When is Training for Safety Not Enough?
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The points I would like to harp on (and it counters what Thridle Op Des says) Are:
1) the big airplanes he mentions make a living by flattening the earth, creaming square miles of territory and employing thousands of workers to make things just right for them. In helicopters, we get the droppings from that system. We have NO instrument procedures that use our machine as a helicopter, we have NO comm/nav/surveillance system that allows us to operate at helicopter altitudes, and we have NO instrument heliports of any kind (nor are we likely to when the FAA insists on a full ALS for the heliport!)
Do not look to airplanes for helicopter solutions, their systems are illustrative of the problem we have, wearing ill-fitting hand-me-down clothing from our big, rich brother.
2) Checklists and SOP's are just examples of training/standardization as fixes for the safety problems built into our systems. How long is the checklist for your telephone? TV? VCR? Toilet bowl? email? Browser? Real systems used by real people do not need crutches, training aids and the like, they just work. Before we lean on such crutches, we should use modern technology to make the system as human engineered as possible, THEN we make the checklist and SOP.
1) the big airplanes he mentions make a living by flattening the earth, creaming square miles of territory and employing thousands of workers to make things just right for them. In helicopters, we get the droppings from that system. We have NO instrument procedures that use our machine as a helicopter, we have NO comm/nav/surveillance system that allows us to operate at helicopter altitudes, and we have NO instrument heliports of any kind (nor are we likely to when the FAA insists on a full ALS for the heliport!)
Do not look to airplanes for helicopter solutions, their systems are illustrative of the problem we have, wearing ill-fitting hand-me-down clothing from our big, rich brother.
2) Checklists and SOP's are just examples of training/standardization as fixes for the safety problems built into our systems. How long is the checklist for your telephone? TV? VCR? Toilet bowl? email? Browser? Real systems used by real people do not need crutches, training aids and the like, they just work. Before we lean on such crutches, we should use modern technology to make the system as human engineered as possible, THEN we make the checklist and SOP.
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Hi Nick, we have begged to differ before, the last thing I seem to recollect was a discussion on helicopter seats, and I would continue to believe that the rotary world would like to think it's self so different, but in my experience both worlds do have common objectives and there are fundamentals in safety that are absoloute. If you are only flying in helicopter seats then helicopter seats are great and they have only got better - true, but not as good as they COULD get, the same goes for SOP and procedures. The rotary world lives in the era of mid 70's with checklist driven procedures. If they want to improve their record then they must look at systems that work. Yes a lot of really clever people are involved in producing these systems, they try to match all the Human Factor issues, why resent that when it is done, it sounds really parochial. The Shell article linked by 212man illustrates what some of the oil majors would like to see, the challange has to be risen to.
As for the contention that everything gets done for the FW pilots then I suggest that you have not been dropped into a visual approach with an Airbus 340-500 at 220 tonnes on a 2700 meter runway with no vertical guidance and a radar vector which JFK's finest think is adequate. Life for both worlds has its moments, we all try to stay alive and out of trouble the best way possible.
Your example of VCR's and Telephones is ideal, you have instructions, not checklists. You memorise the operating procedure and then use the equipment, familiarity with a well designed intuitive piece of equipment will produce better performance that laboriously dragging out a checklist for a piece of kit which has been designed with little proper thought, there's plenty of good examples there. To use your toilet flushing anology, have you seen some of the more exotic Japanese toilets in comparison with the American Standard porcelain - it depends on who you speak to.
Unless you see - really see, with thousands of hours on both modes of transport, how each world could learn from each other, but how really rotary has so much more to learn from fixed-wing than visa versa.
Both Helicopters and Aeroplanes carry payloads all over the world and have done for a hundred years, they are both done on a commercial basis (or at least that is the intention). There is no excuse for the lack of investment in infrastructure to support helicopters, if there is an issue of obtaining funds for the development of infrastructure then the helicopter world only has it's self to blame, look at the ridiculous rates that some of the charter companies were offering on the GOM and NS when oil was hovering around 10 US. As an ex rotary pilot myself (though soon to go back I hope on one of your products), I have been through the mill of learning and applying regulations dreamt up by ex-fixedwing pen pushers who cannot comprehend the abilities of a helicopter. Just because there are some particularly stupid rules created by plank drivers does not excuse a mentality of parochialism (if there is such an 'ism')
Lots of Respect, but cannot agree with your contention
As for the contention that everything gets done for the FW pilots then I suggest that you have not been dropped into a visual approach with an Airbus 340-500 at 220 tonnes on a 2700 meter runway with no vertical guidance and a radar vector which JFK's finest think is adequate. Life for both worlds has its moments, we all try to stay alive and out of trouble the best way possible.
Your example of VCR's and Telephones is ideal, you have instructions, not checklists. You memorise the operating procedure and then use the equipment, familiarity with a well designed intuitive piece of equipment will produce better performance that laboriously dragging out a checklist for a piece of kit which has been designed with little proper thought, there's plenty of good examples there. To use your toilet flushing anology, have you seen some of the more exotic Japanese toilets in comparison with the American Standard porcelain - it depends on who you speak to.
Unless you see - really see, with thousands of hours on both modes of transport, how each world could learn from each other, but how really rotary has so much more to learn from fixed-wing than visa versa.
Both Helicopters and Aeroplanes carry payloads all over the world and have done for a hundred years, they are both done on a commercial basis (or at least that is the intention). There is no excuse for the lack of investment in infrastructure to support helicopters, if there is an issue of obtaining funds for the development of infrastructure then the helicopter world only has it's self to blame, look at the ridiculous rates that some of the charter companies were offering on the GOM and NS when oil was hovering around 10 US. As an ex rotary pilot myself (though soon to go back I hope on one of your products), I have been through the mill of learning and applying regulations dreamt up by ex-fixedwing pen pushers who cannot comprehend the abilities of a helicopter. Just because there are some particularly stupid rules created by plank drivers does not excuse a mentality of parochialism (if there is such an 'ism')
Lots of Respect, but cannot agree with your contention
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Originally Posted by Nick Lappos
Real systems used by real people do not need crutches, training aids and the like, they just work.
From a designers viewpoint the trick is making them cost effective and reliable.
Mart
If you forget to flush the toilet, the worst that will happen is you get your wife/girlfriend/Mum (delete as applicable) moaning at you. If you land with the gear up, you get a different story!
I'm not saying we don't need to introduce more sophistication to our workplace, but as Nick is saying it has to bee intuitive and well designed. The Man Machine Interface concepts need to be well understood by the designers and the test pilots have to understand the neds of industry and the capabilities of the average pilot. Including those who have fallen into a state of TIBMIN. This needs to go hand in hand with a strong culture of disciplne and well thought out, relevant and useable SOPs.
TOD: Glad to see you found the grass less green than you thought; I'm sure you'll be welcomed back into the 'fold'! Mind you, not much grass in Dubai I guess!!
I'm not saying we don't need to introduce more sophistication to our workplace, but as Nick is saying it has to bee intuitive and well designed. The Man Machine Interface concepts need to be well understood by the designers and the test pilots have to understand the neds of industry and the capabilities of the average pilot. Including those who have fallen into a state of TIBMIN. This needs to go hand in hand with a strong culture of disciplne and well thought out, relevant and useable SOPs.
TOD: Glad to see you found the grass less green than you thought; I'm sure you'll be welcomed back into the 'fold'! Mind you, not much grass in Dubai I guess!!
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Nick and co
One thing that I have really enjoyed from this thread is the amount of extremely well researched reports that have been referenced and spot on comments from many thoughtful and well experienced dudes.
There is another article around if anyone can find it, from 1984 (I think) Rotor and Wing, titled “the subtle hazards of calm winds” It deals brilliantly with vortex ring, T/R vortices etc.
SAS
How many emerg in a career? in my case many, but I’ll keep it classified until they can me for being deaf and blind, probably not long to go, ,,, and I’ve been lucky to have used those experiences in training and saving many more others. However we are talking recips here.
The big end of town, what? A million hours a year on off shore stuff did I see? well mostly those guys just seem to keep trucking on, like Bader’s bus co. but we do hear often about many vibe problems, being able to recognise a potential problem in time, T/R bits cracking regularly, hot-end blades often having probs, esp. the types that then take out the primary flight controls and too often one of them decides to prove that vortex ring does hit em all, big and small.
The main trouble as we see it from the lighties is that whenever a biggie goes down, our insurance premiums skyrocket. And it bl@@@y hurts.
Down to the smaller end just the other day, on pprune a 47 missed out on doing a very simple straight ahead auto, after a power loss, (typical symptoms of the free-wheel, another rumour?) recently in OZ not one but two machines have been attacked by eagles going through the tail rotor. Always the unusual in this game.
At least one of those blokes could have done a much better job had he been up to speed with correct T/R failure training, a dude with 10k hours and excellent references in mustering!!
Just by reading these threads one finds plenty of bad news stories about emerg happening all the time, maybe that is the answer to your Q sas, if not we can always read about the ones that got away in Dick Smiths volumes??
Nick
I hear your frustration with people that crash A1 machines under the guise of check and training when in fact often the check pilot might have been pushing himself instead of the pupe, which proves that he was not skilled enough for the job for starters let alone the procedure he was supposedly enacting.
Hear my frustration too when I tell you about the largest percentage of the multitudes that turn up for interview from all over; they cannot hover, most have never seen full autos, vortex ring state, secondary effects of controls or jammed controls, confined area power checks are a joke, cannot shoot an approach consistent with a safe engine out profile, can’t do a W&B, don’t respect AUW, cannot read a map, the list goes on. And, the best part is that most reckon that I owe them a job, cheees.
More often than not they have this phobia about LTE; you know exactly what is going to happen the very first time they overpitch at a high DA and the tail starting moving, PANIC. That phobia is one of my pet hates and it is generated in loose pub talk by those who haven’t the faintest smick about, simple things, like how can a developed vortex bubble stay with the T/R at the accelerating rotational speed of the airframe?? If they had a real T/R failure from a bad spot they would have something to b’ well complain about. I feel very sorry for most of them and always very angry about the rip off merchants that exchanged these kids’ good cash for a piece of paper under the guise of flight instruction.
Having vented that spleen I am happy to say that there are some extremely good instructional outfits, whose names always gets mentioned when I get the old phone call, where, when, how, and some extremely proficient kids that they train, very proud of ‘their’ bit of paper.. and you know what? those ones always have the bubble cleaned ready and their shoes clean.
Two comments which I think were magic in this thread were;
1. “Modern error management theory”. No doubt there are institutes that gather and teach these theories, are there? If so I suggest two things, first you guys on this thread had better sign up as honorary deans, (and where has PF1 gone?) second but most important and always the hardest is how to get the theory to ‘walk the talk’ right down to the early operational stage right after licence issue, of every pilot where it is needed most?
2. “The golden Hour”. This in itself is a major driver of pushing ‘hero pilot one’ into a confrontation with WX that he doesn’t need. In fact it may be a real medical statistic but it has no place in any air regs that I have ever seen. Once again the capacity for kids (anyone) to say NO needs to be a major currency check list item. The relevance of MEL also needs to take a walk, it really means this component is U/S, but the driver who is hanging onto the same old sticks as yesterday, all last month, maybe doesn’t gather what U/S is until things get sticky and then, Oh s*@# no rad alt and I cant see the water.
Perhaps a comparative study could be done on the numbers of EMS flights that went horribly wrong and the numbers of fatalities, as against the survivability probability of the patients. How many times do we read that the patient had a greenstick fracture or less? It may be nearly always three crew to one patient, rule #1, or sometimes the crew + patient + a family member, to none, rule #2.
Why is it that any EMS job should be anything other than a routine flight operating under routine procedures? A major phobia shift in this department of thinking would clear a lot of our cluttered lawn space.
TOD
Good article sport, a mate of mine did a stint with china, hauling freight, on long hauls but with shorter legs as the idea was to carry big mobs of freight not fuel. And yes he talked about the really nice brand new 747s with all the great gizmos but he also talked about the massive duty times on some trips. Up to 23 hours and sure, nearly all landings were hosted by the aeroplane but he reckoned at the end of those legs one would have only had to ‘drop a plug’,---‘so to speak’ and it would have been all over red rover. An amusing side of the job was how to discuss politics for six hours straight with a Chinese nationalist so as to stay awake?
TET
There is another article around if anyone can find it, from 1984 (I think) Rotor and Wing, titled “the subtle hazards of calm winds” It deals brilliantly with vortex ring, T/R vortices etc.
SAS
How many emerg in a career? in my case many, but I’ll keep it classified until they can me for being deaf and blind, probably not long to go, ,,, and I’ve been lucky to have used those experiences in training and saving many more others. However we are talking recips here.
The big end of town, what? A million hours a year on off shore stuff did I see? well mostly those guys just seem to keep trucking on, like Bader’s bus co. but we do hear often about many vibe problems, being able to recognise a potential problem in time, T/R bits cracking regularly, hot-end blades often having probs, esp. the types that then take out the primary flight controls and too often one of them decides to prove that vortex ring does hit em all, big and small.
The main trouble as we see it from the lighties is that whenever a biggie goes down, our insurance premiums skyrocket. And it bl@@@y hurts.
Down to the smaller end just the other day, on pprune a 47 missed out on doing a very simple straight ahead auto, after a power loss, (typical symptoms of the free-wheel, another rumour?) recently in OZ not one but two machines have been attacked by eagles going through the tail rotor. Always the unusual in this game.
At least one of those blokes could have done a much better job had he been up to speed with correct T/R failure training, a dude with 10k hours and excellent references in mustering!!
Just by reading these threads one finds plenty of bad news stories about emerg happening all the time, maybe that is the answer to your Q sas, if not we can always read about the ones that got away in Dick Smiths volumes??
Nick
I hear your frustration with people that crash A1 machines under the guise of check and training when in fact often the check pilot might have been pushing himself instead of the pupe, which proves that he was not skilled enough for the job for starters let alone the procedure he was supposedly enacting.
Hear my frustration too when I tell you about the largest percentage of the multitudes that turn up for interview from all over; they cannot hover, most have never seen full autos, vortex ring state, secondary effects of controls or jammed controls, confined area power checks are a joke, cannot shoot an approach consistent with a safe engine out profile, can’t do a W&B, don’t respect AUW, cannot read a map, the list goes on. And, the best part is that most reckon that I owe them a job, cheees.
More often than not they have this phobia about LTE; you know exactly what is going to happen the very first time they overpitch at a high DA and the tail starting moving, PANIC. That phobia is one of my pet hates and it is generated in loose pub talk by those who haven’t the faintest smick about, simple things, like how can a developed vortex bubble stay with the T/R at the accelerating rotational speed of the airframe?? If they had a real T/R failure from a bad spot they would have something to b’ well complain about. I feel very sorry for most of them and always very angry about the rip off merchants that exchanged these kids’ good cash for a piece of paper under the guise of flight instruction.
Having vented that spleen I am happy to say that there are some extremely good instructional outfits, whose names always gets mentioned when I get the old phone call, where, when, how, and some extremely proficient kids that they train, very proud of ‘their’ bit of paper.. and you know what? those ones always have the bubble cleaned ready and their shoes clean.
Two comments which I think were magic in this thread were;
1. “Modern error management theory”. No doubt there are institutes that gather and teach these theories, are there? If so I suggest two things, first you guys on this thread had better sign up as honorary deans, (and where has PF1 gone?) second but most important and always the hardest is how to get the theory to ‘walk the talk’ right down to the early operational stage right after licence issue, of every pilot where it is needed most?
2. “The golden Hour”. This in itself is a major driver of pushing ‘hero pilot one’ into a confrontation with WX that he doesn’t need. In fact it may be a real medical statistic but it has no place in any air regs that I have ever seen. Once again the capacity for kids (anyone) to say NO needs to be a major currency check list item. The relevance of MEL also needs to take a walk, it really means this component is U/S, but the driver who is hanging onto the same old sticks as yesterday, all last month, maybe doesn’t gather what U/S is until things get sticky and then, Oh s*@# no rad alt and I cant see the water.
Perhaps a comparative study could be done on the numbers of EMS flights that went horribly wrong and the numbers of fatalities, as against the survivability probability of the patients. How many times do we read that the patient had a greenstick fracture or less? It may be nearly always three crew to one patient, rule #1, or sometimes the crew + patient + a family member, to none, rule #2.
Why is it that any EMS job should be anything other than a routine flight operating under routine procedures? A major phobia shift in this department of thinking would clear a lot of our cluttered lawn space.
TOD
Good article sport, a mate of mine did a stint with china, hauling freight, on long hauls but with shorter legs as the idea was to carry big mobs of freight not fuel. And yes he talked about the really nice brand new 747s with all the great gizmos but he also talked about the massive duty times on some trips. Up to 23 hours and sure, nearly all landings were hosted by the aeroplane but he reckoned at the end of those legs one would have only had to ‘drop a plug’,---‘so to speak’ and it would have been all over red rover. An amusing side of the job was how to discuss politics for six hours straight with a Chinese nationalist so as to stay awake?
TET
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Thriddle Op Des,
I guess if you're going to fly one of Nick's former employer's products you'll get to find out that helicopters are indeed now fitted with EGPWS, TCAS and indeed with automated satellite tracking systems. Even Pan African have many of these goodies in their Bell 206/407s in Nigeria.
I completely concur with your thoughts about R/W checklists and too often they're unecessary, repetitive and have both of the crew with their heads in the cockpit when they should be looking outside. One thing which, to my mind, encourages this is that so many checks these days are done on simulators, with a heavy emphasis on IMC flight for twin engine types (when the vast majority of helicopter operations are VMC, even in twins) in a simulator environment where the risks of mid-air collision, bird strikes and the like are rarely encountered.
I guess if you're going to fly one of Nick's former employer's products you'll get to find out that helicopters are indeed now fitted with EGPWS, TCAS and indeed with automated satellite tracking systems. Even Pan African have many of these goodies in their Bell 206/407s in Nigeria.
I completely concur with your thoughts about R/W checklists and too often they're unecessary, repetitive and have both of the crew with their heads in the cockpit when they should be looking outside. One thing which, to my mind, encourages this is that so many checks these days are done on simulators, with a heavy emphasis on IMC flight for twin engine types (when the vast majority of helicopter operations are VMC, even in twins) in a simulator environment where the risks of mid-air collision, bird strikes and the like are rarely encountered.
Tok,
The next time you wander into the BRC, and can get one of the plank drivers to speak to you, ask them about how they do/did the procedures in the Dornier.
The planks were doing silent checklists....the helicopter side were into Gregorian Chants. All the same company mind you with at least one CP who moves to both sides.
Funny how that improvement cannot be shifted to the helicopter side.
Until the famous "CFS" adopts that practice and it migrates to the civvie world....I doubt it will ever happen.
The next time you wander into the BRC, and can get one of the plank drivers to speak to you, ask them about how they do/did the procedures in the Dornier.
The planks were doing silent checklists....the helicopter side were into Gregorian Chants. All the same company mind you with at least one CP who moves to both sides.
Funny how that improvement cannot be shifted to the helicopter side.
Until the famous "CFS" adopts that practice and it migrates to the civvie world....I doubt it will ever happen.
topendtorque, some pretty sweeping statements about EMS there. Have you ever worked in a dedicated EMS operation? Which country are you talking about? Australia, US, Europe?
No "Heros" where I work. All a bunch of very professional guys who have no problem saying NO if the weather minimums, or predicted miniums on-route are not going to be met. No one here has an interest in killing themselves or anyone else.
Problem with something on the MEL, the aircraft is now US, and the back-up aircraft is brought on-line.
The patients condition has nothing to do with a Go, or No-Go. We keep dispatch advised in any change to flight status (weather, etc) and they will task us as nessesary. When you are sent on a primary mission no one really knows the true condtion of the patient until you get there (In Czech,if we are sent,then we will be the first medical team to arrive) Sometimes the person is fine, other times they are fighting for their life. Not something they can decide from a sketchy phone call.
No "Heros" where I work. All a bunch of very professional guys who have no problem saying NO if the weather minimums, or predicted miniums on-route are not going to be met. No one here has an interest in killing themselves or anyone else.
Problem with something on the MEL, the aircraft is now US, and the back-up aircraft is brought on-line.
The patients condition has nothing to do with a Go, or No-Go. We keep dispatch advised in any change to flight status (weather, etc) and they will task us as nessesary. When you are sent on a primary mission no one really knows the true condtion of the patient until you get there (In Czech,if we are sent,then we will be the first medical team to arrive) Sometimes the person is fine, other times they are fighting for their life. Not something they can decide from a sketchy phone call.
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These kind of discussions are so productive, and this particular one is probably one of the best, thanks Nick for setting this off.
Getting back to the original drive of the thread, here is a problem my company is experiencing at the moment. Just west of an African airfield (Elevation 5500’) is a ridge at about 8000’ which has to be overflown during the descent and terminal phase of the route from another African airfield. In the past 12 months we have had three ‘Whoop Whoop – Terrain’ calls and just two weeks ago a further ‘Terrain’. Just to differentiate between the calls; the ‘Whoop Whoop’ is an indication of impending death and not the thing a First Class passenger ever wants to hear through the Flight Deck door. It usually requires an instantaneous response preferably with the bowel movement, occurring after the escape manoeuvre is complete. A simple ‘Terrain’ call is an indication that there is rock around but brace yourself for the ‘Whoop Whoop’. All these events took place at night, the last one was a well-lit moonlight night and the terrain was visible. The reason for the GPWS/EGPWS alerts was closure speed/vertical speed caused the time to impact to fall into the warning envelope, amplified by the high density altitude and a bit split between IAS and TAS. What is particularly disturbing is that on ALL three incidents that REQUIRED the escape manoeuvre, nothing was done by either of the two crew. So the question is ‘When is training for safety not enough?’ We have the most modern terrain awareness equipment created by man and a cruise missile program, if the autopilot was programmed to make the decision then a 2.5g pitch manoeuvre with full thrust would have resulted. Why do trained pilots ignore these indications? It’s really hard to tell, I suspect there is a story from every one, why did the other guy not say something with an expletive deleted involved? Why did this happen with six individual pilots randomly crewed together? Are the systems that intuitive? Do they stimulate the required response? I remember as a very green FO on the Airbus 320 with one of the UK operators climbing out of Dublin on a dark night. I was in the; ‘what does this light mean’ phase, (bear in mind the ‘Lights out philosophy’ Airbus uses, if the lights is off – all is well) Anyway this particular button hidden under the instrument coaming was just a black square about ¾ inches square. I thought if I pushed it, then I would discover its function, rather like a lights test in my previous Bell. Anyway I soon discovered how frightening loud the ‘Whoop Whoop’ was, as it was the GPWS test button. The poor Captain still has several years off his life span. Anyway just to illustrate, when the GPWS/EGPWS goes off there are no other sounds you can hear, which further compounds the issue – how can you ignore the warning?
CFIT is still the number one crew/passenger/airframe killer. CFIT still happens on wonderfully equipped flying machines, but how do we stop the toll?
Hi TET, thanks for the feedback, we kinda run out of things to talk about as well, this is why Sudoko has become a must for most these days!
Tok: it’s been a while since I was in Escravos, brave boys!
edited to deidentify events so I don't get into trouble with anyone
Getting back to the original drive of the thread, here is a problem my company is experiencing at the moment. Just west of an African airfield (Elevation 5500’) is a ridge at about 8000’ which has to be overflown during the descent and terminal phase of the route from another African airfield. In the past 12 months we have had three ‘Whoop Whoop – Terrain’ calls and just two weeks ago a further ‘Terrain’. Just to differentiate between the calls; the ‘Whoop Whoop’ is an indication of impending death and not the thing a First Class passenger ever wants to hear through the Flight Deck door. It usually requires an instantaneous response preferably with the bowel movement, occurring after the escape manoeuvre is complete. A simple ‘Terrain’ call is an indication that there is rock around but brace yourself for the ‘Whoop Whoop’. All these events took place at night, the last one was a well-lit moonlight night and the terrain was visible. The reason for the GPWS/EGPWS alerts was closure speed/vertical speed caused the time to impact to fall into the warning envelope, amplified by the high density altitude and a bit split between IAS and TAS. What is particularly disturbing is that on ALL three incidents that REQUIRED the escape manoeuvre, nothing was done by either of the two crew. So the question is ‘When is training for safety not enough?’ We have the most modern terrain awareness equipment created by man and a cruise missile program, if the autopilot was programmed to make the decision then a 2.5g pitch manoeuvre with full thrust would have resulted. Why do trained pilots ignore these indications? It’s really hard to tell, I suspect there is a story from every one, why did the other guy not say something with an expletive deleted involved? Why did this happen with six individual pilots randomly crewed together? Are the systems that intuitive? Do they stimulate the required response? I remember as a very green FO on the Airbus 320 with one of the UK operators climbing out of Dublin on a dark night. I was in the; ‘what does this light mean’ phase, (bear in mind the ‘Lights out philosophy’ Airbus uses, if the lights is off – all is well) Anyway this particular button hidden under the instrument coaming was just a black square about ¾ inches square. I thought if I pushed it, then I would discover its function, rather like a lights test in my previous Bell. Anyway I soon discovered how frightening loud the ‘Whoop Whoop’ was, as it was the GPWS test button. The poor Captain still has several years off his life span. Anyway just to illustrate, when the GPWS/EGPWS goes off there are no other sounds you can hear, which further compounds the issue – how can you ignore the warning?
CFIT is still the number one crew/passenger/airframe killer. CFIT still happens on wonderfully equipped flying machines, but how do we stop the toll?
Hi TET, thanks for the feedback, we kinda run out of things to talk about as well, this is why Sudoko has become a must for most these days!
Tok: it’s been a while since I was in Escravos, brave boys!
edited to deidentify events so I don't get into trouble with anyone
Last edited by Thridle Op Des; 18th Mar 2006 at 17:45.
Pilot aids:
I think anything that will help make this job safer is worth while but you have to be realistic about what you can do in the short term.
I fly a EMS Bell 427. Our operation is 24 hour VFR only. The helicopter is fully equipped for IFR flight less an auto-pilot, and includes 2 GPS's, one of which is a Moving map. We are given regular night training with ILS approaches under a covered cockpit to keep eveyone current should we end up in the clouds.
The future for us: we are looking at NVG's now and also the introducing a transparent weather overlay on the Moving map GPS, which is updated by Sat-phone. Both of which are not going to break the bank.
I see the future for night flying/IMC involving not only Nick's GPS system, but an all weather visual system similar to what the military have where a combined FLIR/NV image is projected on to the visor of your helmet, along with automated stabilisation, foolproof Wire detection and GPWS.
As always, the cost will be the issue.
I think anything that will help make this job safer is worth while but you have to be realistic about what you can do in the short term.
I fly a EMS Bell 427. Our operation is 24 hour VFR only. The helicopter is fully equipped for IFR flight less an auto-pilot, and includes 2 GPS's, one of which is a Moving map. We are given regular night training with ILS approaches under a covered cockpit to keep eveyone current should we end up in the clouds.
The future for us: we are looking at NVG's now and also the introducing a transparent weather overlay on the Moving map GPS, which is updated by Sat-phone. Both of which are not going to break the bank.
I see the future for night flying/IMC involving not only Nick's GPS system, but an all weather visual system similar to what the military have where a combined FLIR/NV image is projected on to the visor of your helmet, along with automated stabilisation, foolproof Wire detection and GPWS.
As always, the cost will be the issue.
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A nieve question
A better understanding of a problem result in a better solution to the problem.
Would not the installation of 'black boxes' in helicopters be the first step?
They are in planes, they are in cars, and they are economical.
Would not the installation of 'black boxes' in helicopters be the first step?
They are in planes, they are in cars, and they are economical.
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Big Mike
absolutely no offence meant , i just borrowed a couple of phrases from Ron-Powell to illuminate the age old prob of pubic euphoric behaviour and why it needs controlling.
where? well if I was in North Qld right now I guess I would be right at home, big cyclone, wild WX, flood relief, etc.
check out the- bom.gov.au -site.
dedicated EMS? no sir, but the medivacs always seemed to crop up years ago. dedicated stuff is very modern from my window, much better than someone on a windy litter holding hands with the doc. half your b luck, enjoy it.
and i Totally agree with whoever, the price of the good gear as long as it is added into the basic price of the machine, then the Govt institutions etc that own/lease the machines will think it a good idea, how clever they were to include it etc. as just part of the lease?? --politics, lobby, politics, that's how you get it, it's there to be used.--
TOD, Thanks, reminded me of my bad manners, I forgot also to thank Nick for throwing the switch on this one, thanks Nick. good pow wow.
If you get those 'error management theory' courses going by internet or whatever, i'd be happy to help anytime.
see you guys later
TET
where? well if I was in North Qld right now I guess I would be right at home, big cyclone, wild WX, flood relief, etc.
check out the- bom.gov.au -site.
dedicated EMS? no sir, but the medivacs always seemed to crop up years ago. dedicated stuff is very modern from my window, much better than someone on a windy litter holding hands with the doc. half your b luck, enjoy it.
and i Totally agree with whoever, the price of the good gear as long as it is added into the basic price of the machine, then the Govt institutions etc that own/lease the machines will think it a good idea, how clever they were to include it etc. as just part of the lease?? --politics, lobby, politics, that's how you get it, it's there to be used.--
TOD, Thanks, reminded me of my bad manners, I forgot also to thank Nick for throwing the switch on this one, thanks Nick. good pow wow.
If you get those 'error management theory' courses going by internet or whatever, i'd be happy to help anytime.
see you guys later
TET
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Indeed a very good discussion with many salient points being made and received. But looking over this (and other) threads I’m going to take a bold stance and proclaim that thus far the two most important things the helicopter industry, particularly the EMS industry, could take from the fixed-wing airline industry have not even been mentioned yet. Those items are:
1) the mentality.
2) the go/no-go decision making process.
In many of the recent fatal EMS crashes the main cause could be summed up as “going flying when they should have stayed on the ground”; faulty pre-flight decision making.
If an EMS pilot accepts a flight in atrocious weather, more often than not the flight ends up being completed successfully. This leads to rueful smiles, some admiring looks and comments along the lines of “those guys are crazy…but God bless ‘em”. Even from their colleagues.
Contrast this with what an airline pilot who pushes on to a destination and completes an approach in weather below minimums can expect. Disgust or worse from his cockpit colleague, who, unless he happens to be a junior FO on probation will likely report him to the Chief Pilot, scorn from his peers and disciplinary action from those in authority. In fact, whether his career will continue is by no means certain.
The mentality in the airline industry was not always thus. Just like the civilian helicopter industry really got going after the Vietnam conflict and was heavily influenced by it, so the airline industry really got going after WWII and was heavily influenced by that. A “press on” attitude engendered by an apprenticeship in mortal combat took years of effort to eliminate. Part of that change was in the go/no-go decision.
See, these days, an airline pilot does not really take the go/no-go decision. Of course, if he is not sure the flight can be safely completed for whatever reason he has the authority to cancel it; but the weather part of the decision has been all but taken away from him in Operations Specifications, Ops Manuals and published approach minima. If an airline pilot is confronted with weather, reported or forecast, below minima for his departure, destination or en route, he is prohibited from going. These minima are not nationwide boilerplate, they depend on the type of approach aids available, minima published for these approaches, type of aircraft, onboard equipment, crew qualifications (mainly experience on type) and many more factors. The numbers are plugged into the formula and the decision rolls out, black or white. This is done by a dispatcher and checked by the captain, removing pressure on the crew to “give it a try”. Some wise people realized that putting the onus of the go/no-go decision squarely on the flight crew only led to (self-generated or otherwise) pressure to complete flights, so the decision was taken out of the crews’ hands while of course retaining their power of veto.
Contrast this with the state of affairs in the EMS industry. When the dispatcher (whose job is not to tell clients when flights are not possible) calls the pilot, the pilot knows three things:
1) people are hurt or they wouldn’t have called;
2) the program needs to fly in order to make money;
3) you have to be in the air in minutes so you have less than minutes to make your decision.
Is there anything in the above list that doesn’t put pressure on the pilot, who has to make the decision, to say “let’s give it a try”? In this case the authorities have provided for guidance one set of weather limits which are so relaxed, especially at night, that they might as well be replaced with one word: GO. And these limits are the same nationwide: from the mountains of Alaska to the deserts of New Mexico to the fog-spewing Great Lakes to the sea of light that is Los Angeles… Am I the only one who thinks this can’t be right?
Interesting philosophical dissertation, Buitenzorg, but what about some practical solutions you might say. Well, these factors can be addressed, but only in a long, consistent and concerted effort by both the operators and authorities. I would suggest the following: first, Chief Pilots and the most experienced line pilots have to sit down and divide the areas of operations for the various bases into geographical areas where the weather is usually consistent (so those areas would be defined by features such as rivers, lakes, mountain ranges etc. rather than state and county lines). For each of those geographical areas a set of weather minimums is then decided upon, and just as importantly, an acceptable means of determining whether those minimums are met. There are so many AWOS, ASOS and ATIS around the country, this must be possible. If the nearest reporting station is 50 miles away, raise the minimums accordingly to stay safe. Preferably at least 3 stations must report above minimums to trigger a “GO” decision; if even one is below minimums, the flight must be declined, and if one station is u/s the minimums for the remaining two must be raised. Then, the FAA is involved by their POI reviewing the decision-making process and criteria proposed by the operator’s Chief and senior pilots, and accepting it by including it in the operator’s Operations Manual, giving it regulatory status. The advantages of this system is that the go/no-go decision is in fact taken by the operator’s most experienced pilots together, over cups of coffee in a stress-free environment. For the line pilot the go/no-go decision is reduced to simply checking numbers; of course without removing the pilot’s power of veto to cancel a flight. The dispatcher could and should in fact use these criteria to inform clients that “the weather is below acceptable minimums” rather than call back in several minutes with the news that “the pilot doesn’t think he should go”.
The second and hardest part will be enforcing this system to the point where no one even thinks of “going for a look and if it’s too bad we can always come back”. Line pilots must be required to keep and file the weather information they used to arrive at a “GO” decision. A Chief Pilot should always know if one of his bases was subject to generally poor weather and if there were any flights from that base, so he then reviews the briefed weather for those flights. Any pilots who took off despite below-minimum weather briefs must be disciplined. The FAA POI must play his part by requesting the same documentation and coming down on any operator that doesn’t take internal action.
Minima for the various areas can be adjusted (only in a more restrictive manner) for such things as pilot experience (lack of) or less capable equipment, or for scene calls vs. inter-facility transfers. A pilot new to a base could be restricted initially to day missions, after 100 hours to night missions with the minimums raised by +3miles and +1000 feet, and after 50 night hours and a checkride, the Operations Manual minima. This is just an example, but you get the general idea.
Such a system will lead to fewer flights going; but how many less? Will it really make that much of a difference? And one other thing: stop thinking of EMS helicopters as a god-given right. People were having heart attacks and car crashes long before the first EMS helicopter ever took to the air, and them having to ride in ambulances was not considered outrageous.
The reason why I’m not so euphoric about getting better gadgets in the cockpit is that I’m familiar with helicopter pilots; most of us will think of these gadgets as ways of completing flights in worse weather than before; to improve the completion rate rather than the safety of the operation. Until this attitude is comprehensively changed all the improvements in aircraft and equipment design will be chaff before the wind.
The biggest problem I see with this proposal is getting the necessary close and long-term involvement of the FAA. It will require a relatively large number of EMS-helicopter-savvy POIs, working almost full-time on the EMS operators in their areas and violating those who break the rules; and the “hands off, well obviously the pilot was at fault” attitude we’ve seen so far makes that seem unlikely to happen.
Let the flaming begin!
1) the mentality.
2) the go/no-go decision making process.
In many of the recent fatal EMS crashes the main cause could be summed up as “going flying when they should have stayed on the ground”; faulty pre-flight decision making.
If an EMS pilot accepts a flight in atrocious weather, more often than not the flight ends up being completed successfully. This leads to rueful smiles, some admiring looks and comments along the lines of “those guys are crazy…but God bless ‘em”. Even from their colleagues.
Contrast this with what an airline pilot who pushes on to a destination and completes an approach in weather below minimums can expect. Disgust or worse from his cockpit colleague, who, unless he happens to be a junior FO on probation will likely report him to the Chief Pilot, scorn from his peers and disciplinary action from those in authority. In fact, whether his career will continue is by no means certain.
The mentality in the airline industry was not always thus. Just like the civilian helicopter industry really got going after the Vietnam conflict and was heavily influenced by it, so the airline industry really got going after WWII and was heavily influenced by that. A “press on” attitude engendered by an apprenticeship in mortal combat took years of effort to eliminate. Part of that change was in the go/no-go decision.
See, these days, an airline pilot does not really take the go/no-go decision. Of course, if he is not sure the flight can be safely completed for whatever reason he has the authority to cancel it; but the weather part of the decision has been all but taken away from him in Operations Specifications, Ops Manuals and published approach minima. If an airline pilot is confronted with weather, reported or forecast, below minima for his departure, destination or en route, he is prohibited from going. These minima are not nationwide boilerplate, they depend on the type of approach aids available, minima published for these approaches, type of aircraft, onboard equipment, crew qualifications (mainly experience on type) and many more factors. The numbers are plugged into the formula and the decision rolls out, black or white. This is done by a dispatcher and checked by the captain, removing pressure on the crew to “give it a try”. Some wise people realized that putting the onus of the go/no-go decision squarely on the flight crew only led to (self-generated or otherwise) pressure to complete flights, so the decision was taken out of the crews’ hands while of course retaining their power of veto.
Contrast this with the state of affairs in the EMS industry. When the dispatcher (whose job is not to tell clients when flights are not possible) calls the pilot, the pilot knows three things:
1) people are hurt or they wouldn’t have called;
2) the program needs to fly in order to make money;
3) you have to be in the air in minutes so you have less than minutes to make your decision.
Is there anything in the above list that doesn’t put pressure on the pilot, who has to make the decision, to say “let’s give it a try”? In this case the authorities have provided for guidance one set of weather limits which are so relaxed, especially at night, that they might as well be replaced with one word: GO. And these limits are the same nationwide: from the mountains of Alaska to the deserts of New Mexico to the fog-spewing Great Lakes to the sea of light that is Los Angeles… Am I the only one who thinks this can’t be right?
Interesting philosophical dissertation, Buitenzorg, but what about some practical solutions you might say. Well, these factors can be addressed, but only in a long, consistent and concerted effort by both the operators and authorities. I would suggest the following: first, Chief Pilots and the most experienced line pilots have to sit down and divide the areas of operations for the various bases into geographical areas where the weather is usually consistent (so those areas would be defined by features such as rivers, lakes, mountain ranges etc. rather than state and county lines). For each of those geographical areas a set of weather minimums is then decided upon, and just as importantly, an acceptable means of determining whether those minimums are met. There are so many AWOS, ASOS and ATIS around the country, this must be possible. If the nearest reporting station is 50 miles away, raise the minimums accordingly to stay safe. Preferably at least 3 stations must report above minimums to trigger a “GO” decision; if even one is below minimums, the flight must be declined, and if one station is u/s the minimums for the remaining two must be raised. Then, the FAA is involved by their POI reviewing the decision-making process and criteria proposed by the operator’s Chief and senior pilots, and accepting it by including it in the operator’s Operations Manual, giving it regulatory status. The advantages of this system is that the go/no-go decision is in fact taken by the operator’s most experienced pilots together, over cups of coffee in a stress-free environment. For the line pilot the go/no-go decision is reduced to simply checking numbers; of course without removing the pilot’s power of veto to cancel a flight. The dispatcher could and should in fact use these criteria to inform clients that “the weather is below acceptable minimums” rather than call back in several minutes with the news that “the pilot doesn’t think he should go”.
The second and hardest part will be enforcing this system to the point where no one even thinks of “going for a look and if it’s too bad we can always come back”. Line pilots must be required to keep and file the weather information they used to arrive at a “GO” decision. A Chief Pilot should always know if one of his bases was subject to generally poor weather and if there were any flights from that base, so he then reviews the briefed weather for those flights. Any pilots who took off despite below-minimum weather briefs must be disciplined. The FAA POI must play his part by requesting the same documentation and coming down on any operator that doesn’t take internal action.
Minima for the various areas can be adjusted (only in a more restrictive manner) for such things as pilot experience (lack of) or less capable equipment, or for scene calls vs. inter-facility transfers. A pilot new to a base could be restricted initially to day missions, after 100 hours to night missions with the minimums raised by +3miles and +1000 feet, and after 50 night hours and a checkride, the Operations Manual minima. This is just an example, but you get the general idea.
Such a system will lead to fewer flights going; but how many less? Will it really make that much of a difference? And one other thing: stop thinking of EMS helicopters as a god-given right. People were having heart attacks and car crashes long before the first EMS helicopter ever took to the air, and them having to ride in ambulances was not considered outrageous.
The reason why I’m not so euphoric about getting better gadgets in the cockpit is that I’m familiar with helicopter pilots; most of us will think of these gadgets as ways of completing flights in worse weather than before; to improve the completion rate rather than the safety of the operation. Until this attitude is comprehensively changed all the improvements in aircraft and equipment design will be chaff before the wind.
The biggest problem I see with this proposal is getting the necessary close and long-term involvement of the FAA. It will require a relatively large number of EMS-helicopter-savvy POIs, working almost full-time on the EMS operators in their areas and violating those who break the rules; and the “hands off, well obviously the pilot was at fault” attitude we’ve seen so far makes that seem unlikely to happen.
Let the flaming begin!
BZ,
I completely agree with the concept you describe if not the letter of it. An example of what we are up against is the FAA's own regulations as you mention. Part 91 night flying regulations are much different than Part 135 requirements for surface light reference and such. I have advocated amending Part 91 to coincide with Part 135. I have also stated that the FAA should monitor EMS operations and when they catch pilots violating Part 135 requirements for surface light reference, they should take certificate action against the pilots and the operator.
To my knowledge, the FAA has never taken Certificate action against any EMS operator for flight rule violations, even after any of the fatal accidents we have experienced.
If I am wrong about this....someone please correct me.
I have also preached that weather checks are done in the office, briefing room, or ramp, with coffee cup in hand.....and never in the air.
Your system would work well towards reducing these night IIMC/CFIT accidents that are killing people.
I completely agree with the concept you describe if not the letter of it. An example of what we are up against is the FAA's own regulations as you mention. Part 91 night flying regulations are much different than Part 135 requirements for surface light reference and such. I have advocated amending Part 91 to coincide with Part 135. I have also stated that the FAA should monitor EMS operations and when they catch pilots violating Part 135 requirements for surface light reference, they should take certificate action against the pilots and the operator.
To my knowledge, the FAA has never taken Certificate action against any EMS operator for flight rule violations, even after any of the fatal accidents we have experienced.
If I am wrong about this....someone please correct me.
I have also preached that weather checks are done in the office, briefing room, or ramp, with coffee cup in hand.....and never in the air.
Your system would work well towards reducing these night IIMC/CFIT accidents that are killing people.
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SASless,
If the FAA had diligently performed their oversight responsibilities in the case of EMS operations I’m sure the accident rate would have been lower, maybe substantially so. The problem is that at the moment “going up for a look” when the weather reports are bad is only stupid, it’s not illegal unless one takes off from a controlled airport without a (Special VFR) clearance. “Yeah, there were some low clouds but the gaps were large so I was always legal…nudge, nudge, wink, wink”. How can an inspector refute that?
About things like losing surface light reference, I believe that in most cases this wasn’t a deliberate choice by the crew, but they rationalized themselves into this situation. Weather reports indicated that loss of surface reference (or IMC) was a serious possibility but “if I follow the highway until the ABC exit I should be able to see the lights of that farmhouse and I’ll just keep them out the right window until I can see over the ridge and that valley is usually clear of fog so I should be able to see XYZ…”
I’m sure there must be some pilots around who can always remain completely dispassionate and also always accurately identify the likelihood of certain conditions developing, and so always make the correct go/no-go decision. I’d like to meet at least one of them but so far I haven’t. This is why I’d like to take the weather go/no-go decision out of the sphere of “pilot interpretation” and instead make it a dispassionate numbers exercise. That will not guarantee that below-minimums weather will never be encountered during a flight, but should make it extremely unlikely and then only in the case of unforecast conditions.
Changing the mindset to the point where everyone follows the rules as a matter of routine without looking for ways around them will be a multi-year, probably multi-decade project and doomed to fail if the FAA will allow Joe Undercut’s Helicopters to flout the rules at will.
But please remember that the FAA can only do what Congress will fund them to do, and Congress is made up of hack politicians who see their job as pandering to each new fad and whim of the fickle public. This is why the FAA spend public money on “Guns in airline cockpits, yes or no?” and “the definition of natural quiet”. So if the public claim it’s a scandal that Joe isn’t allowed to run a rescue helicopter just because the gearbox leaks a quart of oil an hour and Joe has only one pilot and… then your friendly local member of Congress will make sure the FSDO listen to the “community’s concerns”. All the POIs I’ve ever met would be much happier weeding out the deadwood and helping the serious operators succeed rather than running bean-counting exercises but they have to work within the system. Until there is political hay to be made from enforcing realistic standards in EMS operations I fear the FAA will not really be allowed to do their job.
If the FAA had diligently performed their oversight responsibilities in the case of EMS operations I’m sure the accident rate would have been lower, maybe substantially so. The problem is that at the moment “going up for a look” when the weather reports are bad is only stupid, it’s not illegal unless one takes off from a controlled airport without a (Special VFR) clearance. “Yeah, there were some low clouds but the gaps were large so I was always legal…nudge, nudge, wink, wink”. How can an inspector refute that?
About things like losing surface light reference, I believe that in most cases this wasn’t a deliberate choice by the crew, but they rationalized themselves into this situation. Weather reports indicated that loss of surface reference (or IMC) was a serious possibility but “if I follow the highway until the ABC exit I should be able to see the lights of that farmhouse and I’ll just keep them out the right window until I can see over the ridge and that valley is usually clear of fog so I should be able to see XYZ…”
I’m sure there must be some pilots around who can always remain completely dispassionate and also always accurately identify the likelihood of certain conditions developing, and so always make the correct go/no-go decision. I’d like to meet at least one of them but so far I haven’t. This is why I’d like to take the weather go/no-go decision out of the sphere of “pilot interpretation” and instead make it a dispassionate numbers exercise. That will not guarantee that below-minimums weather will never be encountered during a flight, but should make it extremely unlikely and then only in the case of unforecast conditions.
Changing the mindset to the point where everyone follows the rules as a matter of routine without looking for ways around them will be a multi-year, probably multi-decade project and doomed to fail if the FAA will allow Joe Undercut’s Helicopters to flout the rules at will.
But please remember that the FAA can only do what Congress will fund them to do, and Congress is made up of hack politicians who see their job as pandering to each new fad and whim of the fickle public. This is why the FAA spend public money on “Guns in airline cockpits, yes or no?” and “the definition of natural quiet”. So if the public claim it’s a scandal that Joe isn’t allowed to run a rescue helicopter just because the gearbox leaks a quart of oil an hour and Joe has only one pilot and… then your friendly local member of Congress will make sure the FSDO listen to the “community’s concerns”. All the POIs I’ve ever met would be much happier weeding out the deadwood and helping the serious operators succeed rather than running bean-counting exercises but they have to work within the system. Until there is political hay to be made from enforcing realistic standards in EMS operations I fear the FAA will not really be allowed to do their job.
Well said BZ.
One thing with both you and SASless in relation to the go/no go - I think you have hit the nail on the head in that there are some fairly easy criteria to set prior to a flight to enable a fairly straight forward go/no go, and I think this is a great way to manage the risks.
I do, however, not agree with the blanket weather minima statments you have made, and in particualr:
I think you have generalised a bit too much here.
As an IFR EMS pilot I regularly offer to go and have a look. I have preset go/no go and it is never approached in a "gung-ho" manner. For example, the weather at point X might be forecast below minima for the approach, but only forecast to be intermittantly below it. If I have enough fuel to hold for the deterioration, or divert to a non wx affected alternate, I will offer to go "and have a look". Once the tasking authority has been made aware that there is a X% possibility I will not get in off the approach, if they are happy to pay for that slim possibility I would go and have a look. I will calcualte my latest diversion fuel levels, and happily get approach practice in after approach practice in whilst having a go until I have to divert. But that doesn't mean I am going to go below MDA or DA. It doesn't mean that I am going to go below min fuel for the divert. It doesn't mean I am going to intentionally fly into icing, thunderstorms, fog, or any other illegal flight situations. These are predetermined go/no go points - thus the risk can be managed.
And thats why I agree with BZ and SASless about the value of the go/no go decision points.
One thing with both you and SASless in relation to the go/no go - I think you have hit the nail on the head in that there are some fairly easy criteria to set prior to a flight to enable a fairly straight forward go/no go, and I think this is a great way to manage the risks.
I do, however, not agree with the blanket weather minima statments you have made, and in particualr:
The problem is that at the moment “going up for a look” when the weather reports are bad is only stupid
As an IFR EMS pilot I regularly offer to go and have a look. I have preset go/no go and it is never approached in a "gung-ho" manner. For example, the weather at point X might be forecast below minima for the approach, but only forecast to be intermittantly below it. If I have enough fuel to hold for the deterioration, or divert to a non wx affected alternate, I will offer to go "and have a look". Once the tasking authority has been made aware that there is a X% possibility I will not get in off the approach, if they are happy to pay for that slim possibility I would go and have a look. I will calcualte my latest diversion fuel levels, and happily get approach practice in after approach practice in whilst having a go until I have to divert. But that doesn't mean I am going to go below MDA or DA. It doesn't mean that I am going to go below min fuel for the divert. It doesn't mean I am going to intentionally fly into icing, thunderstorms, fog, or any other illegal flight situations. These are predetermined go/no go points - thus the risk can be managed.
And thats why I agree with BZ and SASless about the value of the go/no go decision points.
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Originally Posted by Dave Jackson
A better understanding of a problem result in a better solution to the problem.
A black box identifies the decisions made during any particular mission. It can only identify fundamental design problems a long time after components will have been design released and tooled up. For fundamentals like handling and systems operation this is too late.
A shift in emphasis towards machines which are easier to fly, at the concept stage, removes many later difficulties: How long does it take to train? How easy is it to convert? Did the machine contribute to any particular incident? etc...
Mart
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helmet fire,
I think we’re mostly on the same wavelength, I’d just like to make two remarks about your description of your decision-making process.
You say you never approach your go/no-go decisions in a gung-ho manner, and I believe you. You have predetermined, hard personal minimums and I believe you. The problem is that not all pilots will always keep to these standards; some are slightly less averse to taking a risk, some honestly believe their skills allow lower minimums, some are weaker personalities and more prone to submit to (often self-imposed) pressure. If your decision-making process were to be formalized and made mandatory for all pilots in your type of operation by including it in the Ops Manual, safety of the operation would be improved.
The biggest problem area, and the one my proposal is aimed at mostly, is the 24-hour VFR EMS operation which is prevalent in the USA. You must have read the NTSB report SASless posted here it falls squarely in the “going up for a look; stupid but legal” bracket, and shows a depressingly similar sequence of events to other fatal EMS crashes in the USA in the last few years. If this kind of accident could be eliminated – by a system like my proposal or in whatever other way – the EMS fatal accident rate would drop by well over half.
I think we’re mostly on the same wavelength, I’d just like to make two remarks about your description of your decision-making process.
You say you never approach your go/no-go decisions in a gung-ho manner, and I believe you. You have predetermined, hard personal minimums and I believe you. The problem is that not all pilots will always keep to these standards; some are slightly less averse to taking a risk, some honestly believe their skills allow lower minimums, some are weaker personalities and more prone to submit to (often self-imposed) pressure. If your decision-making process were to be formalized and made mandatory for all pilots in your type of operation by including it in the Ops Manual, safety of the operation would be improved.
The biggest problem area, and the one my proposal is aimed at mostly, is the 24-hour VFR EMS operation which is prevalent in the USA. You must have read the NTSB report SASless posted here it falls squarely in the “going up for a look; stupid but legal” bracket, and shows a depressingly similar sequence of events to other fatal EMS crashes in the USA in the last few years. If this kind of accident could be eliminated – by a system like my proposal or in whatever other way – the EMS fatal accident rate would drop by well over half.
The comment someone made about folks not "intentionally" flying where there are no surface lights ignores reality.
I suggest you take yourself to a significant part of the rural United States in any defined "mountainous" area or the desert areas. There are areas larger than the UK with next to no surface lights that are serviced by EMS helicopters at night. We have ranches that have driveways that are 25 miles long. Take yourself out in the Southeast on a very hazy summer night and see how many lights you have in some areas....lots of piney woods in that part of the world.
Ever been to South Dakota, Nebraska, eastern Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and gone flying at night?
Combine the lack of any weather reporting along your route and it gets very hard to make an accurate estimate of the weather you can expect to encounter. Throw in elevation changes as well.....do you fly all the way around that 9,000 foot hill mass or climb up and go straight over the top of it?
Ever fly out of Tucson at night? Alberquercue? Del Rio? Mojave? Salt Lake?
The Appalachins can get dark as well...ever been around the mountains of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, or Kentucky?
Every night EMS guys are flying in areas without the required surface light reference required by the rules.
There used to be a photograph ,hanging on the wall of a major EMS operator's training office, of a Bell 222 with about six inches of ice gathered during a night flight in Nebraska. The pilot in the photograph was a Check Airman (TRE/IRE) for the company. Any weather....any time, right?
When quizzed...."What were you thinking?" The response was...."I did not know we were building ice....it was night time you know."
I suggest you take yourself to a significant part of the rural United States in any defined "mountainous" area or the desert areas. There are areas larger than the UK with next to no surface lights that are serviced by EMS helicopters at night. We have ranches that have driveways that are 25 miles long. Take yourself out in the Southeast on a very hazy summer night and see how many lights you have in some areas....lots of piney woods in that part of the world.
Ever been to South Dakota, Nebraska, eastern Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and gone flying at night?
Combine the lack of any weather reporting along your route and it gets very hard to make an accurate estimate of the weather you can expect to encounter. Throw in elevation changes as well.....do you fly all the way around that 9,000 foot hill mass or climb up and go straight over the top of it?
Ever fly out of Tucson at night? Alberquercue? Del Rio? Mojave? Salt Lake?
The Appalachins can get dark as well...ever been around the mountains of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, or Kentucky?
Every night EMS guys are flying in areas without the required surface light reference required by the rules.
There used to be a photograph ,hanging on the wall of a major EMS operator's training office, of a Bell 222 with about six inches of ice gathered during a night flight in Nebraska. The pilot in the photograph was a Check Airman (TRE/IRE) for the company. Any weather....any time, right?
When quizzed...."What were you thinking?" The response was...."I did not know we were building ice....it was night time you know."