GoM offshore safety
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GoM Safety
SASLess
You hit the nail on the head when you mentioned costs.
Two points:
1. The North Sea Jigsaw system is being paid for by BP, not the UK government.
2. They can afford to: latest annual profits announced by BP something like £9 billion, maybe $17billion. Shell\'s figures much the same.
If anyone still believes an oil company executive when he states that "safety is the first priority", then you're on the wrong planet!!
You hit the nail on the head when you mentioned costs.
Two points:
1. The North Sea Jigsaw system is being paid for by BP, not the UK government.
2. They can afford to: latest annual profits announced by BP something like £9 billion, maybe $17billion. Shell\'s figures much the same.
If anyone still believes an oil company executive when he states that "safety is the first priority", then you're on the wrong planet!!
Thread Starter
Hippolite and GLS....and any other GOMER....
A little birdie told me that the boys in New Little Siberia had a rough sea policy but removed it from the Ops Manual not so long ago.
I assume from previous posts that GLS does not wear the blue and white but is more into earth tones.
Can you two confirm that rumour?
Maybe Gomex can assist in this answer?
A little birdie told me that the boys in New Little Siberia had a rough sea policy but removed it from the Ops Manual not so long ago.
I assume from previous posts that GLS does not wear the blue and white but is more into earth tones.
Can you two confirm that rumour?
Maybe Gomex can assist in this answer?
Given the number of instances where a helicopter inverts and sinks even when fitted with floats has anyone tried a self deploying raft that would deploy in the same way that floats do.
Particularly usefull for light helicopters where the chance of getting a raft out of the cabin are slim.
This would be fitted externally, I suppose to skids?
Mickjoebill
Particularly usefull for light helicopters where the chance of getting a raft out of the cabin are slim.
This would be fitted externally, I suppose to skids?
Mickjoebill
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SaSless
The blue and white did take out 10 foot sea state for fuel planning, but has never had a sea state prohibition for single engine a/c for flight. Their ops manuel prohibits flights in single eng. a/c when winds are 40 kts or greater. I have seen sea states 10 ft. or better in winds around 25 kts. This sea state far exceed the limit that the floats on the a/c are designed for. All the GOM operators fly single eng. a/c in the above weather all winter. There is no reason now, to not have twin engs a/c madated for overwater or hazardous terrain. The equipment is now available, but at a cost the oil companies deeds to be excessive. I am smart enough to know that having another engine is not going to solve all our problems, but is one of many things that needs to be change. One is having SAR equipment available around the gulf, with train crews, on a standby status. The oil companies have work boats and crews standing by for oil spill recoveries, all the oil companies pays for this service. Why can not this SAR service be let out for bids, and all the companies that works in the Gulf pays for this. Just an idea. I really appreciate reading everyone views.
The blue and white did take out 10 foot sea state for fuel planning, but has never had a sea state prohibition for single engine a/c for flight. Their ops manuel prohibits flights in single eng. a/c when winds are 40 kts or greater. I have seen sea states 10 ft. or better in winds around 25 kts. This sea state far exceed the limit that the floats on the a/c are designed for. All the GOM operators fly single eng. a/c in the above weather all winter. There is no reason now, to not have twin engs a/c madated for overwater or hazardous terrain. The equipment is now available, but at a cost the oil companies deeds to be excessive. I am smart enough to know that having another engine is not going to solve all our problems, but is one of many things that needs to be change. One is having SAR equipment available around the gulf, with train crews, on a standby status. The oil companies have work boats and crews standing by for oil spill recoveries, all the oil companies pays for this service. Why can not this SAR service be let out for bids, and all the companies that works in the Gulf pays for this. Just an idea. I really appreciate reading everyone views.
Thread Starter
Who's Listening in the Gulf?
Yo, GOMERS!
Is it true there are no common frequencies assigned to particular sectors of the GOM so that all operators zipping around in that particular sector are all on one unique frequency making landing/departure calls to alert all the other guys (and gals) that are doing their share of the rat killing in that sector?
Someone tried to convince me that each operator uses their own frequency and thus you could have several aircraft in the same small area or field and they are not talking to each other. Is that so?
Surely not....I hope. My alcohol ravaged brain tells me that on the North Sea , the place was divided into sectors and everyone wound up on the same VHF frequency thus allowing for a free flow of information between aircraft. Works magic to keep everyone from close encounters of the unpreferred kind. It was not fool proof but it sure worked better than the free for all I had described to me today.
Gomex, GLS, Hippo...need some help on this one too!
Is it true there are no common frequencies assigned to particular sectors of the GOM so that all operators zipping around in that particular sector are all on one unique frequency making landing/departure calls to alert all the other guys (and gals) that are doing their share of the rat killing in that sector?
Someone tried to convince me that each operator uses their own frequency and thus you could have several aircraft in the same small area or field and they are not talking to each other. Is that so?
Surely not....I hope. My alcohol ravaged brain tells me that on the North Sea , the place was divided into sectors and everyone wound up on the same VHF frequency thus allowing for a free flow of information between aircraft. Works magic to keep everyone from close encounters of the unpreferred kind. It was not fool proof but it sure worked better than the free for all I had described to me today.
Gomex, GLS, Hippo...need some help on this one too!
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Each company has its own frequencies. The HSAC frequency card lists these. There is a common frequency for use when there is a need to talk to a helicopter from another company, but it's not used that often, and nobody monitors it. We have no idea whatsoever what other helicopters flying for other operators may be in the area, or indeed anywhere. The present system makes no sense, but the majors are concerned about smaller operators using their resources, and thus nobody is willing to go to a common flight-following system. It's every man for himself out there, and the flight following ranges from very good to non-existant. There is not, and is not likely to be, any common flight-following frequencies in the GOM unless the FAA does it, and the chances of that are in the lower quartile of the range between slim and none.
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mickjoebill:
It appears that nobody has picked up your point so perhaps I might: it is the policy of some oil companies to move to liferaft installations that provide automatic deployment. In the case where there is a requirement for two liferafts (any FAR 29 certificated aircraft), external attachment will provide a liferaft on each side of the aircraft; in all but a controlled ditching, this raises the possibility that one or other of the liferafts will not be available. Certification (and in some States operational rules) require that on a two liferaft installation the smallest of the two must hold all possible occupants in the overloaded state. There are therefore substantial benefits but there is a down side - i.e. not all incidents/accidents arise from a controlled ditching. Some of the more flexible systems have internal liferafts with external deployment - these are not automatic (but are usually controlled from the cockpit). The benefit, the liferaft can be removed from its fittings and deployed from the best exit. I am not aware of any light helicopter which has automatic deployment.
There is some irony about this discussion on sea state; if one was to examine the SEA STATE CODE that is provided in AC 28.801-1, it can be seen that a sea state of 5 is indicated when the wave heights are 8ft to13ft. Bearing in mind that none but the latest helicopters like the S92 and the EC225 and probably the AB139 are certificated to more than sea state 4 such a sea state for an adverse weather policy (for singles) might be a little liberal. Singles with emergency floats are rarely certificated for ditching (ditching is considered to be a controlled entry into the water) and when the floats are tested it is usually to sea state 1 (about four inches or 10 centimetres) - they are not tested for the entry procedure although it can (probably) be assumed that the floats would stay attached and survive the autorotation. However, remember what was stated in earlier posts - survival of the entry procedure is only half the battle; once out of the helicopter, water temperature, wind effect (leading to breaking waves and sea spray), clothing and the survival equipment all then come into play - the criteria for examination of those - that the survival time exceeds the rescue time (hence the point that SASless is making on SAR).
I’m sure we all welcome the statement of helirider on the policy of Total and Agip; the comments by Hippolite on the future policy of Shell are also noted although his remarks on the GOM
are still difficult to understand in the light of the accident record over the last two years.
It is also not quite clear to me why an oil company which operates for itself under Part 91 would not do so using industry best practice.
It appears that nobody has picked up your point so perhaps I might: it is the policy of some oil companies to move to liferaft installations that provide automatic deployment. In the case where there is a requirement for two liferafts (any FAR 29 certificated aircraft), external attachment will provide a liferaft on each side of the aircraft; in all but a controlled ditching, this raises the possibility that one or other of the liferafts will not be available. Certification (and in some States operational rules) require that on a two liferaft installation the smallest of the two must hold all possible occupants in the overloaded state. There are therefore substantial benefits but there is a down side - i.e. not all incidents/accidents arise from a controlled ditching. Some of the more flexible systems have internal liferafts with external deployment - these are not automatic (but are usually controlled from the cockpit). The benefit, the liferaft can be removed from its fittings and deployed from the best exit. I am not aware of any light helicopter which has automatic deployment.
There is some irony about this discussion on sea state; if one was to examine the SEA STATE CODE that is provided in AC 28.801-1, it can be seen that a sea state of 5 is indicated when the wave heights are 8ft to13ft. Bearing in mind that none but the latest helicopters like the S92 and the EC225 and probably the AB139 are certificated to more than sea state 4 such a sea state for an adverse weather policy (for singles) might be a little liberal. Singles with emergency floats are rarely certificated for ditching (ditching is considered to be a controlled entry into the water) and when the floats are tested it is usually to sea state 1 (about four inches or 10 centimetres) - they are not tested for the entry procedure although it can (probably) be assumed that the floats would stay attached and survive the autorotation. However, remember what was stated in earlier posts - survival of the entry procedure is only half the battle; once out of the helicopter, water temperature, wind effect (leading to breaking waves and sea spray), clothing and the survival equipment all then come into play - the criteria for examination of those - that the survival time exceeds the rescue time (hence the point that SASless is making on SAR).
I’m sure we all welcome the statement of helirider on the policy of Total and Agip; the comments by Hippolite on the future policy of Shell are also noted although his remarks on the GOM
In future, there will 2 GOMs, one with new generation IFR twins and one with older single engine aircraft. The problem will still be a lack of FAA oversight and regulation, poor comms (somewhat alleviated by systems like outerlink) no adequate IFR system, unmanned helidecks in an unregulated helideck environment etc.
Lumped into the second category will be those who have new twin equipment but who choose to operate it Part 91 because they themselves are an oil company and can do it that way.
Last edited by Mars; 7th Mar 2005 at 13:00.
Thread Starter
A couple of stories have gotten to me that highlights the situation as it exists now in the GOM.
The first one was a Jetranger that went down just before dark in moderately rough seas. No airborner SAR around....but a non-SAR civilian helicopter was able to find the survivors who were in the water. The aircraft remained in a hover overhead as a workboat arrived....and remained overhead to assist when the workboat crew could not see the survivors lifejacket lights from as close as ten feet due to the spray and sea state.
That suggests the use of standard life jacket lights is inadequate....why not use military style strobe lights and use reflective tape on the jackets.
The other was a crash of a Jetranger very close to the shore but in 40 knot winds. It occurred due to an engine failure very shortly after takeoff and just after the aircraft turned downwind. The pilot was unable to get turned into wind and thus the aircraft landed hard, removing the floats in the process. Everyone got out but the front seat passenger and the pilot were unable to get to the raft. The rear seat passengers got into the raft. Within just a few minutes two aircraft were overhead....neither were SAR aircraft. One dropped a liferaft to see it blow away downwind from the two swimmers....the second aircraft had an oil company employee aboard who jumped into the sea with a liferaft. (Hats Off! to him!). The pilot in the water was seen trying to make it to that raft but died due to a heart attack.
Again...no SAR....and this time...no workboat.
Now lets consider the fact.....with the companies operating on private radio frequencies....you could be in the area thus able to help in a search effort but you would know nothing about it in all likelihood.
It seems to me....there is some improvement needed to that situation down there...and some of them can be done at very little costs to anyone.
Let me guess....do the Jetrangers and other single engine aircraft have but one VHF radio as well....thus the need to stay on the company radio for flight following reasons?
I also heard that only a few aircraft have automatic location tracking equipment....customer demand drives that and must be paid for by the customer before it gets installed? I would imagine that would be a great sales pitch that would make one operator much more attractive than another if it were to be installed fleet-wide.
The first one was a Jetranger that went down just before dark in moderately rough seas. No airborner SAR around....but a non-SAR civilian helicopter was able to find the survivors who were in the water. The aircraft remained in a hover overhead as a workboat arrived....and remained overhead to assist when the workboat crew could not see the survivors lifejacket lights from as close as ten feet due to the spray and sea state.
That suggests the use of standard life jacket lights is inadequate....why not use military style strobe lights and use reflective tape on the jackets.
The other was a crash of a Jetranger very close to the shore but in 40 knot winds. It occurred due to an engine failure very shortly after takeoff and just after the aircraft turned downwind. The pilot was unable to get turned into wind and thus the aircraft landed hard, removing the floats in the process. Everyone got out but the front seat passenger and the pilot were unable to get to the raft. The rear seat passengers got into the raft. Within just a few minutes two aircraft were overhead....neither were SAR aircraft. One dropped a liferaft to see it blow away downwind from the two swimmers....the second aircraft had an oil company employee aboard who jumped into the sea with a liferaft. (Hats Off! to him!). The pilot in the water was seen trying to make it to that raft but died due to a heart attack.
Again...no SAR....and this time...no workboat.
Now lets consider the fact.....with the companies operating on private radio frequencies....you could be in the area thus able to help in a search effort but you would know nothing about it in all likelihood.
It seems to me....there is some improvement needed to that situation down there...and some of them can be done at very little costs to anyone.
Let me guess....do the Jetrangers and other single engine aircraft have but one VHF radio as well....thus the need to stay on the company radio for flight following reasons?
I also heard that only a few aircraft have automatic location tracking equipment....customer demand drives that and must be paid for by the customer before it gets installed? I would imagine that would be a great sales pitch that would make one operator much more attractive than another if it were to be installed fleet-wide.
Thread Starter
NTSB Identification: DFW05LA074
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Friday, February 18, 2005 in Cameron, LA
Aircraft: Bell 206L-3, registration: N512RA
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On February 18, 2005, approximately 1030 central standard time, a Bell 206L-3 helicopter, N512RA, owned and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company, LLC, of Broussard, Louisiana, experienced a reported loss of engine power and subsequent autorotation during takeoff from HIA382F, a heliport located in the Gulf of Mexico, near Cameron, Louisiana. The airline transport rated pilot and two passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the passenger flight, which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.
In a written statement, the 14,490-hour airline transport rated pilot reported that as he prepared for takeoff from HIA382F, "rotor revolutions per minute (RPM) was increased to 100%, caution panel and instruments were checked, and everything appeared normal." During the initial hover on the platform, the pilot did not notice any abnormalities and he took off into the wind. He reported that as he cleared the deck, "he heard the rpm start to decrease and observed the rotor rpm passing through 90%." The pilot then lowered the collective to recover rpm and verified that the throttle was full open. The rpm appeared to stabilize momentarily, and in an attempt to make it back to the platform, the pilot initiated a right turn. It was immediately obvious to the pilot that the rpm was decreasing, so he "turned back into the wind, entered autorotation, and deployed the floats in anticipation of water landing."
According to the pilot, the seas were high, and upon contact with the water, the helicopter filled with water. The pilot was not able to open his door immediately, but after some delay, he was able to exit through the left front passenger door. At this time, he realized that the helicopter was inverted in the water. The two passengers had exited the helicopter and were located on top of the inverted helicopter. The pilot and passengers were rescued by a boat approximately one hour later.
On February 23, 2005, under the supervision of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, representatives from Rolls Royce and Bell Helicopter examined the helicopter. The examination revealed that the fuel nozzle screen had collapsed and was covered in a "slimy substance." Further tests will be conducted to determine the components of the substance. Additionally, there was impact damage to the tail boom and a rotor blade.
At 1053, the automated weather observing system at the Lake Charles Regional Airport (LCH), located approximately 21 miles to the north, reported wind from 070 degrees at 10 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, a clear sky, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 33 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure setting of 30.38 inches of Mercury.
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Friday, February 18, 2005 in Cameron, LA
Aircraft: Bell 206L-3, registration: N512RA
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On February 18, 2005, approximately 1030 central standard time, a Bell 206L-3 helicopter, N512RA, owned and operated by Rotorcraft Leasing Company, LLC, of Broussard, Louisiana, experienced a reported loss of engine power and subsequent autorotation during takeoff from HIA382F, a heliport located in the Gulf of Mexico, near Cameron, Louisiana. The airline transport rated pilot and two passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the passenger flight, which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.
In a written statement, the 14,490-hour airline transport rated pilot reported that as he prepared for takeoff from HIA382F, "rotor revolutions per minute (RPM) was increased to 100%, caution panel and instruments were checked, and everything appeared normal." During the initial hover on the platform, the pilot did not notice any abnormalities and he took off into the wind. He reported that as he cleared the deck, "he heard the rpm start to decrease and observed the rotor rpm passing through 90%." The pilot then lowered the collective to recover rpm and verified that the throttle was full open. The rpm appeared to stabilize momentarily, and in an attempt to make it back to the platform, the pilot initiated a right turn. It was immediately obvious to the pilot that the rpm was decreasing, so he "turned back into the wind, entered autorotation, and deployed the floats in anticipation of water landing."
According to the pilot, the seas were high, and upon contact with the water, the helicopter filled with water. The pilot was not able to open his door immediately, but after some delay, he was able to exit through the left front passenger door. At this time, he realized that the helicopter was inverted in the water. The two passengers had exited the helicopter and were located on top of the inverted helicopter. The pilot and passengers were rescued by a boat approximately one hour later.
On February 23, 2005, under the supervision of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, representatives from Rolls Royce and Bell Helicopter examined the helicopter. The examination revealed that the fuel nozzle screen had collapsed and was covered in a "slimy substance." Further tests will be conducted to determine the components of the substance. Additionally, there was impact damage to the tail boom and a rotor blade.
At 1053, the automated weather observing system at the Lake Charles Regional Airport (LCH), located approximately 21 miles to the north, reported wind from 070 degrees at 10 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, a clear sky, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 33 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure setting of 30.38 inches of Mercury.
One thing to bear in mind with the concept of automatically deploying liferafts; unlike floats, which are tested and certificated against inadvertent inflation in forward flight, the consequences of inadvertent liferaft deployment are not worth thinking about.
On my current type, the liferafts are externally mounted in conformal pods below the main cabin entrance. If one inflated in flight it would go through the disc, and that would be that.
Also, if the deployed on initial impact, while the aircraft was still running and possibly 'bobbing' about in rough seas, there is a good chance they would be destroyed.
Having said that, if manufacturers are going to put them on the outside, they ought to give the crew a means of deploying them from the cockpit, rather than from the outside! No names, no pack drill!!
On my current type, the liferafts are externally mounted in conformal pods below the main cabin entrance. If one inflated in flight it would go through the disc, and that would be that.
Also, if the deployed on initial impact, while the aircraft was still running and possibly 'bobbing' about in rough seas, there is a good chance they would be destroyed.
Having said that, if manufacturers are going to put them on the outside, they ought to give the crew a means of deploying them from the cockpit, rather than from the outside! No names, no pack drill!!
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It should be noted that 'near Cameron' is a relative term. HI A382F is actually 117NM from Cameron, and 138NM from Lake Charles. The weather report is meaningless. There are actually part-time weather stations in the GOM much closer than that, but they don't make regular observations, and thus useless for accident investigations most of the time.
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Mars
I take your point about the terrible accident record over the last 2 years...but maybe, just maybe, those accidents are starting to have an effect, certainly on the majors. That October 2003 accident to a PHI Bell 206L3 in bad weather did really shake them up and will continue to have ramifications.
Shell are now mandating that their twins (S76A++ and Bell 412s) are actually flown and even loaded to take into account some single engine accountability which in itself is a major step forward. Before it was just "fill em up and haul ass" operations. PHI has built or is building new rejected take off areas at some of its bases, agian, some improvement over what happened before.
My point about oil companies is valid. Chevron operates its own fleet as Part 91 and uses different standards for its own ops than it does when it flies for another customer under Part 135. Same operator using different standards in the same place.
Some of the singles do have the Apical float system which has rafts contained in the center float bag. It is inflated by the pilot by pulling on a lanyard and is attached to the aircraft until cut loose.
SASless
Correct on the frequencies, unbelievable in this day and age that 600 aircraft fly around the GoMex without really talking to each other. Although I don't want to sound like an advert for PHI
(I don't work for any of the GoMex operators) they at least have probably got the best flight following system in the GoM and also a rigid adverse weather policy applied under the guise of enhanced operational control.
Overall, if I were a Gomer, I would be using my union not to increase my pay but to improve equipement fit and to demand operational policies that better ensured a successful outcome in the event of a ditching.
I take your point about the terrible accident record over the last 2 years...but maybe, just maybe, those accidents are starting to have an effect, certainly on the majors. That October 2003 accident to a PHI Bell 206L3 in bad weather did really shake them up and will continue to have ramifications.
Shell are now mandating that their twins (S76A++ and Bell 412s) are actually flown and even loaded to take into account some single engine accountability which in itself is a major step forward. Before it was just "fill em up and haul ass" operations. PHI has built or is building new rejected take off areas at some of its bases, agian, some improvement over what happened before.
My point about oil companies is valid. Chevron operates its own fleet as Part 91 and uses different standards for its own ops than it does when it flies for another customer under Part 135. Same operator using different standards in the same place.
Some of the singles do have the Apical float system which has rafts contained in the center float bag. It is inflated by the pilot by pulling on a lanyard and is attached to the aircraft until cut loose.
SASless
Correct on the frequencies, unbelievable in this day and age that 600 aircraft fly around the GoMex without really talking to each other. Although I don't want to sound like an advert for PHI
(I don't work for any of the GoMex operators) they at least have probably got the best flight following system in the GoM and also a rigid adverse weather policy applied under the guise of enhanced operational control.
Overall, if I were a Gomer, I would be using my union not to increase my pay but to improve equipement fit and to demand operational policies that better ensured a successful outcome in the event of a ditching.
Helicopter crashes in Gulf; injured pilot rescued
3/13/2005, 12:49 p.m. CT
FOURCHON, La. The Coast Guard says a helicopter crashed this morning (Sunday) in the Gulf of Mexico, injuring the pilot.
Petty Officer Kyle Niemi (nee-mee) says the pilot was the only person on the helicopter.
He says the crew of a nearby supply vessel pulled the pilot out of the water and called the Coast Guard, which sent a helicopter to take the pilot from the supply boat "Chauntsie G" to Houma-Terrebonne General Hospital.
Niemi does not know the pilot's name, the extent of his injuries, or the cause or time of the crash.
3/13/2005, 12:49 p.m. CT
FOURCHON, La. The Coast Guard says a helicopter crashed this morning (Sunday) in the Gulf of Mexico, injuring the pilot.
Petty Officer Kyle Niemi (nee-mee) says the pilot was the only person on the helicopter.
He says the crew of a nearby supply vessel pulled the pilot out of the water and called the Coast Guard, which sent a helicopter to take the pilot from the supply boat "Chauntsie G" to Houma-Terrebonne General Hospital.
Niemi does not know the pilot's name, the extent of his injuries, or the cause or time of the crash.
Thread Starter
A second article about the crash...the aircraft was a Bell 407 belonging to Rotorcraft Leasing. No other details known. Again a case of non-SAR vessels pulling survivors from the water after a single engine aircraft crashes.
FOURCHON, La. An offshore service helicopter crashed Sunday morning in the Gulf of Mexico, injuring the pilot.
The Coast Guard says crews of nearby boats found and rescued 35-year-old Carl O'Donnell, the only person aboard. Petty Officer Kyle Niemi (nee-mee) says O'Donnell was was in stable condition with shock, cuts on his face, and possible head and spine injuries.
He said O'Donnell made an emergency call with his location about 8 a-m, before he crashed.
That let the Coast Guard send a helicopter straight to him while making marine broadcasts to ask all vessels in the area to look for the pilot.
Niemi says the crew of the crewboat "Mr. Stephen" located the pilot about 70 miles south of Fourchon (foo-shonh), the crew of the supply boat "Chauntsie G." pulled him out, and the helicopter crew got him to Terrebonne General Medical Center.
Niemi said investigators don't know what caused the crash.
FOURCHON, La. An offshore service helicopter crashed Sunday morning in the Gulf of Mexico, injuring the pilot.
The Coast Guard says crews of nearby boats found and rescued 35-year-old Carl O'Donnell, the only person aboard. Petty Officer Kyle Niemi (nee-mee) says O'Donnell was was in stable condition with shock, cuts on his face, and possible head and spine injuries.
He said O'Donnell made an emergency call with his location about 8 a-m, before he crashed.
That let the Coast Guard send a helicopter straight to him while making marine broadcasts to ask all vessels in the area to look for the pilot.
Niemi says the crew of the crewboat "Mr. Stephen" located the pilot about 70 miles south of Fourchon (foo-shonh), the crew of the supply boat "Chauntsie G." pulled him out, and the helicopter crew got him to Terrebonne General Medical Center.
Niemi said investigators don't know what caused the crash.
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Rotorcraft Leasing do not seem to be having a very good run at the moment.
That's at least 2 aircraft lost in one month (or 2 months)
Thier insurance must be going through the roof at the moment.
They might have to raise their rates to compensate then they won't be so cheap anymore and will lose work.
Since thier whole method of operating has relied on providing a cheap service, I guess the oil companies who use them are getting what they pay for. Buy cheap, buy twice!
HH
That's at least 2 aircraft lost in one month (or 2 months)
Thier insurance must be going through the roof at the moment.
They might have to raise their rates to compensate then they won't be so cheap anymore and will lose work.
Since thier whole method of operating has relied on providing a cheap service, I guess the oil companies who use them are getting what they pay for. Buy cheap, buy twice!
HH
Thread Starter
Air Log loses another 206...no injuries/deaths
Engine failure of some sort put another Jetranger into the water a few days ago. Pilot did an excellent job of the forced landing...a non-SAR trained shrimp fishing boat efffected the resuce in 35 knot winds and damaged the aircraft with a net boom....aircraft overturned and sank. The pilot was taken aboard the shrimp boat and the search continues for the missing helicopter wreckage.
Thread Starter
Now come on guys....Bubba Gump Search, Rescue, and Shrimp company does a reasonable job. The got the pilot out of the water and sank the aircraft....saved a life and made it easy for the helicopter company.
What you expect out of the Gulf....professionally trained, equipped SAR helicopters to come fetch you out of the water?
Question.......has the Coast Guard done a SAR mission that resulted in the recovery of survivors by helicopter in the Gulf of Mexico following a downed helicopter event? Ever?
If they are not able to respond in a reasonable time....is there any SAR equipped and trained helicopter(s) to do that mission in the Gulf of Mexico?
If the answer to both questions is "NO".....why is that acceptable to the oil companies and operators in the Gulf of Mexico? If the answer is "NO" to both questions....this might as well be West Africa or someplace off the Atlantic coast of Africa.
What you expect out of the Gulf....professionally trained, equipped SAR helicopters to come fetch you out of the water?
Question.......has the Coast Guard done a SAR mission that resulted in the recovery of survivors by helicopter in the Gulf of Mexico following a downed helicopter event? Ever?
If they are not able to respond in a reasonable time....is there any SAR equipped and trained helicopter(s) to do that mission in the Gulf of Mexico?
If the answer to both questions is "NO".....why is that acceptable to the oil companies and operators in the Gulf of Mexico? If the answer is "NO" to both questions....this might as well be West Africa or someplace off the Atlantic coast of Africa.
Thread Starter
2003 HSAC Stats published in Feb '04
HSAC Members: February 23, 2004
Please find attached the Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC) "2003 Gulf of Mexico Offshore Helicopter Operations and Safety Review". The membership support and response from 22 helicopter operators for this review is not only appreciated, but vital in establishing a meaningful report. Continued support is encouraged for the future.
The 2003 Gulf of Mexico oil industry helicopter accident rate per 100,000 flight hours was 3.93 with a total of 15 accidents (all single engine) compared to a 20-year annual average accident rate of 1.83 with a total of 9.1 accidents/year. The fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours during 2003 was 1.84 with a total of 7 fatal accidents compared to a 20-year average of 0.63 with a total of 2.7 fatal accidents/year.
This was the worst overall accident record in the 20 years since we began gathering data, with the highest number of fatal events (7) and total fatalities (12), and second highest number of total accidents (15). The 7 fatal accidents were caused by: 2 each engine and controlled flight into water; 1 each loss of control, helideck obstacle strike, loss of passenger control.
During 2003, improper pilot procedures accounted for 11 (73%) of the 15 accidents. 3 each of these were due to controlled flight into terrain or water, loss of control of the helicopter, and obstacle strikes. 1 each due to cargo falling out of the baggage bay and striking the tail rotor, and a strike to another helicopter.
In the last 5 years, there have been 47 accidents of which 14 were fatal (30%), resulting in 19 fatalities and 42 injuries. 25 (53%) of these accidents were due to pilot procedure related causes and 13 (28%) were due to technical fault. It should be noted that other than engines, the only technical causes of accidents were tail rotor failures. The specific leading causes of accidents in the last 5 years have been:
(19%) engine related - with 4 fatalities
(19 %) loss of control or improper procedure with 1 fatality
(11%) helideck obstacle strikes with 5 fatalities
(11%) controlled flight into terrain or water - 3 occurred at night - with 5 fatalities
(9%) tail rotor failures
(6%) fuel quality control
(6%) loose cargo striking tail rotor
(6%) passenger control with 2 fatalities
We are optimistic that by sharing this information with all operators and other oil industry group's, safety initiatives may be developed to reduce accidents and incidents.
Please find attached the Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC) "2003 Gulf of Mexico Offshore Helicopter Operations and Safety Review". The membership support and response from 22 helicopter operators for this review is not only appreciated, but vital in establishing a meaningful report. Continued support is encouraged for the future.
The 2003 Gulf of Mexico oil industry helicopter accident rate per 100,000 flight hours was 3.93 with a total of 15 accidents (all single engine) compared to a 20-year annual average accident rate of 1.83 with a total of 9.1 accidents/year. The fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours during 2003 was 1.84 with a total of 7 fatal accidents compared to a 20-year average of 0.63 with a total of 2.7 fatal accidents/year.
This was the worst overall accident record in the 20 years since we began gathering data, with the highest number of fatal events (7) and total fatalities (12), and second highest number of total accidents (15). The 7 fatal accidents were caused by: 2 each engine and controlled flight into water; 1 each loss of control, helideck obstacle strike, loss of passenger control.
During 2003, improper pilot procedures accounted for 11 (73%) of the 15 accidents. 3 each of these were due to controlled flight into terrain or water, loss of control of the helicopter, and obstacle strikes. 1 each due to cargo falling out of the baggage bay and striking the tail rotor, and a strike to another helicopter.
In the last 5 years, there have been 47 accidents of which 14 were fatal (30%), resulting in 19 fatalities and 42 injuries. 25 (53%) of these accidents were due to pilot procedure related causes and 13 (28%) were due to technical fault. It should be noted that other than engines, the only technical causes of accidents were tail rotor failures. The specific leading causes of accidents in the last 5 years have been:
(19%) engine related - with 4 fatalities
(19 %) loss of control or improper procedure with 1 fatality
(11%) helideck obstacle strikes with 5 fatalities
(11%) controlled flight into terrain or water - 3 occurred at night - with 5 fatalities
(9%) tail rotor failures
(6%) fuel quality control
(6%) loose cargo striking tail rotor
(6%) passenger control with 2 fatalities
We are optimistic that by sharing this information with all operators and other oil industry group's, safety initiatives may be developed to reduce accidents and incidents.