More news about the Indiana PHI EMS Crash
Thread Starter
You ever seen the look on the face of a Med Crew when you suggest you are in the Air Transportation business and not the Life Saving business? Shortlly after that you become a dangerous pilot whom no one can get along with and no matter what you do....besides pack yer bongo's and beat feet will make them happy. As you say...frequent mover club!
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Europe
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SASless
Answer me this. In no more than 50 words please. In what approximate percentage of EMS accidents do you think the pilots have flown in accordance with existing rules, either FAA or their own operations?
Answer me this. In no more than 50 words please. In what approximate percentage of EMS accidents do you think the pilots have flown in accordance with existing rules, either FAA or their own operations?
Thread Starter
Rotorspeed,
How the heck do I know....and I bet you the EMS industry does not know either. We do know of some that did not follow the weather minimums for some reason and found themselves answering a Roll Call Up Yonder.
Does it matter if that happens to you the very first time or the hundred and first time? Your answer please?
How many of us have gotten caught out despite our very best and honestly made decisions? That is a more telling question. Can you answer that one?
Have you an answer for the question...."Why do folks knowingly fly in adverse weather conditions that are such as to present a mortal danger to them and their crew?
Whats your view on that?
How the heck do I know....and I bet you the EMS industry does not know either. We do know of some that did not follow the weather minimums for some reason and found themselves answering a Roll Call Up Yonder.
Does it matter if that happens to you the very first time or the hundred and first time? Your answer please?
How many of us have gotten caught out despite our very best and honestly made decisions? That is a more telling question. Can you answer that one?
Have you an answer for the question...."Why do folks knowingly fly in adverse weather conditions that are such as to present a mortal danger to them and their crew?
Whats your view on that?
Indiana crew
For those that have express their concerns, the PHI crew is doing well.
The Pilot has been discharged and the Medic and Nurse have been moved to rehab hospitals closer to their homes.
The Pilot has been discharged and the Medic and Nurse have been moved to rehab hospitals closer to their homes.
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: Europe
Posts: 535
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SASless
Not entirely surprised with your post in response to my question, the answer to which is important.
If a high % of accidents occur when pilots have been in blatant breach of the rules, then a major problem is pilot compliance. If not, then there is a case for reviewing rules and imposing higher limits. Getting a clear direction and focus on what simple, inexpensive actions are required to reduce accidents is essential.
You are quite rightly very concerned that EMS accidents should reduce. Maybe you have the time to do some research and trawl through old accident reports to come up with an answer?
Answering your (somewhat strange) questions:
1. No
2. What do you mean by caught out?
3. Because they probably do not feel obliged to comply with the rules, and they believe their judgement and skill will keep them alive, which it almost always does.
Havoc: really pleased to hear that, thanks.
Not entirely surprised with your post in response to my question, the answer to which is important.
If a high % of accidents occur when pilots have been in blatant breach of the rules, then a major problem is pilot compliance. If not, then there is a case for reviewing rules and imposing higher limits. Getting a clear direction and focus on what simple, inexpensive actions are required to reduce accidents is essential.
You are quite rightly very concerned that EMS accidents should reduce. Maybe you have the time to do some research and trawl through old accident reports to come up with an answer?
Answering your (somewhat strange) questions:
1. No
2. What do you mean by caught out?
3. Because they probably do not feel obliged to comply with the rules, and they believe their judgement and skill will keep them alive, which it almost always does.
Havoc: really pleased to hear that, thanks.
Thread Starter
FAA Preliminary Report on the Crash
NTSB Identification: CHI06LA074
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Thursday, February 02, 2006 in Chesterfield, IN
Aircraft: Bell 206L-1, registration: N593AE
Injuries: 3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On February 2, 2006, at 0143 eastern standard time, a Bell 206L-1 helicopter, operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., based in Lafayette, Louisiana, was destroyed during impact with trees, wires, and residential structures while maneuvering near Chesterfield, Indiana. The emergency medical service (EMS) flight was dispatched to pickup a patient at the St. Joseph Hospital, Kokomo, Indiana, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed during the flight. The pilot, flight nurse, and paramedic were seriously injured. The flight departed Anderson Municipal Airport (AID), Anderson, Indiana, at 0139.
According to company dispatch records, shortly after departure the pilot reported that he was aborting the flight due to poor weather conditions. At 0145, the weather station at the departure airport reported calm winds, overcast ceilings of 400 feet above ground level (agl) and 2-1/2 statute mile visibility.
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Thursday, February 02, 2006 in Chesterfield, IN
Aircraft: Bell 206L-1, registration: N593AE
Injuries: 3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On February 2, 2006, at 0143 eastern standard time, a Bell 206L-1 helicopter, operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., based in Lafayette, Louisiana, was destroyed during impact with trees, wires, and residential structures while maneuvering near Chesterfield, Indiana. The emergency medical service (EMS) flight was dispatched to pickup a patient at the St. Joseph Hospital, Kokomo, Indiana, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed during the flight. The pilot, flight nurse, and paramedic were seriously injured. The flight departed Anderson Municipal Airport (AID), Anderson, Indiana, at 0139.
According to company dispatch records, shortly after departure the pilot reported that he was aborting the flight due to poor weather conditions. At 0145, the weather station at the departure airport reported calm winds, overcast ceilings of 400 feet above ground level (agl) and 2-1/2 statute mile visibility.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Philadelphia PA
Age: 73
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
Let me see if I remember the weather info given earlier:
Temperature and dewpoint both 2C.
Unless someone has changed the lapse rate and not told us, 2C/1,000 feet means that somewhere not far above the weather station, the temperature would definitely be below the dewpoint, and it would be pretty thick fog (amazing - it says here 400' higher).
So how high did the pilot think he was going to get, and what about local variations in temperature that might (shock, horror) be lower than where the temperature was taken?
And did they get any weather report from the scene?
It might be something to add to your list of things to check or get a second opinion on when things are this close.
What statistics do we have on what percentage of calls (day or night) get turned down because of weather, lack of weather reporting / information critical to the flight, etc.?
Sorry for the unconnected nature of the rant, but the industry needs to do something about the continued bad safety record.
Temperature and dewpoint both 2C.
Unless someone has changed the lapse rate and not told us, 2C/1,000 feet means that somewhere not far above the weather station, the temperature would definitely be below the dewpoint, and it would be pretty thick fog (amazing - it says here 400' higher).
So how high did the pilot think he was going to get, and what about local variations in temperature that might (shock, horror) be lower than where the temperature was taken?
And did they get any weather report from the scene?
It might be something to add to your list of things to check or get a second opinion on when things are this close.
What statistics do we have on what percentage of calls (day or night) get turned down because of weather, lack of weather reporting / information critical to the flight, etc.?
Sorry for the unconnected nature of the rant, but the industry needs to do something about the continued bad safety record.
Has anyone checked the stats to identify whether it was:
pilot error
weather
mechanical
CRM
etc
that causes the majority of these EMS crashes?
From that it should be relatively easy to backtrack to the source of the problem and fix it.
My money is on pilot error it being a mixture of:
Press on itis
experience
press on itis
experience
oh...yes..and...press on itis.
pilot error
weather
mechanical
CRM
etc
that causes the majority of these EMS crashes?
From that it should be relatively easy to backtrack to the source of the problem and fix it.
My money is on pilot error it being a mixture of:
Press on itis
experience
press on itis
experience
oh...yes..and...press on itis.
Shawn, here's the key to the accident:
The emergency medical service (EMS) flight was dispatched to pickup a patient at the St. Joseph Hospital, Kokomo, Indiana, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
Pt.91 operations do not envision any particular WX restrictions for helicopters.
Today, we have a live example (fortunately with no fatalities) of the reasons why Pt.91 ought to go away for EMS operations, unless the FAA decides to change the wording regarding helicopters in CFR14 FAR 91.155.
The emergency medical service (EMS) flight was dispatched to pickup a patient at the St. Joseph Hospital, Kokomo, Indiana, and was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
Pt.91 operations do not envision any particular WX restrictions for helicopters.
Today, we have a live example (fortunately with no fatalities) of the reasons why Pt.91 ought to go away for EMS operations, unless the FAA decides to change the wording regarding helicopters in CFR14 FAR 91.155.
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: USA
Age: 54
Posts: 305
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Tottigol, PHI's EMS WX limitations are more restrictive than Part 91 and are followed on all legs, wether Part 91 or Part 135. So in this instance, that would not have made a difference. I agree with you though that from a regulatory point of view it would be much better to declare all EMS flights Part 135, regardless of wether there is a patient on board or not.
I know this will never happen but I sometimes wonder how much safer it would be if every EMS helicopter had a designated, protected service area and if dispatch was a government operated, nationwide entity. No more trying to muscle in to each other's service areas; no more helicopter shopping by 911 operators. EMS operators could simply bid on service areas and be assured of a certain amount of business, handed out by an independent dispatching agency.
I know this will never happen but I sometimes wonder how much safer it would be if every EMS helicopter had a designated, protected service area and if dispatch was a government operated, nationwide entity. No more trying to muscle in to each other's service areas; no more helicopter shopping by 911 operators. EMS operators could simply bid on service areas and be assured of a certain amount of business, handed out by an independent dispatching agency.
Thread Starter
Rev,
Make it simpler yet....and Nick Lappos woud love you for it...just make all EMS in the country government run operations and do away with private operators. The down side to that immediately would be the operations would be "Public Use" aircraft and standards except for the State of Oregon that has a state law that forbids "Public Use Operations" by state owned aircraft. Thus it would have to be a Federal operation there I would think.
Make it simpler yet....and Nick Lappos woud love you for it...just make all EMS in the country government run operations and do away with private operators. The down side to that immediately would be the operations would be "Public Use" aircraft and standards except for the State of Oregon that has a state law that forbids "Public Use Operations" by state owned aircraft. Thus it would have to be a Federal operation there I would think.
SAS, that would be a huge culture clash, and it would go against the grain of a typically privately run hospital system as it is in this country, however some level of filtering ought to be applied.
Training EMS dispatchers to Part 121 standards is not going to cure the problem as long as we have pilots (and med crews) accepting flights they have no reason to.
Where we need to work is in educating the medical community to understand and accept the fact that sometimes the risks involved are just not acceptable, and no means just that.
As long as someone out there is willing to jump the gun and expose his/her personal safety and that of the transported medical team (be they passengers or crew) there shall be someone "weather shopping" for aircraft.
One possible solution (as I believe someone already proposed in this forum) would be to remove direct call privileges from requesting hospitals, and have them go through 911 regional call centres (boy, would that tickle someone) even for inter-hospital transfers.
In the end the only thing that shall stop this "scramble for customers" phenomenon is accountability and one way to rpovide for that is to have WX reporting located anywhere there is a EMS helicopter; to make that an IFR operation would require other and more expensive propositions but the "traffic light" would be there for all to see.
Rev, at no time in my posts have I implied or pointed out that any one particular operator is more or less guilty of keeping WX in disregard and I wouldn't expect any operator's official position to be any different than the utmost respect of regulations.
As we stand, we are once again spending rivers of words while there's someone out there doing a regulatory work that is out of balance and is failing to consider the opinions of those whom ought to actually be at the forefront of this battle.
Training EMS dispatchers to Part 121 standards is not going to cure the problem as long as we have pilots (and med crews) accepting flights they have no reason to.
Where we need to work is in educating the medical community to understand and accept the fact that sometimes the risks involved are just not acceptable, and no means just that.
As long as someone out there is willing to jump the gun and expose his/her personal safety and that of the transported medical team (be they passengers or crew) there shall be someone "weather shopping" for aircraft.
One possible solution (as I believe someone already proposed in this forum) would be to remove direct call privileges from requesting hospitals, and have them go through 911 regional call centres (boy, would that tickle someone) even for inter-hospital transfers.
In the end the only thing that shall stop this "scramble for customers" phenomenon is accountability and one way to rpovide for that is to have WX reporting located anywhere there is a EMS helicopter; to make that an IFR operation would require other and more expensive propositions but the "traffic light" would be there for all to see.
Rev, at no time in my posts have I implied or pointed out that any one particular operator is more or less guilty of keeping WX in disregard and I wouldn't expect any operator's official position to be any different than the utmost respect of regulations.
As we stand, we are once again spending rivers of words while there's someone out there doing a regulatory work that is out of balance and is failing to consider the opinions of those whom ought to actually be at the forefront of this battle.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: In my house
Posts: 320
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The decision to launch with a +2 +2 temp and dewpoint and any common sense is questionable as I have said previously. The 400' cloudbase is well below PHI minima.
What puzzles me even more is that this was a patient transfer, the helicopter was en route TO the hospital. It wasn't even a scene call. In my mind, the crew decision has to be even MORE questionable. PHI has a combined CRM course for EMS crews, the decision must have been supported by all crew.
This one baffles me somewhat.
What puzzles me even more is that this was a patient transfer, the helicopter was en route TO the hospital. It wasn't even a scene call. In my mind, the crew decision has to be even MORE questionable. PHI has a combined CRM course for EMS crews, the decision must have been supported by all crew.
This one baffles me somewhat.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: Philadelphia PA
Age: 73
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
At the risk of adding fuel to the fire - some (loosely connected) thoughts....
The US Air Force has a system where the Supervisor of Flying has to approve all flights - bit cumbersome and not the way most others operate, but they did it for a good reason (I suppose). The RAF has an 'authorization' system where someone has to authorize you to go flying. Again, implemented for a good reason.
Why not implement a watered down version of these systems with the dispatchers having to have something (verbal or faxed or emailed) from the pilot (and only the pilot) that he has checked the weather and confirming it is within limits. To those who say it's going to increase the time it takes to respond to a call, this is not a war, and I doubt the extra minute would make the difference in most cases.
In return, dispatchers would have to state to the person accepting the call (may not initially be a pilot who answers the phone) that another operator or base has turned down the call and the reason why it was turned down. Keeps everybody on the responbility curve.
And since there are more hospitals than airports, why not make it a requirement for the hospital to have a mini-weather station with temperature and dewpoint as a minimum (you can determine a lot about cloud base and potential vis from those two numbers).
And how much would some of those mini-weather stations cost to be put at police and fire stations or even on fire trucks (which seem to be on most scenes before the helicopter)?
The US Air Force has a system where the Supervisor of Flying has to approve all flights - bit cumbersome and not the way most others operate, but they did it for a good reason (I suppose). The RAF has an 'authorization' system where someone has to authorize you to go flying. Again, implemented for a good reason.
Why not implement a watered down version of these systems with the dispatchers having to have something (verbal or faxed or emailed) from the pilot (and only the pilot) that he has checked the weather and confirming it is within limits. To those who say it's going to increase the time it takes to respond to a call, this is not a war, and I doubt the extra minute would make the difference in most cases.
In return, dispatchers would have to state to the person accepting the call (may not initially be a pilot who answers the phone) that another operator or base has turned down the call and the reason why it was turned down. Keeps everybody on the responbility curve.
And since there are more hospitals than airports, why not make it a requirement for the hospital to have a mini-weather station with temperature and dewpoint as a minimum (you can determine a lot about cloud base and potential vis from those two numbers).
And how much would some of those mini-weather stations cost to be put at police and fire stations or even on fire trucks (which seem to be on most scenes before the helicopter)?
Shawn, believe it or not a document defined as EOC (Enhanced Operational Control) Policy has been sent forth by the FAA some time back, prior to the 25 jan NTSB conference and prior to this latest accident.
IIRC that document has its origins in the USAA community, and may or may not be a version of the USAF one.
The process is cumbersome and does nothing to improve response accountability on the part of the pilot.
I agree with you on the WX reporting facilities, the only problem is cost for those that shall need to be certificated by the FAA and unless they would be directly accessible by the pilots what operators are going to be trained to be authorized WX observers as for part 135 operations?
WX reporting stations at those locations from where EMS helicopters operate shall have two effects:
Pilots shall be accountable for launching in WX they ain't supposed to, but at the same they'll be able to use the same WX to support their no-go decisions.
IIRC that document has its origins in the USAA community, and may or may not be a version of the USAF one.
The process is cumbersome and does nothing to improve response accountability on the part of the pilot.
I agree with you on the WX reporting facilities, the only problem is cost for those that shall need to be certificated by the FAA and unless they would be directly accessible by the pilots what operators are going to be trained to be authorized WX observers as for part 135 operations?
WX reporting stations at those locations from where EMS helicopters operate shall have two effects:
Pilots shall be accountable for launching in WX they ain't supposed to, but at the same they'll be able to use the same WX to support their no-go decisions.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Asia
Posts: 179
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
We operate such a system of authorisation for all flights in our AOC (Part 135? equivalent) operation.
Depending on the risk level determined by our risk matrix assessment the flight may even require authorisation by the company Vice President (the accountable manager). Of course such a system does not preclude the pilot from deciding it is a no-go early in the process.
Is it cumbersome? On paper maybe, but the system is part of our procedure and there is no doubt that it concentrates the mind of someone who is considering an action that may be extreme.
Depending on the risk level determined by our risk matrix assessment the flight may even require authorisation by the company Vice President (the accountable manager). Of course such a system does not preclude the pilot from deciding it is a no-go early in the process.
Is it cumbersome? On paper maybe, but the system is part of our procedure and there is no doubt that it concentrates the mind of someone who is considering an action that may be extreme.
Last edited by SHortshaft; 13th Feb 2006 at 07:49.
Waking the CEO
PHI has implemented a program that a pilot is now in the EMS dispatch center. Basically another set of eyes on the decision process. He can say no based on information but cannot tell you to go.
Got to use him last night on a dispatch, quick discussion on the weather forecast for the return flight (TEMPO conditions). Planned to get the patient to where they needed to go and then we had another discussion prior to returning to base. Painless, basically he listened to what my plan was based on the weather I had and pressed on.
PHI has been using the risk matrix for a couple of months, still a work in progress, but again painless if you keep an eye on the weather.
There is nothing offical about the Anderson accident, and really just piece meal of speculation. The crewmembers are doing fine.
Note to Shawn: The Air Force SOF did not have the authority to launch aircraft. They did last chance looks at the hammer head, braking action checks, occassional drop off of left behind equipment for the aircrew, and at times a set of eyes on low passes to checking parts and pieces on aircraft (gear down/hung gear) etc.
to be the SOF, you had to be an Aircraft commander and then eventually it was opened up to other rated crew positions (Share in the fun of SOF duties).
Got to use him last night on a dispatch, quick discussion on the weather forecast for the return flight (TEMPO conditions). Planned to get the patient to where they needed to go and then we had another discussion prior to returning to base. Painless, basically he listened to what my plan was based on the weather I had and pressed on.
PHI has been using the risk matrix for a couple of months, still a work in progress, but again painless if you keep an eye on the weather.
There is nothing offical about the Anderson accident, and really just piece meal of speculation. The crewmembers are doing fine.
Note to Shawn: The Air Force SOF did not have the authority to launch aircraft. They did last chance looks at the hammer head, braking action checks, occassional drop off of left behind equipment for the aircrew, and at times a set of eyes on low passes to checking parts and pieces on aircraft (gear down/hung gear) etc.
to be the SOF, you had to be an Aircraft commander and then eventually it was opened up to other rated crew positions (Share in the fun of SOF duties).
