GoM offshore safety
Thread Starter
This topic has been split from another thread.
Heliport
The issue about educating your passengers and the "duty of care" issue is an interesting one. I suggest holding management and owners responsible as well as pilots and mechanics/engineers might go a long way of improving the situation.
Consider this concept in the Gulf of Mexico offshore oil businesss....No jigsaw down there....no effective SAR at all...particularly at night. The primary SAR response will be non-SAR capable commerical helicopters and surface vessels again primarily non SAR capable private vessels. The USCG is busy doing the Homeland Security bit and that has adversely impacted the SAR mission they are so famous for in the past.
Every single day....thousands of passengers are flying in the GOM without survival suits or any viable SAR helicopter service to assist in an emergency. If you go down at night.....you are in big, big trouble.
This is the mindset over here.....bottomline numbers first....everything else second.
Heliport
The issue about educating your passengers and the "duty of care" issue is an interesting one. I suggest holding management and owners responsible as well as pilots and mechanics/engineers might go a long way of improving the situation.
Consider this concept in the Gulf of Mexico offshore oil businesss....No jigsaw down there....no effective SAR at all...particularly at night. The primary SAR response will be non-SAR capable commerical helicopters and surface vessels again primarily non SAR capable private vessels. The USCG is busy doing the Homeland Security bit and that has adversely impacted the SAR mission they are so famous for in the past.
Every single day....thousands of passengers are flying in the GOM without survival suits or any viable SAR helicopter service to assist in an emergency. If you go down at night.....you are in big, big trouble.
This is the mindset over here.....bottomline numbers first....everything else second.
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The duty of care in the GOM should be more clearly focussed upon the Oil Industry as they have the means to alter the balance. You would be correct that flying at night in a single outside the survival time without some mitigating safety equipment should be frowned upon if that were the case - my understanding is that singles at night in the GOM is the exception rather than the rule (and, as oil company policy changes, becoming more so). We might also wish to bring to their attention that flying in adverse weather in singles also increases substantially the risk as some accidents in the last two years have shown.
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I've been flying at night in the GOM for a few years now, and I have a few observations.
Deaths from exposure are non-existant. If you do go in the water, it's not that hard to survive if you have a life vest, and exposure suits are simply excess baggage. You don't die quickly from 80 degree water.
Night flights aren't all that common, but there are a significant number of single-engine flights at night compared to the overall number. There are a few operators flying single-engine at night over water.
Given the choice between single-engine or single-pilot ops, I'll take single-engine every time. A second pilot is far more important than a second engine. Engines don't quit that often, especially turbines, and if they do, a reasonably competent pilot can get the helicopter down safely enough to get everyone out. What kills people is flying into the water inverted, hitting obstacles on landing, flying into thunderstorms, etc. A second pilot is, IMO, far more important than a second engine, and should be required for night flight whether over water or over land. Night EMS single-pilot flights will continue to kill people, as long as they are permitted. Night flight single-pilot flight anywhere will kill people. If I flew single-pilot all the time, I wouldn't be writing this, I would be feeding the fishes. I don't care if you have one engine or three, if it's dark or IMC you need two pilots active in the cockpit, and night flight will eventually become IMC, guaranteed.
Deaths from exposure are non-existant. If you do go in the water, it's not that hard to survive if you have a life vest, and exposure suits are simply excess baggage. You don't die quickly from 80 degree water.
Night flights aren't all that common, but there are a significant number of single-engine flights at night compared to the overall number. There are a few operators flying single-engine at night over water.
Given the choice between single-engine or single-pilot ops, I'll take single-engine every time. A second pilot is far more important than a second engine. Engines don't quit that often, especially turbines, and if they do, a reasonably competent pilot can get the helicopter down safely enough to get everyone out. What kills people is flying into the water inverted, hitting obstacles on landing, flying into thunderstorms, etc. A second pilot is, IMO, far more important than a second engine, and should be required for night flight whether over water or over land. Night EMS single-pilot flights will continue to kill people, as long as they are permitted. Night flight single-pilot flight anywhere will kill people. If I flew single-pilot all the time, I wouldn't be writing this, I would be feeding the fishes. I don't care if you have one engine or three, if it's dark or IMC you need two pilots active in the cockpit, and night flight will eventually become IMC, guaranteed.
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GLSNightPilot:
As always you present a logical argument but the likelihood of two pilot operations in a single engine helicopter is quite small and, because it would not be within the normal scope would likely suffer from CRM problems (which have been seen even in two crew helicopter operations).
However, I have to take issue with your contention that “deaths from exposure are non existent”; almost within the last two years (On February 16, 2003) there was a ditching in the GOM that resulted in the death of two of the occupants - which occured following a successful escape from the helicopter.
As always you present a logical argument but the likelihood of two pilot operations in a single engine helicopter is quite small and, because it would not be within the normal scope would likely suffer from CRM problems (which have been seen even in two crew helicopter operations).
However, I have to take issue with your contention that “deaths from exposure are non existent”; almost within the last two years (On February 16, 2003) there was a ditching in the GOM that resulted in the death of two of the occupants - which occured following a successful escape from the helicopter.
Thread Starter
Water temperature at the location of the last 407 crash was approximatley 65 degrees F. The closer to shore you get in the Gulf of Mexico, the colder the water gets during the winter.
We wore Mustang Floater Jackets in the summer in Alaska and I have worn the same jacket while flying over the North Sea in the summer.
I found this excerpt in a discussion about the US Coast Guard Policy for their own crewmembers.
The United States Search and Rescue Task Force published data, which shows survival time in 73º water to be almost indefinite, but in 37º water, it ranges betweenº, 30 – 90 minutes. With such a small window of time, why would anyone venture out into the ocean without proper emergency equipment and be thoroughly familiar with how to wear it?
Such equipment consists of cold water immersion protective clothing. As with all emergency and survival equipment, improper storage, handling and failure to use it correctly or in time, diminishes the chances of survival.
The Coast Guard currently requires the use of anti-exposure coveralls when the water temperature or air temperature pose health threats, should a member get wet. According to one manufacturer’s published research, by wearing the anti-exposure suit, the survival time increases approximately 60 minutes, but only if the suit is properly maintained and donned. Dry suits, which prevent water from touching your body, increase your survival even longer.
Preparation
Coast Guard regulations (in the First Coast Guard District, Southern Region) require all of their crew members to don anti-exposure suits when the water temperature is between 50º and 60º. Should the water temperature drop lower than 50º, then dry-suits are mandated. This means, even if the air temperature is 80º, and the water temperature is less than 60º, members must still wear an anti-exposure suit, except if the local station commander applies an exception. Other Coast Guard Districts have procedures that are similar.
We wore Mustang Floater Jackets in the summer in Alaska and I have worn the same jacket while flying over the North Sea in the summer.
I found this excerpt in a discussion about the US Coast Guard Policy for their own crewmembers.
The United States Search and Rescue Task Force published data, which shows survival time in 73º water to be almost indefinite, but in 37º water, it ranges betweenº, 30 – 90 minutes. With such a small window of time, why would anyone venture out into the ocean without proper emergency equipment and be thoroughly familiar with how to wear it?
Such equipment consists of cold water immersion protective clothing. As with all emergency and survival equipment, improper storage, handling and failure to use it correctly or in time, diminishes the chances of survival.
The Coast Guard currently requires the use of anti-exposure coveralls when the water temperature or air temperature pose health threats, should a member get wet. According to one manufacturer’s published research, by wearing the anti-exposure suit, the survival time increases approximately 60 minutes, but only if the suit is properly maintained and donned. Dry suits, which prevent water from touching your body, increase your survival even longer.
Preparation
Coast Guard regulations (in the First Coast Guard District, Southern Region) require all of their crew members to don anti-exposure suits when the water temperature is between 50º and 60º. Should the water temperature drop lower than 50º, then dry-suits are mandated. This means, even if the air temperature is 80º, and the water temperature is less than 60º, members must still wear an anti-exposure suit, except if the local station commander applies an exception. Other Coast Guard Districts have procedures that are similar.
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Water temperature is not the only element that needs to be considered where survival is concerned - adequate clothing (whether or not survival suits are worn), survival suits and splash-hoods on the lifevest (or on the survival suit if it is integrated) also improve the chances of survival.
The 407 accident that led to the death of two of the occupants in February 2003 occured in seas of 5ft - 9ft and with winds of 25 - 40 mph. Existing guidance indicates that the survival time can be reduced by two thirds with winds above 25 mph. This would put the survival time at less than 30 minutes in sea temperatures of 13C.
Sea states with breaking waves can also reduce the survival time unless spray hoods are deployed (spray hoods, on lifevests or suvival suits, are mandatary for offshore flying in Europe).
You already know that there have been deaths due to exposure in the GOM. If the causal chain contains night flying, high seas, strong winds and single engine operations; one link that is preventing a hazardous event is the reliability of the engine (or any other cause of ditching). With the assumed engine reliability of 1:100,000 (if in fact that is achieved) and usage rates of 400,000 flying hours per year in the GOM, there is the potential for four fatal accidents a year due to engine failure (in addition to those which are not engine related).
The causal chain can be broken in a number of ways but the elimination of single engine night flying and the introduction of an adverse weather policy would be two which could have most effect.
The 407 accident that led to the death of two of the occupants in February 2003 occured in seas of 5ft - 9ft and with winds of 25 - 40 mph. Existing guidance indicates that the survival time can be reduced by two thirds with winds above 25 mph. This would put the survival time at less than 30 minutes in sea temperatures of 13C.
Sea states with breaking waves can also reduce the survival time unless spray hoods are deployed (spray hoods, on lifevests or suvival suits, are mandatary for offshore flying in Europe).
You already know that there have been deaths due to exposure in the GOM. If the causal chain contains night flying, high seas, strong winds and single engine operations; one link that is preventing a hazardous event is the reliability of the engine (or any other cause of ditching). With the assumed engine reliability of 1:100,000 (if in fact that is achieved) and usage rates of 400,000 flying hours per year in the GOM, there is the potential for four fatal accidents a year due to engine failure (in addition to those which are not engine related).
The causal chain can be broken in a number of ways but the elimination of single engine night flying and the introduction of an adverse weather policy would be two which could have most effect.
Thread Starter
Too true Mars,
Also contained in an article I read while researching this topic is a statement to the effect that drowning deaths are often a result of hypothermia since the victim is unable to turn his back to on-coming waves and spray as he becomes weakened from exposure to cold.
Compound the exposure to cold water and cold air....with the lack of effective airborne SAR capability that now exists in the Gulf Of Mexico and you have a potential for disaster.
Middle of the summer, hot , clear sunny day, flat water, calm winds....immersion in the sea does not present nearly the hazard.
Also contained in an article I read while researching this topic is a statement to the effect that drowning deaths are often a result of hypothermia since the victim is unable to turn his back to on-coming waves and spray as he becomes weakened from exposure to cold.
Compound the exposure to cold water and cold air....with the lack of effective airborne SAR capability that now exists in the Gulf Of Mexico and you have a potential for disaster.
Middle of the summer, hot , clear sunny day, flat water, calm winds....immersion in the sea does not present nearly the hazard.
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I don't see anything that says they died from exposure. Apparently the helicopter capsized immediately upon landing, which is pretty much expected in 9-ft seas. From the NTSB report, it's impossible to attribute the deaths to anything. I don't have access to a coroner's report.
Flying single-engine helicopters when the seas are high isn't the brightest idea anyone ever came up with, but it is unfortunately perfectly legal. Some judgement is required.
Flying single-engine helicopters when the seas are high isn't the brightest idea anyone ever came up with, but it is unfortunately perfectly legal. Some judgement is required.
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GLS:
We are in total agreement but who is to exercise the judgement: the FAA; the customer; the operator; or the pilot.
In some States (and in fact in the current ICAO text), the regulation requires a safe-forced-landing to be carried out in the event of an engine failure. European regulations amplifies that by prohibiting (except in some risk assessed circumstances) flight over a hostile environment in singles (a hostile environment includes the surface conditions, protection of the occupants and survival beyond the search and rescue response/capability) - thus the State takes responsibility.
In the absence of action from the FAA (which is unlikely to change) only the last three are options - I would suggest that in the current climate, the pilot should not bear such a burden and it is therefore left to the operator or the customer - both of whom have corporate responsibility for duty of care.
We are in total agreement but who is to exercise the judgement: the FAA; the customer; the operator; or the pilot.
In some States (and in fact in the current ICAO text), the regulation requires a safe-forced-landing to be carried out in the event of an engine failure. European regulations amplifies that by prohibiting (except in some risk assessed circumstances) flight over a hostile environment in singles (a hostile environment includes the surface conditions, protection of the occupants and survival beyond the search and rescue response/capability) - thus the State takes responsibility.
In the absence of action from the FAA (which is unlikely to change) only the last three are options - I would suggest that in the current climate, the pilot should not bear such a burden and it is therefore left to the operator or the customer - both of whom have corporate responsibility for duty of care.
Thread Starter
GLS,
Has any single-engine helicopter flight ever been cancelled due to "sea-state issues"....ever....in the Gulf of Mexico? I am not talking about wind or turbulence or rain but sea state alone?
Can a pilot look at the customer, tell them "NO" and get backing from his company safety, operations, and management?
Do you have first hand information that it ever happened? Do you have any second or third hand knowledge of that ever happening?
You are correct when you say it is legal....I decline to accept the statement that it is a matter of judgement. I would suggest the pursuit of money has put safety well down in priorities in this situation.
Has any single-engine helicopter flight ever been cancelled due to "sea-state issues"....ever....in the Gulf of Mexico? I am not talking about wind or turbulence or rain but sea state alone?
Can a pilot look at the customer, tell them "NO" and get backing from his company safety, operations, and management?
Do you have first hand information that it ever happened? Do you have any second or third hand knowledge of that ever happening?
You are correct when you say it is legal....I decline to accept the statement that it is a matter of judgement. I would suggest the pursuit of money has put safety well down in priorities in this situation.
Thread Starter
How about the other outfits GLS....
What limits does your outfit publish? Does it enforce those policies or is there a blind eye turned towards those who fly beyond that particular set of rules?
Do you agree with my view of the Coast Guard and their general unpreparedness for deep water SAR on a timely basis? If you fly out towards the very southern reaches of the the American side of the GOM....do you have USCG SAR available to you for the entire route or do you have to rely upon commerical non-SAR aircraft to come find you and maybe drop a raft to you? Any hoist equipped civilian SAR aircraft in the GOM that you know of?
What limits does your outfit publish? Does it enforce those policies or is there a blind eye turned towards those who fly beyond that particular set of rules?
Do you agree with my view of the Coast Guard and their general unpreparedness for deep water SAR on a timely basis? If you fly out towards the very southern reaches of the the American side of the GOM....do you have USCG SAR available to you for the entire route or do you have to rely upon commerical non-SAR aircraft to come find you and maybe drop a raft to you? Any hoist equipped civilian SAR aircraft in the GOM that you know of?
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The limits are somewhat flexible, but realistic, and enforced. As for USCG SAR, it is somewhat depressing. They will eventually get there, I think, but they are slow. They do have hoists in their cute little Dolphin helicopters. ;-) They don't have a lot of range, but they can refuel on any of the fuel platforms, and often do. My only real complaint is that it seems to take them a rather long time to get started.
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Sasless
GLS is right, the larger GOM operators do have an adverse weather policy which is rigidly applied to single engine ops. It not only takes into account wind, sea state and temperature but also cloudbase and visibility.
One particular operator has a program of enhanced operational control in adverse weather. Much of this was in existence but was modified and upgraded by the October 2003 accident to a Bell 206L3 which crashed in heavy rain having missed a landing on a Shell platform in the GOM.
In future, I think you will see some of the larger oil companies mandating twin engine IFR capable helicopters instead of singles. Shell, I believe will one of the first to do this.
HH
GLS is right, the larger GOM operators do have an adverse weather policy which is rigidly applied to single engine ops. It not only takes into account wind, sea state and temperature but also cloudbase and visibility.
One particular operator has a program of enhanced operational control in adverse weather. Much of this was in existence but was modified and upgraded by the October 2003 accident to a Bell 206L3 which crashed in heavy rain having missed a landing on a Shell platform in the GOM.
In future, I think you will see some of the larger oil companies mandating twin engine IFR capable helicopters instead of singles. Shell, I believe will one of the first to do this.
HH
Thread Starter
Hippolite,
Does this not turn the GOM operating philosophy upside down if that is so?
The additional level of operational control appears to be the use of a Risk Matrix as I suggested earlier in the thread. It begins to remove the pressure from the pilot in deciding whether to fly or not. We never have a problem with censure if we say "Yes", it is the times we say "No" that seem to get the scrutiny.
At the recent PHPA Safety Seminar, a large oil company representative remarked privately, that whenever that topic was forwarded, it got a very chilly reception by his superiors. The issue in particular was the fact that oil companies operated to completely different standards of safety vis-a-vis IFR Twins vice VFR Single Engine aircraft in different parts of the world. His comment suggested that he personally supported the more complex aircraft and two crew concept but his organization's senior management did not. His comment gave the impression that the almighty dollar was the driving factor and not "safety" itself.
Seeing more twin IFR aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico and the retirement of more single engine aircraft would be an improvement.
Does this not turn the GOM operating philosophy upside down if that is so?
The additional level of operational control appears to be the use of a Risk Matrix as I suggested earlier in the thread. It begins to remove the pressure from the pilot in deciding whether to fly or not. We never have a problem with censure if we say "Yes", it is the times we say "No" that seem to get the scrutiny.
At the recent PHPA Safety Seminar, a large oil company representative remarked privately, that whenever that topic was forwarded, it got a very chilly reception by his superiors. The issue in particular was the fact that oil companies operated to completely different standards of safety vis-a-vis IFR Twins vice VFR Single Engine aircraft in different parts of the world. His comment suggested that he personally supported the more complex aircraft and two crew concept but his organization's senior management did not. His comment gave the impression that the almighty dollar was the driving factor and not "safety" itself.
Seeing more twin IFR aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico and the retirement of more single engine aircraft would be an improvement.
Last edited by SASless; 2nd Mar 2005 at 21:32.
GOM offshore safety.
Isn't that an oxymoron?
Isn't that an oxymoron?
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SASless
As usual, you make some fair points. To say that it turns the philosophy upside down though is to infer that the previous philosophy actually condoned poor safety which is not the case,.
Granted, poor safety may have been the result of poor practices and a lack of operational control. To some extent, this is still the case and will be for some time.
However, one only has to look at the C+ fleet expansion, the start of S-92 operations (even before the much vaunted North Sea) and various orders for EC135s and AB139s to see that things are changing slowly.
In future, there will 2 GOMs, one with new generation IFR twins and one with older single engine aircraft. The problem will still be a lack of FAA oversight and regulation, poor comms (somewhat alleviated by systems like outerlink) no adequate IFR system, unmanned helidecks in an unregulated helideck enviroinment etc etc. Lumped into the second cetgory will be those who have new twin equipment but who choose to operate it Part 91 because they themselves are an oil company and can do it that way.
Comments about oil company executives are to some extent also true and in the world we live in today where results are judged on EBITDA, the pressure will always be there. However at least one senior executive has been transferred from the US GOM to run the aviation side of the whole oil company based in London. This gentleman has begun to see a different picture in terms of safety and has instructed his old GOM counterparts that new light twins will be the requirement in future.
I think that the times may be beginning to change but it takes time to change attitudes in a world driven by shareholder return and little else.
HH
As usual, you make some fair points. To say that it turns the philosophy upside down though is to infer that the previous philosophy actually condoned poor safety which is not the case,.
Granted, poor safety may have been the result of poor practices and a lack of operational control. To some extent, this is still the case and will be for some time.
However, one only has to look at the C+ fleet expansion, the start of S-92 operations (even before the much vaunted North Sea) and various orders for EC135s and AB139s to see that things are changing slowly.
In future, there will 2 GOMs, one with new generation IFR twins and one with older single engine aircraft. The problem will still be a lack of FAA oversight and regulation, poor comms (somewhat alleviated by systems like outerlink) no adequate IFR system, unmanned helidecks in an unregulated helideck enviroinment etc etc. Lumped into the second cetgory will be those who have new twin equipment but who choose to operate it Part 91 because they themselves are an oil company and can do it that way.
Comments about oil company executives are to some extent also true and in the world we live in today where results are judged on EBITDA, the pressure will always be there. However at least one senior executive has been transferred from the US GOM to run the aviation side of the whole oil company based in London. This gentleman has begun to see a different picture in terms of safety and has instructed his old GOM counterparts that new light twins will be the requirement in future.
I think that the times may be beginning to change but it takes time to change attitudes in a world driven by shareholder return and little else.
HH
Thread Starter
The news about Shell and the future of new hi-tech well equipped IFR twins is good news. There exists a safety culture in the GOM, there is no denying that and there are excellent people working to make it better. However, the old attitudes are going to die hard. Compound that with the problems you list and that have been discussed before and we can see that it will not be an easy transition. Cost will certainly be a factor.
In order for the GOM to mature into a highly efficient place to operate these new machines, pressure by the operators, oil companies, and those that ride in the machines , has to be focused upon the government to ensure the IFR infrastructure is provided to ensure safe operations. There is no reason remote radars could not be located throughout the Gulf to facilitate ATC control of the IFR flights, remote comms could be installed as well to facilitate obtaining IFR clearances and controlling air traffic.
Weather reporting continues to be a problem, but then ASOS type automated weather reporting equipment ought to be available as well.
SAR coverage in the form of privately operated dedicated aircraft ought to be initiated. If the Coast Guard cannot provide the service with Government owned aircraft and crews, then they should contract that service out just like the British government does.
All this costs money but it will improve effiecieny and promote a much safer place for the oil companies to operate.
The technology is out there....all we have to do is find a way to pay for it. A thing that plagues the helicopter industry whenever we try to improve the situation.
In order for the GOM to mature into a highly efficient place to operate these new machines, pressure by the operators, oil companies, and those that ride in the machines , has to be focused upon the government to ensure the IFR infrastructure is provided to ensure safe operations. There is no reason remote radars could not be located throughout the Gulf to facilitate ATC control of the IFR flights, remote comms could be installed as well to facilitate obtaining IFR clearances and controlling air traffic.
Weather reporting continues to be a problem, but then ASOS type automated weather reporting equipment ought to be available as well.
SAR coverage in the form of privately operated dedicated aircraft ought to be initiated. If the Coast Guard cannot provide the service with Government owned aircraft and crews, then they should contract that service out just like the British government does.
All this costs money but it will improve effiecieny and promote a much safer place for the oil companies to operate.
The technology is out there....all we have to do is find a way to pay for it. A thing that plagues the helicopter industry whenever we try to improve the situation.
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Water temp info
You can get the water temperature on this website:
http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Maps/WestGulf.shtml
Concerning the Oil companies policy, you already have some (like Total and Agip) prohibiting single engine helicopters for passenger transportation (policy applied everywhere in the world).
http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/Maps/WestGulf.shtml
Concerning the Oil companies policy, you already have some (like Total and Agip) prohibiting single engine helicopters for passenger transportation (policy applied everywhere in the world).