GOM Air Log crash and AEL ems crash
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after checking on a friend working for air log who thankfully wasn't flying that day I believe it was a 206L as previously reported. pilot survived. also there seems to be 2 versions of survivors in the news. 1 version is that 4 people taken to hospital 2nd ver is only 3 people found 1 missing. any more news ?
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" all caused by night or bad weather"
I beg to differ. I believe night and bad weather were/are FACTORS in so many of these sad and sorry occurrences. ( Maybe not these two)
In my own personal experience the wisdom and the courage to say NO has been the biggest single factor in my situations that I would not like to repeat.
Condolences to the the loved ones of those lost, especially at this time of year.
Happy New Year to you all and may God grant you the wisdom to make the right decisions and the intestinal fortitude to live with the consequences.
In my own personal experience the wisdom and the courage to say NO has been the biggest single factor in my situations that I would not like to repeat.
Condolences to the the loved ones of those lost, especially at this time of year.
Happy New Year to you all and may God grant you the wisdom to make the right decisions and the intestinal fortitude to live with the consequences.
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I have seen serious mistakes in FAA preliminary reports, and the media get it wrong more often than right. I've seen the wrong aircraft type on the FAA site more than once, and many of them read as if the writer had never even seen a picture of an aircraft. I'll wait for an NTSB report to see what actually happened in both these accidents.
I'm with you Gomer.
It is absolutely incredible that by post #2 of this thread;
and some following posts appear to agree with the same interpretation.
Now it is my turn to surmise and interpret these comments - it is OBVIOUSLY the fault of each of the pilots involved. No consideration to FACT; circumstance, for the pilot; aircraft; external or internal conditions; physical condition of the aircraft or systems; failures of any kind - nothing - just that they are really self explanatory!
Well, I'm sorry, but I don't see anything self explanatory about either? Maybe I'm not smart enough to see what is so self explanatory about any of this?
The one thing that is self explanatory is the immediate rush to ignore any facts (the outcome is the sole fact at this time) and immediately pin all the blame on the pilot.
I hope to God that no-one ever does that to you, should you have the misfortune to be involved in an accident!
Unbelievable.
It is absolutely incredible that by post #2 of this thread;
Both accidents are really self explanatory.
Now it is my turn to surmise and interpret these comments - it is OBVIOUSLY the fault of each of the pilots involved. No consideration to FACT; circumstance, for the pilot; aircraft; external or internal conditions; physical condition of the aircraft or systems; failures of any kind - nothing - just that they are really self explanatory!
Well, I'm sorry, but I don't see anything self explanatory about either? Maybe I'm not smart enough to see what is so self explanatory about any of this?
The one thing that is self explanatory is the immediate rush to ignore any facts (the outcome is the sole fact at this time) and immediately pin all the blame on the pilot.
I hope to God that no-one ever does that to you, should you have the misfortune to be involved in an accident!
Unbelievable.
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Yeah, the "self explanatory" thing was a pretty callous comment.
Letting people make inane comments on this "professional" forum
should not go unchallenged. As for the GOM accident, I think we are
going to find it happened closer to 4:00. Please, no more nasty-grams
tottigol.
Letting people make inane comments on this "professional" forum
should not go unchallenged. As for the GOM accident, I think we are
going to find it happened closer to 4:00. Please, no more nasty-grams
tottigol.
Some FACTS. Both preliminary reports are at; http://origin.www.faa.gov/data_stati...a/J_1231_N.txt
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 211EL Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 12/29/2007 Time: 2350
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Fatal Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Destroyed
LOCATION
City: NEW ORLEANS State: LA Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N211EL, A BELL 206L-1 ROTORCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, THERE WERE FOUR PERSONS ON BOARD, ONE WAS FATALLY INJURED, ONE SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES, AND TWO SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, LOCATED 65 MILES FROM NEW ORLEANS, LA
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 1
# Crew: 4 Fat: 1 Ser: 1 Min: 2 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: NOT REPORTED
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 12/31/2007
IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 211EL Make/Model: B206 Description: BELL 206B HELICOPTER
Date: 12/29/2007 Time: 2350
Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Fatal Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Destroyed
LOCATION
City: NEW ORLEANS State: LA Country: US
DESCRIPTION
N211EL, A BELL 206L-1 ROTORCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, THERE WERE FOUR PERSONS ON BOARD, ONE WAS FATALLY INJURED, ONE SUSTAINED SERIOUS INJURIES, AND TWO SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, LOCATED 65 MILES FROM NEW ORLEANS, LA
INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 1
# Crew: 4 Fat: 1 Ser: 1 Min: 2 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
WEATHER: NOT REPORTED
OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER
FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 12/31/2007
I have a question for the coscientious in this group:
Let's suppose you are out there not "really" doing what you're supposed to do, but you've been there before and were lucky; so you go and do it again, only this time something happens, perhaps the engine fails, perhaps you have LTE, perhaps your T/R fails, perhaps there are power lines or some embedded thunderstorm that's too dark to see.
What is the NTSB report going to say?
Are we going to blame Rolls Royce? Bell? The Power Company? Or the lack of NVGs?
Is it the NTSB job to keep us from painting us in those corners, or is the guy/girl looking at you in the mirror whom is supposed to do that?
God bless their Souls and may they all rest to the right of the Lord.
Happy New Year Celebration to all.
Let's suppose you are out there not "really" doing what you're supposed to do, but you've been there before and were lucky; so you go and do it again, only this time something happens, perhaps the engine fails, perhaps you have LTE, perhaps your T/R fails, perhaps there are power lines or some embedded thunderstorm that's too dark to see.
What is the NTSB report going to say?
Are we going to blame Rolls Royce? Bell? The Power Company? Or the lack of NVGs?
Is it the NTSB job to keep us from painting us in those corners, or is the guy/girl looking at you in the mirror whom is supposed to do that?
God bless their Souls and may they all rest to the right of the Lord.
Happy New Year Celebration to all.
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NTSB Identification: DFW08FA053
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On December 29, 2007, at 1531 central standard time, a single-engine Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, impacted the water in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of control during approach. One passenger was fatally injured, while the commercial pilot and two other passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter was owned and operated by Air Logistics LLC., of New Iberia, Louisiana. The flight originated from offshore platform Chandelier 63 and was destined for offshore platform South Pass 38, both in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. All times in this report will be based on central standard time using the 24-hour format.
In a telephone interview with the NTSB, the pilot reported encountering a "sloping cloud deck" as he approached the offshore platform for landing. The pilot added that while in a left turn to final approach, he began slowing the helicopter to 20-25 knots and encountered a tail wind. The pilot noticed a settling tendency and reduced the left bank. Additionally, the pilot reported experiencing vibrations and shaking from the helicopter. The pilot added forward cyclic and increased power. The vibration and shaking became worse and the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event. Due to the low altitude, the pilot was unable to recover the helicopter or deploy the emergency floatation devices prior to water impact. All four occupants survived the initial crash and egressed the helicopter.
A life raft was not deployed prior to the helicopter sinking. The four personnel attempted to swim to the unmanned platform located approximately 100 yards away and were separated by the 8 to 10 foot wave swells. Personnel were located by local boats and the United States Coast Guard. The pilot, who was the last survivor to be rescued from the water, was in the water for approximately 2 and 1/2 hours.
The helicopter sank in approximately 115 feet of water. The helicopter was located and recovery is in progress. Upon recovery the helicopter will be transported to a secure facility pending examination at a later date.
The pilot reported the weather at South Pass 38 was estimated to start at 500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility and reduce to approximately 300 feet ceiling and one mile visibility on final. At 1751 an automated weather reporting facility located about 22-nautical miles to the northwest reported winds from 030 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 1,000- feet, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 51 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.05 inches of Mercury.
Index for Dec2007 | Index of months
Just thought I'd point out to Tott, that it wasn't 18:00 as he reported twice.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Saturday, December 29, 2007 in Venice, LA
Aircraft: Bell 206L1, registration: N211EL
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious, 2 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On December 29, 2007, at 1531 central standard time, a single-engine Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, impacted the water in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of control during approach. One passenger was fatally injured, while the commercial pilot and two other passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter was owned and operated by Air Logistics LLC., of New Iberia, Louisiana. The flight originated from offshore platform Chandelier 63 and was destined for offshore platform South Pass 38, both in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. All times in this report will be based on central standard time using the 24-hour format.
In a telephone interview with the NTSB, the pilot reported encountering a "sloping cloud deck" as he approached the offshore platform for landing. The pilot added that while in a left turn to final approach, he began slowing the helicopter to 20-25 knots and encountered a tail wind. The pilot noticed a settling tendency and reduced the left bank. Additionally, the pilot reported experiencing vibrations and shaking from the helicopter. The pilot added forward cyclic and increased power. The vibration and shaking became worse and the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event. Due to the low altitude, the pilot was unable to recover the helicopter or deploy the emergency floatation devices prior to water impact. All four occupants survived the initial crash and egressed the helicopter.
A life raft was not deployed prior to the helicopter sinking. The four personnel attempted to swim to the unmanned platform located approximately 100 yards away and were separated by the 8 to 10 foot wave swells. Personnel were located by local boats and the United States Coast Guard. The pilot, who was the last survivor to be rescued from the water, was in the water for approximately 2 and 1/2 hours.
The helicopter sank in approximately 115 feet of water. The helicopter was located and recovery is in progress. Upon recovery the helicopter will be transported to a secure facility pending examination at a later date.
The pilot reported the weather at South Pass 38 was estimated to start at 500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility and reduce to approximately 300 feet ceiling and one mile visibility on final. At 1751 an automated weather reporting facility located about 22-nautical miles to the northwest reported winds from 030 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 1,000- feet, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 51 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.05 inches of Mercury.
Index for Dec2007 | Index of months
Just thought I'd point out to Tott, that it wasn't 18:00 as he reported twice.
18:00 was the time of the Emergency message from the shrimp boat, apparently when they found the survivors.
Nobody was looking for this helicopter in over two hours that it was missing?
Was a VFR flight plan ever filed with flight following?
From the NTSB report it appears that SP38 was his destination.
Guess what, I believe the rest is...............self explanatory.
I hope ya'll can read a report.
Nobody was looking for this helicopter in over two hours that it was missing?
Was a VFR flight plan ever filed with flight following?
From the NTSB report it appears that SP38 was his destination.
Guess what, I believe the rest is...............self explanatory.
I hope ya'll can read a report.
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Enhanced operational control has made great strides in reducing the occurrence of just this sort of mishap in the Gulf of Mexico. However, this one apparently slipped through the crack. While pilot error may well be assigned as the primary cause in this accident, there appears to be plenty of blame left over for a system or supervisor which allowed him to proceed into unsuitable weather.
-Stan-
-Stan-
Stan Grossman noted:
Maybe, Stan, but maybe not. You know better than I what the current policies are when there are areas of bad weather about. But isn't the pilot still the final judge? We know the weather that day was up and down. Is Enhanced Operation Control good enough that it can pinpoint areas and have the Lead Pilots (or whomever) say, "Don't go there." This flight was from two platforms relatively close to the beach. And the pilot did report that he generally had a 500' ceiling in the area of Southwest Pass.
It's very tough, as you know Stan. The weather in the GOM is rarely "smoothly" bad...in other words, the same level of "bad" in every area. On bad-weather days, it's often "okay" in some/most places and "really, really crappy" in others. And those "really, really crappy" areas move. I'm sure the Lead Pilots rely on a variety of resources for their Operational Control decisions...primarily reports from the pilots who are actually out there.
tottigol asked:
As in all things, the answer is "it depends."
If the pilot had not closed his flight plan, then Air Log would normally start looking for him at his stated ETA. However, many GOM pilots close their flight plans when they are on final or get "reasonably" close to their destination in contravention of the rules in the Operations Manual. If a flight plan is closed, then nobody will begin looking for the aircraft until two hours has passed - the famous "two-hour checks." Even when we're shut down safely on a platform all day, we still have to check-in every two hours just to let the company know we're okay.
So...*if* an immediate search was not begun, then we can assume that the flight plan was closed.
At South Pass 38 is very close to "land" (or what constitutes land in south Louisiana), just to the north and east of what most people identify as the "mouth" of the Mississippi River (although there are numerous outlets) at the entrance to what is called East Bay between Southwest Pass and South Pass. The pilot *should* have been able to be in contact with Air Log Ops while sitting on the deck.
Some pilots will close their flight plan prematurely if they are landing at a distant platform at which VHF communication with the Comm Center is "iffy" or doubtful. Some pilots then get into the habit of doing this everywhere. It is a grave error. During my 13 years at PHI, I knew plenty of pilots who would routinely call "landing" when they were still a mile or two out! Or they'd take-off and not file their new plan until they were well underway. This left them in what we called a "flight-following void"...i.e. being airborne and on a flight without a plan, which is counter to the FARs.
At such platforms without direct VHF commo (and there are quite a few in PHI's system), I used to open up a 30-minute "local" flight plan. That way, if anything happened and I was not able to get a call off, I knew PHI would start looking for me within thirty minutes. If I ended up simply landing and shutting down, I'd walk downstairs, pick up the phone, close my flight plan and start the two-hour check cycle.
So there are ways of doing it right.
We do not know whether this Air Log pilot's plan was open or closed. However, if there was a long delay in beginning the search, the ONLY assumption must be that he was not on a flight plan for some reason. But from the NTSB report and the pilot's statements to that agency, it sounds like he's already admitted to a downwind landing. Why? There is no excuse for doing that, and certainly no excuse for admitting it! At least, not until all the facts of the case are known. (We pilots sure do like incriminating ourselves - but that is another topic for another thread.)
What makes me scratch my head is the report of 8 to 10 foot swells. Eight to ten feet! In that relatively protected area?? I'll tell you what, the wind must have been howling to generate waves of that height. Something doesn't seem right. OR...perhaps the northeast surface wind was light and the big swells were from the south and leftover from the nasty system that had just passed through. (My personal assumption is that there was a storm cell in the area and the winds were high. But this is troubling; any GOM pilot worth his salt can quickly and easily discern wind direction/velocity from the water surface.)
Obviously, there was a lot of bad weather in the area. I've made my share of landings to platforms that were just about to "go under." That close to the "beach," the pilot had plenty of options if the landing had to be aborted. Dry land in the form of the levees on either side of the Mississippi River were a mere minute away to the west. Also, there were plenty of other platforms/landing sites in the area. So it wasn't like SP38 was the only place to set down for miles around...
The pilot stated to the NTSB that he didn't pop the floats "due to the low altitude." Huh? This is a strange admission. Was he not at 300 feet when he turned final? The floats were most certainly armed (that's a given) and the "trigger" is as close as your right-hand ring finger. If you know you're going into the water, even from 300 feet, it doesn't take a lot to pull that switch. So there's another thing I would not have admitted to the feds.
When the accident sequence begins, things start happening very, very quickly. It takes a few beats for our minds (and hands) to catch-up. People think that flying in the GOM is so "easy" or unchallenging. And they're wrong. I don't know what the exact weather was as this poor pilot was beginning his ill-fated approach to SP38, but it very quickly went sour and out of control. All of us who've flown in the GOM have been in his place, making a low-weather approach in high winds.
If I were to criticize this pilot now, the only thing I'd say to him is, "KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT!"...at least until things have settled and he can collect his thoughts and we can figure out what went wrong. I know he feels awful right now. But as it is, he's stepped on his unit big time already with those statements to the NTSB, no matter what his ultimate level of responsibility for the crash will be.
...There appears to be plenty of blame left over for a system or supervisor which allowed him to proceed into unsuitable weather.
It's very tough, as you know Stan. The weather in the GOM is rarely "smoothly" bad...in other words, the same level of "bad" in every area. On bad-weather days, it's often "okay" in some/most places and "really, really crappy" in others. And those "really, really crappy" areas move. I'm sure the Lead Pilots rely on a variety of resources for their Operational Control decisions...primarily reports from the pilots who are actually out there.
tottigol asked:
Nobody was looking for this helicopter in over two hours that it was missing?
If the pilot had not closed his flight plan, then Air Log would normally start looking for him at his stated ETA. However, many GOM pilots close their flight plans when they are on final or get "reasonably" close to their destination in contravention of the rules in the Operations Manual. If a flight plan is closed, then nobody will begin looking for the aircraft until two hours has passed - the famous "two-hour checks." Even when we're shut down safely on a platform all day, we still have to check-in every two hours just to let the company know we're okay.
So...*if* an immediate search was not begun, then we can assume that the flight plan was closed.
At South Pass 38 is very close to "land" (or what constitutes land in south Louisiana), just to the north and east of what most people identify as the "mouth" of the Mississippi River (although there are numerous outlets) at the entrance to what is called East Bay between Southwest Pass and South Pass. The pilot *should* have been able to be in contact with Air Log Ops while sitting on the deck.
Some pilots will close their flight plan prematurely if they are landing at a distant platform at which VHF communication with the Comm Center is "iffy" or doubtful. Some pilots then get into the habit of doing this everywhere. It is a grave error. During my 13 years at PHI, I knew plenty of pilots who would routinely call "landing" when they were still a mile or two out! Or they'd take-off and not file their new plan until they were well underway. This left them in what we called a "flight-following void"...i.e. being airborne and on a flight without a plan, which is counter to the FARs.
At such platforms without direct VHF commo (and there are quite a few in PHI's system), I used to open up a 30-minute "local" flight plan. That way, if anything happened and I was not able to get a call off, I knew PHI would start looking for me within thirty minutes. If I ended up simply landing and shutting down, I'd walk downstairs, pick up the phone, close my flight plan and start the two-hour check cycle.
So there are ways of doing it right.
We do not know whether this Air Log pilot's plan was open or closed. However, if there was a long delay in beginning the search, the ONLY assumption must be that he was not on a flight plan for some reason. But from the NTSB report and the pilot's statements to that agency, it sounds like he's already admitted to a downwind landing. Why? There is no excuse for doing that, and certainly no excuse for admitting it! At least, not until all the facts of the case are known. (We pilots sure do like incriminating ourselves - but that is another topic for another thread.)
What makes me scratch my head is the report of 8 to 10 foot swells. Eight to ten feet! In that relatively protected area?? I'll tell you what, the wind must have been howling to generate waves of that height. Something doesn't seem right. OR...perhaps the northeast surface wind was light and the big swells were from the south and leftover from the nasty system that had just passed through. (My personal assumption is that there was a storm cell in the area and the winds were high. But this is troubling; any GOM pilot worth his salt can quickly and easily discern wind direction/velocity from the water surface.)
Obviously, there was a lot of bad weather in the area. I've made my share of landings to platforms that were just about to "go under." That close to the "beach," the pilot had plenty of options if the landing had to be aborted. Dry land in the form of the levees on either side of the Mississippi River were a mere minute away to the west. Also, there were plenty of other platforms/landing sites in the area. So it wasn't like SP38 was the only place to set down for miles around...
The pilot stated to the NTSB that he didn't pop the floats "due to the low altitude." Huh? This is a strange admission. Was he not at 300 feet when he turned final? The floats were most certainly armed (that's a given) and the "trigger" is as close as your right-hand ring finger. If you know you're going into the water, even from 300 feet, it doesn't take a lot to pull that switch. So there's another thing I would not have admitted to the feds.
When the accident sequence begins, things start happening very, very quickly. It takes a few beats for our minds (and hands) to catch-up. People think that flying in the GOM is so "easy" or unchallenging. And they're wrong. I don't know what the exact weather was as this poor pilot was beginning his ill-fated approach to SP38, but it very quickly went sour and out of control. All of us who've flown in the GOM have been in his place, making a low-weather approach in high winds.
If I were to criticize this pilot now, the only thing I'd say to him is, "KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT!"...at least until things have settled and he can collect his thoughts and we can figure out what went wrong. I know he feels awful right now. But as it is, he's stepped on his unit big time already with those statements to the NTSB, no matter what his ultimate level of responsibility for the crash will be.
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Doesn't sound like weather had much to do with it (other than the wind
blowing the wrong way). Hard for a system or supervisor to keep
someone from making a downwind approach. Curious as why the floats
didn't get deployed. Oh, I guess that would be "self explanatory". I'll
resist the urge to put up the little winky face.
blowing the wrong way). Hard for a system or supervisor to keep
someone from making a downwind approach. Curious as why the floats
didn't get deployed. Oh, I guess that would be "self explanatory". I'll
resist the urge to put up the little winky face.
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FH1100 Pilot & helonorth,
I had been flying that day out of Morgan City. We enjoyed the same weather system earlier that brought such joy to the Venice area. Due to the wind, convective weather, and the intermittent low clouds and vis I would not have considered flying my IFR-capable medium twin under VFR. I can't imagine that the weather in Venice was much better than what I had seen.
The scenario that seems most likely to me is that due to inadequate supervision an eager but inexperienced pilot was allowed to go out into a combintion of weather conditions that overloaded his capabilities. Did he display poor judgement? Probably. Did he display poor piloting skill? On that occasion, apparently yes. But was he solely responsible for the decision to make that flight, and if so, why?
Some may see management entering the decision-making loop as interference and an infringement on their prerogative as PIC, but on many occasions it's the saving grace that takes the pressure (real or perceived) off the back of the pilot. I'm not advocating that we absolve the pilot of guilt, but by the same token, let's not overlook the responsibility of the manager in this situation.
-Stan-
I had been flying that day out of Morgan City. We enjoyed the same weather system earlier that brought such joy to the Venice area. Due to the wind, convective weather, and the intermittent low clouds and vis I would not have considered flying my IFR-capable medium twin under VFR. I can't imagine that the weather in Venice was much better than what I had seen.
The scenario that seems most likely to me is that due to inadequate supervision an eager but inexperienced pilot was allowed to go out into a combintion of weather conditions that overloaded his capabilities. Did he display poor judgement? Probably. Did he display poor piloting skill? On that occasion, apparently yes. But was he solely responsible for the decision to make that flight, and if so, why?
Some may see management entering the decision-making loop as interference and an infringement on their prerogative as PIC, but on many occasions it's the saving grace that takes the pressure (real or perceived) off the back of the pilot. I'm not advocating that we absolve the pilot of guilt, but by the same token, let's not overlook the responsibility of the manager in this situation.
-Stan-
Last edited by slgrossman; 2nd Jan 2008 at 02:33.
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Why would Cyclic Hotline and myself be stomping our feet? Apparently
you feel some new information vindicates whatever it is you've been
trying to say. I just thought it was funny that you bought the whole
thing that it went into the water at 6:00. Even I figured that out.
When I posted that it didn't make sense that a 206 would be flying
then, you "corrected" me that it was indeed a 206, when I meant that
I couldn't figure out why a 206 was out in the DARK. Oh well, have a
good time and thanks for the winky face.
To fh1100 pilot: I like the idea of opening a local when you can't get
flight following on the deck, but I bet 1 out of three times the pilot
would head for the fridge and forget to call and close, if there was a
phone. The Blue Sky system will fill the gap.
you feel some new information vindicates whatever it is you've been
trying to say. I just thought it was funny that you bought the whole
thing that it went into the water at 6:00. Even I figured that out.
When I posted that it didn't make sense that a 206 would be flying
then, you "corrected" me that it was indeed a 206, when I meant that
I couldn't figure out why a 206 was out in the DARK. Oh well, have a
good time and thanks for the winky face.
To fh1100 pilot: I like the idea of opening a local when you can't get
flight following on the deck, but I bet 1 out of three times the pilot
would head for the fridge and forget to call and close, if there was a
phone. The Blue Sky system will fill the gap.
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There has been a dumbing down of Pprune in the last months due to people's innate desire to display their knowledge, insider's knowledge, and wisdom before any real facts have emerged (fine they may have been correct - but not many and it just leads to stupid bitching, and now flungdung spitting out his dummy and leaping out of the cot). Probably the result of spreading the proverbial!.
Moderators ... are we there? As we seem unable to regulate ourselves and our two'penn'orth - why not simply state that comments should be left until a preliminary report (well done C of G) has been received and posted, from the authority? Thankfully this latest one, with survivors, was able to be clear and concise - and then you can say what the hell you like, before making an ass of yourself?
And quite right about keeping your mouth shut (meaning opinions) when speaking to the Feds post accident - but of course, if you had a Union that would have been the instruction you would already have had from them!!! Sorry, I digress but couldn't resist - perhaps another topic ......
Moderators ... are we there? As we seem unable to regulate ourselves and our two'penn'orth - why not simply state that comments should be left until a preliminary report (well done C of G) has been received and posted, from the authority? Thankfully this latest one, with survivors, was able to be clear and concise - and then you can say what the hell you like, before making an ass of yourself?
And quite right about keeping your mouth shut (meaning opinions) when speaking to the Feds post accident - but of course, if you had a Union that would have been the instruction you would already have had from them!!! Sorry, I digress but couldn't resist - perhaps another topic ......
tistisnot:
But the Air Log pilot *is* in a union! His union rep should have met him at the hospital. I'm surprised he did not counsel the pilot to keep his big mouth shut and just say, "I'm too rattled right now. I've just been in a crash, you know, and I don't really remember much. I'll have to collect my thoughts. Let my head clear and if you'll give me your number I'll get back to you as soon as I can."
The rules only state that we have to report the accident within a given amount of time. Nowhere does it say we have to incriminate ourselves by writing the NTSB's report for them before the wreckage has even cooled.
Stan Grossman:
Well that brings up a good question: Were any of PHI's small ships flying out of Boothville that afternoon?
And you are quite right about Enhanced Operational Control taking at least some of the burden off the pilot. I can't stand when somebody tells me I *have* to go, but I really don't mind somebody from management telling me that I can't go. You don't want me to make the flight? No sweat off of my...nose! Takes the pressure right of, it does.
helonorth:
Yeah, and so what? Worst thing that happens is that some Comm Spec has to track down a helicopter that is safely shut-down on a deck somewhere. And yeah, it's happened to me once or twice (he says with a shrug). They always acted all peeved, like I had committed some heinous crime. But I was, like, "Get over it, it's your job." Better that they have to look for me that way than have me close the plan in the air, then go in the drink have to wait for a couple of hours before they noticed I was missing.
And quite right about keeping your mouth shut (meaning opinions) when speaking to the Feds post accident - but of course, if you had a Union that would have been the instruction you would already have had from them!!! Sorry, I digress but couldn't resist - perhaps another topic ......
The rules only state that we have to report the accident within a given amount of time. Nowhere does it say we have to incriminate ourselves by writing the NTSB's report for them before the wreckage has even cooled.
Stan Grossman:
I had been flying that day out of Morgan City. We enjoyed the same weather system earlier that brought such joy to the Venice area. Due to the wind, convective weather, and the intermittent low clouds and vis I would not have considered flying my IFR-capable medium twin under VFR. I can't imagine that the weather in Venice was much better than what I had seen.
And you are quite right about Enhanced Operational Control taking at least some of the burden off the pilot. I can't stand when somebody tells me I *have* to go, but I really don't mind somebody from management telling me that I can't go. You don't want me to make the flight? No sweat off of my...nose! Takes the pressure right of, it does.
helonorth:
I like the idea of opening a local when you can't get
flight following on the deck, but I bet 1 out of three times the pilot
would head for the fridge and forget to call and close, if there was a
phone.
flight following on the deck, but I bet 1 out of three times the pilot
would head for the fridge and forget to call and close, if there was a
phone.
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Weather was bad enough for a Level 2 - no flight with out base manager approval - in the venice area. Seemingly he did have approval from the base manager. The pilot (relatively new with only a few months with the company) seems to have continue flight in bad to worsening conditions.
Looks like to me like inadequate supervision by management, to let an inexperienced pilot go out into a combination of weather conditions that overloaded him.
I have known many occasions that management has entered the loop to take the pressure off the back of the pilot. Does not seem to have happened this time.
Not only does the pilot but also management has a share in this.
Looks like to me like inadequate supervision by management, to let an inexperienced pilot go out into a combination of weather conditions that overloaded him.
I have known many occasions that management has entered the loop to take the pressure off the back of the pilot. Does not seem to have happened this time.
Not only does the pilot but also management has a share in this.