EC225
Probability/Statistics are fraught with peril!
As noted....167 hours and 4,000 hours on something that was supposed to be safe to some astronomically figure to the 10 to the umpteenth power as I recall.
Add in the fact it happened to exactly one Operator and that really begs the imagination!
The view must be great out there where you lurk.....bit wobbly when the wind blows though I bet!
As noted....167 hours and 4,000 hours on something that was supposed to be safe to some astronomically figure to the 10 to the umpteenth power as I recall.
Add in the fact it happened to exactly one Operator and that really begs the imagination!
The view must be great out there where you lurk.....bit wobbly when the wind blows though I bet!
Pitts, I think I have explained why it doesn't matter what the cause of the MOD45 alarm is.
But that isn't the case now is it? Now you have the same data as you had before but available real time (effectively) so is the process for dealing with MOD45 alarm the same?
What was the protocol when you had MOD45 alarm before??
HC -
hence why I said in the post before -
and this sounds like press-on-it is
Pitts, set against Bristow's 100,000 hr trouble-free flight time in the EC225, and the detailed investigations culminating in the cleaning and checking for corrosion of the affected areas, and the cockpit MOD45 alarm, just how likely do you think we are to encounter another shaft failure
to continue to flying they are making a huge assumption with the MOD45 alarm – especially since all the other measures would suggest if an EC225 has a MOD45 alarm now its likely NOT to be linked to current issues.
Which is not the same as "land as soon as possible" since the latter puts you on a helideck somewhere in the N Sea - and then what do you do - whereas the former allows you to return to a land airport, hopefully a base with engineering support.
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This circular Q&A is making me dizzy. Ridiculous.
Pitts, do you realize how many a/c, certified and happily flying pax every day, are out there with AD's and additional inspections to components just as critical as the 225 MGB? For instance blades (main and tailrotor), grips, shafts......
This is how it works! Every a/c ever certified and every a/c that will be certified will encounter a situation where real life differs from the computer model and things must be tweaked. We don't go back to a clean sheet design every time this happens.
It is NOT press-on-it is to follow what is written. Some crews will choose to be more cautious and that is their prerogative just as it is situational. If a corporation chooses to be additionally cautious because they work for risk averse customers, that too is their prerogative.
Land as soon as POSSIBLE, not IMMEDIATELY. Or perhaps to be interpreted as POSSIBLE with an escalation to IMMEDIATE is a better interpretation. The professionals are accustomed to dealing with these kind of decisions, THAT is why they make the big bucks, not for pushing buttons when things are going well.
Personally, I would have no qualms about riding in the back of 225 offshore today. And yes I understand the consequences as I have already rode one [helicopter] in!
Pitts, do you realize how many a/c, certified and happily flying pax every day, are out there with AD's and additional inspections to components just as critical as the 225 MGB? For instance blades (main and tailrotor), grips, shafts......
This is how it works! Every a/c ever certified and every a/c that will be certified will encounter a situation where real life differs from the computer model and things must be tweaked. We don't go back to a clean sheet design every time this happens.
It is NOT press-on-it is to follow what is written. Some crews will choose to be more cautious and that is their prerogative just as it is situational. If a corporation chooses to be additionally cautious because they work for risk averse customers, that too is their prerogative.
It then goes on to say that “The flight manual requires the helicopter to land as soon as possible, without exceeding 2 hours”.
We also know the thresholds vary from aircraft to aircraft – hence the need for a learned threshold and an absolute limit.
If the MOD45 alarm could – for whatever reason –signal a failure that is beyond that already understood by recent events and since the grounding operators have managed to continue to provide service and a “proper” fix is due in 1 year. It therefore seems a huge gamble with the Eurocopter brand, for operators, crew and passengers to push on, MOD45 alarming for 2 hours??
We also know the thresholds vary from aircraft to aircraft – hence the need for a learned threshold and an absolute limit.
If the MOD45 alarm could – for whatever reason –signal a failure that is beyond that already understood by recent events and since the grounding operators have managed to continue to provide service and a “proper” fix is due in 1 year. It therefore seems a huge gamble with the Eurocopter brand, for operators, crew and passengers to push on, MOD45 alarming for 2 hours??
Personally, I would have no qualms about riding in the back of 225 offshore today. And yes I understand the consequences as I have already rode one [helicopter] in!
I don't know why people get stressed. I've not said the 225 is going to go down in a huge fireball and sea monsters be 'ere!
Like you say / like I said recently EC have thrown the sink at this, etc, etc but my point is this. If a MOD45 alarm can be for other things beyond this issue and the previous actions for an alarm were not fly up to 2 hours then....
BBC News - Heathrow emergency: Nine passengers sue
Like you say / like I said recently EC have thrown the sink at this, etc, etc but my point is this. If a MOD45 alarm can be for other things beyond this issue and the previous actions for an alarm were not fly up to 2 hours then....
BBC News - Heathrow emergency: Nine passengers sue
P&A, as I mentioned earlier its actually "limit duration of flight" which is the same as "land as soon as practicable". It is not "land as soon as possible"
Pitts, as usual I don't think you quite understand what you are talking about. Let's put the shoe on the other foot and ask you what you think should happen?
Pitts, as usual I don't think you quite understand what you are talking about. Let's put the shoe on the other foot and ask you what you think should happen?
SAS, no it happened to exactly two operators. And yes, the breeze is pleasant out here during such hot weather!
Last edited by HeliComparator; 11th Jul 2013 at 17:49.
I stand corrected....got the Fatal One mixed up.
Pitts, as usual I don't think you quite understand what you are talking about. Let's put the shoe on the other foot and ask you what you think should happen?
When someone asks a question I don't know how it suggest to you they know anything! I just asked what the previous action was if you got a MOD45 alarm. I hope the EC PR machine is a little more able to put the message across to people.
You know you hammer people for reading the material that actually EC themselves have put out there and then say don't ask questions and there is more information out there etc.. So what can you do!?
What would I do?
Firstly it depends which hat I had on.
If I was Eurocopter I'd wait the year until I had a proper fix in place. I'm not sure who is pushing to fly the 225 as it seems operators have coped for the last 9 months and as I said it would seem Bristow won't fly anyway until near the end of the year.
Whilst the chances are slim to none the risk is massive and if I have changed the treatment of MOD45 alarm in order to fly again then frankly it would be the end.
If I was the operator I'd wait. Take Bristow and their zero accident policy, how would they explain that to their stock holders, management, employees and customers were anything to happen.
If I was the customer I'd wait for the same reason as the operator.
If I was a passenger I'll do what my boss tells me, but I'd be asking questions like "have you changed the treatment of the MOD45 alarm..."
Whilst its a thorn and easy to call people names in the last year the company you are asking everyone to trust "this time" has had two accidents, the second after the first solution wasn't correct. You've had a problem with wiring and EMLUB was it / wasn't it working. Now the EMLUB doesn't fully work. You've had a shaft re-design that goodness knows who signed off on it as it failed after 160ish hours and yet the problems were the same for that as the prior shaft that ran almost 4000hrs. You have a HUMS system that if you look at the data in the existing AAIB reports has had threshold changes yet this is the same system that we all should believe is cock on this time and you have this constant suggestion that the Super Puma has never had an oil loss in its gearbox - despite a specific report on this type of subject written for EASA with Super Puma G-REDL inside.
What part of that is scare mongering and what part of that is fact?
Pitts, in fact you are quite right. The best thing to do, from a flight safety point of view, is to leave the aircraft in the hangar and never fly them again. That way you can be certain that a shaft will never break again, there will be no unknown MOD45 alarms and everyone is a winner!
HC .....in that case would the Company just mail me my pay check and not insist upon all those check rides and such?
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MR PITTS
I do not think anybody called you a "Git", but it is comforting that you have at last inferred correctly!!
DB
PS as you are a PPLH maybe you can enlighten us as to which types you fly then we can see what ADs are in place for those that you routinely live with.
DB
PS as you are a PPLH maybe you can enlighten us as to which types you fly then we can see what ADs are in place for those that you routinely live with.
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I think we need Pitts to come over our way and explain to our crowd why he would want to ground all 27 A380s we have - despite the known wing issues. I would not even have to guess at the response from the owners/lessors/passengers. Which ever way you slice the business, 19 from ABZ to NS or 540 from DXB to JFK, it is ALL about risk management - balancing safety against productivity. EC have made that assessment in the full glare of an EASA oversight program, risk is still present - yes, but to an acceptable level to all the stakeholder decision makers. HC, I can see why you shrug your shoulders!
When you had a MOD 45 alarm before, you were standing in the line office so you went for a cup of tea whilst the engineers went through the relevant work cards.
At the risk of being branded like Pitt......if no exceedence in the past....are we guaranteed a Warning this time? The AD talks plenty about what happens "after" and excellence.
SAS - it just means that there has never been degradation of the bevel gears resulting in an M'ARMS alert, which is quite reassuring since they are fairly important! The system obviously does work because the M'ARMS data viewed post the ditchings showed a rising trend and threshold exceedance some time before the shaft rupture.
The information to prevent the ditchings was available but as we know from the reports, unfortunately the data wasn't looked at and/or the thresholds weren't optimal, hence the ditchings.
The information to prevent the ditchings was available but as we know from the reports, unfortunately the data wasn't looked at and/or the thresholds weren't optimal, hence the ditchings.
Pitts. We have never had a MOD 45 exceedance before the first shaft rupture. That was one ofthe most confusing aspects of the entire issue.
You say no MOD45 exceedance but just look where the limit is now to where it was! Read it for yourself in S7/2012 AAIB and I quote:-
At the time of the first accident in May 2012, the MOD-45 and MOD-70 indicators only included amber thresholds; these were ‘learned’ thresholds each with a maximum value of 0.6
After the accident to G-REDW, Eurocopter published EC225 Service Bulletin No 45-001, in July 2012 that included the introduction of a red threshold and lowered the fleet-wide maximum threshold values for both indicators. For MOD-45 the amber alert was reduced to 0.3 and a red alert of 0.4 was introduced.
After the accident to G-CHCN, Eurocopter published an Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (ASB), on 21 November 2012, which removed the maximum amber alert threshold for MOD 45 and lowered the red alert threshold to 0.2.
I guess you guys know where it is now but crikey that's some difference!
Another interesting aspect of the in-cockpit MOD45 warning is that it is a shift in thinking for EC because after G-REDL they resisted AAIB recommendation for an in cockpit chip warning system I believe, suggesting that existing checks were sufficient.