G-JSAR
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G-JSAR
Was wondering if there had been any further findings with regard to the G-JSAR ditching.
Having googled 'G-JSAR', came accross this video.
YouTube - G-Jsar scramble
Apologies in advance if it's already been posted somewhere!
Having googled 'G-JSAR', came accross this video.
YouTube - G-Jsar scramble
Apologies in advance if it's already been posted somewhere!
I have seen some crap videos on youtube but that one is really bad! Unfortunately no clues yet from the Dutch AIB as to possible causes. Yes, it seems to be taking for ever!
HC
HC
JSAR
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Life after death!
Good to hear that jsar has been reborn and now haunts transylvania!!
Heared a wisper ,some time ago, that Bond had been enquiring as to her health. Rumoured, as a addition to the jigsaw pair. They were advised, by ECF, that the rebuild costs would exceed the price of a new build 225.
Heared a wisper ,some time ago, that Bond had been enquiring as to her health. Rumoured, as a addition to the jigsaw pair. They were advised, by ECF, that the rebuild costs would exceed the price of a new build 225.
Chief Bottle Washer
Another video from YouTube:
The final report is published today by the Dutch Safety Board:
Emergency landing in sea, AS322L2 Search and rescue helicopter, North Sea near Den Helder - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid
HC
ps: Its long!
Emergency landing in sea, AS322L2 Search and rescue helicopter, North Sea near Den Helder - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid
HC
ps: Its long!
The Summary is short and to the point!
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1996 Eurocopter Internal Report
Any further information about the nature of this "significant controllability problem" ?
(Accident Report, Page 120, Conclusion 12.)
(Accident Report, Page 120, Conclusion 12.)
Last edited by marcr; 24th Feb 2010 at 11:07. Reason: To include reference for above comment.
HC,
In my experience teaching in the Sim.....I and other instructors noted a distinct tendency amongst pilots of all backgrounds to immediately kick off the AutoPilot and grab manual control when Alarms and Warning Lights of any kind activated.
Is there a technical reason the crew would have had to take the Action they did with the Auto Pilot in this accident? Was there a SOP, Flying Instruction or similar that dictated such a response prior to the onset of control issues or the decision to descend?
Considering the engine issues.....the report states the engines were sustaining flight despite the unusual indications which fit no checklist procedure. Would the aircraft have maintained flight on a single engine at the weight, temps, and altitude they were operating?
If the Factory could obtain a control degradation by test flying the profile used by the crew.....is that a "normal" situation for the Aircraft Model in question and has it been documented before the accident during testing? Is there a design flaw in the flight control system that is inherent to the design?
Is this another example of problems akin to but different of the EC Jack Stall problem in the 350/355 series?
In my experience teaching in the Sim.....I and other instructors noted a distinct tendency amongst pilots of all backgrounds to immediately kick off the AutoPilot and grab manual control when Alarms and Warning Lights of any kind activated.
Is there a technical reason the crew would have had to take the Action they did with the Auto Pilot in this accident? Was there a SOP, Flying Instruction or similar that dictated such a response prior to the onset of control issues or the decision to descend?
Considering the engine issues.....the report states the engines were sustaining flight despite the unusual indications which fit no checklist procedure. Would the aircraft have maintained flight on a single engine at the weight, temps, and altitude they were operating?
If the Factory could obtain a control degradation by test flying the profile used by the crew.....is that a "normal" situation for the Aircraft Model in question and has it been documented before the accident during testing? Is there a design flaw in the flight control system that is inherent to the design?
Is this another example of problems akin to but different of the EC Jack Stall problem in the 350/355 series?
SAS
No, there was no technical reason to dump the upper modes. Use of the upper modes/automation was a key area of training since this aircraft had transition down to a fix, auto-hover etc. However with hindsight I think that too much training time was spent on SAR-type training and not enough on normal and abnormal general flying operations. The Ops Man didn't specifically say to engage upper modes when there was a problem, though that was generally the culture in the company. Of course its now in the manual...
I think the very limited Simulator training these pilots received was an issue - there can be no doubt that Sim training familiarises pilots with how to deal with emergencies as a crew, something that cannot be learned outside the Sim other than by making mistakes.
The engine problems did not cause any loss of power, and to answer your question yes they had easy OEI stayup capability. There was some discussios about why they decended, but as far as I was concerned it was because they were getting close to De Kooy and it was time to descend anyway for a VFR arrival, engine problem or not.
I think EC were trying to prove that it was the AP hydraulic problem, they did some test flying with AP Hydraulics out / cycling and showed that control movements could be made to match those of the accident flight, however there were many other scenarios that could also fit, so it didn't really prove anything. Not quite sure exactly what question you are asking here.
Since that type of aircraft has a millions of flight hours without a reputation for control jams, I doubt there is an inherent design issue, but we can't be certain! Its frustrating that I thought there must be a connection between the engine issue and the control problem (that started only a couple of minutes after the engine issue) but none could be found.
HC
No, there was no technical reason to dump the upper modes. Use of the upper modes/automation was a key area of training since this aircraft had transition down to a fix, auto-hover etc. However with hindsight I think that too much training time was spent on SAR-type training and not enough on normal and abnormal general flying operations. The Ops Man didn't specifically say to engage upper modes when there was a problem, though that was generally the culture in the company. Of course its now in the manual...
I think the very limited Simulator training these pilots received was an issue - there can be no doubt that Sim training familiarises pilots with how to deal with emergencies as a crew, something that cannot be learned outside the Sim other than by making mistakes.
The engine problems did not cause any loss of power, and to answer your question yes they had easy OEI stayup capability. There was some discussios about why they decended, but as far as I was concerned it was because they were getting close to De Kooy and it was time to descend anyway for a VFR arrival, engine problem or not.
I think EC were trying to prove that it was the AP hydraulic problem, they did some test flying with AP Hydraulics out / cycling and showed that control movements could be made to match those of the accident flight, however there were many other scenarios that could also fit, so it didn't really prove anything. Not quite sure exactly what question you are asking here.
Since that type of aircraft has a millions of flight hours without a reputation for control jams, I doubt there is an inherent design issue, but we can't be certain! Its frustrating that I thought there must be a connection between the engine issue and the control problem (that started only a couple of minutes after the engine issue) but none could be found.
HC
It makes one wonder how an engine power delta (deviation) could lead to cyclic control problems. No doubt they were there as it would take some motivation to put down at night in cold rough water rather than continue to land which was not so far away. As you rightly say....there are so many hours on the fleet it should be a well known flying characteristic if it were common to the aircraft.
One has to assume the engine problem and the flight control problems did not have a common cause as they are two very different systems.
One has to assume the engine problem and the flight control problems did not have a common cause as they are two very different systems.
SAS
However there is a place where engine governing meets flight controls - the anticipator, which is a pair of potentiometers that set each engine's N2 datum, and therefore have the power to cause the sort of engine fluctuations they experienced. The anticipator is located in the flight control cabinet and whilst its connected only to the collective pushrod, its adjacent to the cyclic pushrods.
Despite my feeling that this must have been the common link, the investigation found no evidence that there was any connection.
HC
the engine problem and the flight control problems did not have a common cause as they are two very different systems.
Despite my feeling that this must have been the common link, the investigation found no evidence that there was any connection.
HC
How could that cause cyclic problems? I can see where the wandering N2 issues would be possible....which would also affect Ng and other parameters.
Are you suggesting a physical binding of the cyclic controls by the Anticipator or perhaps an electrical or electronic interference? If a physical interference....would it be able for the cyclic controls to be blocked in all directions at one time? That would seem highly unlikely.
I do not believe in "coincidences"....the odds of the aircraft experiencing a some what confusing but relatively benign engine problem then experiencing a serious flight control problem, although not impossible, seems very unlikely from real life experience and from a statistical view.
Are you suggesting a physical binding of the cyclic controls by the Anticipator or perhaps an electrical or electronic interference? If a physical interference....would it be able for the cyclic controls to be blocked in all directions at one time? That would seem highly unlikely.
I do not believe in "coincidences"....the odds of the aircraft experiencing a some what confusing but relatively benign engine problem then experiencing a serious flight control problem, although not impossible, seems very unlikely from real life experience and from a statistical view.
Yes, it seemed to me likely that there was some physical interaction between the anticipator and the cyclic pushrods, eg wiring harness trapped / caught, bits fallen off the anticipator onto the lower bellcrank etc, but as I said, in fact no evidence to support that.
HC
HC
I view this as a great learning tool.
There are lots of lessons to learned and applied to current operations.
I would think "outside" reviews of one's operations do not harm anyone's job security. The lack of an objective review of policies, practices, and the like, set folks up for the ultimate embarrassment when their hunky dory cozy little world gets turned upside down by events such as this one. That is when folks get the can tied to their tail.
Bristow has been known to hold a "Daddy Knows Best" attitude in the past. Thus this should not come as a big surprise to anyone that is familiar with the evolution of the organization. Every large operator falls prey to that at some point thus Bristow is no different than any other in that regard.
What is important is to move forward with improvements after taking a cold hard look at how business is getting done and look for the holes in the Cheese ahead of time rather than after the fact.
There are lots of lessons to learned and applied to current operations.
I would think "outside" reviews of one's operations do not harm anyone's job security. The lack of an objective review of policies, practices, and the like, set folks up for the ultimate embarrassment when their hunky dory cozy little world gets turned upside down by events such as this one. That is when folks get the can tied to their tail.
Bristow has been known to hold a "Daddy Knows Best" attitude in the past. Thus this should not come as a big surprise to anyone that is familiar with the evolution of the organization. Every large operator falls prey to that at some point thus Bristow is no different than any other in that regard.
What is important is to move forward with improvements after taking a cold hard look at how business is getting done and look for the holes in the Cheese ahead of time rather than after the fact.
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P3 Bellows
Probably because we do not wish to inflict further pain? As SASless says - a good learning tool .....
But please, and I'll be shot down by many, for heavens sake:
Hanger or hangers may refer to:
Yours irrationally irritated
But please, and I'll be shot down by many, for heavens sake:
Hanger or hangers may refer to:
- Hanger, a woodland area on the side of a hill — road going through this woodland may be named 'Hanger Hill'
- Clothes hangar, device in the shape of human shoulders or legs used to hang clothes on
- Hanger steak, a tender cut of steak
- Casing hangar, part of a wellhead assembly in oil drilling
- Derailleur hangar, a slot in a bicycle frame where the derailleur bolt attaches to
- Monkey hangar, a British term for people from Hartlepool, England
- Hanger, part of a skateboard
- Hanger (weapon), a sword similar to a cutlass, used by woodsmen and soldiers in 17th to 18th centuries
- Hanger, or specky, a slang term for spectacular mark in Australian rules football
- Hangers, American slang for large, pendulous breasts
- Hanger (barbershop music), a long note sung by one voice in a barbershop music song
- A hangar is a vertical cable or rod connecting the roadway of a suspension bridge to the bridge's main cable or arch
- Hanger, a type of structural tie.
Yours irrationally irritated
