no idea what his autopilot was doing, and it killed him. I think this indicates the trap we face- we rely on equipment we don’t understand: GPS; autopilots; radar, and we’re failing to respect the fact that every time we takeoff, we’re making a life and death decision. We are the problem. Read the accident reports.
I think rad alts are a reasonable requirement, and my employer has required them for years. I’d rather have some logical, scientific scheduling that includes physiological considerations when the night duty roster is set. Until we get better pilots, we’d better learn how to work the ones we have better. Burdening them with more equipment to manage isn’t an answer. Encouraging the illusion of greater capability with that equipment is a definite increase in risk.
I fully agree with Devil 49. There are much much more accidents induced by pilot errors than founded on technical problems.
I have seen ships fully equipped with the latest technical toys, 2 experienced pilots inside, IR of course, smashed in bad weather because the 2 pilots thought they were invulnerable.
Rad alt are good toys but they could not fix some other problems i afraid.
I have seen ships fully equipped with the latest technical toys, 2 experienced pilots inside, IR of course, smashed in bad weather because the 2 pilots thought they were invulnerable.
Rad alt are good toys but they could not fix some other problems i afraid.
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Training is the key
In my present job I teach on the AW139 simulator. Mostly type ratings so far but these are early days and it wont be long before we get a lot more recurrent training candidates coming through. The spectrum of students I have seen so far range from the ridiculous to the sublime and they come from many different countries, backgrounds and operations.
There is a common denominator and that is that those that do not do procedural IFR ops as part of their daily routine find achieving the required standard very challenging. I think it would be fair to say that to equip the aircraft is one thing but to provide the pilot with an appropriate rating is another. Both have cost implications but the latter is an ongoing penalty that is a bit like an iceberg. The rating and the 6 monthly check-ride are just the tip, the main (hidden) expense is in realising that achieving and MAINTAINING a decent standard of skill requires ADDITIONAL recurrent training.
I detect a growing awareness in some quarters that this is the way to go but those most reluctant to sign up to 'prevention is better than cure' seem to be those areas dominated by FAA standards and philosophies.
I have stood by for many years and put up with the AMERICA IS BEST school of thought and judged each situation on its merits but I increasingly feel the need to cry out to those in the US to get your collective heads out of your collective a***es, raise your eyes to see what others in the industry are doing and give the matter a bit of thought. We need the momentum you can generate around the world if we are to achieve an 80% reduction in accidents.
This means that when setting the operating standards you must POLICE THEM and you must TRAIN FOR THEM .......... REALISTICALLY .......... WITH A COMPETENCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS INCLUDED.
There are many around the world that take their lead from the US and the FAA and it must live up to these responsibilities. There are some promising signs ..... please may it continue.
G
There is a common denominator and that is that those that do not do procedural IFR ops as part of their daily routine find achieving the required standard very challenging. I think it would be fair to say that to equip the aircraft is one thing but to provide the pilot with an appropriate rating is another. Both have cost implications but the latter is an ongoing penalty that is a bit like an iceberg. The rating and the 6 monthly check-ride are just the tip, the main (hidden) expense is in realising that achieving and MAINTAINING a decent standard of skill requires ADDITIONAL recurrent training.
I detect a growing awareness in some quarters that this is the way to go but those most reluctant to sign up to 'prevention is better than cure' seem to be those areas dominated by FAA standards and philosophies.
I have stood by for many years and put up with the AMERICA IS BEST school of thought and judged each situation on its merits but I increasingly feel the need to cry out to those in the US to get your collective heads out of your collective a***es, raise your eyes to see what others in the industry are doing and give the matter a bit of thought. We need the momentum you can generate around the world if we are to achieve an 80% reduction in accidents.
This means that when setting the operating standards you must POLICE THEM and you must TRAIN FOR THEM .......... REALISTICALLY .......... WITH A COMPETENCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS INCLUDED.
There are many around the world that take their lead from the US and the FAA and it must live up to these responsibilities. There are some promising signs ..... please may it continue.
G
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At the risk of angering the Gods of Training:
Training is not the key to eliminating accidents, it is the key to minimizing their number. Making the task easier and more fool proof is the key to accident elimination.
If 5,000 hour professionals can have the accidents (and that is who does) then the task is too tough to ever be accident free. People have a natural limit to their capabilities, especially when intuitive judgment is what is called for.
We must train, and never stop, but if we want fewer accidents, we must make better aircraft, better routes. better autopilots. To eliminate accidents, we must have the nerve to stop blaming pilots and start blaming those who give us a task that is naturally too difficult to be performed every time to perfection.
Training is not the key to eliminating accidents, it is the key to minimizing their number. Making the task easier and more fool proof is the key to accident elimination.
If 5,000 hour professionals can have the accidents (and that is who does) then the task is too tough to ever be accident free. People have a natural limit to their capabilities, especially when intuitive judgment is what is called for.
We must train, and never stop, but if we want fewer accidents, we must make better aircraft, better routes. better autopilots. To eliminate accidents, we must have the nerve to stop blaming pilots and start blaming those who give us a task that is naturally too difficult to be performed every time to perfection.
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Here is a thought. Instead of trying to run before we can walk, how about if we mandate IFR for all inter -hospital transfers for now and leave scenes as VFR only. Accident on a non-VFR day, turn down the flight. Once the system, regulators, companies get into the hang of operating IFR for hospital transfers maybe we can progress to the next level.
Somebody mentioned pilots unions. Hats off to you sir. Always been my pet peeve that unions should be more about professional quality of work place and not just about nickels and dimes.
Alt3
Somebody mentioned pilots unions. Hats off to you sir. Always been my pet peeve that unions should be more about professional quality of work place and not just about nickels and dimes.
Alt3
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Training and the Gods of Aviation
Nick - I hear you. That's why a good session in the sim will help. You quite rightly highlight the poor judgment sometimes shown by even the most experienced pilot so when I talk about competence I mean more than just handling skills. Also in the spotlight should be well designed LOFT flights that help reveal those who need some help with their attitude and their other 'skills'.
The God of Training has a few angels and some of those need to get to work on training the trainers and training the management ..... and in the light of the previous comments, training the unions. I do not know of any other profession that has such a poor record when it comes to the training of those in whom we invest considerable responsibility ......... even if the job seems to come with little authority. We seem to have a 'sink or swim' philosophy and we can blame some if not all of that on the regulators who could have and indeed should have, mandated management training for CPs and above. HAI have some good courses - I have done a couple myself - but we need the regulators to come on board.
In the UK the CAA can be sued for 'negligent oversight' - not the case in the US I believe.
One day we can get it right ... we just have to keep struggling to identify 'best practice' and set about making it happen.
A re-read of Nicks post and I can see he's putting the regulators in the dock for not demanding higher design standards. Can I ask the question 'could we have achieved the standards we aspire to today 10 or 20 years ago if the certification standards had demanded it?'
G
The God of Training has a few angels and some of those need to get to work on training the trainers and training the management ..... and in the light of the previous comments, training the unions. I do not know of any other profession that has such a poor record when it comes to the training of those in whom we invest considerable responsibility ......... even if the job seems to come with little authority. We seem to have a 'sink or swim' philosophy and we can blame some if not all of that on the regulators who could have and indeed should have, mandated management training for CPs and above. HAI have some good courses - I have done a couple myself - but we need the regulators to come on board.
In the UK the CAA can be sued for 'negligent oversight' - not the case in the US I believe.
One day we can get it right ... we just have to keep struggling to identify 'best practice' and set about making it happen.
A re-read of Nicks post and I can see he's putting the regulators in the dock for not demanding higher design standards. Can I ask the question 'could we have achieved the standards we aspire to today 10 or 20 years ago if the certification standards had demanded it?'
G
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Geoffers,
You do get my point. My favorite fiction author, C. S. Forester used a brilliant analogy in his book "The General" as an indictment of the inability to leap past the problem. To paraphrase, he described the intellectually stubborn as unable to see the real problem, as if some Pacific Islanders had come across a pair of boards fastened together with screws. Trying larger and larger pry bars to separate the boards, they were unable to see the solution as a nothing more than a few twists of the wrist.
I espouse the following:
Any system that has a high failure rate, yet employs professionals with years of practice, is by nature in dire need of improvement. Focusing on training is the sop used to placate those trapped inside that system.
You do get my point. My favorite fiction author, C. S. Forester used a brilliant analogy in his book "The General" as an indictment of the inability to leap past the problem. To paraphrase, he described the intellectually stubborn as unable to see the real problem, as if some Pacific Islanders had come across a pair of boards fastened together with screws. Trying larger and larger pry bars to separate the boards, they were unable to see the solution as a nothing more than a few twists of the wrist.
I espouse the following:
Any system that has a high failure rate, yet employs professionals with years of practice, is by nature in dire need of improvement. Focusing on training is the sop used to placate those trapped inside that system.
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For 'TRAINING' read 'EDUCATION'
Nick
You are shining a light into a dark corner. This intellectual conundrum seems to be beyond the mere mortal helicopter pilot.
I have struggled for years in an environment that perpetuated a less than virtuous circle when it came to the advantages of a sophisticated autopilot. From the early 80s when the Sperry HeliPilot appeared the UK authorities have refused to allow pilots to use the coupling in any check-ride. They failed to understand that the operators - who have a limited training budget - trained for the check-ride. This left pilots woefully uneducated on autopilot management. It took a crash in Scotland to reveal to the CAA the consequences of their policies. Things have changed a bit now but such is the sophistication and complexity of the latest autopilot/FMS systems that I could spend a week teaching that alone and still not cover everything it can and cannot do.
So, to square the circle, by all means introduce more sophisticated pilot aids but for heavens sake be sure we install appropriate and adequate training regimes to support them.
G
You are shining a light into a dark corner. This intellectual conundrum seems to be beyond the mere mortal helicopter pilot.
I have struggled for years in an environment that perpetuated a less than virtuous circle when it came to the advantages of a sophisticated autopilot. From the early 80s when the Sperry HeliPilot appeared the UK authorities have refused to allow pilots to use the coupling in any check-ride. They failed to understand that the operators - who have a limited training budget - trained for the check-ride. This left pilots woefully uneducated on autopilot management. It took a crash in Scotland to reveal to the CAA the consequences of their policies. Things have changed a bit now but such is the sophistication and complexity of the latest autopilot/FMS systems that I could spend a week teaching that alone and still not cover everything it can and cannot do.
So, to square the circle, by all means introduce more sophisticated pilot aids but for heavens sake be sure we install appropriate and adequate training regimes to support them.
G
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When 25% of the pilots who have autopilots in their helicopters don't use them, something is drastically wrong.
When manufacturers (and Nick, I certainly don't count Sikorsky as one of these) don't insist on training pilots in the use of the autopilot on transition courses, something is drastically wrong.
When the authorities don't insist on making sure the pilot can manage the systems on the helicopter, something is drastically wrong.
Why don't the insurance companies do something??? (any insurance people who want to PM me, I'd be happy to help you set up courses to ensure your covered folks know how to use the equipment....)
When manufacturers (and Nick, I certainly don't count Sikorsky as one of these) don't insist on training pilots in the use of the autopilot on transition courses, something is drastically wrong.
When the authorities don't insist on making sure the pilot can manage the systems on the helicopter, something is drastically wrong.
Why don't the insurance companies do something??? (any insurance people who want to PM me, I'd be happy to help you set up courses to ensure your covered folks know how to use the equipment....)
Gentlemen, I believe we are again digressing.
The nature of EMS flying (by far the highest accident prone helicopter industry in the US and afar) in the US is dictated by revenues and income, there are private structures that actually make money only by flying helicopters in EMS.
This is different from Germany, England, Spain, Italy, etc.
Any, ANY overhead decreases the take, hence the Operators and Customers vie for the smallest possible expense that can cope with rules and regulations.
This is why we have companies flying unaided night VFR with underpowered Bell 206L helicopters (example in the recent crash).
However we should not limit our critics to these type of operators since there have been accidents spread all over the quality spectrum, from IFR twins, to highly experienced pilots.
IFR, would simply be one of the qualifiers since it would simply (as Mr.Lappos correctly point out) weed out the bummers, however there ought to be other mechanisms in place to protect the pilots' operational control and keep the "white knights" from killing themselves and others.
So, what are we to do, because none of the arguments (as valid as they are) so far discussed "can fix stupid".
The nature of EMS flying (by far the highest accident prone helicopter industry in the US and afar) in the US is dictated by revenues and income, there are private structures that actually make money only by flying helicopters in EMS.
This is different from Germany, England, Spain, Italy, etc.
Any, ANY overhead decreases the take, hence the Operators and Customers vie for the smallest possible expense that can cope with rules and regulations.
This is why we have companies flying unaided night VFR with underpowered Bell 206L helicopters (example in the recent crash).
However we should not limit our critics to these type of operators since there have been accidents spread all over the quality spectrum, from IFR twins, to highly experienced pilots.
IFR, would simply be one of the qualifiers since it would simply (as Mr.Lappos correctly point out) weed out the bummers, however there ought to be other mechanisms in place to protect the pilots' operational control and keep the "white knights" from killing themselves and others.
So, what are we to do, because none of the arguments (as valid as they are) so far discussed "can fix stupid".
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An autopilot can kill you as quickly as anything else, maybe quicker, if you don't know exactly how to use it and don't stay proficient at using it. IFR isn't the answer if the pilots don't fly IFR consistently. Proficiency comes from constant practice, whether you have 1000 or 20,000 hours. Proficiency comes slowly and goes away very quickly. If you're primarily flying EMS scene flights, you're flying VFR, because there is just no other way to get to the scene. If the system Nick envisions existed, it should be possible to do the trip to the hospital and back to the base IFR, but the trip to the scene will always be VFR. VFR flying, especially at night, requires proficiency and practice just as much as IFR flying. There will have to be the ability to fly many hours of training in addition to the EMS flights, and that requires the med crew to be willing to go out in the dark and sit in the back while the pilot trains, because a call can come at any time, and the crew has to be together. It's a difficult and complicated situation, with no easy answers. Technology alone isn't an answer, and never will be. I'll take all the technology I can get, but without working with it constantly, it can sometimes be worse than no technology. Designers of aircraft and autopilots seem to have little clue about how things actually work in the aviation world, and about what pilots need and how the information needs to be displayed. Autopilot workings, and what is required to get a desired result, are not intuitive at all, and much training is required. No 20,000 hour pilot I have ever seen can get into the seat of an S76C++ or an S92 and fly it proficiently. It's not hard to fly manually, but working the autopilot takes a LOT of training and practice. It won't get better in my lifetime. Nick wants autopilots that can do everything for the pilot, but they don't exist, and won't exist for decades, if at all. The human interface is far too primitive, and the designers aren't making much progress.
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The IFR dilemma
The helicopter world could be divided into those that never expect to use an IFR capability, those that need it for 'in-extremis' situations and those that need to undertake IFR ops as a matter of course.
The problem areas are the first two. Those that say they never need it not only do not train for it but they don't equip the helicopter for it either. Then they get suckered into an 'inadvertent IFR' situation and WHALLOP!!!! If they could be trusted to make the right decisions then we would not be seeing an increasing number of VFR pilots flying VFR machines into the ground. The answer - make an IMC rating a 'must have' at the PPL level and only certify helicopters equipped with basic IFR equipment unless they are part of a flight school fleet and the flights are supervised by a 'Duty Instructor'.
Those that fly only occasional IFR somehow turn the logic on its head and translate that into a minimal training reqime. Surely common sense dictates that if you may need to do something and you don't get much practice for real then the only recourse is to MORE regular (competence-based) training. I am not surprised when guys and gals who are not current don't perform as well as they would like and certainly not to a standard they are capable of.
Now that we have generic or type-specific FTDs and FFSs suitable for almost every type there is little excuse for not removing this horrendous anomaly from our world. Stop making excuses - get out there and do it........ and tell your insurance company whilst you are at it. The sooner the insurance industry wises up the better.
G
The problem areas are the first two. Those that say they never need it not only do not train for it but they don't equip the helicopter for it either. Then they get suckered into an 'inadvertent IFR' situation and WHALLOP!!!! If they could be trusted to make the right decisions then we would not be seeing an increasing number of VFR pilots flying VFR machines into the ground. The answer - make an IMC rating a 'must have' at the PPL level and only certify helicopters equipped with basic IFR equipment unless they are part of a flight school fleet and the flights are supervised by a 'Duty Instructor'.
Those that fly only occasional IFR somehow turn the logic on its head and translate that into a minimal training reqime. Surely common sense dictates that if you may need to do something and you don't get much practice for real then the only recourse is to MORE regular (competence-based) training. I am not surprised when guys and gals who are not current don't perform as well as they would like and certainly not to a standard they are capable of.
Now that we have generic or type-specific FTDs and FFSs suitable for almost every type there is little excuse for not removing this horrendous anomaly from our world. Stop making excuses - get out there and do it........ and tell your insurance company whilst you are at it. The sooner the insurance industry wises up the better.
G