S-76 down in New York
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NTSB Prelim Report S-76C+ in NY
Some paras excerpted:
NTSB Identification: IAD05FA078
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, June 17, 2005 in New York, NY
Aircraft: Sikorsky S-76C, registration: N317MY
Injuries: 1 Serious, 7 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On June 17, 2005, at 1638 eastern daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76C, N317MY, operated by Corporate Aviation Services, was substantially damaged when it impacted water after takeoff from the 34th Street Metroport (6N5), New York, New York. The certificated airline transport pilot was seriously injured. The airline transport-rated copilot and six passengers sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The corporate/executive flight, destined for New Castle Airport (ILG), Wilmington, Delaware, was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
The 34th Street Metroport was located on the west bank of the East River. The purpose of the flight was to fly executives of MBNA Bank from the Metroport to their corporate offices in Delaware.
In an interview, the pilot said that he and the copilot waited at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, with the helicopter in anticipation of the late-afternoon flight from the Metroport to Wilmington. They topped off the helicopter's fuel tanks while they waited.
The helicopter subsequently departed, and the 10-minute flight from Newark to the Metroport, which included a "steep" climb to 1,000 feet, was uneventful. The helicopter landed to the west, facing FDR Drive. After landing, the crew waited for 5 to 10 minutes for the passengers while the engines continued to run.
Because of obstructions to the front, and helicopters parked on either side, the crew decided to "back out" of the parking spot. A hovering takeoff to the rear, with a right pedal turn and a departure to the north over the water was planned. When asked why, the pilot explained that the helicopter was "heavy," and a right pedal turn required less power. He added that the windsock was "dead."
The pilot performed the takeoff, and the helicopter climbed as it backed out of the parking spot. At 25 to 30 feet above the water, about the time of the right pedal turn, the helicopter began to "sink." The pilot noticed an audible "degrading" of the rotor rpm, but he did not crosscheck the engine instruments or the rotor tachometer. "It felt like we were losing power and we were starting to sink. I didn't know if we had enough power to fly away, and I couldn't land back due to crowding [on the helipad]. It was not responding, and the rotor rpm was going down."
As the helicopter descended, the pilot maneuvered it toward the western bank. The helicopter shuddered during the descent, as the pilot adjusted the flight controls to cushion the landing to the water. He attempted to deploy the landing gear floats, but was "too late", and the helicopter sank.
Following the water landing, the pilot was unable to locate the cockpit door handle, or to open the door on his side after the helicopter submerged. He released his seatbelt and swam toward light before reaching the surface. He stated that he had "no idea" how he exited the cockpit.
The copilot's description of the flight from Newark was consistent with the pilot's. He stated that the crew discussed limiting the fuel purchase at Newark because the helicopter would be close to their computed maximum gross weight, but that they then decided to fill the tanks.
At the Metroport, the copilot assisted the passengers, loaded their baggage, performed a walk-around inspection, and boarded the helicopter. He performed the before-takeoff check and armed the landing gear floats. The copilot stated that the windsock was not showing its "usual" indication, and that it influenced the decision to depart to the north.
The takeoff and initial climb were "fine," with no rotor rpm decay, or "droop." The helicopter transitioned through the pedal turn and into forward flight. As the helicopter accelerated through effective translational lift (ETL), it descended, and the copilot "heard a little rotor droop." He explained that it was customary for the helicopter to "dip" through ETL, then climb as it accelerated.
Instead, the helicopter continued to descend. According to the copilot, "The N1 gauges were in the yellow, and I can remember hearing the rotor really droop. It started to yaw, and then about 10 to 15 feet [above the water] it started to shudder violently."
According to the copilot, he then announced "Floats! Floats! Floats!" but waited for the pilot to acknowledge and give the order for the deployment. The pilot did not immediately reply. At water contact, the pilot announced, "Blow the floats!"
After the helicopter submerged, the copilot could not find the door "unlock switch," and never searched for the emergency release handle. Instead, he broke the window out of the copilot's door, cutting his hand. He then released his seatbelt, and swam through the window opening to the surface.
The copilot swam back under the water to search the helicopter for trapped occupants, but he could not gain access to the cockpit or cabin. The copilot resurfaced, and a head count revealed that all of the occupants were on top of the water.
The passengers provided written statements, and each had flown aboard the helicopter several times. One passenger as few as six times, and some said they flew on the helicopter over 100 times. Their descriptions of the takeoff and the turn to the north were consistent, and many described a "shake," "shudder," or "wobble" during the descent. One passenger described the "rotors" as "laboring."
The passengers described their exit through the right cabin door. Many remembered who opened the door and the order in which the passengers exited the helicopter. One passenger said, "I was looking for a door, [passenger name] grabbed me by the collar and pulled me up. I saw light and exited the helicopter. I believe I was the last out…"
The passengers were asked if they were familiar with the emergency evacuation procedures for the helicopter. Responses to the question included "Some," "Somewhat," and "No." Only one of the six passengers said that he was familiar with the procedures.
During a telephone interview, a witness stated that he observed the accident flight while seated in his helicopter at the 34th Street Metroport. He stated that after the helicopter performed the pedal turn, "they dipped the nose down into an accelerating attitude, and went right down into the water."
The witness did not notice decay in rotor rpm, or a yawing of the helicopter. He described the winds at the heliport as light and out of the north/northwest.
The manager of the Metroport was interviewed by telephone, and provided a written statement. Her description of the accident flight was consistent with that of the first witness. She was accustomed to the "dip" when helicopters transitioned to forward flight, but that the accident aircraft "just didn't climb." She observed no smoke or fire from the helicopter prior to its contact with the water.
The helicopter was examined at Port Authority Pier 2 on June 18, 2005. There was no evidence of fire. The nose enclosure was broken open, and the weather radar antenna was exposed. The cockpit, cabin area, and empennage were intact. The main transmission and engine cowlings were closed and intact.
The rotor head was attached to the main rotor shaft, and the spindles and cuffs of each blade were fractured but attached. The cuffs and their associated blades were designated red, blue, yellow, and black. All four blades were fractured within 2 to 6 feet of the rotor cuff. The blue and yellow blades, outboard of the breaks, were recovered.
The 3P and 5P bifilars were still attached. Of the four pitch change rods, two were fractured, one was bent, and the fourth was attached. All of the four hub arms and their spindles were attached. Each hub displayed dents at the 9 to 12 o'clock quadrant. The dents matched the size and curvature of the spindle.
Droop and flap stops were attached and free to move. The blade dampers remained attached.
The rotating swashplate moved without restriction. The rotating and stationary scissors were attached. All primary servos were attached, and control continuity was established from the cockpit to the servos. Tail rotor control continuity was verified from the pedals to the cable breaks at the point where the tailboom was severed.
The tailboom was severed along a diagonal from station 353 on the upper side, to station 420 on the bottom. The exposed sheet metal at the point of separation was displaced in the direction of main rotor rotation.
The remainder of the severed tailboom, with the vertical fin and horizontal stabilizer attached, was largely intact. The intermediate gearbox, number 5 tailrotor driveshaft, and 90-degree gearbox remained attached and intact. The tailrotor hub was intact, and all four tailrotor retention plate bolts were attached and safety-wired. The red and black tailrotor blades were fractured at the cuff. The yellow blade was partially fractured at the cuff and the blue blade was intact.
The main landing gear was down, locked, and intact. The main landing gear floats were not deployed, and were stowed. The forward landing gear floats were not deployed, but were no longer stowed due to impact.
The engines were inspected visually. The number 1 engine could be rotated by hand at the compressor. One compressor blade was bent at the tip. No other damage was visible.
The number 2 engine was rotated by hand at the compressor. There was no visible damage.
The engines were rotated through the starter drive, and again rinsed through the inlet with penetrating oil prior to shipment.
The engines were shipped to Turbomeca USA, Grand Prairie, Texas, and the transmission was shipped to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Stratford, Connecticut, for examination. The DECUs were shipped to the Bureau Enquêtes Accidents, France, for examination under the supervision of the French government.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate, with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. He also held a flight instructor certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first class medical certificate was issued on November 17, 2004.
The pilot reported 11,470 total hours of flight experience. He reported 3,200 hours of experience in the Sikorsky S-76, 3,000 hours of which were as pilot-in-command. His most recent flight review was completed January 28, 2005.
The helicopter was a 1986 Sikorsky S-76C Plus, and had accrued 2,452 total flight hours. The helicopter was maintained through a Manufacturer's Inspection Program, and its most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on February 6, 2005, at 2,339 aircraft hours.
At 1651, the weather reported at LaGuardia International Airport (LGA), 5 nautical miles east of the Metroport, included a few clouds at 7,000 feet, and a broken ceiling at 10,000 feet. The temperature was 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and the dewpoint was 44 degrees Fahrenheit. The wind was from 270 degrees at 17knots, gusting to 21 knots.
At 1651, the weather reported at Newark International Airport (EWR), 9 nautical miles west of the Metroport, included a scattered cloud layer at 6,000 feet, and a broken ceiling at 10,000 feet. The temperature was 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and the dewpoint was 46 degrees Fahrenheit. The wind was from 270 degrees at 15 knots, gusting to 23 knots.
NTSB Identification: IAD05FA078
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, June 17, 2005 in New York, NY
Aircraft: Sikorsky S-76C, registration: N317MY
Injuries: 1 Serious, 7 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On June 17, 2005, at 1638 eastern daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76C, N317MY, operated by Corporate Aviation Services, was substantially damaged when it impacted water after takeoff from the 34th Street Metroport (6N5), New York, New York. The certificated airline transport pilot was seriously injured. The airline transport-rated copilot and six passengers sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The corporate/executive flight, destined for New Castle Airport (ILG), Wilmington, Delaware, was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
The 34th Street Metroport was located on the west bank of the East River. The purpose of the flight was to fly executives of MBNA Bank from the Metroport to their corporate offices in Delaware.
In an interview, the pilot said that he and the copilot waited at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, with the helicopter in anticipation of the late-afternoon flight from the Metroport to Wilmington. They topped off the helicopter's fuel tanks while they waited.
The helicopter subsequently departed, and the 10-minute flight from Newark to the Metroport, which included a "steep" climb to 1,000 feet, was uneventful. The helicopter landed to the west, facing FDR Drive. After landing, the crew waited for 5 to 10 minutes for the passengers while the engines continued to run.
Because of obstructions to the front, and helicopters parked on either side, the crew decided to "back out" of the parking spot. A hovering takeoff to the rear, with a right pedal turn and a departure to the north over the water was planned. When asked why, the pilot explained that the helicopter was "heavy," and a right pedal turn required less power. He added that the windsock was "dead."
The pilot performed the takeoff, and the helicopter climbed as it backed out of the parking spot. At 25 to 30 feet above the water, about the time of the right pedal turn, the helicopter began to "sink." The pilot noticed an audible "degrading" of the rotor rpm, but he did not crosscheck the engine instruments or the rotor tachometer. "It felt like we were losing power and we were starting to sink. I didn't know if we had enough power to fly away, and I couldn't land back due to crowding [on the helipad]. It was not responding, and the rotor rpm was going down."
As the helicopter descended, the pilot maneuvered it toward the western bank. The helicopter shuddered during the descent, as the pilot adjusted the flight controls to cushion the landing to the water. He attempted to deploy the landing gear floats, but was "too late", and the helicopter sank.
Following the water landing, the pilot was unable to locate the cockpit door handle, or to open the door on his side after the helicopter submerged. He released his seatbelt and swam toward light before reaching the surface. He stated that he had "no idea" how he exited the cockpit.
The copilot's description of the flight from Newark was consistent with the pilot's. He stated that the crew discussed limiting the fuel purchase at Newark because the helicopter would be close to their computed maximum gross weight, but that they then decided to fill the tanks.
At the Metroport, the copilot assisted the passengers, loaded their baggage, performed a walk-around inspection, and boarded the helicopter. He performed the before-takeoff check and armed the landing gear floats. The copilot stated that the windsock was not showing its "usual" indication, and that it influenced the decision to depart to the north.
The takeoff and initial climb were "fine," with no rotor rpm decay, or "droop." The helicopter transitioned through the pedal turn and into forward flight. As the helicopter accelerated through effective translational lift (ETL), it descended, and the copilot "heard a little rotor droop." He explained that it was customary for the helicopter to "dip" through ETL, then climb as it accelerated.
Instead, the helicopter continued to descend. According to the copilot, "The N1 gauges were in the yellow, and I can remember hearing the rotor really droop. It started to yaw, and then about 10 to 15 feet [above the water] it started to shudder violently."
According to the copilot, he then announced "Floats! Floats! Floats!" but waited for the pilot to acknowledge and give the order for the deployment. The pilot did not immediately reply. At water contact, the pilot announced, "Blow the floats!"
After the helicopter submerged, the copilot could not find the door "unlock switch," and never searched for the emergency release handle. Instead, he broke the window out of the copilot's door, cutting his hand. He then released his seatbelt, and swam through the window opening to the surface.
The copilot swam back under the water to search the helicopter for trapped occupants, but he could not gain access to the cockpit or cabin. The copilot resurfaced, and a head count revealed that all of the occupants were on top of the water.
The passengers provided written statements, and each had flown aboard the helicopter several times. One passenger as few as six times, and some said they flew on the helicopter over 100 times. Their descriptions of the takeoff and the turn to the north were consistent, and many described a "shake," "shudder," or "wobble" during the descent. One passenger described the "rotors" as "laboring."
The passengers described their exit through the right cabin door. Many remembered who opened the door and the order in which the passengers exited the helicopter. One passenger said, "I was looking for a door, [passenger name] grabbed me by the collar and pulled me up. I saw light and exited the helicopter. I believe I was the last out…"
The passengers were asked if they were familiar with the emergency evacuation procedures for the helicopter. Responses to the question included "Some," "Somewhat," and "No." Only one of the six passengers said that he was familiar with the procedures.
During a telephone interview, a witness stated that he observed the accident flight while seated in his helicopter at the 34th Street Metroport. He stated that after the helicopter performed the pedal turn, "they dipped the nose down into an accelerating attitude, and went right down into the water."
The witness did not notice decay in rotor rpm, or a yawing of the helicopter. He described the winds at the heliport as light and out of the north/northwest.
The manager of the Metroport was interviewed by telephone, and provided a written statement. Her description of the accident flight was consistent with that of the first witness. She was accustomed to the "dip" when helicopters transitioned to forward flight, but that the accident aircraft "just didn't climb." She observed no smoke or fire from the helicopter prior to its contact with the water.
The helicopter was examined at Port Authority Pier 2 on June 18, 2005. There was no evidence of fire. The nose enclosure was broken open, and the weather radar antenna was exposed. The cockpit, cabin area, and empennage were intact. The main transmission and engine cowlings were closed and intact.
The rotor head was attached to the main rotor shaft, and the spindles and cuffs of each blade were fractured but attached. The cuffs and their associated blades were designated red, blue, yellow, and black. All four blades were fractured within 2 to 6 feet of the rotor cuff. The blue and yellow blades, outboard of the breaks, were recovered.
The 3P and 5P bifilars were still attached. Of the four pitch change rods, two were fractured, one was bent, and the fourth was attached. All of the four hub arms and their spindles were attached. Each hub displayed dents at the 9 to 12 o'clock quadrant. The dents matched the size and curvature of the spindle.
Droop and flap stops were attached and free to move. The blade dampers remained attached.
The rotating swashplate moved without restriction. The rotating and stationary scissors were attached. All primary servos were attached, and control continuity was established from the cockpit to the servos. Tail rotor control continuity was verified from the pedals to the cable breaks at the point where the tailboom was severed.
The tailboom was severed along a diagonal from station 353 on the upper side, to station 420 on the bottom. The exposed sheet metal at the point of separation was displaced in the direction of main rotor rotation.
The remainder of the severed tailboom, with the vertical fin and horizontal stabilizer attached, was largely intact. The intermediate gearbox, number 5 tailrotor driveshaft, and 90-degree gearbox remained attached and intact. The tailrotor hub was intact, and all four tailrotor retention plate bolts were attached and safety-wired. The red and black tailrotor blades were fractured at the cuff. The yellow blade was partially fractured at the cuff and the blue blade was intact.
The main landing gear was down, locked, and intact. The main landing gear floats were not deployed, and were stowed. The forward landing gear floats were not deployed, but were no longer stowed due to impact.
The engines were inspected visually. The number 1 engine could be rotated by hand at the compressor. One compressor blade was bent at the tip. No other damage was visible.
The number 2 engine was rotated by hand at the compressor. There was no visible damage.
The engines were rotated through the starter drive, and again rinsed through the inlet with penetrating oil prior to shipment.
The engines were shipped to Turbomeca USA, Grand Prairie, Texas, and the transmission was shipped to Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Stratford, Connecticut, for examination. The DECUs were shipped to the Bureau Enquêtes Accidents, France, for examination under the supervision of the French government.
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate, with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. He also held a flight instructor certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first class medical certificate was issued on November 17, 2004.
The pilot reported 11,470 total hours of flight experience. He reported 3,200 hours of experience in the Sikorsky S-76, 3,000 hours of which were as pilot-in-command. His most recent flight review was completed January 28, 2005.
The helicopter was a 1986 Sikorsky S-76C Plus, and had accrued 2,452 total flight hours. The helicopter was maintained through a Manufacturer's Inspection Program, and its most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on February 6, 2005, at 2,339 aircraft hours.
At 1651, the weather reported at LaGuardia International Airport (LGA), 5 nautical miles east of the Metroport, included a few clouds at 7,000 feet, and a broken ceiling at 10,000 feet. The temperature was 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and the dewpoint was 44 degrees Fahrenheit. The wind was from 270 degrees at 17knots, gusting to 21 knots.
At 1651, the weather reported at Newark International Airport (EWR), 9 nautical miles west of the Metroport, included a scattered cloud layer at 6,000 feet, and a broken ceiling at 10,000 feet. The temperature was 75 degrees Fahrenheit, and the dewpoint was 46 degrees Fahrenheit. The wind was from 270 degrees at 15 knots, gusting to 23 knots.
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It will take some careful weight estimates to be sure, but the aircraft was probably within a few hundred pounds of max gross weight, and just about at its Max HOGE weight, too. With the wind coming over the buildings and FDR drive elevated roadway, there would probably be some downdraft, but at the least a tail wind (15 to 23 knots from the west, while the takeoff needed to be eastbound) to contend with upon departure.
The acceleration toward the east would take the aircraft gradually to a flight speed near zero airspeed as it transitioned away from the heliport. One can believe the aircraft went OGE (as it passed over the water and was no longer over the somewhat elevated pier) and also to zero airspeed at about the same time, and that it was near performance limits to start with.
The acceleration toward the east would take the aircraft gradually to a flight speed near zero airspeed as it transitioned away from the heliport. One can believe the aircraft went OGE (as it passed over the water and was no longer over the somewhat elevated pier) and also to zero airspeed at about the same time, and that it was near performance limits to start with.
I can imagine the thoughts going through the poor pilot's head:
"I think we can get away with this ... I don't want to pop the floats yet, because if we then fly away, we have to land back to get it serviced and the execs will be late and the boss will be furious ... I think I can get away with this..."
And unfortunately when he realised he wasn't going to fly away, it was too late to pop them.
I am going to FSI next week for my refresher training, and I will make sure they give me the dunking practice in the Hudson River.
"I think we can get away with this ... I don't want to pop the floats yet, because if we then fly away, we have to land back to get it serviced and the execs will be late and the boss will be furious ... I think I can get away with this..."
And unfortunately when he realised he wasn't going to fly away, it was too late to pop them.
I am going to FSI next week for my refresher training, and I will make sure they give me the dunking practice in the Hudson River.
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11,000 hrs and 3,000 hrs on type and they still bite you on the a$$e.
How is it that you can fly 113 hrs on a 100 hr inspection cycle. Is that a misprint or are the rules different in the US.
How is it that you can fly 113 hrs on a 100 hr inspection cycle. Is that a misprint or are the rules different in the US.
If, and let me repeat *IF* it turns out that a perfectly good S-76 got dunked in the East River, then that very experienced pilot will have learned two valuable lessons. Actually, he'll have re-learned one and possibly learned the other for the first time.
Firstly, he'll understand something that helicopter pilots have known through the millennia. To wit: when we ask more of our helicopters than they can give, they sometimes flop ungracefully back to earth. Yes, even the warbling Supercopter. And that close to gross, backing out of 34th Street into an HOGE hover was asking a lot. In fact, it was asking for "it."
Secondly, this pilot will have learned how very, very close to the edge we routinely are in these strange machines, whether we know it or not. And I am totally convinced that many helicopter pilots blithely fly along with absolutely no earthly idea how close they are to disaster. One second you're flying, next second you're crashing. No transition time for the brain to come to terms with, "Hey, this is all going to, uhh..." crash, tinkle, bang, gurgle..."SH*T!"
Firstly, he'll understand something that helicopter pilots have known through the millennia. To wit: when we ask more of our helicopters than they can give, they sometimes flop ungracefully back to earth. Yes, even the warbling Supercopter. And that close to gross, backing out of 34th Street into an HOGE hover was asking a lot. In fact, it was asking for "it."
Secondly, this pilot will have learned how very, very close to the edge we routinely are in these strange machines, whether we know it or not. And I am totally convinced that many helicopter pilots blithely fly along with absolutely no earthly idea how close they are to disaster. One second you're flying, next second you're crashing. No transition time for the brain to come to terms with, "Hey, this is all going to, uhh..." crash, tinkle, bang, gurgle..."SH*T!"
"The helicopter was a 1986 Sikorsky S-76C Plus "
I question the date of manufacture if it is indeed a C+
Max gross of a C+ is 11700 LBS
If I take the APSW of one of our offshore equipped C+'s Including the 2 rafts.
7657 Lbs APSW
400 Lbs for the Crew
8057 Lbs Zero Fuel weight
1200 Lbs 6 Pax @ 200 LBS each
1650 Lbs Fuel on take off (1850- start and ferry from
Newark + idle)
10907 Lbs Gross weight on take off.
11700Lbs Max Gross weight
893 lbs under gross weight even using 200 lbs for pax and crew
HOGE is, I believe, 11700 at a temperature 24 C or 75 F
It would be interesting to know what the actual APSW of the A/C was.
.
I question the date of manufacture if it is indeed a C+
Max gross of a C+ is 11700 LBS
If I take the APSW of one of our offshore equipped C+'s Including the 2 rafts.
7657 Lbs APSW
400 Lbs for the Crew
8057 Lbs Zero Fuel weight
1200 Lbs 6 Pax @ 200 LBS each
1650 Lbs Fuel on take off (1850- start and ferry from
Newark + idle)
10907 Lbs Gross weight on take off.
11700Lbs Max Gross weight
893 lbs under gross weight even using 200 lbs for pax and crew
HOGE is, I believe, 11700 at a temperature 24 C or 75 F
It would be interesting to know what the actual APSW of the A/C was.
.
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Hello folks,
Without wanting to apportion blame whatsoever, I'd like to ask a question regarding the roles of PIC and SIC in most people's experiences.
These pilots are vastly more experienced than I and I don't know what their SOPs are for this kind of eventuality. So again, I stress that I am not trying to pass any judgement.
Simply, I noticed that SIC did call for 'floats' and PIC did not give the order "straight away". Of course, PIC is final authority and all that, but...
...if the SIC had popped them anyway (even without the order from PIC) and caused the saving of the helicopter, is this generally a no-no, or would he have got a pat on the back and a beer in the bar?
cl12pv2s
Without wanting to apportion blame whatsoever, I'd like to ask a question regarding the roles of PIC and SIC in most people's experiences.
These pilots are vastly more experienced than I and I don't know what their SOPs are for this kind of eventuality. So again, I stress that I am not trying to pass any judgement.
Simply, I noticed that SIC did call for 'floats' and PIC did not give the order "straight away". Of course, PIC is final authority and all that, but...
...if the SIC had popped them anyway (even without the order from PIC) and caused the saving of the helicopter, is this generally a no-no, or would he have got a pat on the back and a beer in the bar?
cl12pv2s
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albatross,
The offshore birds are lighter by hundreds, the typical exec C+ weighs in at 8250 to 8500 lbs. If we use 8250, our figures agree quite nicely.
Regarding the 100 hour inspection, most US corporate operators fly by Part 91, and do not have to do 100 hour inspections. They can (and often do) follow Pt 135 informally, but waive the specific rquirements as they see fit, as long as they meet Pt 91. Thus it is not unreasonable for them to have a commercial maintenance regime, but somewhat overfly the inspections to allow better scheduling.
cl12pv2s,
You raise a great question :
"Simply, I noticed that SIC did call for 'floats' and PIC did not give the order "straight away". Of course, PIC is final authority and all that, but......if the SIC had popped them anyway (even without the order from PIC) and caused the saving of the helicopter, is this generally a no-no, or would he have got a pat on the back and a beer in the bar?"
The answer is simple, and will surely cause a great pprune debate:
Do the right thing, regardless. Each crew member must know when it is time to act independantly and save pax and plane. If the captain is about to hit a mast, grab the stick and take charge. If the captain is about to run out of fuel and he won't listen to reason, hit him over the head and take charge. (this is a bit of hyperboly, of course, just slap him gently). The copilot can be held accountable if he does not act in the best interest of the pax and plane, regardless of the autocratic beliefs of the captain (should he be so hard-headed).
The offshore birds are lighter by hundreds, the typical exec C+ weighs in at 8250 to 8500 lbs. If we use 8250, our figures agree quite nicely.
Regarding the 100 hour inspection, most US corporate operators fly by Part 91, and do not have to do 100 hour inspections. They can (and often do) follow Pt 135 informally, but waive the specific rquirements as they see fit, as long as they meet Pt 91. Thus it is not unreasonable for them to have a commercial maintenance regime, but somewhat overfly the inspections to allow better scheduling.
cl12pv2s,
You raise a great question :
"Simply, I noticed that SIC did call for 'floats' and PIC did not give the order "straight away". Of course, PIC is final authority and all that, but......if the SIC had popped them anyway (even without the order from PIC) and caused the saving of the helicopter, is this generally a no-no, or would he have got a pat on the back and a beer in the bar?"
The answer is simple, and will surely cause a great pprune debate:
Do the right thing, regardless. Each crew member must know when it is time to act independantly and save pax and plane. If the captain is about to hit a mast, grab the stick and take charge. If the captain is about to run out of fuel and he won't listen to reason, hit him over the head and take charge. (this is a bit of hyperboly, of course, just slap him gently). The copilot can be held accountable if he does not act in the best interest of the pax and plane, regardless of the autocratic beliefs of the captain (should he be so hard-headed).
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Do what it takes !!
Yep, a classic example of this is the Egyptian Flash Air air charter flight leaving Sharm el-Sheikh. The co-pilot sat there and watched the captain put a 737 on its back. A culturally enforced authority hierarchy apparently kept him from simply grabbing the controls and averting disaster.
Also, glad to see you back, rjsquirrel
HOSS
Also, glad to see you back, rjsquirrel
HOSS
I have to question your weights:
When was the last time any US executive weighed 200 lbs? When he was sixteen, probably.
Put the weights at 220 - 250 and you would be closer. And don't forget the tray of donuts on the centre console.....
When was the last time any US executive weighed 200 lbs? When he was sixteen, probably.
Put the weights at 220 - 250 and you would be closer. And don't forget the tray of donuts on the centre console.....
"Just a pilot"
The first rule- "Fly the aircraft" should have a second, "Prepare for the worst." Consider what you're about to do with the aircraft, the potential issues in the proposed action, and most importantly, what- and when- your potential responses will be to issues that arise. Brief everybody, including the PIC, even if you're single-pilot. Yup, talk to yourself- forming the sentence to accomplish the brief seems to make the reality more concrete.
Know too, that the expectation that all will proceed as previously, perhaps thousands of times, can limit your appreciation of the actual situation- exactly what you don't need when the plan's circling the drain.
An aside- Drooping NR on departure, especially over water, can be a wholly absorbing situation. Unlike a departure over land, when you're accelerating over water, you know your surface reference cues are not accurate. That surface may be mere inches away, or several feet. That little bit of uncertainty should be prepared for, or it can be a further issue as you hope it's not inches, that it's feet- and act accordingly.
The thing that stands out reading the brief, is that this crew seemed to stop being a directed, cohesive unit. They became two pilots who happened to be sitting in the same aircraft.
Know too, that the expectation that all will proceed as previously, perhaps thousands of times, can limit your appreciation of the actual situation- exactly what you don't need when the plan's circling the drain.
An aside- Drooping NR on departure, especially over water, can be a wholly absorbing situation. Unlike a departure over land, when you're accelerating over water, you know your surface reference cues are not accurate. That surface may be mere inches away, or several feet. That little bit of uncertainty should be prepared for, or it can be a further issue as you hope it's not inches, that it's feet- and act accordingly.
The thing that stands out reading the brief, is that this crew seemed to stop being a directed, cohesive unit. They became two pilots who happened to be sitting in the same aircraft.
Found this pic on airliners.net the S-76 remains
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This past May 25th an S-76 crashed while taking off with 8 passengers on board while making a running take off but it was BECAUSE THE PILOT TOOK OFF WITH ONLY ONE ENGINE IN THE FLY POSITION AN THE OTHER AT IDLE!
The aircraft was pretty much totaled, and the rumor is that when he attended training at FSI earlier this year they were saying the pilot had problems with the machine but they still made him Capitain over here because there was nobody else for the job?
The aircraft was pretty much totaled, and the rumor is that when he attended training at FSI earlier this year they were saying the pilot had problems with the machine but they still made him Capitain over here because there was nobody else for the job?
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Blender,
That error is not very rare. The USMC lost a 53E in the Desert when the crew tried a similar takeoff, and I know of one test pilot who had a hard landing doing a similar event.
In my unit in Vietnam, our illustrious Platoon Leader declared an emergency and made a running landing back home in a Cobra when he realized that his engine was unable to deliver more than half power. We stood by and cheered his landing, until the maintenance chief walked over to the aircraft, stood on the step, leaned inside and calmly rolled the throttle back to full open!
This NY accident, like so many others, has its share of "There but for the grace of God go I!"
That error is not very rare. The USMC lost a 53E in the Desert when the crew tried a similar takeoff, and I know of one test pilot who had a hard landing doing a similar event.
In my unit in Vietnam, our illustrious Platoon Leader declared an emergency and made a running landing back home in a Cobra when he realized that his engine was unable to deliver more than half power. We stood by and cheered his landing, until the maintenance chief walked over to the aircraft, stood on the step, leaned inside and calmly rolled the throttle back to full open!
This NY accident, like so many others, has its share of "There but for the grace of God go I!"
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Egress training
After re-reading the NTSB report, besides judgement, CRM and planning issues, it seems that only one of the passengers knew how to get the doors open. Might be a good idea to spend a couple of minutes with your principal passengers and teach them how the doors work and where the life vests are, if you carry them. Pilots might want to come down to the hangar and take part in annual door jettison inspection and practice popping the door off.
Toolguy....the rule is all...all passengers must be briefed...not just principle passengers.
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SASless,
You are right, teach them all how to operate doors, jettison, escape, lock and unlock. I think that some corporate operators do not teach their exec's because they do not want to spook them.
You are right, teach them all how to operate doors, jettison, escape, lock and unlock. I think that some corporate operators do not teach their exec's because they do not want to spook them.
