Wires - strikes, cutters and detectors
Is that the pilot's adrenalin dripping off the tail end of the fuselage?
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There was some years back a Bell 47 (J I think just fully restored) flown into wires, here in the UK buy the owner, whilst on final approach to his field at the rear of his resturant, what made this even worse for the owner pilot was that this happened on the night of his grand resturant opening in front of the local press, and further compounded by taking out the power to to this establishment as well.
I saw the A/c in the hangar, and if I remember it correctly it had the steel wire wrapped around the middle of the two pitch links and pulled them in to the main shaft without breaking them. I think it sustained minor damage to the skids and fortunatly no injuries, (other than bad press)
There may have been some pictures of this taken and if anyone has them they would be great to see here.
I saw the A/c in the hangar, and if I remember it correctly it had the steel wire wrapped around the middle of the two pitch links and pulled them in to the main shaft without breaking them. I think it sustained minor damage to the skids and fortunatly no injuries, (other than bad press)
There may have been some pictures of this taken and if anyone has them they would be great to see here.
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It's 2005, flying a helo without wire cutters is like driving without seatbelts and no air bags. This dude is lucky and glad to see nobody got hurt but if I were him, I'd demand wire cutters on my next machine.
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most of you have probably heard of this, but there's a system available (or at least under development?) that detects wires based on their emissions. Of course this means that the wires need to be live to be detected, but it might reduce the occurence of strikes.
I wonder if the system would fit in an S300C?
http://www.safeflight.com/products/powerline.html
Dave Blevins
I wonder if the system would fit in an S300C?
http://www.safeflight.com/products/powerline.html
Dave Blevins
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Wire Cutters
Wire Cutters are great things to have, but like most devices, have significant limitations.
They rely on speed to impart the cutting force needed to sever the wire.
If you are fast and low enough to hit wires, then they are a life saver. For those that have to operate down there at speed, they are a must. If you don't have to be there, then it could be argued that you may be lacking in wisdom.
If you are at speed and high enough that wires are not a threat, the 32kgs on a 412 (for example) is probably just dead weight.
If you are on approach, where you are in the wire threat environment,you are usually slower than required to be assured of cutting any wire you strike. In that case, the cutter is not likely to save your hide and any comfort it gives you is illusory. You still need to ensure you do not fly into wires through constant vigilance.
Where economics and performance permit carrying emission detecting gear, and you are fortunate enough to only encounter live wires, then it would be worth having. That is until the day the wire is not energised, such as an HF antenna or phone line, or deliberately strung wire trap.
That leaves us still needing to be very wary and not place unrealistic dependance on cutters, or detectors to keep out of wires.
One pilot I knew working on power line operations got hooked up with an earth wire at maybe 10 kts (before he stopped) which ran from the top inside of the rear T tail fin of a 500D down the side of the aircraft and across the glass of his door. It took a very clear head and hands to figure out how to get unentangled without the tail or main rotors getting involved.
The cutters top and bottom weren't much help.
This is not to say cutters are not very desirable bits of gear. Just don't think they are going to do you much good apart from fast collisions with wires, usually at cruise.
They rely on speed to impart the cutting force needed to sever the wire.
If you are fast and low enough to hit wires, then they are a life saver. For those that have to operate down there at speed, they are a must. If you don't have to be there, then it could be argued that you may be lacking in wisdom.
If you are at speed and high enough that wires are not a threat, the 32kgs on a 412 (for example) is probably just dead weight.
If you are on approach, where you are in the wire threat environment,you are usually slower than required to be assured of cutting any wire you strike. In that case, the cutter is not likely to save your hide and any comfort it gives you is illusory. You still need to ensure you do not fly into wires through constant vigilance.
Where economics and performance permit carrying emission detecting gear, and you are fortunate enough to only encounter live wires, then it would be worth having. That is until the day the wire is not energised, such as an HF antenna or phone line, or deliberately strung wire trap.
That leaves us still needing to be very wary and not place unrealistic dependance on cutters, or detectors to keep out of wires.
One pilot I knew working on power line operations got hooked up with an earth wire at maybe 10 kts (before he stopped) which ran from the top inside of the rear T tail fin of a 500D down the side of the aircraft and across the glass of his door. It took a very clear head and hands to figure out how to get unentangled without the tail or main rotors getting involved.
The cutters top and bottom weren't much help.
This is not to say cutters are not very desirable bits of gear. Just don't think they are going to do you much good apart from fast collisions with wires, usually at cruise.
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Wire strike - lucky escape!
Saw this story while in Cape Town last week -
Cape Town - A helicopter carrying Eastern Cape social development MEC Christian Martin and MPL Temmy Majodina crash landed near Stutterheim on Thursday after apparently hitting power lines.
Provincial government spokesperson Sizwe Kupelo said the helicopter was on its way to Sterkspruit when the accident occurred.
The helicopter's blades hit power lines before going down, as the glare of the sun apparently blinded the pilot.
Martin and Majodina were not seriously hurt, he said. Martin told Sapa he was "lucky to be alive".
Speaking from another helicopter taking them to a child support grant launch in Sterkspruit, Martin said the helicopter hit a power line, which "smashed the front wind screen and sliced the metal... It stopped just in front of my seat."
He said the pilot was "very professional" and helped bring the "totally unstable" helicopter to a bumpy landing.
Majodina, the Eastern Cape's public works committee chairperson, said she heard a "big sound" before the helicopter spiralled out of control. "We don't want to blame anybody, accidents happen anyhow," she said.
Majodina had glass shards removed from her eye at a hospital, and Martin was treated for a sore neck.
Cape Town - A helicopter carrying Eastern Cape social development MEC Christian Martin and MPL Temmy Majodina crash landed near Stutterheim on Thursday after apparently hitting power lines.
Provincial government spokesperson Sizwe Kupelo said the helicopter was on its way to Sterkspruit when the accident occurred.
The helicopter's blades hit power lines before going down, as the glare of the sun apparently blinded the pilot.
Martin and Majodina were not seriously hurt, he said. Martin told Sapa he was "lucky to be alive".
Speaking from another helicopter taking them to a child support grant launch in Sterkspruit, Martin said the helicopter hit a power line, which "smashed the front wind screen and sliced the metal... It stopped just in front of my seat."
He said the pilot was "very professional" and helped bring the "totally unstable" helicopter to a bumpy landing.
Majodina, the Eastern Cape's public works committee chairperson, said she heard a "big sound" before the helicopter spiralled out of control. "We don't want to blame anybody, accidents happen anyhow," she said.
Majodina had glass shards removed from her eye at a hospital, and Martin was treated for a sore neck.
PPRuNe Time
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ATSB report Wire strike Forbes NSW 30Oct04
The report includes comprehensive factual information and finishes with the following:
ANALYSIS
Risk management options for application during an airborne task include reducing the consequence and/or likelihood of adverse events, such as an aircraft striking a power cable. Those options having the potential to affect the consequence of a wire strike include:
the use of helmets and wearing of full-cover clothing by aircraft occupants
installation of wire-strike protection systems
inclusion of advanced safety harnesses
appropriate flight following and search and rescue procedures.
However, in terms of risk, the consequence of an aircraft striking a power cable can generally be expected to be severe to catastrophic. As a result, a large investment is generally made by involved parties in order to decrease the likelihood, and therefore risk of a wire strike. That was the case during the 2004 Plague Locust Control Campaign.
The regulatory requirements affecting aircraft operations below 500 ft above ground level, including in the plague locust aerial support task, were an attempt to reduce the likelihood of an adverse event affecting a pilot during those operations. In addition, the Expression of Interest (EOI) mandated requirements affecting the acceptability of nominated pilots for employment in the locust survey task, indicated an attempt by the NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI) to further reduce the likelihood of an adverse event during the locust control campaign. Also, the establishment by the operator of specific pilot low-level operations competency requirements defined an additional risk mitigation strategy that was based on the reduction of the likelihood of an adverse event in that environment. Both the DPI and the operator’s requirements were in excess of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority regulatory requirements, and were valid risk management options for application in the locust survey task.
It was likely that Rural Lands Protection Boards (RLPBs) relied on the pilot’s competence and experiential requirements of the EOI when considering the risks affecting their employees during aerial survey operations. The lack of any local control measure that would have allowed the Forbes or other control centre staffs to ensure that the occurrence and other pilots complied with those requirements meant that the Forbes, and possibly other RLPBs unknowingly placed its employees in a potentially higher risk environment than intended. Similarly, the residual risk inherent in the locust control campaign, including that of a wire strike could have been higher than initially accepted by the State Council in order for the campaign to commence.
The emergency nature of the 2004 locust control infestation resulted in the involvement of DPI and RLPB staff volunteers from throughout NSW in the locust control campaign. In addition, operators and pilots from many backgrounds and experience bases were also involved in that campaign. Those circumstances, together with the ‘living’ nature of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and, in some instances verbal amendment process minimised the likelihood of the standardisation of airborne techniques and procedures among those operators, pilots and DPI / RLPB staff. That was confirmed in this instance by the recent consideration of whether a survey helicopter needed to land to examine the bands of locusts and the variation in knowledge of the content and application of the SOPs among the DPI / RLPB staff aboard the helicopter.
It was probable that the pilot was unaware of the rear seat occupants’ perceived lack of involvement in the identification of power cables or other hazards, or communication equipment difficulties affecting that process. That meant that the identification of any power cables and other hazards effectively rested with the pilot and senior ranger. It was likely that, having drawn the pilot’s attention to the wires to the west of the landing area, the senior ranger applied his concentration to the locust band in the paddock once the pilot commenced the final stages of the approach to land. In that case, the identification of the west to east spur line fell to the pilot. Although unable to be quantified, there was the potential that the pilot’s workload during the approach to land in the unfamiliar environment adversely impacted on his ability to detect the west to east spur line. The result was that no-one onboard the helicopter detected that spur line.
The abbreviated nature of the pilot’s induction meant that the pilot had to integrate relevant aspects of his low flying training and previous experience to the specifics of the locust survey task while carrying out that task. In contrast to the pilot’s likely intimate knowledge of the few power cables in the Kununurra area, the density of the power cables in the Forbes area, and the differing environmental and other cues indicating the presence of those cables, suggested that the pilot would have benefited from a practical consolidation of elements of the Chief Pilot’s brief. The lack of that practical consolidation had the potential to reduce the reliability of the operator’s low-level rating/approval/training requirement as a risk management tool.
Depending on respective pilots’ ratings and endorsements, there was a potential difference between survey and spray pilots’ knowledge and skills bases affecting the low-level locust control operations. Adherence to the DPI SOP meant that, in the event that a survey pilot did not have an agricultural rating, the pilot may not be able to contribute effectively to the identification and communication of low-level hazards and sensitive areas by an on board ranger or spotter. That could result in the ranger or spotter unwittingly omitting information that was potentially critical to the safe application of relevant chemicals by a spray pilot. Although a spray pilot retained ultimate responsibility for the safety of that application, the investigation concluded that the SOP compounded the risk of an unsafe or environmentally unsound application by a spray pilot.
The SOP requirement for locust survey pilots to fly along creek and tree lines in order to flush up adult locusts could be perceived to represent a form of mustering manoeuvre. Unless included as an individual operator requirement, or an individual pilot held a mustering approval or had completed low-level training, the SOP required pilots to conduct those mustering-like manoeuvres without the benefit of the competency-based mustering risk controls inherent in the requirements of Civil Aviation Order 29.10. In addition, that procedure placed pilots in an environment identified by the Chief Pilot as being particularly dangerous with regard to power cables and other hazards. There was the potential that the SOP manoeuvre requirement could combine with those environmental dangers to increase the likelihood, and therefore risk that a pilot might strike a power cable or other hazard to unacceptable levels.
This investigation identified the potential for the application of relevant risk management strategies to reduce the residual risk affecting a low-level aircraft operation to a level considered acceptable by that operation’s stakeholders. The majority of the investment in risk management in that environment was found to be in the reduction of the likelihood of an adverse event. In this occurrence, the lack of a robust application of existing risk controls to the locust survey task resulted in the level of residual risk, including that of a wire strike, being above that intended by the State Council, and considered by respective RLPBs when approving the employment of their staff in airborne operations. The investigation was unable to quantify the contribution of that elevated residual risk to the development of the accident.
SIGNIFICANT FACTORS
No-one aboard the helicopter identified the spur line overhead the intended touchdown point in sufficient time to allow the pilot to avoid impacting the wire.
SAFETY ACTION
Operator
The Chief Pilot has amended the company procedures to include the requirement for pilots to restrict the number of persons carried during locust survey operations to two. That was in order to increase the anticipated helicopter power margin, which would decrease the incidence of pilots being constrained to the conduct of heavy, shallow arrivals and departures to/from landing areas.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
On 31 January 2005, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) convened a round table discussion to consider potential safety activities relating to the conduct of aerial work in proximity to power cables. The participants in that discussion included representatives from relevant industry associations and other bodies and affected Government departments and agencies.
CASA has commenced planning to facilitate a conference in September 2005 involving relevant industry associations and other bodies and affected Government departments and agencies to further progress those safety issues confronting aerial work operations that were identified during the 31 January 2005 round table discussions.
Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia Limited
The Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia Limited has nominated to be included in the Standards Australia committee responsible for the development of the standards affecting the mapping and marking of power cables and their supporting structures.
The NSW Department of Primary Industries
The NSW DPI has commenced an iterative approach to the review and amendment of the NSW DPI / RLPB SOP for Locust Control. That has included:
involving an operator having extensive experience in the conduct of plague locust campaigns in the re-development of the SOP
deleting the requirement for low-level flight along tree lines in order to flush adult locusts up and ahead of the helicopter
developing standard Task Profiles for the aerial survey and spotting tasks that include the following operating height limitations:
- locust survey, not below 500 ft AGL
- locust spotting, not below 100 ft AGL
promulgating minimum personal protective equipment requirements for the conduct of locust survey and spotting tasks
promulgating a minimum crew composition for locust survey and spotting tasks of one pilot and one aviation trained observer. That observer is to be provided by the aircraft operator, be appropriately trained and have a minimum of 50 hours aviation experience. The aviation trained observer is responsible for assisting the pilot with:
- the operation of the aircraft
- identification of hazards and their avoidance
- mapping identified locust infestations
establishing an observer position, which can include carriage of either RLPB / DPI staff or local farmers in the rear of the survey aircraft. If carried, that observer has responsibility for assisting the pilot with:
- local knowledge, including property boundaries and owners and environmentally sensitive areas
- identification and mapping of locusts infestations
other than approved observers, prohibiting the carriage of back seat passengers
prohibiting flight by RLPB / DPI employees below 100 feet AGL
amending the flight following and search and rescue procedures.
RLPB and DPI staff members likely to be involved in locust control helicopter operations have completed the National Parks and Wildlife aircraft operations awareness course.
ATSB
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has commenced a research project that is examining the potential influence of contractual structure and organisational interaction on the safety of aviation campaign operations such as invertebrate pest management and airborne fire-fighting activities. That examination includes the responsibilities for the management of the unique risks inherent to those types of campaign, and seeks to highlight risk mitigation options for consideration by future aviation campaign participants.
When complete, the research project report will be published on the ATSB website www.atsb.gov.au or be available from the Bureau on request.
Risk management options for application during an airborne task include reducing the consequence and/or likelihood of adverse events, such as an aircraft striking a power cable. Those options having the potential to affect the consequence of a wire strike include:
the use of helmets and wearing of full-cover clothing by aircraft occupants
installation of wire-strike protection systems
inclusion of advanced safety harnesses
appropriate flight following and search and rescue procedures.
However, in terms of risk, the consequence of an aircraft striking a power cable can generally be expected to be severe to catastrophic. As a result, a large investment is generally made by involved parties in order to decrease the likelihood, and therefore risk of a wire strike. That was the case during the 2004 Plague Locust Control Campaign.
The regulatory requirements affecting aircraft operations below 500 ft above ground level, including in the plague locust aerial support task, were an attempt to reduce the likelihood of an adverse event affecting a pilot during those operations. In addition, the Expression of Interest (EOI) mandated requirements affecting the acceptability of nominated pilots for employment in the locust survey task, indicated an attempt by the NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI) to further reduce the likelihood of an adverse event during the locust control campaign. Also, the establishment by the operator of specific pilot low-level operations competency requirements defined an additional risk mitigation strategy that was based on the reduction of the likelihood of an adverse event in that environment. Both the DPI and the operator’s requirements were in excess of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority regulatory requirements, and were valid risk management options for application in the locust survey task.
It was likely that Rural Lands Protection Boards (RLPBs) relied on the pilot’s competence and experiential requirements of the EOI when considering the risks affecting their employees during aerial survey operations. The lack of any local control measure that would have allowed the Forbes or other control centre staffs to ensure that the occurrence and other pilots complied with those requirements meant that the Forbes, and possibly other RLPBs unknowingly placed its employees in a potentially higher risk environment than intended. Similarly, the residual risk inherent in the locust control campaign, including that of a wire strike could have been higher than initially accepted by the State Council in order for the campaign to commence.
The emergency nature of the 2004 locust control infestation resulted in the involvement of DPI and RLPB staff volunteers from throughout NSW in the locust control campaign. In addition, operators and pilots from many backgrounds and experience bases were also involved in that campaign. Those circumstances, together with the ‘living’ nature of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and, in some instances verbal amendment process minimised the likelihood of the standardisation of airborne techniques and procedures among those operators, pilots and DPI / RLPB staff. That was confirmed in this instance by the recent consideration of whether a survey helicopter needed to land to examine the bands of locusts and the variation in knowledge of the content and application of the SOPs among the DPI / RLPB staff aboard the helicopter.
It was probable that the pilot was unaware of the rear seat occupants’ perceived lack of involvement in the identification of power cables or other hazards, or communication equipment difficulties affecting that process. That meant that the identification of any power cables and other hazards effectively rested with the pilot and senior ranger. It was likely that, having drawn the pilot’s attention to the wires to the west of the landing area, the senior ranger applied his concentration to the locust band in the paddock once the pilot commenced the final stages of the approach to land. In that case, the identification of the west to east spur line fell to the pilot. Although unable to be quantified, there was the potential that the pilot’s workload during the approach to land in the unfamiliar environment adversely impacted on his ability to detect the west to east spur line. The result was that no-one onboard the helicopter detected that spur line.
The abbreviated nature of the pilot’s induction meant that the pilot had to integrate relevant aspects of his low flying training and previous experience to the specifics of the locust survey task while carrying out that task. In contrast to the pilot’s likely intimate knowledge of the few power cables in the Kununurra area, the density of the power cables in the Forbes area, and the differing environmental and other cues indicating the presence of those cables, suggested that the pilot would have benefited from a practical consolidation of elements of the Chief Pilot’s brief. The lack of that practical consolidation had the potential to reduce the reliability of the operator’s low-level rating/approval/training requirement as a risk management tool.
Depending on respective pilots’ ratings and endorsements, there was a potential difference between survey and spray pilots’ knowledge and skills bases affecting the low-level locust control operations. Adherence to the DPI SOP meant that, in the event that a survey pilot did not have an agricultural rating, the pilot may not be able to contribute effectively to the identification and communication of low-level hazards and sensitive areas by an on board ranger or spotter. That could result in the ranger or spotter unwittingly omitting information that was potentially critical to the safe application of relevant chemicals by a spray pilot. Although a spray pilot retained ultimate responsibility for the safety of that application, the investigation concluded that the SOP compounded the risk of an unsafe or environmentally unsound application by a spray pilot.
The SOP requirement for locust survey pilots to fly along creek and tree lines in order to flush up adult locusts could be perceived to represent a form of mustering manoeuvre. Unless included as an individual operator requirement, or an individual pilot held a mustering approval or had completed low-level training, the SOP required pilots to conduct those mustering-like manoeuvres without the benefit of the competency-based mustering risk controls inherent in the requirements of Civil Aviation Order 29.10. In addition, that procedure placed pilots in an environment identified by the Chief Pilot as being particularly dangerous with regard to power cables and other hazards. There was the potential that the SOP manoeuvre requirement could combine with those environmental dangers to increase the likelihood, and therefore risk that a pilot might strike a power cable or other hazard to unacceptable levels.
This investigation identified the potential for the application of relevant risk management strategies to reduce the residual risk affecting a low-level aircraft operation to a level considered acceptable by that operation’s stakeholders. The majority of the investment in risk management in that environment was found to be in the reduction of the likelihood of an adverse event. In this occurrence, the lack of a robust application of existing risk controls to the locust survey task resulted in the level of residual risk, including that of a wire strike, being above that intended by the State Council, and considered by respective RLPBs when approving the employment of their staff in airborne operations. The investigation was unable to quantify the contribution of that elevated residual risk to the development of the accident.
SIGNIFICANT FACTORS
No-one aboard the helicopter identified the spur line overhead the intended touchdown point in sufficient time to allow the pilot to avoid impacting the wire.
SAFETY ACTION
Operator
The Chief Pilot has amended the company procedures to include the requirement for pilots to restrict the number of persons carried during locust survey operations to two. That was in order to increase the anticipated helicopter power margin, which would decrease the incidence of pilots being constrained to the conduct of heavy, shallow arrivals and departures to/from landing areas.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
On 31 January 2005, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) convened a round table discussion to consider potential safety activities relating to the conduct of aerial work in proximity to power cables. The participants in that discussion included representatives from relevant industry associations and other bodies and affected Government departments and agencies.
CASA has commenced planning to facilitate a conference in September 2005 involving relevant industry associations and other bodies and affected Government departments and agencies to further progress those safety issues confronting aerial work operations that were identified during the 31 January 2005 round table discussions.
Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia Limited
The Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia Limited has nominated to be included in the Standards Australia committee responsible for the development of the standards affecting the mapping and marking of power cables and their supporting structures.
The NSW Department of Primary Industries
The NSW DPI has commenced an iterative approach to the review and amendment of the NSW DPI / RLPB SOP for Locust Control. That has included:
involving an operator having extensive experience in the conduct of plague locust campaigns in the re-development of the SOP
deleting the requirement for low-level flight along tree lines in order to flush adult locusts up and ahead of the helicopter
developing standard Task Profiles for the aerial survey and spotting tasks that include the following operating height limitations:
- locust survey, not below 500 ft AGL
- locust spotting, not below 100 ft AGL
promulgating minimum personal protective equipment requirements for the conduct of locust survey and spotting tasks
promulgating a minimum crew composition for locust survey and spotting tasks of one pilot and one aviation trained observer. That observer is to be provided by the aircraft operator, be appropriately trained and have a minimum of 50 hours aviation experience. The aviation trained observer is responsible for assisting the pilot with:
- the operation of the aircraft
- identification of hazards and their avoidance
- mapping identified locust infestations
establishing an observer position, which can include carriage of either RLPB / DPI staff or local farmers in the rear of the survey aircraft. If carried, that observer has responsibility for assisting the pilot with:
- local knowledge, including property boundaries and owners and environmentally sensitive areas
- identification and mapping of locusts infestations
other than approved observers, prohibiting the carriage of back seat passengers
prohibiting flight by RLPB / DPI employees below 100 feet AGL
amending the flight following and search and rescue procedures.
RLPB and DPI staff members likely to be involved in locust control helicopter operations have completed the National Parks and Wildlife aircraft operations awareness course.
ATSB
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has commenced a research project that is examining the potential influence of contractual structure and organisational interaction on the safety of aviation campaign operations such as invertebrate pest management and airborne fire-fighting activities. That examination includes the responsibilities for the management of the unique risks inherent to those types of campaign, and seeks to highlight risk mitigation options for consideration by future aviation campaign participants.
When complete, the research project report will be published on the ATSB website www.atsb.gov.au or be available from the Bureau on request.
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Wire Strike Protection - opinions solicited
Wire cutter systems have been getting more penetration (sorry for the pun) in recent years, although they still aren't considered standard fit on helicopters which may be vulnerable to flying into cables.
They also are not really the final solution, more the equivalent of the fast jets' ejection seat. As a one time fast jet pilot, I regarded that as a welcome backup capability, but declined the few opportunities I had to use it. Wire cutters may increase your survival probability, but still leave you with a very bad day.
Laser cable detection systems are reaching the market, and are in service in Italy and Germany. They appear to be under consideration in the US DOD. Their biggest disadvantages are the current cost ($100K ++) and high weight (min 25 lb.) The cost may start coming down now that production is increasing, but it will take some time. My belief is that weight reduction will be much slower.
What is the level of awareness in the operational community of the capabilities and limitations of these systems?
Is there a consensus in the civil operator world as to the cost at which these systems will be attractive enough that many will procure them?
Also, how much of a barrier is the payload penalty? Presumably on large twins it would not be significant, but on a 206 class it may be too much to bear.
Over to all.
They also are not really the final solution, more the equivalent of the fast jets' ejection seat. As a one time fast jet pilot, I regarded that as a welcome backup capability, but declined the few opportunities I had to use it. Wire cutters may increase your survival probability, but still leave you with a very bad day.
Laser cable detection systems are reaching the market, and are in service in Italy and Germany. They appear to be under consideration in the US DOD. Their biggest disadvantages are the current cost ($100K ++) and high weight (min 25 lb.) The cost may start coming down now that production is increasing, but it will take some time. My belief is that weight reduction will be much slower.
What is the level of awareness in the operational community of the capabilities and limitations of these systems?
Is there a consensus in the civil operator world as to the cost at which these systems will be attractive enough that many will procure them?
Also, how much of a barrier is the payload penalty? Presumably on large twins it would not be significant, but on a 206 class it may be too much to bear.
Over to all.
Twinstar has hit the nail on the head.
As with any safety improvement which costs money I believe it will be the government/corporate contracts mandating these devices in aircraft they hire that will bring them into service. They also have the capacity to pay a higher hourly rate to compensate for the device, & if that means hiring a 206L for the job instead of a 206 so they can carry the extra weight I believe they'll do it. "Duty of Care" has far reaching consequences & if I was a government dude spending tax payers money I certainly wouldn't bare my arse to the lawyers for the sake of a few hundred dollars/hr extra! R44 operators will be watching these developments with interest as the R44 cabin isn't strong enough to support manual WSP, but with 1 passenger could carry this type of equipment. My solution to avoiding a funeral due to wires has been drink lots of water, no beer & a good night sleep. Not to mention that recurring dream - wires, wires, wires, wires.......
Lowlevldevil - What is the murmerings in the Ag industry on wire strike protection these days?
As with any safety improvement which costs money I believe it will be the government/corporate contracts mandating these devices in aircraft they hire that will bring them into service. They also have the capacity to pay a higher hourly rate to compensate for the device, & if that means hiring a 206L for the job instead of a 206 so they can carry the extra weight I believe they'll do it. "Duty of Care" has far reaching consequences & if I was a government dude spending tax payers money I certainly wouldn't bare my arse to the lawyers for the sake of a few hundred dollars/hr extra! R44 operators will be watching these developments with interest as the R44 cabin isn't strong enough to support manual WSP, but with 1 passenger could carry this type of equipment. My solution to avoiding a funeral due to wires has been drink lots of water, no beer & a good night sleep. Not to mention that recurring dream - wires, wires, wires, wires.......
Lowlevldevil - What is the murmerings in the Ag industry on wire strike protection these days?
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The power lines across the Hawksbury near the junction with the Colo river came within a nat's whisker of taking me out way back in an S-51 doing flood relief.
Those lines still do not have any visibility spheres fitted.
Beware.
Those lines still do not have any visibility spheres fitted.
Beware.
Gatvol
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Twinstar gets my vote. The simple wire strike system looks ugly, a little expense above and beyond. But I have seen it used and it works.
I have lost many friends to Helicopter Grabbers, anything that will let me keep a beer drinking buddy alive is OK in my book.
I have lost many friends to Helicopter Grabbers, anything that will let me keep a beer drinking buddy alive is OK in my book.
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Some good points already. I have WSPS fitted to the Bell 407 I get around in and I must say, it is a nice bit of kit but it doesn't or shouldn't stop you from looking out for wires. If you miss the gap they still get you..........
But then I suppose you don't really hit the ones you know about or see, it's the ones you DON"T see.
I haven't had to pay for the system but it does leave you with something of a warm glowy when you are making approaches to properties out in the sticks where wires can be anywhere that Farmer Ed feels like stringing them. It does assist with your wellbeing a little bit.
But then I suppose you don't really hit the ones you know about or see, it's the ones you DON"T see.
I haven't had to pay for the system but it does leave you with something of a warm glowy when you are making approaches to properties out in the sticks where wires can be anywhere that Farmer Ed feels like stringing them. It does assist with your wellbeing a little bit.
WSPS are great if the wire hits the cutter, and doesn't go through the gap between the top of the cutter and the rotor disc. As it did on the Australian Army 206 that I was following. 