What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey?
The Stabilator....Again?
Lonewolf, you were doing absolutely fine until you got to the UH-60 stabilator. Probably as much myth there as for VRS, I'd guess.
The real history is that there was a single fatal UH-60 stabilator caused accident, and that occurred on the first prototype UH-60A, 21650 at the Sikorsky facility in Stratford and flown by a SA crew of two pilots and a flight test engineer. It sounds as if someone has given you bad information about what actually happened, so I'll provide the short version of what actually transpired here.
The ship was scheduled to do two things on accident day. First, provide a flight demo for Asst Sec. of the Army for R&D Dr. Percy Pierre. Second, I was to ferry the ship down to the Dev Flt Test Ctr we had established in West Palm Beach so that the Maturity Phase Test Program could commence.. The ship had been worked on since completing its last test program in Stfd and needed a maintenance test flt, which I did late the preceding afternoon, and after which I wrote up the stabilator for being a degree outside the trailing edge down tolerance limit for cruise. Another crew was to fly the demo and the stabilator maintenance was to be done overnight.
At about 2 AM the job wasn't complete and the stab system engineer and second shift left the job incomplete and departed. First shift came to work, did the daily, buttoned up the stabilator connections, the inspector did his backup inspection and the crew took off on a second maintenance test flight to recheck the stabilator schedule.
But the paperwork did not reflect that the airspeed inputs to the stab amplifiers was not reconnected. The crew made an aggressive takeoff, the stabilator didn't come up, and they, for reasons never understood, did not use the 28V DC backup emergency switch to raise the stab. With the stab full down, they ran out of aft control by 100 KIAS or so and went in the adjacent river upside down. After the wreckage was pulled out of the river the 28v DC Emergency backup system was found to be functional, and the airspeed connections to the amps undone.
Thus it didn't take much analysis to get at the root cause. What made it hard for me to believe was that the pilot who was flying had a lot of time flying with me in the company owned prototype which had ONLY a electric manual stabilator system and so to him it should have been second nature to go for the DC switch. Additionally, there had been two instances during development of the system wherein the stabilator did not come up during takeoff and in both cases the pilot flying brought up the tail manually via the switch without issue. So there was sufficient time.
However it was 1978, the production aircraft were on the line and a lot of high ranking individuals were involved ( I have to say that all whom I met seemed to be honestly motivated ), so there were nonetheless a number of after the fact activities, more stabilator controllability and hardover testing at West Palm, simulator work at Ames and the Army version of the H-60 got the claw switch on the cyclic, which the USN and yours truly thought was unnecessary.
Apologize for the rant, but there was no dearth of mis-information afoot for years regarding mysterious stabilator caused accidents( the most popular one being the Ft Bragg accident which finally turned out to be caused by an unsafetied bolt or associated nut ( can't recall which ) falling into, and jamming the longitudinal control system in the mixer/limiter area).
Thanks,
John Dixson
The real history is that there was a single fatal UH-60 stabilator caused accident, and that occurred on the first prototype UH-60A, 21650 at the Sikorsky facility in Stratford and flown by a SA crew of two pilots and a flight test engineer. It sounds as if someone has given you bad information about what actually happened, so I'll provide the short version of what actually transpired here.
The ship was scheduled to do two things on accident day. First, provide a flight demo for Asst Sec. of the Army for R&D Dr. Percy Pierre. Second, I was to ferry the ship down to the Dev Flt Test Ctr we had established in West Palm Beach so that the Maturity Phase Test Program could commence.. The ship had been worked on since completing its last test program in Stfd and needed a maintenance test flt, which I did late the preceding afternoon, and after which I wrote up the stabilator for being a degree outside the trailing edge down tolerance limit for cruise. Another crew was to fly the demo and the stabilator maintenance was to be done overnight.
At about 2 AM the job wasn't complete and the stab system engineer and second shift left the job incomplete and departed. First shift came to work, did the daily, buttoned up the stabilator connections, the inspector did his backup inspection and the crew took off on a second maintenance test flight to recheck the stabilator schedule.
But the paperwork did not reflect that the airspeed inputs to the stab amplifiers was not reconnected. The crew made an aggressive takeoff, the stabilator didn't come up, and they, for reasons never understood, did not use the 28V DC backup emergency switch to raise the stab. With the stab full down, they ran out of aft control by 100 KIAS or so and went in the adjacent river upside down. After the wreckage was pulled out of the river the 28v DC Emergency backup system was found to be functional, and the airspeed connections to the amps undone.
Thus it didn't take much analysis to get at the root cause. What made it hard for me to believe was that the pilot who was flying had a lot of time flying with me in the company owned prototype which had ONLY a electric manual stabilator system and so to him it should have been second nature to go for the DC switch. Additionally, there had been two instances during development of the system wherein the stabilator did not come up during takeoff and in both cases the pilot flying brought up the tail manually via the switch without issue. So there was sufficient time.
However it was 1978, the production aircraft were on the line and a lot of high ranking individuals were involved ( I have to say that all whom I met seemed to be honestly motivated ), so there were nonetheless a number of after the fact activities, more stabilator controllability and hardover testing at West Palm, simulator work at Ames and the Army version of the H-60 got the claw switch on the cyclic, which the USN and yours truly thought was unnecessary.
Apologize for the rant, but there was no dearth of mis-information afoot for years regarding mysterious stabilator caused accidents( the most popular one being the Ft Bragg accident which finally turned out to be caused by an unsafetied bolt or associated nut ( can't recall which ) falling into, and jamming the longitudinal control system in the mixer/limiter area).
Thanks,
John Dixson
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JohnDixson says:
Hi John,
I haven't met Tom, but have a friend who worked with him on V-22 flight test projects and has been involved with him on other tiltrotor research efforts. He like you has nothing but good things to say about Tom including that he 'does not say or write what people want him to,' he 'reports the facts' as proven by the research. His paper will be interesting, and we can all count on it being completely credible.
JohnDixson says:
I completely agree. Again, I am not in any way connected to the program, and am not quoting others who are. From what I read in open sources during the post accident period, it appears that instead of doing the VRS flight testing that was planned for in the initial development program, computer modeling was used in place of actual flight tests. Computers can do great things, but they have their limits. In an attempt to save cost and time the decision was made not to engage in a full program of flight testing at the upper management level, perhaps directed from the government side(?), and it was the wrong decision. Just like with the S-92 gearbox, when corners are cut in aircraft development programs, tragedy and loss of life can be, and too often are the final result.
If flight testing on the V-22 to explore VRS thoroughly was accomplished before operational testing commenced, it seems likely the dangers of the asymmetrical aspects would have been fully understood at that stage with the appropriate warning systems and training programs developed and put in place. But I don't blame those at the research and flight test level, as they can only recommend what tests they believe need to be accomplished, in the end they are told from above what they can and cannot do sometimes despite their recommendations. I would guess that the elimination of recommended test series does not happen often, but it should be completely removed from the equation with the flight test team being given the last word.
In his response, Tom mentioned his intention to write an in-depth SETP paper at length on the subject, saying that the 2003 paper was limited by the 20 minute presentation time allotted by the SETP at their functions... The paper that Tom MacDonald will be writing ought to answer all of the conjectures and will, I am certain, be very interesting reading.
I haven't met Tom, but have a friend who worked with him on V-22 flight test projects and has been involved with him on other tiltrotor research efforts. He like you has nothing but good things to say about Tom including that he 'does not say or write what people want him to,' he 'reports the facts' as proven by the research. His paper will be interesting, and we can all count on it being completely credible.
JohnDixson says:
The USMC discovered a serious problem in the Marana incident. The Bell/Boeing/USMC test team did what appears to be an extensive and technically rigorous flight test to establish the boundaries of the problem and establish corrective action procedures. They did that and the USMC and USAF aviators are now happy with what they fly.
There will inevitably be some comment that Marana represented a failure of that same test team to discover that particular problem. In response, my experience is that prior to flight test beginning on any new model, the entire test planning sequence is reviewed at many levels for rigor, completeness and of course adherence to contractual/specification requirements. What I am suggesting is that none of the experts involved saw this one coming, and along those lines, it is not the first time it has occurred within the industry.
There will inevitably be some comment that Marana represented a failure of that same test team to discover that particular problem. In response, my experience is that prior to flight test beginning on any new model, the entire test planning sequence is reviewed at many levels for rigor, completeness and of course adherence to contractual/specification requirements. What I am suggesting is that none of the experts involved saw this one coming, and along those lines, it is not the first time it has occurred within the industry.
If flight testing on the V-22 to explore VRS thoroughly was accomplished before operational testing commenced, it seems likely the dangers of the asymmetrical aspects would have been fully understood at that stage with the appropriate warning systems and training programs developed and put in place. But I don't blame those at the research and flight test level, as they can only recommend what tests they believe need to be accomplished, in the end they are told from above what they can and cannot do sometimes despite their recommendations. I would guess that the elimination of recommended test series does not happen often, but it should be completely removed from the equation with the flight test team being given the last word.
Last edited by 21stCen; 23rd Dec 2011 at 12:40.
21st.....that has been one of the complaints all along about the Osprey Program.
It went from being the "Universal Soldier"...capable of all things....all missions...for all Services and over time the Mission Set has been altered (read "reduced") when the aircraft was found unable to carry out a particular mission or task. Then, compounded with the pitiful record of Testing, there have been about 30 Marines killed in accidents that very most likely would have been avoided by adhering to the planned Test Schedule.....one can begin to understand why some critics of the Osprey Program are as strident as they are.
Then to put the icing on the Cake....we learned the USMC deliberately mis-stated the situation and were publically denounced for doing do. Which unfortunately casts a rather large shadow over the Program yet again.
If one takes a big step back....reviews all the justifications for the program...that being the Over-The-Horizion Amphibious Assault...and the current status of that pipe dream...then again, the very justification of the Osprey Program gets a leg knocked off that stool.
For those that are new to the argument....OTH was based upon the US Navy insisted their Amphib Support Ships being kept much further out to Sea to keep them safe from attack by land based artillery, rockets, missiles and the like.
OTH Amphibious assault requires the Osprey and a new fast Amphibous Tractor for the assault phase and the LCAC (air cushion landing craft) and CH-53E/K for the support phase.
The Marines finally accepted defeat on their super dooper jet Amtrac after spending Billions of Dollars.....leaving the OTH concept yet/still useless. The USMC in modern times (Post WWII) has always been in jeopardy as budget cutters and inter-service rivalry for the available budget money allows for some to seriously consider doing away with the Marine Corps amphibious mission and in some circles...doing away with the Marine Corps all together.
As modern warfare and the prospective Wars are being considered....that situation is not going to change. There is some merit to the argument the USMC Jet Squadrons are really "Navy" squadrons in numbers, aircraft, and mission sets....and thus Marine Air should be transferred to the Navy. The Helicopter/Tilt Rotor ground assault mission will always be a Marine mission but some see it as rightfully being limited to On-Shore "Army" type operations and thus only an Amphibious Asault capability limited to "Raids" or other limited scale operations need be maintained with a resulting decrease in the need for large numbers of long range helicopter/tilt rotor aircraft.
I don't profess to know the answer....but certainly see why the questions are asked.
I do know for sure we need our Marines....as they are a first class fighting organization made up of very fine Men and Women, with a great heritage which they live up to today as they have in the past. What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.
All this being said....the Osprey excels at some Missions....far fewer than it is being used for and is expected to be used for.
It went from being the "Universal Soldier"...capable of all things....all missions...for all Services and over time the Mission Set has been altered (read "reduced") when the aircraft was found unable to carry out a particular mission or task. Then, compounded with the pitiful record of Testing, there have been about 30 Marines killed in accidents that very most likely would have been avoided by adhering to the planned Test Schedule.....one can begin to understand why some critics of the Osprey Program are as strident as they are.
Then to put the icing on the Cake....we learned the USMC deliberately mis-stated the situation and were publically denounced for doing do. Which unfortunately casts a rather large shadow over the Program yet again.
If one takes a big step back....reviews all the justifications for the program...that being the Over-The-Horizion Amphibious Assault...and the current status of that pipe dream...then again, the very justification of the Osprey Program gets a leg knocked off that stool.
For those that are new to the argument....OTH was based upon the US Navy insisted their Amphib Support Ships being kept much further out to Sea to keep them safe from attack by land based artillery, rockets, missiles and the like.
OTH Amphibious assault requires the Osprey and a new fast Amphibous Tractor for the assault phase and the LCAC (air cushion landing craft) and CH-53E/K for the support phase.
The Marines finally accepted defeat on their super dooper jet Amtrac after spending Billions of Dollars.....leaving the OTH concept yet/still useless. The USMC in modern times (Post WWII) has always been in jeopardy as budget cutters and inter-service rivalry for the available budget money allows for some to seriously consider doing away with the Marine Corps amphibious mission and in some circles...doing away with the Marine Corps all together.
As modern warfare and the prospective Wars are being considered....that situation is not going to change. There is some merit to the argument the USMC Jet Squadrons are really "Navy" squadrons in numbers, aircraft, and mission sets....and thus Marine Air should be transferred to the Navy. The Helicopter/Tilt Rotor ground assault mission will always be a Marine mission but some see it as rightfully being limited to On-Shore "Army" type operations and thus only an Amphibious Asault capability limited to "Raids" or other limited scale operations need be maintained with a resulting decrease in the need for large numbers of long range helicopter/tilt rotor aircraft.
I don't profess to know the answer....but certainly see why the questions are asked.
I do know for sure we need our Marines....as they are a first class fighting organization made up of very fine Men and Women, with a great heritage which they live up to today as they have in the past. What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.
All this being said....the Osprey excels at some Missions....far fewer than it is being used for and is expected to be used for.
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Sas says:
Hi Sas,
One should never believe the marketing hype of any program, it will always be far more than they are capable of delivering.
Sas says:
Hind sight is always 20/20. Taking a "big step back" is not possible in reality as expenditures of the past are already gone. It is better to look at the present with how the a/c has become vital to the Marine medium lift mission, and how it will add to the effectiveness of the USMC aviation capability requirements in the future. In other words it is better to instead 'take a big step forward' to see if the program should be adjusted today for future requirements expected. That is something that you and I can talk about, but those who are in a better position to assess its true effectiveness under battlefield conditions in Iraq and now in Afghanistan will decide its future (modified by upcoming fiscal restraints no doubt!).
Sas says:
I certainly agree with that.
Sas says:
The Marines flying the Osprey in Afghanistan say they feel that the aircraft is doing far more than they expected, and those flying it wouldn't go back to what they were flying before. Guess they didn't get the 'marketing brochure.'
21stC
It went from being the "Universal Soldier"...capable of all things....all missions...
One should never believe the marketing hype of any program, it will always be far more than they are capable of delivering.
Sas says:
If one takes a big step back....
Sas says:
I do know for sure we need our Marines....as they are a first class fighting organization made up of very fine Men and Women, with a great heritage which they live up to today as they have in the past. What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.
Sas says:
All this being said....the Osprey excels at some Missions....far fewer than it is being used for and is expected to be used for.
21stC
Mine Sweeping was a proposed mission....and very quickly was found to be impossible. That is an example of what I meant by a reduction in Mission Set capability. Then we might bring up HOGE capability at altitude...again very quickly one can see the aircraft is not capable of that. It is not alone in that problem but it is what it is as they say.
Does the Osprey beat the CH-46 in most taskings.....for sure.
How much money do we spend looking forward...and when is it a pipe dream and not a necessary goal?
What value proposing a three legged stool with but two legs installed?
Intellectual honesty requires one be able to discuss the actual situation and discount the hoped for result that not only has not been achieved but has no real hope of being achieved in the next decade or so.
Without the ability to land forces by boat or vehicle....beach assaults from OTH are just that....a damn pipe dream. Either we accept the Navy shall have to put ships at risk or the Marines cannot claim to be able to do real Amphibious Assaults from OTH.
Neither service will admit the extent the lack of the fast amphibious tractor harms the OTH strategy....as one of the two services shall have to surrender its position and that just ain't gonna happen.
In the mean while....huge amounts of Tax Dollars are being squandered on a capability that does not exist...and will not for the foreseeable future.
It is not just the Osprey that is expensive...but the special vehicles being bought that will fit inside the aircraft, the special ships that are needed to handle the Osprey, the R & D money that has been wasted so far on the fast Tractor and that shall invariably be spent yet again trying to come up with an Armored Amphibious Tractor that can cover ground like a speedboat.
Pardon me if I sound pessimistic about all this....but when Pigs Fly....we'll see that fast Tractor built and made operational. I dare say it will not be in my life time. So...the Marines are into Vertical Envelopment to secure a small beach head safe from enemy fire....where LCACs can land heavy equipment, supplies and large numbers of troops. Which is not in any sense an OTH amphibious assault.
Does the Osprey beat the CH-46 in most taskings.....for sure.
How much money do we spend looking forward...and when is it a pipe dream and not a necessary goal?
What value proposing a three legged stool with but two legs installed?
Intellectual honesty requires one be able to discuss the actual situation and discount the hoped for result that not only has not been achieved but has no real hope of being achieved in the next decade or so.
Without the ability to land forces by boat or vehicle....beach assaults from OTH are just that....a damn pipe dream. Either we accept the Navy shall have to put ships at risk or the Marines cannot claim to be able to do real Amphibious Assaults from OTH.
Neither service will admit the extent the lack of the fast amphibious tractor harms the OTH strategy....as one of the two services shall have to surrender its position and that just ain't gonna happen.
In the mean while....huge amounts of Tax Dollars are being squandered on a capability that does not exist...and will not for the foreseeable future.
It is not just the Osprey that is expensive...but the special vehicles being bought that will fit inside the aircraft, the special ships that are needed to handle the Osprey, the R & D money that has been wasted so far on the fast Tractor and that shall invariably be spent yet again trying to come up with an Armored Amphibious Tractor that can cover ground like a speedboat.
Pardon me if I sound pessimistic about all this....but when Pigs Fly....we'll see that fast Tractor built and made operational. I dare say it will not be in my life time. So...the Marines are into Vertical Envelopment to secure a small beach head safe from enemy fire....where LCACs can land heavy equipment, supplies and large numbers of troops. Which is not in any sense an OTH amphibious assault.
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Sas says:
Way too much. But those fighting on the battlefield in Afghanistan today as we speak think it is worth it...
How much money do we spend looking forward...
Last edited by 21stCen; 23rd Dec 2011 at 15:54.
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SASless said:
What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.
Then SASless said:
How much money do we spend looking forward...
To which 21stCentury replied:
Way too much. But those fighting on the battlefield in Afghanistan today as we speak think it is worth it...
Gents, both those sets of thought sound like circular arguments to me. The U.S., like every other power in history, is spending itself out of existence through militarism. The true test of American exceptionalism might be America's ability to recognize this and be the first power in history to avoid the mistake.
I see no sign or that happening, however, and the two sets of thought you have expressed being more or less universally accepted or at least unquestioned, are in fact clear indications to the contrary.
What the Marines do....they do as only Marines can....and that is what makes them special.
Then SASless said:
How much money do we spend looking forward...
To which 21stCentury replied:
Way too much. But those fighting on the battlefield in Afghanistan today as we speak think it is worth it...
Gents, both those sets of thought sound like circular arguments to me. The U.S., like every other power in history, is spending itself out of existence through militarism. The true test of American exceptionalism might be America's ability to recognize this and be the first power in history to avoid the mistake.
I see no sign or that happening, however, and the two sets of thought you have expressed being more or less universally accepted or at least unquestioned, are in fact clear indications to the contrary.
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The U.S., like every other power in history, is spending itself out of existence through militarism. The true test of American exceptionalism might be America's ability to recognize this and be the first power in history to avoid the mistake.
Your thoughts are welcome.
21stC
Militarism can be defined in way too many ways to be accepted merely by stipulation.
You will have to provide us your definition if we are going to have commonality of definition by which we can discuss your view of things.
The Japanese immediately prior to WWII can be said fairly to have been Militaristic....whereas the UK and USA at the end of the War would not have been despite the sheer size of their Military Forces.
If you are making reference to the Military-Industrial Complex that Eisenhower warned us of....you might have a point.
Perhaps recent history of "Pre-emptive War" would indict the Bush Administration in some folks view....but not in all.
As a percentage of GDP....we are spending far less than at most of our history as a Nation which would belie the usual definition of Militarism.
What say you?
Another view of the OTH Amphibious Assault situation including remarks by General Amos....it appears the super fast Armored vehicle is history and the USMC is looking at more traditional boats and/or Air Cushion craft for that role. But....if as the article suggests...the Marines have to buy both watercraft and armored vehicles...it shall be very expensive. It would make the current AAV obselete but yet deprive the Marines of that current capability....an armored vehicle that could swim ashore.
James Hasik
You will have to provide us your definition if we are going to have commonality of definition by which we can discuss your view of things.
The Japanese immediately prior to WWII can be said fairly to have been Militaristic....whereas the UK and USA at the end of the War would not have been despite the sheer size of their Military Forces.
If you are making reference to the Military-Industrial Complex that Eisenhower warned us of....you might have a point.
Perhaps recent history of "Pre-emptive War" would indict the Bush Administration in some folks view....but not in all.
As a percentage of GDP....we are spending far less than at most of our history as a Nation which would belie the usual definition of Militarism.
What say you?
Another view of the OTH Amphibious Assault situation including remarks by General Amos....it appears the super fast Armored vehicle is history and the USMC is looking at more traditional boats and/or Air Cushion craft for that role. But....if as the article suggests...the Marines have to buy both watercraft and armored vehicles...it shall be very expensive. It would make the current AAV obselete but yet deprive the Marines of that current capability....an armored vehicle that could swim ashore.
James Hasik
Last edited by SASless; 24th Dec 2011 at 12:44.
John:
Many thanks for the recounting of the actual mishap circumstances. You do indeed dispell some myth I had been fed some years ago.
Much appreciated.
Militarism: a one sized fits all perjorative used (carelessly) far too often. I'll put my chips on SASless' point regarding its lack of utility in this discussion.
SASless, all shadows of the past aside, time moves forward, as do events. The mistakes are part of the record, but you cannot go back and undo them. So, the Marines have chosen to use an expensive aircraft for their medium lift.
Fifteen years ago, a very astute Marine Colonel argued to me that the tank was OBE. I think he ws 20 years ahead of his time, but the foundations of his argument are beginning to show substantial merit.
His point, however, at that time, late 90's, did not necessarily match the realities in Iraq ... but if we look at Afghanistan, he seems prescient.
Many thanks for the recounting of the actual mishap circumstances. You do indeed dispell some myth I had been fed some years ago.
Much appreciated.
Militarism: a one sized fits all perjorative used (carelessly) far too often. I'll put my chips on SASless' point regarding its lack of utility in this discussion.
SASless, all shadows of the past aside, time moves forward, as do events. The mistakes are part of the record, but you cannot go back and undo them. So, the Marines have chosen to use an expensive aircraft for their medium lift.
Fifteen years ago, a very astute Marine Colonel argued to me that the tank was OBE. I think he ws 20 years ahead of his time, but the foundations of his argument are beginning to show substantial merit.
His point, however, at that time, late 90's, did not necessarily match the realities in Iraq ... but if we look at Afghanistan, he seems prescient.
Now who would have guessed the American Military would go to an all armored transportation system? Think of the money spent putting armor on all manner of vehicles as a defensive measure against the IED. Who would have guessed that would become necessary?
The sad thing is the next War may not be similar in that respect and all that expense, weight penalty, and transport demand will be wasted.
I guess DARPA needs to get cracking on a military version of the Crystal Ball if there is any hope to get our Force Structure and Unit TO&E's correct for the nex t Dust Up!
We are not supposed to say this....nay....not even think this...but if we are making such progress in Afghanistan then why are we fielding Pilotless Re-Supply helicopters to relieve the demand on our helicopter fleet which has had to replace the trucks normally used for re-supply over the road ways?
The sad thing is the next War may not be similar in that respect and all that expense, weight penalty, and transport demand will be wasted.
I guess DARPA needs to get cracking on a military version of the Crystal Ball if there is any hope to get our Force Structure and Unit TO&E's correct for the nex t Dust Up!
We are not supposed to say this....nay....not even think this...but if we are making such progress in Afghanistan then why are we fielding Pilotless Re-Supply helicopters to relieve the demand on our helicopter fleet which has had to replace the trucks normally used for re-supply over the road ways?
SAS:
Because technology makes putting together remotely operated land mines so damned easy.
Just over 7 years ago part of my job involved bits and pieces of countering that problem. You eliminate the problem if you avoid road networks. As with air travel versus rail, it is far easier to secure NODES than entire Lines of Communication. So, secure launch and land sites, and you secure Nodes.
Cheers.
Because technology makes putting together remotely operated land mines so damned easy.
Just over 7 years ago part of my job involved bits and pieces of countering that problem. You eliminate the problem if you avoid road networks. As with air travel versus rail, it is far easier to secure NODES than entire Lines of Communication. So, secure launch and land sites, and you secure Nodes.
Cheers.
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I said goodbye to this thread some time ago, because it seemed ridiculous. I still believe that, but I've checked in and am amazed that it's still the topic of almost daily discussion.
I'm willing to modify my views based on data and new information, but the Osprey haters seem to be unable to even acknowledge the slightest bit of merit in the airframe. If I told one that the V-22 cured childhood leukemia, they'd counter that it costs too much, the side effects are horrible, and that it's surely a lie perpetrated by Big Pharma. I'll say it again. I've flown or flown in about everything we've got, and the V-22 is the best platform going. Ask whether the cost has been worth it, I'll acknowledge that there can be very legitimate debate on the subject.
The most bizarre thing is, "WHY are we talking about it?" There IS NO GOING BACK at this point. Over half of the FMF medium-lift force has been replaced. Going back and replacing the V-22s we've got already ISN'T going to happen. Even replacing the remaining CH-46s with something different isn't happening either. That's just reality.
So, are we discussing this from some kind of hypothetical historical analysis standpoint, like debating what the world would be like if the US hadn't entered WWII? That's an interesting topic, but is really just mental masturbation when one gets down to it. The decision's been made and isn't going to change.
One can argue, "In the future, we shouldn't buy expensive weapons systems like this one," or "The next generation of vertical lift should not be based on tilt rotor technology," but arguing the specific merits of the V-22 is just a waste of time. The train's left the station. Get on board or don't, but stop bitching about whether the train was on time.
I'm willing to modify my views based on data and new information, but the Osprey haters seem to be unable to even acknowledge the slightest bit of merit in the airframe. If I told one that the V-22 cured childhood leukemia, they'd counter that it costs too much, the side effects are horrible, and that it's surely a lie perpetrated by Big Pharma. I'll say it again. I've flown or flown in about everything we've got, and the V-22 is the best platform going. Ask whether the cost has been worth it, I'll acknowledge that there can be very legitimate debate on the subject.
The most bizarre thing is, "WHY are we talking about it?" There IS NO GOING BACK at this point. Over half of the FMF medium-lift force has been replaced. Going back and replacing the V-22s we've got already ISN'T going to happen. Even replacing the remaining CH-46s with something different isn't happening either. That's just reality.
So, are we discussing this from some kind of hypothetical historical analysis standpoint, like debating what the world would be like if the US hadn't entered WWII? That's an interesting topic, but is really just mental masturbation when one gets down to it. The decision's been made and isn't going to change.
One can argue, "In the future, we shouldn't buy expensive weapons systems like this one," or "The next generation of vertical lift should not be based on tilt rotor technology," but arguing the specific merits of the V-22 is just a waste of time. The train's left the station. Get on board or don't, but stop bitching about whether the train was on time.
OD,
Welcome back....hang around this time and contribute to the discussion. Despite being a Chinook pilot and naturally loving the old girls....I learned to accept the British would never accept the Chinook as being a very good aircraft due to the reception it was given by them when put into operation on the North Sea Offshore Operations. I maintain it was a case of Penis Envy but that is another story.
Care to give us your views of the OTH strategy status now that the Fast Track program died a failure?
How does the USMC achieve that capability now there is no replacement for the AAV's currently in use and were due to be replaced by faster vehicles?
As the USN is adapting some of the new Amphib ships specifically for the Osprey....what does that say about the overall capability of the Gator fleet to operate organic air units....are there major alterations or design changes that shall need to be made to accomodate the Osprey?
With massive budget cuts arriving....what is the future of the USMC in general and the Osprey program in particular....and how will those cuts affect the Amphibious Assault Capability the USMC sees as its core mission? Is OTH dead.....in spirit and reality if not in words?
If OTH remains un-doable....and the USN will not change its position of demanding its ships staying well offshore....what then?
Welcome back....hang around this time and contribute to the discussion. Despite being a Chinook pilot and naturally loving the old girls....I learned to accept the British would never accept the Chinook as being a very good aircraft due to the reception it was given by them when put into operation on the North Sea Offshore Operations. I maintain it was a case of Penis Envy but that is another story.
Care to give us your views of the OTH strategy status now that the Fast Track program died a failure?
How does the USMC achieve that capability now there is no replacement for the AAV's currently in use and were due to be replaced by faster vehicles?
As the USN is adapting some of the new Amphib ships specifically for the Osprey....what does that say about the overall capability of the Gator fleet to operate organic air units....are there major alterations or design changes that shall need to be made to accomodate the Osprey?
With massive budget cuts arriving....what is the future of the USMC in general and the Osprey program in particular....and how will those cuts affect the Amphibious Assault Capability the USMC sees as its core mission? Is OTH dead.....in spirit and reality if not in words?
If OTH remains un-doable....and the USN will not change its position of demanding its ships staying well offshore....what then?
SASless...Why wouldnt the Brits accept the Chinook...After all it was Jock Cameron of British Airways who pioneered the use of tandem rotors with the Bristol 173 in 19953 and British designers and engineers who went to Phily in the early 1960s to help Boeing to complete design of the Chinook and get it to work after their own design ,the Bristol 194/Westland WG.1 was abandoned by the government as too expensive !
Mind you the CH-47 's still only got a three bladed rotor rather than the four blade head the Brits offered.
Mind you the CH-47 's still only got a three bladed rotor rather than the four blade head the Brits offered.
Heli....there's some folks that post here that can far better answer your questions as they were involved in the Chinook operations and some in the Bristow decision process that led to the Puma/Tiger/Super Puma decision.
Costs, lack of uses in other kinds of tasking, vibration levels, are among some of the complaints but one must also remember the marketing campaign (or anti-Chinook campaign as some believe) that painted the Chinook in a bad light as being part of the reception the old girls got on the North Sea.
There have been some recent discussions about this in Rotorheads....cannot recall which thread.
Costs, lack of uses in other kinds of tasking, vibration levels, are among some of the complaints but one must also remember the marketing campaign (or anti-Chinook campaign as some believe) that painted the Chinook in a bad light as being part of the reception the old girls got on the North Sea.
There have been some recent discussions about this in Rotorheads....cannot recall which thread.
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I think the USMC is going to return to the expeditionary, sea-based crisis response force that it should have been all along. The 202K plan was a fiction from the get-go. I don't know whether it was a fiction to buy gear and infrastructure or whether it was poor planning, but we were never going to stay there.
The Osprey is going to replace all medium lift in the USMC. That's a fact. Now, there were going to be squadrons added as part of 202K. Those will probably go away.
If the Corps is lucky, it will stabilize at either 180K or 172K, where it was before GWOT started. If not, it will end up in the 140s.
In my view, either is fine. The Corps is meant to be a light crisis-response force, not a second land army. Put us in to rescue AMCITs stuck in a country falling apart or secure an airfield for follow-on forces. That's what we've done since the days of Samuel Nicholas (not the airfield part, but you get the idea).
We aren't going to do an amphibious assault against an opposed beach, especially OTH. But OTH is still valid for the missions we should be doing--embassy reinforcement, NEOs, IHR, etc, etc. Navy shipbuilding reflects this, even if the official statements don't--the America LHAs don't have well-decks for AAVs.
The Osprey gives us the capability to do all those crisis response missions from the sea to well inland. Need TRAP coverage of a bombing campaign (Libya)? You got it. Need a NEO done while the gators are still steaming? The Ospreys could've done the Somalia NEO without AAR, unlike the 53s used at the time.
The Osprey is better suited to the new reality than any other aircraft.
The Osprey is going to replace all medium lift in the USMC. That's a fact. Now, there were going to be squadrons added as part of 202K. Those will probably go away.
If the Corps is lucky, it will stabilize at either 180K or 172K, where it was before GWOT started. If not, it will end up in the 140s.
In my view, either is fine. The Corps is meant to be a light crisis-response force, not a second land army. Put us in to rescue AMCITs stuck in a country falling apart or secure an airfield for follow-on forces. That's what we've done since the days of Samuel Nicholas (not the airfield part, but you get the idea).
We aren't going to do an amphibious assault against an opposed beach, especially OTH. But OTH is still valid for the missions we should be doing--embassy reinforcement, NEOs, IHR, etc, etc. Navy shipbuilding reflects this, even if the official statements don't--the America LHAs don't have well-decks for AAVs.
The Osprey gives us the capability to do all those crisis response missions from the sea to well inland. Need TRAP coverage of a bombing campaign (Libya)? You got it. Need a NEO done while the gators are still steaming? The Ospreys could've done the Somalia NEO without AAR, unlike the 53s used at the time.
The Osprey is better suited to the new reality than any other aircraft.
Last edited by ospreydriver; 7th Jan 2012 at 04:43.
The Marine Corps V-22 Osprey’s safety, combat effectiveness and reliability have improved in the past year, according to the Pentagon’s test office.
New aircraft software evaluated in tests from August through early November “performed largely as expected,” the test office found. The improvement gives Osprey pilots greater capability to track, monitor and communicate from their cockpit with U.S. ground forces and to avoid bad weather.
“Software enhancements were modest but provided new piloting options and power margins” during flying operations,“increasing safety and reducing pilot workload,” Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation said in a report released today.
The report is good news for makers of the $53 billion V-22 Osprey, the Pentagon’s sixth-largest acquisition program. The Navy plans to spend $8 billion this year to buy an additional 122 V-22s, made by Providence, Rhode Island-based Textron Inc. Bell Helicopter unit and Chicago-based Boeing Co.
“Across the fleet, the V-22 generally meets reliability and maintainability requirements,” Gilmore wrote. Still, the V-22 in its most recent testing was available only 53 percent of the time it was required, rather than the specification of 82 percent, according to Gilmore.
The Navy should continue “development and testing to improve overall reliability and availability,” he wrote.
New aircraft software evaluated in tests from August through early November “performed largely as expected,” the test office found. The improvement gives Osprey pilots greater capability to track, monitor and communicate from their cockpit with U.S. ground forces and to avoid bad weather.
“Software enhancements were modest but provided new piloting options and power margins” during flying operations,“increasing safety and reducing pilot workload,” Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation said in a report released today.
The report is good news for makers of the $53 billion V-22 Osprey, the Pentagon’s sixth-largest acquisition program. The Navy plans to spend $8 billion this year to buy an additional 122 V-22s, made by Providence, Rhode Island-based Textron Inc. Bell Helicopter unit and Chicago-based Boeing Co.
“Across the fleet, the V-22 generally meets reliability and maintainability requirements,” Gilmore wrote. Still, the V-22 in its most recent testing was available only 53 percent of the time it was required, rather than the specification of 82 percent, according to Gilmore.
The Navy should continue “development and testing to improve overall reliability and availability,” he wrote.
A 53% dispatch rate .. wow! This programme really is an 'amazing' commitment by the US government. Let's hope the technology eventually trickles down into those markets with slightly smaller budgets; I'm especially thinking of long-range offshore rescue missions where, presumably, this type of vehicle would excel!
“Across the fleet, the V-22 generally meets reliability and maintainability requirements,” Gilmore wrote. Still, the V-22 in its most recent testing was available only 53 percent of the time it was required, rather than the specification of 82 percent, according to Gilmore.
Look, we must face the fact that the technology that allows the V-22 to exist simply has not been developed yet. "WHAT?!" you ask incredulously. "Look Bob, the V-22 is flying!! How can you say the technology doesn't yet exist?"
Well, Bell has been working on the (inherently flawed) tiltrotor concept since 1953, so let's give them credit for forcing the aircraft to this point. But I think we've hit a wall here. Using conventional technology and materials, the V-22 is just too hugely complicated to have any kind of reliability. Thus we've seen the military admit that the availability of the V-22 has actually gone down as more and more of the things come into use.
Some of us are not surprised. Some of us are not impressed. Some of us have not lost our objectivitity and are not blown away by the "gee-whiz!" factor of the V-22. Cheney had it right: We should have cancelled it and developed something else...something cheaper and more reliable.
In the 1970's there was a well-known TV weatherman in New York. His name was Tex Antoine. He was a "character." One day, the lead-in story to the weather segment involved a five year-old girl who'd been raped. Antoine, thinking he was a funny guy, quipped, "With rape so predominant in the news lately, it is well to remember the words of Confucius: 'If rape is inevitable, lie back and enjoy it.'" I'm sure the family of the 5 year-old girl appreciated the remark. Needless to say, Antoine's career at WABC-7 was over.
But that's where we're at with the V-22: It's too late now to cancel this albatross...sorry, Osprey. The American public is being...err, raped, and all we can do, as Confucius (supposedly) advised, is lie back and enjoy it.
...53% availability. And they call that acceptable.