How to improve the HEMS safety record in the USA?
Thread Starter
Joined: May 2004
Posts: 917
Likes: 11
From: Tax-land.
How to improve the HEMS safety record in the USA?
HEMS operations in the United States are characterized by sometimes fierce competition among programs, be they Hospital sponsored or Community Based.
In this, they differ markedly from operations in say, Europe or Australia, where most HEMS programs are sponsored by the local administrations or survive just thanks to donations.
I welcome the valued opinion of ALL our colleagues flying this important and difficult mission, be them from the USA or abroad.
I'd like to compare figures with programs flying under the restrictions of JAA and or the Australian CAA.
Any attempt to generate an intelligent list of responses in another well known web site claiming to be the best rotary wing web site, usually degenerates to a slandering and name calling contest, due to the anonimity of its nature.Questions are welcome as well.
In this, they differ markedly from operations in say, Europe or Australia, where most HEMS programs are sponsored by the local administrations or survive just thanks to donations.
I welcome the valued opinion of ALL our colleagues flying this important and difficult mission, be them from the USA or abroad.
I'd like to compare figures with programs flying under the restrictions of JAA and or the Australian CAA.
Any attempt to generate an intelligent list of responses in another well known web site claiming to be the best rotary wing web site, usually degenerates to a slandering and name calling contest, due to the anonimity of its nature.Questions are welcome as well.
Joined: Oct 2003
Posts: 1,030
Likes: 0
From: Over here
I wish I had an answer for you. I don't. As long as the overall corporate culture, in all industries, is to care only about the stock price and short-term profits, and HEMS operators are driven by this, then corners will be cut, pressure will be applied to take flights, and patients, medical crew, and pilots will die. The insurance companies can cover the losses, and the management types assuage their consciences with large bonuses. This isn't new, and it isn't likely to change. 
Joined: Apr 2004
Posts: 60
Likes: 0
From: New South Wales
The competition factor I think is a huge influence on the decision making by pilots involved in HEMS in the USA.
Following a couple accidents here, some community helicopter EMS providers on the east coast Australia have enrolled in a safety network supported by an aviation risk management company. It is essentially a safety management system provider that includes standards setting, incident reporting and information sharing, safety management systems etc. but with the costs shared among several rather than one operator.
Just launched last week with more providers including police units looking to become involved. I have been involved in developing small bits of the system so I'm biased towards it but having been an accident investigator for 7 years, I support anything that will hopefully improve safety in the helo industry. At least it's worth a try!
Following a couple accidents here, some community helicopter EMS providers on the east coast Australia have enrolled in a safety network supported by an aviation risk management company. It is essentially a safety management system provider that includes standards setting, incident reporting and information sharing, safety management systems etc. but with the costs shared among several rather than one operator.
Just launched last week with more providers including police units looking to become involved. I have been involved in developing small bits of the system so I'm biased towards it but having been an accident investigator for 7 years, I support anything that will hopefully improve safety in the helo industry. At least it's worth a try!
"Just a pilot"
Joined: May 2001
Posts: 633
Likes: 8
From: Jefferson GA USA
Where to start...Two EMS operators so far:
1) Training needs to be a stronger influence in corporate, more line oriented, and, well "more," lots more- training. Example of an issue- I've never done a ride at night, in initial training or recurrent. Both parts of the training do an IFR slash IIMC, I'm at a VFR program. As far as I know, everybody- IFR & VFR, traditional and community based- do nights, and that's when a vast majority of the accidents occur.
2) Night vision goggles for any program that does night scenes, and better yet anybody operating nights. This isn't airport to airport, I'll go when I want to stuff. It's much more akin to the military- pilot goes or not, and deals with the situation with what skills are brought...
3) Autopilots.
4) Quality control. The med side has a QCI built-in. Pilots operate in a vacuum, with rudimentary guidance. To do the job well requires a constant learning process, and that requires feedback. Some of us do this somewhat on our own, many do not. Any accident starts with a single event, without feedback, the event trends to bad practice- bad habits are reenforced.
5) We need to be more scientific in human scheduling. Circadien rhythms disorders, sleep disruption, and the loss of efficiency resulting, are well documented scientific facts.
We do the hardest part of our job, with minimal equipment and training, when we're at our intellectual worst- nights.
1) Training needs to be a stronger influence in corporate, more line oriented, and, well "more," lots more- training. Example of an issue- I've never done a ride at night, in initial training or recurrent. Both parts of the training do an IFR slash IIMC, I'm at a VFR program. As far as I know, everybody- IFR & VFR, traditional and community based- do nights, and that's when a vast majority of the accidents occur.
2) Night vision goggles for any program that does night scenes, and better yet anybody operating nights. This isn't airport to airport, I'll go when I want to stuff. It's much more akin to the military- pilot goes or not, and deals with the situation with what skills are brought...
3) Autopilots.
4) Quality control. The med side has a QCI built-in. Pilots operate in a vacuum, with rudimentary guidance. To do the job well requires a constant learning process, and that requires feedback. Some of us do this somewhat on our own, many do not. Any accident starts with a single event, without feedback, the event trends to bad practice- bad habits are reenforced.
5) We need to be more scientific in human scheduling. Circadien rhythms disorders, sleep disruption, and the loss of efficiency resulting, are well documented scientific facts.
We do the hardest part of our job, with minimal equipment and training, when we're at our intellectual worst- nights.
Last edited by Devil 49; 8th March 2005 at 14:13.
Joined: May 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATP+Mil
Posts: 18,633
Likes: 1,072
From: Downeast
Two EMS companies....five different operations...Training Captain at one of the outfits...SPIFR at one.
49 says it right....training is laughable. Never done at night, always done to "minimum" standard....on the IFR outfit....one training flight then the checkride (Identical flights oddly enough). Ground training at one place was by means of CTS (computer based training)done monthly.
Oversight by the corporate office (CP/Training/Safety) were all done by remote....very infrequent visits...usually done for the VFR annual checkrides or the IFR checkrides every six months. Woe be anyone that brought up concerns or suggested all was not right in the Kingdom.
One company tried to focus on safety issues...primarily a VFR company at that time but was dragged into the IFR business by competition. The other bragged upon its IFR capability and requirement for a college degree but had a safety culture that failed to meet the test of reality. They never used the existing full motion simulators as did most other operators...but then few EMS companies ever do unless they are hospital owned operators. Vendors just do not go for sim training.
Neither place used a "Lessons learned" concept or spread information around to the outying operations.
49 says it right....training is laughable. Never done at night, always done to "minimum" standard....on the IFR outfit....one training flight then the checkride (Identical flights oddly enough). Ground training at one place was by means of CTS (computer based training)done monthly.
Oversight by the corporate office (CP/Training/Safety) were all done by remote....very infrequent visits...usually done for the VFR annual checkrides or the IFR checkrides every six months. Woe be anyone that brought up concerns or suggested all was not right in the Kingdom.
One company tried to focus on safety issues...primarily a VFR company at that time but was dragged into the IFR business by competition. The other bragged upon its IFR capability and requirement for a college degree but had a safety culture that failed to meet the test of reality. They never used the existing full motion simulators as did most other operators...but then few EMS companies ever do unless they are hospital owned operators. Vendors just do not go for sim training.
Neither place used a "Lessons learned" concept or spread information around to the outying operations.
Joined: Dec 2001
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 3
From: Philadelphia PA
I'm relatively new to the EMS business, but the company I work for has an ethic of never questioning the pilot if he turns down a flight. In my short time here, I've turned down four because of weather. Not a murmur.
In fact, the dispatch system will go looking at the various bases to see if someone will take a flight that has been turned down by another base. We all know this, and ask who else has turned down the flight. (lottsa mountain ranges around here mean that sometimes somebody might be able to make it legally). I've seen no sense of bravado aomng the other pilots to do something others can't.
Also nurses and medics can stop a flight and we have to accept their decision.
I agree that NVGs would be great, and so would easy access to simulation of some sort.
In fact, the dispatch system will go looking at the various bases to see if someone will take a flight that has been turned down by another base. We all know this, and ask who else has turned down the flight. (lottsa mountain ranges around here mean that sometimes somebody might be able to make it legally). I've seen no sense of bravado aomng the other pilots to do something others can't.
Also nurses and medics can stop a flight and we have to accept their decision.
I agree that NVGs would be great, and so would easy access to simulation of some sort.
Joined: Jun 2001
Posts: 506
Likes: 1
From: Europe
In this, they differ markedly from operations in say, Europe or Australia, where most HEMS programs are sponsored by the local administrations or survive just thanks to donations.
And forget your "donations" or "local sponsoring". It's a business. Also the great EMS operators like the automotive clubs or rega operating under great financial pressure. And a lot of helicopters are operated by small helicopter companies in Austria, Switzerland and Germany. Look at the last accident in germany (25.02.05) CFIT now confirmed.
Joined: Mar 2005
Posts: 651
Likes: 127
From: West
How to improve the HEMS safety record in the USA
I think you will see several solutions coming but eventually the industry will become more regulated.
NVGs are not the total solution but the industry is banking on that fixing the problem. NVGs have limits and the pilot needs to keep in mind...googles will still get someone in trouble. Would not be surprised within a year that goggles will be mandated. Serves to address a couple of issues: FAA can show that they did something and smaller programs that cant afford the cost will be absorbed or go away.
Terrain/obstacle avoidance programs for the GPS becoming widly used on EMS aircraft. The programs are there, but the $$$ are in the NVG market as the fix so this will be slower to come into force.
The pilot market is streched at this time no immediate solution for that . Totally hypothetical is that the business plans of the major EMS providers throttle back and get realistic with pilot supply and growth. Slim chance.
Another reason to regulate the industry, the surge in articles that are being done on unncessary flights. Granted for every one the papers say should not go there is a story that its good the flight was there. Insurance costs tied into health care costs will make its way into the front running as a reason to put some regulation in place verus common sense on the hopsita. Hospitals generate the cash flow from the follow up services once we get the patient there. EMS programs are the whipping post for this one.
Twin engines may seem the solution to the public and a marketing tool for the companies that fly them but if you crashing in night/weather, the second engine gets you to the crash that much faster.
The fleet needs to be looked at for a different reason, (personal opinon only, my time is in UH-1 and 60s now the AStar) for what we do. Power management is a must but if you flying with 1/2 fuel so you can take a patient and your range is limited, maybe you have the wrong aircraft.
NVGs are not the total solution but the industry is banking on that fixing the problem. NVGs have limits and the pilot needs to keep in mind...googles will still get someone in trouble. Would not be surprised within a year that goggles will be mandated. Serves to address a couple of issues: FAA can show that they did something and smaller programs that cant afford the cost will be absorbed or go away.
Terrain/obstacle avoidance programs for the GPS becoming widly used on EMS aircraft. The programs are there, but the $$$ are in the NVG market as the fix so this will be slower to come into force.
The pilot market is streched at this time no immediate solution for that . Totally hypothetical is that the business plans of the major EMS providers throttle back and get realistic with pilot supply and growth. Slim chance.
Another reason to regulate the industry, the surge in articles that are being done on unncessary flights. Granted for every one the papers say should not go there is a story that its good the flight was there. Insurance costs tied into health care costs will make its way into the front running as a reason to put some regulation in place verus common sense on the hopsita. Hospitals generate the cash flow from the follow up services once we get the patient there. EMS programs are the whipping post for this one.
Twin engines may seem the solution to the public and a marketing tool for the companies that fly them but if you crashing in night/weather, the second engine gets you to the crash that much faster.
The fleet needs to be looked at for a different reason, (personal opinon only, my time is in UH-1 and 60s now the AStar) for what we do. Power management is a must but if you flying with 1/2 fuel so you can take a patient and your range is limited, maybe you have the wrong aircraft.
Joined: May 2001
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
From: 38 South
There appears to be an awful lot of night "weather related" crashes happening in the USA . What are your night VFR minima? Are they being adhered too or are they too low?Is the regulator policing this? Working to a route MSA (highest terrain plus 1000ft)on known tracks and sector MSA's for night cross country on unfamiliar routes would be a good starting point. Doesn't cost much cash to do this. There are some great tools available now that don't cost the earth such as GPS based enhanced ground proximity warning systems and terrain mapping.
Safe flying.
Safe flying.
Joined: Jul 2002
Posts: 512
Likes: 0
From: Texas
Night minima under Part 135 are 1 mile visibility, and sufficient surface lights to safely control the aircraft. I suspect many pilots forget about the latter requirement, because with 1 mile visibility you won't have many surface lights in sight outside an urban area. Flying at night with 1 mile vis is really pushing the envelope, IMO. Our company minimum is 1000/3, and I will seldom fly VFR with that weather, only in the immediate vicinity of the airport. Cross-country, at night, with 1000/3 is simply too dangerous for me to even consider. Lots of people do it, though, and even with 1 mile and an unknown ceiling. Whether it's because of economic and job pressure, or because of the hero syndrome, it's becoming increasingly fatal. We have entirely too many EMS pilots trying to be heroes, but killing the patient isn't heroic in any sense, nor is killing yourself and/or the medical crew. It's simply stupid.
Joined: Mar 2005
Posts: 651
Likes: 127
From: West
We have a local flying area 25 nm around the base which has lower weather minimums then our cross county. (both day and night)
One step further, new pilots or temp pilots that come in to cover shortages have higher minimums (local/cross country, day/night)
Helps in the decision process and the pilots have submitted a request to raise the minimums because of the lack of weather reporting along the route (50 miles away) to a trauma center. We had a couple of flights get turned back (departure 6000/7and arrival 9000/10 ) but halfway went to 500 and 2.
The locals say that is a normal weather pattern for that area.
The company asked for the input as well as asked us to research putting in an AWOS at the midway point.
One step further, new pilots or temp pilots that come in to cover shortages have higher minimums (local/cross country, day/night)
Helps in the decision process and the pilots have submitted a request to raise the minimums because of the lack of weather reporting along the route (50 miles away) to a trauma center. We had a couple of flights get turned back (departure 6000/7and arrival 9000/10 ) but halfway went to 500 and 2.
The locals say that is a normal weather pattern for that area.
The company asked for the input as well as asked us to research putting in an AWOS at the midway point.
Joined: Jun 2003
Posts: 320
Likes: 0
From: Off the Planet
This might be of interest to you - check how many of these recommendations have been carried out!
Background
Between 1987 and 1997, there were on average four air medical helicopter accidents per year for the industry. By 1997, the accident rate for helicopter AMS operations had been reduced to 1.97 accidents per 100,000 flight hours from a high of 17.08 in 1987. In 1998, however, the number of accidents rose to a nine year high of seven, but more alarming was the rise in fatalities to fourteen, the highest number since the peak year of 1986. In 1999, the number of accidents rose even further to ten, the highest also since the peak year of 1986. Fatalities were down to ten but still higher than the average of six.
To address the issue of safety, the Association of Air Medical Service, in consult with HAI, the National EMS Pilots Association (NEMSPA), the National Flight Paramedics Association (NFPA), the Air & Surface Transport Nurses Association (ASTNA), the major air medical service operators and aircraft manufacturers, convened the Air Medical Safety Summit in Dallas, TX, on April 7, 2000, to discuss safety within the air medical service industry.
In a process very similar to that used by the FAAs Safer Skies Joint Safety Analysis Teams (JSATs) in their recent study of weather and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents, the Safety Summit attempted to identify what prevalent factors existed in AMS operations that tended to degrade safety. With insufficient time at this particular meeting to conduct an in-depth cause analysis, the identification of accident causes was based primarily on opinions and speculation. However, several broad areas were identified, including: a lack of training (recurrent, CRM, weather, decision making, etc.); an administrative culture that too often does not place safety first; inadequate technologies; and other human factors (fatigue, cockpit overload, sense of mission urgency, inadequate piloting skills, etc.)
Although the Summit arrived at a variety of perceived causes of air medical accidents, no comprehensive analysis of accidents had been conducted. Therefore, the Air Medical Service Accident Analysis Team was formed to conduct an in-depth analysis of air medical helicopter accidents to identify the chain of events that has led to accidents and to identify intervention strategies that would be both effective and feasible in preventing such accidents in the future.
...
Recommendations - It is the recommendation of the Air Medical Accident Analysis Team that the Air Medical Safety Advisory Council (AMSAC) review these findings and focus efforts within the air medical service industry on the development of implementation strategies for those interventions that are highly effective and highly feasible. AMSAC should also consider interventions that are highly effective but moderately feasible, as well as interventions that are highly feasible but moderately effective. When time and resources permit, AMSAC should also consider interventions that are moderately effective and moderately feasible, as some of these interventions may require only modest implementation but may have some impact upon the enhancement of safety. However, those interventions that are identified as low in effectiveness, low in feasibility, or both, should not be pursued.
LIST of RECOMMENDED INTERVENTION STRATEGIES:
Interventions that ranked High Effectiveness and High Feasibility:
Enhance the training for night flying operations
Enhance the training for mountain flying operations
Equip aircraft with Terrain Avoidance Warning Systems (TAWS)
Equip aircraft with Radar Altimeters
Provide aircraft with mission essential equipment
Improve the content of weather briefings
Interventions that ranked High Effectiveness and Moderate Feasibility:
Conduct/enhance annual IFR proficiency checks
Conduct/enhance training to improve the understanding of weather briefings
Enhance overall training: recurrent, professional knowledge, etc.
Conduct/enhance training in Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM)
Establish an integrated and structured Pilot Training Program
Conduct/enhance mission oriented training
Conduct/enhance Crew Resource Management (CRM) training
Equip aircraft with Moving Map Displays to provide weather, obstacle and terrain data
Equip aircraft with avionics to provide a vertical awareness display or warning
Standardize cockpits of similar make/model used in similar operations
FAA to enhance/improve contents of annual IFR proficiency checks
Establish a national criteria for the marking of wires and towers
Interventions that ranked Moderate Effectiveness and High Feasibility:
Enhance the awareness of accident causes
Improve physiological training
Improve training with avionics equipment: usage, capabilities, etc.
Improve weather radar
Encourage greater utilization, interaction with and assistance from Air Traffic Management
Improve/enhance training of ATC personnel in rotorcraft operations and capabilities
FAA to enhance training elements of Biennial Flight Reviews and Pilot Training Standards
Interventions that ranked Moderate Effectiveness and Moderate Feasibility:
Operators to enhance training for Biennial Flight Reviews and Pilot Training Standards
Develop helicopter-specific, mission-specific computer based Emergency Procedures Simulators
Develop satellite-based Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (C/N/S) technology
Increase the rate of commissioning of new AWOS/ASOS facilities
Improve aeronautical charts (symbology, data, etc.)
LIST of INTERVENTIONS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
Intervention Strategies Scoring Low Effectiveness:
TRN-11: Improve Pilot Handbooks
EQ-3: Data-Link Technology
EQ-18: Readily available passenger/crew briefing cards
EQ-22: Fuel Flow indicators
ATC-3: Simplify contacting FSS
REG-7: Require annual calibration of fuel quantity gauges
REG-9: Publish a Mountain Flying Advisory Circular
REG-10: Publish a Flat Light/Whiteout Advisory Circular
REG-11: Require flight plans
NAS-2: Provide more UNICOM frequencies
Interventions Scoring Low Feasibility:
EQ-1: Avionics to provide horizontal awareness of terrain
EQ-4: Synthetic Vision
EQ-6: ADS-B technology
EQ-8: Heads-Up Display
EQ-9: Night Vision Devices
EQ-11: Automated Voice Callouts
EQ-12: Over-Bank Warnings
EQ-13: Excess terrain closure warning
EQ-21: Equip aircraft with state-of-the-art technology
EQ-24: Avionics to enhance detection of wires and towers
REG-2: Prohibit night flying by non-IFR rated pilots
REG-6: Require human factors/ergonomics in cockpit designs
MISC-2: Change corporate/management mindset
MISC-3: Improve safety culture
MISC-5: Improve safety programs
Interventions Scoring Low Effectiveness and Low Feasibility:
TRN-12: Increase Dual-Pilot time prior to solo PIC
TRN-13: Increase time requirements for mission certification
EQ-7: Obstacle Database
EQ-17: Enhanced ice detection equipment
ATC-5: Raise Minimums for night instrument approaches
ATC-6: Require ATC monitoring of instrument approaches
REG-1: Prohibit night VFR
REG-5: Update FAR Part 135 requirements
REG-8: Require crashworthy fuel tanks for certification
Background
Between 1987 and 1997, there were on average four air medical helicopter accidents per year for the industry. By 1997, the accident rate for helicopter AMS operations had been reduced to 1.97 accidents per 100,000 flight hours from a high of 17.08 in 1987. In 1998, however, the number of accidents rose to a nine year high of seven, but more alarming was the rise in fatalities to fourteen, the highest number since the peak year of 1986. In 1999, the number of accidents rose even further to ten, the highest also since the peak year of 1986. Fatalities were down to ten but still higher than the average of six.
To address the issue of safety, the Association of Air Medical Service, in consult with HAI, the National EMS Pilots Association (NEMSPA), the National Flight Paramedics Association (NFPA), the Air & Surface Transport Nurses Association (ASTNA), the major air medical service operators and aircraft manufacturers, convened the Air Medical Safety Summit in Dallas, TX, on April 7, 2000, to discuss safety within the air medical service industry.
In a process very similar to that used by the FAAs Safer Skies Joint Safety Analysis Teams (JSATs) in their recent study of weather and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents, the Safety Summit attempted to identify what prevalent factors existed in AMS operations that tended to degrade safety. With insufficient time at this particular meeting to conduct an in-depth cause analysis, the identification of accident causes was based primarily on opinions and speculation. However, several broad areas were identified, including: a lack of training (recurrent, CRM, weather, decision making, etc.); an administrative culture that too often does not place safety first; inadequate technologies; and other human factors (fatigue, cockpit overload, sense of mission urgency, inadequate piloting skills, etc.)
Although the Summit arrived at a variety of perceived causes of air medical accidents, no comprehensive analysis of accidents had been conducted. Therefore, the Air Medical Service Accident Analysis Team was formed to conduct an in-depth analysis of air medical helicopter accidents to identify the chain of events that has led to accidents and to identify intervention strategies that would be both effective and feasible in preventing such accidents in the future.
...
Recommendations - It is the recommendation of the Air Medical Accident Analysis Team that the Air Medical Safety Advisory Council (AMSAC) review these findings and focus efforts within the air medical service industry on the development of implementation strategies for those interventions that are highly effective and highly feasible. AMSAC should also consider interventions that are highly effective but moderately feasible, as well as interventions that are highly feasible but moderately effective. When time and resources permit, AMSAC should also consider interventions that are moderately effective and moderately feasible, as some of these interventions may require only modest implementation but may have some impact upon the enhancement of safety. However, those interventions that are identified as low in effectiveness, low in feasibility, or both, should not be pursued.
LIST of RECOMMENDED INTERVENTION STRATEGIES:
Interventions that ranked High Effectiveness and High Feasibility:
Enhance the training for night flying operations
Enhance the training for mountain flying operations
Equip aircraft with Terrain Avoidance Warning Systems (TAWS)
Equip aircraft with Radar Altimeters
Provide aircraft with mission essential equipment
Improve the content of weather briefings
Interventions that ranked High Effectiveness and Moderate Feasibility:
Conduct/enhance annual IFR proficiency checks
Conduct/enhance training to improve the understanding of weather briefings
Enhance overall training: recurrent, professional knowledge, etc.
Conduct/enhance training in Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM)
Establish an integrated and structured Pilot Training Program
Conduct/enhance mission oriented training
Conduct/enhance Crew Resource Management (CRM) training
Equip aircraft with Moving Map Displays to provide weather, obstacle and terrain data
Equip aircraft with avionics to provide a vertical awareness display or warning
Standardize cockpits of similar make/model used in similar operations
FAA to enhance/improve contents of annual IFR proficiency checks
Establish a national criteria for the marking of wires and towers
Interventions that ranked Moderate Effectiveness and High Feasibility:
Enhance the awareness of accident causes
Improve physiological training
Improve training with avionics equipment: usage, capabilities, etc.
Improve weather radar
Encourage greater utilization, interaction with and assistance from Air Traffic Management
Improve/enhance training of ATC personnel in rotorcraft operations and capabilities
FAA to enhance training elements of Biennial Flight Reviews and Pilot Training Standards
Interventions that ranked Moderate Effectiveness and Moderate Feasibility:
Operators to enhance training for Biennial Flight Reviews and Pilot Training Standards
Develop helicopter-specific, mission-specific computer based Emergency Procedures Simulators
Develop satellite-based Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (C/N/S) technology
Increase the rate of commissioning of new AWOS/ASOS facilities
Improve aeronautical charts (symbology, data, etc.)
LIST of INTERVENTIONS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
Intervention Strategies Scoring Low Effectiveness:
TRN-11: Improve Pilot Handbooks
EQ-3: Data-Link Technology
EQ-18: Readily available passenger/crew briefing cards
EQ-22: Fuel Flow indicators
ATC-3: Simplify contacting FSS
REG-7: Require annual calibration of fuel quantity gauges
REG-9: Publish a Mountain Flying Advisory Circular
REG-10: Publish a Flat Light/Whiteout Advisory Circular
REG-11: Require flight plans
NAS-2: Provide more UNICOM frequencies
Interventions Scoring Low Feasibility:
EQ-1: Avionics to provide horizontal awareness of terrain
EQ-4: Synthetic Vision
EQ-6: ADS-B technology
EQ-8: Heads-Up Display
EQ-9: Night Vision Devices
EQ-11: Automated Voice Callouts
EQ-12: Over-Bank Warnings
EQ-13: Excess terrain closure warning
EQ-21: Equip aircraft with state-of-the-art technology
EQ-24: Avionics to enhance detection of wires and towers
REG-2: Prohibit night flying by non-IFR rated pilots
REG-6: Require human factors/ergonomics in cockpit designs
MISC-2: Change corporate/management mindset
MISC-3: Improve safety culture
MISC-5: Improve safety programs
Interventions Scoring Low Effectiveness and Low Feasibility:
TRN-12: Increase Dual-Pilot time prior to solo PIC
TRN-13: Increase time requirements for mission certification
EQ-7: Obstacle Database
EQ-17: Enhanced ice detection equipment
ATC-5: Raise Minimums for night instrument approaches
ATC-6: Require ATC monitoring of instrument approaches
REG-1: Prohibit night VFR
REG-5: Update FAR Part 135 requirements
REG-8: Require crashworthy fuel tanks for certification
Joined: Dec 2001
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 3
From: Philadelphia PA
I note that the date for this study was 2000.
Given the large change in technology in many areas (TAWS for helicopters, NVGs, etc.) isn't it time this was revisited? Or what is the special panel that has recently been formed doing about this not-so-old report?
Given the large change in technology in many areas (TAWS for helicopters, NVGs, etc.) isn't it time this was revisited? Or what is the special panel that has recently been formed doing about this not-so-old report?
Joined: May 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATP+Mil
Posts: 18,633
Likes: 1,072
From: Downeast
FAA/HAI/EMS Operators work to make changes
The HAI News had this article today....salient point seems to be "within existing regulations and current aircraft equipment". Is that a polite way of saying it is the pilots that are the problem?
But then it is a government organization teaming with an operator's lobby and operators to arrive at a solution to a problem. I shouldn't imagine they will be wanting to point the finger at themselves now would I?
FAA and HAI Staff Meet on HEMS Task Force Issues
Posted on Wednesday, April 06 @ 16:44:23 Eastern Daylight Time By News Staff
In a move to follow up on initiatives suggested during the initial Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) task force meeting in January, representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) met with HAI staff members recently to discuss the next steps in the process.
It is clear that the FAA is committed to an aggressive, ongoing effort to improve safety in HEMs operations, working within the framework of existing regulations and current aircraft equipment. The FAAs initial focus will apparently be on risk assessment and management programs and on Controlled Flight Into Terrain and inadvertent IMC flight. The FAA representatives made it clear they intend to seek extensive industry involvement in the process
But then it is a government organization teaming with an operator's lobby and operators to arrive at a solution to a problem. I shouldn't imagine they will be wanting to point the finger at themselves now would I?
FAA and HAI Staff Meet on HEMS Task Force Issues
Posted on Wednesday, April 06 @ 16:44:23 Eastern Daylight Time By News Staff
In a move to follow up on initiatives suggested during the initial Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) task force meeting in January, representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) met with HAI staff members recently to discuss the next steps in the process.
It is clear that the FAA is committed to an aggressive, ongoing effort to improve safety in HEMs operations, working within the framework of existing regulations and current aircraft equipment. The FAAs initial focus will apparently be on risk assessment and management programs and on Controlled Flight Into Terrain and inadvertent IMC flight. The FAA representatives made it clear they intend to seek extensive industry involvement in the process
