PHI lose S76 in GOM
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The kid's account is interesting, but if it is accurate it raises one big question for me.
PHI's flight-following procedures dictate that flight plans be closed *after* landing. (Many pilots call "landing" prematurely, while they are still in the air in direct contravention of the letter and spirit of PHI's rules.) When an aircraft is overdue, PHI "goes crazy" trying to find it; by that I mean, they do not take these things lightly. If it is true that "no one" was looking for the S-76, then either two things had to happen:
1. PHI's computerized flight-following system failed to alert that a ship was overdue (which happens immediately at the ETA - the aircraft's call-sign turns red or flashes or something);
2. The flight-plan had already been closed while the aircraft was still in the air, meaning that the "two-hour check" rule was in effect and the company would not look for the aircraft until that time period had elapsed.
Either way, there was a serious breakdown in the system somewhere and explanations are due. I don't even want to think about what would have happened if the helicopter was full of pax instead of empty seats.
PHI's flight-following procedures dictate that flight plans be closed *after* landing. (Many pilots call "landing" prematurely, while they are still in the air in direct contravention of the letter and spirit of PHI's rules.) When an aircraft is overdue, PHI "goes crazy" trying to find it; by that I mean, they do not take these things lightly. If it is true that "no one" was looking for the S-76, then either two things had to happen:
1. PHI's computerized flight-following system failed to alert that a ship was overdue (which happens immediately at the ETA - the aircraft's call-sign turns red or flashes or something);
2. The flight-plan had already been closed while the aircraft was still in the air, meaning that the "two-hour check" rule was in effect and the company would not look for the aircraft until that time period had elapsed.
Either way, there was a serious breakdown in the system somewhere and explanations are due. I don't even want to think about what would have happened if the helicopter was full of pax instead of empty seats.
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Reading that statement makes us all thankful that it turned out OK. Had they not made that platform, sounds like we would be reading obituaries instead.
I wonder what the people on the platform were doing? They got a 20 minute call, then a 5 minute landing call and then nothing. Did it occure to anyone on the platform that the aircraft they were expecting any minute never made it?
His statement says they were at 400 feet with the platform in sight. Simple math infers that they entered a high rate of descent that they were unaware off. CRM classes these days, hammer home the term "situational awareness." I wonder if the two pilots had CRM classes, considering the rush to get pilots on the line.
The PIC in his email, mentioned he's considering his future options and the SIC looks forward to returning to flying. I sincerely wish them the best, but have the feeling their futures won't be with PHI. In a case of ironies, they will have no organization to go to bat for them in the investigation (probably wouldn't matter much in this case anyway as companies almost always are deffered to in matters of safety).
I fear Al will opt for termination rather than having to worry about another accident involving either pilot
I wonder what the people on the platform were doing? They got a 20 minute call, then a 5 minute landing call and then nothing. Did it occure to anyone on the platform that the aircraft they were expecting any minute never made it?
His statement says they were at 400 feet with the platform in sight. Simple math infers that they entered a high rate of descent that they were unaware off. CRM classes these days, hammer home the term "situational awareness." I wonder if the two pilots had CRM classes, considering the rush to get pilots on the line.
The PIC in his email, mentioned he's considering his future options and the SIC looks forward to returning to flying. I sincerely wish them the best, but have the feeling their futures won't be with PHI. In a case of ironies, they will have no organization to go to bat for them in the investigation (probably wouldn't matter much in this case anyway as companies almost always are deffered to in matters of safety).
I fear Al will opt for termination rather than having to worry about another accident involving either pilot
Last edited by js0987; 1st Nov 2006 at 13:52. Reason: didn't finish
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speed
Another question that comes to mind is why they were doing 100mph if the visibility was that bad? Wouldn't it be better to slow it down a little bit??
I know that's what i do when i fly in marginal vfr conditions.
I know that's what i do when i fly in marginal vfr conditions.
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I've got to jump on the bandwagon with Nick here. We have a lot of technology readily available at a cost which is justified by the reduction in risk it provides. Yes, we can and have gotten by without it, but how close to the edge do we routinely walk without ever realizing it?
I've been in nearly identical situations a couple of times. In my case we had a bit of a scare, but, no blood - no foul. However, it wouldn't have taken much to put us over the edge. Then you'd have been reading about me and my copilot instead.
You establish limits and procedures, you check the weather, you pay diligent attention to what you're doing, and still it happens. It happens because at some point you exceed the limit of what you can manage with the available resources. And until you get the task load back to a managable level you're relying on luck for a happy outcome.
There's a bunch of stuff out there that will tremendously improve the margin of safety. Of course, the appropriate technology differs with the application. For marginal weather in the GoM it may be four-axis autopilots. For EMS in the mountains at night maybe it's NVGs. Whatever. But any operator that doesn't take advantage of the appropriate technology, and any customer that doesn't require it of their contractors, is opening themselves up to serious liability. I think you know what's coming next, "If you think the equipment is expensive, just think about the cost of an accident."
-Stan-
I've been in nearly identical situations a couple of times. In my case we had a bit of a scare, but, no blood - no foul. However, it wouldn't have taken much to put us over the edge. Then you'd have been reading about me and my copilot instead.
You establish limits and procedures, you check the weather, you pay diligent attention to what you're doing, and still it happens. It happens because at some point you exceed the limit of what you can manage with the available resources. And until you get the task load back to a managable level you're relying on luck for a happy outcome.
There's a bunch of stuff out there that will tremendously improve the margin of safety. Of course, the appropriate technology differs with the application. For marginal weather in the GoM it may be four-axis autopilots. For EMS in the mountains at night maybe it's NVGs. Whatever. But any operator that doesn't take advantage of the appropriate technology, and any customer that doesn't require it of their contractors, is opening themselves up to serious liability. I think you know what's coming next, "If you think the equipment is expensive, just think about the cost of an accident."
-Stan-
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Woolf
Of course, you are right. It could have been prevented by a simple AVAD system and some Standard Operating Procedures attached to Rad Alt use. After all, they have been in use on the NS for how long....20 years....no more like 23 I think.
The Gomers have always been a bit slow to catch onto some of this "technology" and at last, its only the oil companies who have started to drive new aircraft acquisitions with improved equipment.
Unfortunately, PHI has had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the 21st century. The Chief Pilot and Director of Operations in PHI have had little operational exposure outside of Louisiana.
For example, until 3 years ago, the concept of looking at a graph and calculating a take off weight to give any kind of Cat A en route performance was totally alien. In fact, the attitude was "why do it, why not just load up to max gross and take off like a helicopter?" Obviously, this makes a S76 like a Bell 206.
It was only a large oil company client who insisted that aircraft were operated to the equivalent of PC2 which started to drive some alternative thinking in PHI.
It used to be said that if the throttles weren't on the collective, it couldn't be operated in the GOM!!
Of course, you are right. It could have been prevented by a simple AVAD system and some Standard Operating Procedures attached to Rad Alt use. After all, they have been in use on the NS for how long....20 years....no more like 23 I think.
The Gomers have always been a bit slow to catch onto some of this "technology" and at last, its only the oil companies who have started to drive new aircraft acquisitions with improved equipment.
Unfortunately, PHI has had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the 21st century. The Chief Pilot and Director of Operations in PHI have had little operational exposure outside of Louisiana.
For example, until 3 years ago, the concept of looking at a graph and calculating a take off weight to give any kind of Cat A en route performance was totally alien. In fact, the attitude was "why do it, why not just load up to max gross and take off like a helicopter?" Obviously, this makes a S76 like a Bell 206.
It was only a large oil company client who insisted that aircraft were operated to the equivalent of PC2 which started to drive some alternative thinking in PHI.
It used to be said that if the throttles weren't on the collective, it couldn't be operated in the GOM!!
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Something missing?
Quote: "The last call I made we were roughly 400 feet on the radar altimeter, the PIC called for windsheild wipers. I stated "windshield wipers" and reached for the switch. From that point it all seems like a bad dream. As I reached the switch we impacted the water at roughly 100mph."
I'm confused about this part of the story. Granted, I don't fly offshore in an S76, but how can you impact the water from 400 feet while you are reaching for the windshield wiper switch? There seems to be a gap in the story. Would the SIC specifically leave out the info in this gap or could it have happened so fast he wouldn't know? I'm just curious if he may have left out that particular part because there is an ongoing investigation. If so, why would he publish anything at all?
My heart goes out to the guys. The story is very similar to one I heard a few years ago from a friend of a friend who worked at Air Log (I think) - ditched off a platform and fought off sharks for a couple of hours, hoping a large one would finally end it for him.
I'm confused about this part of the story. Granted, I don't fly offshore in an S76, but how can you impact the water from 400 feet while you are reaching for the windshield wiper switch? There seems to be a gap in the story. Would the SIC specifically leave out the info in this gap or could it have happened so fast he wouldn't know? I'm just curious if he may have left out that particular part because there is an ongoing investigation. If so, why would he publish anything at all?
My heart goes out to the guys. The story is very similar to one I heard a few years ago from a friend of a friend who worked at Air Log (I think) - ditched off a platform and fought off sharks for a couple of hours, hoping a large one would finally end it for him.
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AVAD? Bug? What are those?
And the 'large oil company client' did not, and still has not, required compliance with PC2 procedures. It does require calculating whether a PC2 takeoff can be made, but will not download to comply with it. If you can't make a PC2 takeoff, you get off the best way you can, at your present weight. Do not even consider telling the dispatcher that you have to reduce the load in order to do a PC2 takeoff.
And the 'large oil company client' did not, and still has not, required compliance with PC2 procedures. It does require calculating whether a PC2 takeoff can be made, but will not download to comply with it. If you can't make a PC2 takeoff, you get off the best way you can, at your present weight. Do not even consider telling the dispatcher that you have to reduce the load in order to do a PC2 takeoff.
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GLS Night Pilot
I am amused by your feigned ignorance!!
I think you are getting mixed up between customers. You maybe speaking of Shell but there are other PHI customers who do require PC2 performance on their S76C++ and S92s contracted from PHI. They even observe take offs at some heliports to ensure compliance.
It remains undeniable that it is only the customers who are starting to demand improved operational standards in the GOM. Most older aircraft are poorly equipped and continue to be operated like a big 206. If the customers weren't driving improvements, the operations management would still be telling people that the 214ST production line should be restarted......like they did 3 years ago when asked about long range deepwater support!
HH
I am amused by your feigned ignorance!!
I think you are getting mixed up between customers. You maybe speaking of Shell but there are other PHI customers who do require PC2 performance on their S76C++ and S92s contracted from PHI. They even observe take offs at some heliports to ensure compliance.
It remains undeniable that it is only the customers who are starting to demand improved operational standards in the GOM. Most older aircraft are poorly equipped and continue to be operated like a big 206. If the customers weren't driving improvements, the operations management would still be telling people that the 214ST production line should be restarted......like they did 3 years ago when asked about long range deepwater support!
HH
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AVAD? can someone tell me what that is?
forgive my off-shore ignorance, but wouldnt there be some procedure for the SIC to countdown the rad-alt readings when descending in poor wx?
and.. is it wise for this guy to post all this on his blog? i personally would be keeping quiet and only talking to the authoritories
forgive my off-shore ignorance, but wouldnt there be some procedure for the SIC to countdown the rad-alt readings when descending in poor wx?
and.. is it wise for this guy to post all this on his blog? i personally would be keeping quiet and only talking to the authoritories
thecontroller:
I believe AVAD stands for "Automatic Voice Alert Device". One of the functions on this device will give you an aural warning when you reach a certain "bugged" height above the ground (measured straight down by rad-alt). Some will also give you other warnings like 100ft, gear up, fire engine 1, etc ...
For offshore approaches most companies in the North Sea would have a bug setting from 50 to 150ft depending on the rig. This will then give you a bit of a "heads up" if things don't go according to plan.
As all of the offshore flying here is done by IFR twins, an approach in low visibility conditions would most likely be a rig radar approach, which uses the weather radar to fly an instrument approach offshore.
Cheers,
Woolf
I believe AVAD stands for "Automatic Voice Alert Device". One of the functions on this device will give you an aural warning when you reach a certain "bugged" height above the ground (measured straight down by rad-alt). Some will also give you other warnings like 100ft, gear up, fire engine 1, etc ...
For offshore approaches most companies in the North Sea would have a bug setting from 50 to 150ft depending on the rig. This will then give you a bit of a "heads up" if things don't go according to plan.
As all of the offshore flying here is done by IFR twins, an approach in low visibility conditions would most likely be a rig radar approach, which uses the weather radar to fly an instrument approach offshore.
Cheers,
Woolf
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Rig Radar Approach
Woolfie
Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'.
Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.
And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode.
Geoffers
Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'.
Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.
And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode.
Geoffers
Last edited by Geoffersincornwall; 2nd Nov 2006 at 16:38. Reason: added text
Geoffers,
I did a google before posting my last reply and most sources do refer to it as "automatic" although I did find one site with your suggestion (altitude). I did decide to go with "automatic" as other functions of AVAD (enhanced AVAD) are not altitude related. Maybe someone in the know can give us a definite answer?
Geoffers, are you suggesting that for once the CAA does allow something that others do not??? Whatever next ..... 
Even the JAA/EASA allow this procedure for CAT under JAR-OPS 3. In any case I would suggest, if done properly, it is a far safer approach in low visibility (see above).
Cheers,
Woolf
I did a google before posting my last reply and most sources do refer to it as "automatic" although I did find one site with your suggestion (altitude). I did decide to go with "automatic" as other functions of AVAD (enhanced AVAD) are not altitude related. Maybe someone in the know can give us a definite answer?
Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'. Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.
Even the JAA/EASA allow this procedure for CAT under JAR-OPS 3. In any case I would suggest, if done properly, it is a far safer approach in low visibility (see above).
Cheers,
Woolf
upgraded to accident
NTSB Identification: DFW07LA011
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, October 22, 2006 in Eugene Island, GM
Aircraft: Sikorsky S-76A++, registration: N22342
Injuries: 1 Minor, 1 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On October 22, 2006, approximately 0730 central daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76A++ twin-engine helicopter, N22342, registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. (PHI), of Lafayette, Louisiana, was destroyed when it impacted the water while landing near offshore platform Eugene Island (EI) Block 259, located in the Gulf of Mexico. The airline transport rated pilot was not injured, but the commercial rated first officer sustained minor injuries. There were no passengers aboard the helicopter at the time of the mishap. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 91 on-demand air taxi flight. The local flight departed PHI's base in Amelia, Louisiana, at 0658, and was destined for EI 259 to pickup a passenger.
A representative of the operator stated in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1) that after takeoff from PHI's base at Amelia, the pilot-in-command (PIC) encountered a cloud deck at 500 feet and leveled the helicopter at approximately at 450 feet, with the visibility at approximately 10 miles. A call was received by the crew that EI 259 had encountered moderate rain, poor visibility and a low ceiling. The PIC responded that he was aware of the weather line of rain showers, and expected them to move through the area prior to their arrival. The crew called EI 259 about 20 minutes out giving their estimate time of arrival, and were told that it was still raining.
At 2 nautical miles (NM) from EI 259, the crew could not see the platform due to the rain, so the PIC turned the helicopter to the West to circle the rain shower and called for the pre-landing check. At just under 2 NM west of the platform, the first officer saw the platform, and the PIC called for the floats to be armed and the windshield wipers to be turned on. At this time the, wind was from 340 degrees. As the PIC turned to final, he remembers his altimeter indicating 250 feet and airspeed 55-60 knots, and seeing the platform, but not seeing a visible horizon. The PIC estimated moderate rain, while noticing that the floats were not armed and that the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision. He asked the first officer again to arm the floats and turn on the wipers. The first officer appeared to be fumbling with the switches as the PIC looked down to see what was happening. At that time, the helicopter made contact with the water, rolled over, and began filling with water. The first officer escaped by jettisoning his entry door and the PIC escaped through the a missing windshield.
Index for Oct2006 | Index of months
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, October 22, 2006 in Eugene Island, GM
Aircraft: Sikorsky S-76A++, registration: N22342
Injuries: 1 Minor, 1 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On October 22, 2006, approximately 0730 central daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76A++ twin-engine helicopter, N22342, registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. (PHI), of Lafayette, Louisiana, was destroyed when it impacted the water while landing near offshore platform Eugene Island (EI) Block 259, located in the Gulf of Mexico. The airline transport rated pilot was not injured, but the commercial rated first officer sustained minor injuries. There were no passengers aboard the helicopter at the time of the mishap. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 91 on-demand air taxi flight. The local flight departed PHI's base in Amelia, Louisiana, at 0658, and was destined for EI 259 to pickup a passenger.
A representative of the operator stated in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1) that after takeoff from PHI's base at Amelia, the pilot-in-command (PIC) encountered a cloud deck at 500 feet and leveled the helicopter at approximately at 450 feet, with the visibility at approximately 10 miles. A call was received by the crew that EI 259 had encountered moderate rain, poor visibility and a low ceiling. The PIC responded that he was aware of the weather line of rain showers, and expected them to move through the area prior to their arrival. The crew called EI 259 about 20 minutes out giving their estimate time of arrival, and were told that it was still raining.
At 2 nautical miles (NM) from EI 259, the crew could not see the platform due to the rain, so the PIC turned the helicopter to the West to circle the rain shower and called for the pre-landing check. At just under 2 NM west of the platform, the first officer saw the platform, and the PIC called for the floats to be armed and the windshield wipers to be turned on. At this time the, wind was from 340 degrees. As the PIC turned to final, he remembers his altimeter indicating 250 feet and airspeed 55-60 knots, and seeing the platform, but not seeing a visible horizon. The PIC estimated moderate rain, while noticing that the floats were not armed and that the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision. He asked the first officer again to arm the floats and turn on the wipers. The first officer appeared to be fumbling with the switches as the PIC looked down to see what was happening. At that time, the helicopter made contact with the water, rolled over, and began filling with water. The first officer escaped by jettisoning his entry door and the PIC escaped through the a missing windshield.
Index for Oct2006 | Index of months
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Woolfie
Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'.
Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.
And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode.
Geoffers
Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'.
Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.
And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode.
Geoffers
...Visual meteorological conditions prevailed...encountered a cloud deck at 500 feet and leveled the helicopter at approximately at 450 feet, with the visibility at approximately 10 miles... not seeing a visible horizon...the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision
At the risk of opening myself up to ridicule and harassment (nah, never happens in the land of PPRUNE) what are the VMC rules in the USA? Not trying to affix blame (never having flown for the oil companies in the Gulf) but something just didn't seem to add up for me with the above.
Bottom line, glad they walked (swam?) away.
HP
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Just for info, Era does OSAP's (Offshore approaches etc.) using GPS and radar down to 200 feet on the radio alt. This is based on the radar agreeing with the GPS, if its not calibrated correctly then the limits are 700 feet (I think). I am sure PHI has a similar arrangement as rick1128 mentions.
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Gentlemen,
At the risk of opening myself up to ridicule and harassment (nah, never happens in the land of PPRUNE) what are the VMC rules in the USA? Not trying to affix blame (never having flown for the oil companies in the Gulf) but something just didn't seem to add up for me with the above.
Bottom line, glad they walked (swam?) away.
HP
At the risk of opening myself up to ridicule and harassment (nah, never happens in the land of PPRUNE) what are the VMC rules in the USA? Not trying to affix blame (never having flown for the oil companies in the Gulf) but something just didn't seem to add up for me with the above.
Bottom line, glad they walked (swam?) away.
HP
Most GOM operators have or have had radar approach Opspecs issued to them.