Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations
I too think that aspects of this thread can be moved to another one.
Red and White said about the 139:
That is exactly the point I have been making on the other threads (are you there FLI?) about the CAT A issues. When are we going to get spending on that which kills us most????????????
Much of the discussion above has mentioned rig positions and moving rigs as a danger. I am assuming the concern here is if the aircraft does not have radar, or am I missing something? How many accidents have occurred with CFI unseen rigs V CFIT? Is it a biggie?
I am thinking the AVAD V EGPWS issues are generating the right kind of focus for us - CFIT. I have another suggestion that is not fixed wing orientated:
Why don’t we have a radar altitude hold function for these machines (particularly off shore)? You might be able to achieve it without the full four axis autopilot by not going through to the full hover capability, let’s say limited to min IFR speed.
What if the radar alt hold function was pre-selectable and predetermined? Imagine setting a "hard deck" of say 200ft Radar Alt by arming the system. Then as the helicopter descends through that figure the collective automatically attempts to level the aircraft by holding current airspeed and turning to heading bug(with pitch/roll/yaw autopilot functions ).
Bitchin Betty would feature by automatically calling radar altitudes from 1000 ft by saying (preferably with a Swedish accent) "passing 1000 ft AGL". Then next call at 500 and every 100 from there. For terrain flight across ridges where this might get rather annoying, there is a mute ability, and even a clever algorithm that prevents the same height, or an increasing height being called within a certain time period.
You could even use the hold system during a step down, by leaving it set at say 500 ft, then if you want to go through this and poke around below that (aka the S76 GOM splash), reset the system to say 200ft and arm, then 100 ft, etc. A big caution light tells you it is not armed.
To overcome the system if it activated during an approach when you forgot it was on, you would simply depress the collective AND cyclic trim switches. It may even prompt you to disable it when you put the gear down....lots of possibilities.
Why don’t we also point another radar altimeter slightly forward to provide earlier recognition of rising terrain? Lots of possibilities if we could spend the money on these sorts of devices and not unnecessary fuel burns and drive train weights hauling around protection from a far lesser evil – engine failure.
Red and White said about the 139:
Here is an aircraft that has staggering performance for which someone pays handsomely, buy very little to help stop us flying it into the water on a inky night.
Much of the discussion above has mentioned rig positions and moving rigs as a danger. I am assuming the concern here is if the aircraft does not have radar, or am I missing something? How many accidents have occurred with CFI unseen rigs V CFIT? Is it a biggie?
I am thinking the AVAD V EGPWS issues are generating the right kind of focus for us - CFIT. I have another suggestion that is not fixed wing orientated:
Why don’t we have a radar altitude hold function for these machines (particularly off shore)? You might be able to achieve it without the full four axis autopilot by not going through to the full hover capability, let’s say limited to min IFR speed.
What if the radar alt hold function was pre-selectable and predetermined? Imagine setting a "hard deck" of say 200ft Radar Alt by arming the system. Then as the helicopter descends through that figure the collective automatically attempts to level the aircraft by holding current airspeed and turning to heading bug(with pitch/roll/yaw autopilot functions ).
Bitchin Betty would feature by automatically calling radar altitudes from 1000 ft by saying (preferably with a Swedish accent) "passing 1000 ft AGL". Then next call at 500 and every 100 from there. For terrain flight across ridges where this might get rather annoying, there is a mute ability, and even a clever algorithm that prevents the same height, or an increasing height being called within a certain time period.
You could even use the hold system during a step down, by leaving it set at say 500 ft, then if you want to go through this and poke around below that (aka the S76 GOM splash), reset the system to say 200ft and arm, then 100 ft, etc. A big caution light tells you it is not armed.
To overcome the system if it activated during an approach when you forgot it was on, you would simply depress the collective AND cyclic trim switches. It may even prompt you to disable it when you put the gear down....lots of possibilities.
Why don’t we also point another radar altimeter slightly forward to provide earlier recognition of rising terrain? Lots of possibilities if we could spend the money on these sorts of devices and not unnecessary fuel burns and drive train weights hauling around protection from a far lesser evil – engine failure.
I've flown EGPWS both offshore and onshore. Onshore its the bees knees, whether you are IFR solid wondering where you are going to autorotate to if the driveshaft lets go, or stooging up a valley in fog and rain looking for a low pass to the next valley. Worth their weight in gold, best thing I've seen in helicopters since celphones and TCAD.
Offshore its a little ho hum - the hope is that it will save the poor souls that seem to have missed everything else like Charron pointed out. Sometimes it makes up (in a really expensive way) for those aircraft that don't have any kind of a moving map display. To save that expense there is even the Garmin TAWS option that in some ways is superior to the Honeywell XXII system commonly found in new helicopters. The problem with the EGPWS offshore is the obstacle database that is nonexistent in many parts of the world, and there seems to be no set mechanism for confirming that it is up to date.
I disagree that the radar will identify all obstacles. Think heavy monsoon and a letdown in some crowded field, where you're coming down to 200' and trolling for a rig. An EGPWS that identifies obstacles works exactly the same as a Garmin map display that has the rigs entered as waypoints. Perhaps someone can comment on the obstacle database in the Garmins because I haven't seen one yet.
I'm waiting for 212man to post a picture of his S92 panel with the userwaypoints displayed on his map screen, and with an ARA approach routing on it as well. Is it "truly superb" compared to poor Geoffincornwall's boat GPS in his Dauphin, or does it hold a candle to the Garmin 530 equipped C+ models? Curious minds want to know, and the sceptics need a photo. After all, surely most conventional types I've looked at lately seem to have some pretty impressive map displays. We know the S92 has to be better than the AW139 - GIC had it pegged right that a business jet navigation suite is going to be a rough fit to a helicopter - so lets look at something really comparable.
Offshore its a little ho hum - the hope is that it will save the poor souls that seem to have missed everything else like Charron pointed out. Sometimes it makes up (in a really expensive way) for those aircraft that don't have any kind of a moving map display. To save that expense there is even the Garmin TAWS option that in some ways is superior to the Honeywell XXII system commonly found in new helicopters. The problem with the EGPWS offshore is the obstacle database that is nonexistent in many parts of the world, and there seems to be no set mechanism for confirming that it is up to date.
I disagree that the radar will identify all obstacles. Think heavy monsoon and a letdown in some crowded field, where you're coming down to 200' and trolling for a rig. An EGPWS that identifies obstacles works exactly the same as a Garmin map display that has the rigs entered as waypoints. Perhaps someone can comment on the obstacle database in the Garmins because I haven't seen one yet.
I'm waiting for 212man to post a picture of his S92 panel with the userwaypoints displayed on his map screen, and with an ARA approach routing on it as well. Is it "truly superb" compared to poor Geoffincornwall's boat GPS in his Dauphin, or does it hold a candle to the Garmin 530 equipped C+ models? Curious minds want to know, and the sceptics need a photo. After all, surely most conventional types I've looked at lately seem to have some pretty impressive map displays. We know the S92 has to be better than the AW139 - GIC had it pegged right that a business jet navigation suite is going to be a rough fit to a helicopter - so lets look at something really comparable.
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Cat A etc.
Helmet Fire
I wish people would understand the realities of Cat A/Class1/Class 2(e) et al.
Here is an aircraft that has staggering performance for which someone pays handsomely, buy very little to help stop us flying it into the water on a inky night.
That is exactly the point I have been making on the other threads (are you there FLI?) about the CAT A issues. When are we going to get spending on that which kills us most????????????
We have been 'reverse-engineered' into the focus on these performance related issue by the legislation. In pre-sim days it was difficult to explain to the studes why we spent two thirds of a proficiency check dealing with single-engine issues but the bottom line was that this is what the law required us to do. Was this frustrating when you were operating from a 3000 ft + runway then chucking the Cat A book out the window as soon as you you crossed the coast? - you bet. Thank goodness the simulators arrived and - in the right hands - this fantastic tool opened our eyes to what things may be like if we were abe to rethink prof-checks and add more LOFT. The rules don't go away but now we have a way of dealing with it that is more in line with the threat. All you need is a Sim (or capable STD/FTD), an enlightened operator or customer (to pay) and training staff that know and understand that a sim is NOT an instrument of torture.
Quote
Much of the discussion above has mentioned rig positions and moving rigs as a danger. I am assuming the concern here is if the aircraft does not have radar, or am I missing something? How many accidents have occurred with CFI unseen rigs V CFIT? Is it a biggie?
I think Malabo's post goes some way to answer that but the question really begins like this - "Can the EGPWS work offshore with no database of obstructions in the operating area?" if the answer is "No" then we have to ask "How accurate does this database have to be to be viable, practical to use and practical to manage?" We must now defer to the experts but for us end users we obviously want perfection but, like everything alse that comes our way (seats, stab systems, wipers, lighting, doors etc) we can learn to live with something less.
Why don’t we have a radar altitude hold function for these machines (particularly off shore)?
Our 76Bs were fitted with the DDAFCS that delivered a fully coupled four-axis system with a good rad-alt hold. It wasn't perfect because you could get yourself into a bit of a scrape if you tried to accelerate too hard between platforms. Power demands could suddenly put you into an overtorque. Nonetheless this was a GREAT system. You coud do the entire flight from 100 ft on departure fully coupled and, with practice, put the machine on short finals before 'decoupling'. Between platforms on a busy shuttle you could take the pressure off for a little while by plugging in the rad alt hold and let those inner tensions go. This helped to pace your periods of intense concentration.
The kit is out there, you just need enlightened customers or ops directors to shell out for it (sorry about the pun)
G
I wish people would understand the realities of Cat A/Class1/Class 2(e) et al.
Here is an aircraft that has staggering performance for which someone pays handsomely, buy very little to help stop us flying it into the water on a inky night.
That is exactly the point I have been making on the other threads (are you there FLI?) about the CAT A issues. When are we going to get spending on that which kills us most????????????
We have been 'reverse-engineered' into the focus on these performance related issue by the legislation. In pre-sim days it was difficult to explain to the studes why we spent two thirds of a proficiency check dealing with single-engine issues but the bottom line was that this is what the law required us to do. Was this frustrating when you were operating from a 3000 ft + runway then chucking the Cat A book out the window as soon as you you crossed the coast? - you bet. Thank goodness the simulators arrived and - in the right hands - this fantastic tool opened our eyes to what things may be like if we were abe to rethink prof-checks and add more LOFT. The rules don't go away but now we have a way of dealing with it that is more in line with the threat. All you need is a Sim (or capable STD/FTD), an enlightened operator or customer (to pay) and training staff that know and understand that a sim is NOT an instrument of torture.
Quote
Much of the discussion above has mentioned rig positions and moving rigs as a danger. I am assuming the concern here is if the aircraft does not have radar, or am I missing something? How many accidents have occurred with CFI unseen rigs V CFIT? Is it a biggie?
I think Malabo's post goes some way to answer that but the question really begins like this - "Can the EGPWS work offshore with no database of obstructions in the operating area?" if the answer is "No" then we have to ask "How accurate does this database have to be to be viable, practical to use and practical to manage?" We must now defer to the experts but for us end users we obviously want perfection but, like everything alse that comes our way (seats, stab systems, wipers, lighting, doors etc) we can learn to live with something less.
Why don’t we have a radar altitude hold function for these machines (particularly off shore)?
Our 76Bs were fitted with the DDAFCS that delivered a fully coupled four-axis system with a good rad-alt hold. It wasn't perfect because you could get yourself into a bit of a scrape if you tried to accelerate too hard between platforms. Power demands could suddenly put you into an overtorque. Nonetheless this was a GREAT system. You coud do the entire flight from 100 ft on departure fully coupled and, with practice, put the machine on short finals before 'decoupling'. Between platforms on a busy shuttle you could take the pressure off for a little while by plugging in the rad alt hold and let those inner tensions go. This helped to pace your periods of intense concentration.
The kit is out there, you just need enlightened customers or ops directors to shell out for it (sorry about the pun)
G
Helmet,
Yes, you are missing something. The whole point about the 'enhanced' function is that it has to have all obstacles mapped - without that this part of the EGPWS itself becomes a hazard for offshore operations. Anyone who has operated offshore will know that mobiles can arrive with little notice, when used as accommodation they can pull off to the standby position in bad weather, large derrick barges (some of them with a vertrical extent of 500ft) move around the patch during construction phases and ships are constantly moving in and out of the area.
There have been proposals for compulsory registration of vessel movement but it really is a non-starter. Operator entry of positions into a data-base is frought with danger and will never be accepted by the regulator let alone pass the Risk Assessment process.
Yes, most helicopters, which operate IFR offshore, do carry radar and it is used to map the obstacle environment for the ARA. When this is used in conjunction with SBAS or GBAS systems (or whatever area nav system you are using at present), it can provide obstacle free approach sectors.
The other fact that must not be ignored is that the landing site that you are approaching, sits (on a high number of occasions) on the highest obstacle in the area. For those reasons the 'enhanced function' should not be used for obstacle avoidance until and unless it can be further enhanced with a dynamic obstacle mapping function - preferably more advanced than the weather radar and certificated for purpose. If use of the 'enhanced' function is set aside for offshore operations (as it should be until we solve the above problems), we are left with the GPWS elements.
Without - for the time being - resurrecting the discussion on the specific purpose of the Modes which was covered extremely well by Nick and Helicomparitor (what a pity those two can't work together), it occurs to me that the GPWS could be improved if tailored for offshore operations. As anyone who has read the technical description will confirm, reading the description of the Modes takes a great deal of time and concentration because it is lacking in the basic description of the 'protection scenarios' (not my phrase but one that has been used by the RTCA HTAWS working group); thus we have not only to understand the function/purpose off the Modes but apply them to (in the case being discussed) offshore operations.
That the radalt/AVAD combination has worked (reasonably well) for so long results from the less complex obstacle environment offshore and the presence of the weather radar. The offshore environment - at least in those areas in which I have operated - has an obstacle vertical limit of 500ft and a level floor; consequently there is no danger of rising or a falling surface and no obstacles above that height.
The manufacturer's preset height is set to 100ft; this is well thought out because descents to within 100ft of the sea is an unusual occurrence with the heights of platforms in, for example, the North Sea. This means that it can be used as a safety net call which results in some action by the crew. (The problem with such a simplistic system is that the 'call' occurs on every approach to a runway/heliport which might be regarded as a nuisance.) It can also cause a problem when fitted on a SAR machine which operate routinely at those heights; however, I am told there is a muting function for those.
That means that I can add another element to offshore operations; although the floor is sea level, the helicopter never descends to that height (unlike onshore operations). Does this affect the logic of the EGPWS - probably not but the switching from takeoff to approach mode does use a combination of height and speed (and other parameters) so it needs to be considered.
The helicopter also takes off and lands above the floor. Does this have an effect, well I'm not sure but I do know that at least one type that I have flown (still in use) the power is limited to the extent that a take-off manoeuvre could (in low winds) result in a descent below the takeoff site while accelerating to Vy; the same might occur if a go-around is initiated for any reason. Does this have an effect; once again I am not sure but would like to know because such manoeuvres are often conducted at night.
I therefore conclude that whilst we have the potential of fitting equipment which can enhance safety - particularly in onshore operations; there does need to be an examination of the specific operating environment and the required 'protection modes' so we can ensure that it is fit for purpose in all environments. Good news then that the RTCA HTAWS have been formed - let's hope that they consider the concept of operations (CONOPS) in as much detail as RTCA-196 did for NVIS.
Sadly, and to return to the initial purpose of this post, I do not see the database function being part of those operations in its present form.
Jim
Much of the discussion above has mentioned rig positions and moving rigs as a danger. I am assuming the concern here is if the aircraft does not have radar, or am I missing something? How many accidents have occurred with CFI unseen rigs V CFIT? Is it a biggie?
There have been proposals for compulsory registration of vessel movement but it really is a non-starter. Operator entry of positions into a data-base is frought with danger and will never be accepted by the regulator let alone pass the Risk Assessment process.
Yes, most helicopters, which operate IFR offshore, do carry radar and it is used to map the obstacle environment for the ARA. When this is used in conjunction with SBAS or GBAS systems (or whatever area nav system you are using at present), it can provide obstacle free approach sectors.
The other fact that must not be ignored is that the landing site that you are approaching, sits (on a high number of occasions) on the highest obstacle in the area. For those reasons the 'enhanced function' should not be used for obstacle avoidance until and unless it can be further enhanced with a dynamic obstacle mapping function - preferably more advanced than the weather radar and certificated for purpose. If use of the 'enhanced' function is set aside for offshore operations (as it should be until we solve the above problems), we are left with the GPWS elements.
Without - for the time being - resurrecting the discussion on the specific purpose of the Modes which was covered extremely well by Nick and Helicomparitor (what a pity those two can't work together), it occurs to me that the GPWS could be improved if tailored for offshore operations. As anyone who has read the technical description will confirm, reading the description of the Modes takes a great deal of time and concentration because it is lacking in the basic description of the 'protection scenarios' (not my phrase but one that has been used by the RTCA HTAWS working group); thus we have not only to understand the function/purpose off the Modes but apply them to (in the case being discussed) offshore operations.
That the radalt/AVAD combination has worked (reasonably well) for so long results from the less complex obstacle environment offshore and the presence of the weather radar. The offshore environment - at least in those areas in which I have operated - has an obstacle vertical limit of 500ft and a level floor; consequently there is no danger of rising or a falling surface and no obstacles above that height.
The manufacturer's preset height is set to 100ft; this is well thought out because descents to within 100ft of the sea is an unusual occurrence with the heights of platforms in, for example, the North Sea. This means that it can be used as a safety net call which results in some action by the crew. (The problem with such a simplistic system is that the 'call' occurs on every approach to a runway/heliport which might be regarded as a nuisance.) It can also cause a problem when fitted on a SAR machine which operate routinely at those heights; however, I am told there is a muting function for those.
That means that I can add another element to offshore operations; although the floor is sea level, the helicopter never descends to that height (unlike onshore operations). Does this affect the logic of the EGPWS - probably not but the switching from takeoff to approach mode does use a combination of height and speed (and other parameters) so it needs to be considered.
The helicopter also takes off and lands above the floor. Does this have an effect, well I'm not sure but I do know that at least one type that I have flown (still in use) the power is limited to the extent that a take-off manoeuvre could (in low winds) result in a descent below the takeoff site while accelerating to Vy; the same might occur if a go-around is initiated for any reason. Does this have an effect; once again I am not sure but would like to know because such manoeuvres are often conducted at night.
I therefore conclude that whilst we have the potential of fitting equipment which can enhance safety - particularly in onshore operations; there does need to be an examination of the specific operating environment and the required 'protection modes' so we can ensure that it is fit for purpose in all environments. Good news then that the RTCA HTAWS have been formed - let's hope that they consider the concept of operations (CONOPS) in as much detail as RTCA-196 did for NVIS.
Sadly, and to return to the initial purpose of this post, I do not see the database function being part of those operations in its present form.
Jim
Now you've gone and spoiled it, by introducing logic and reason, plus facts!
One thing I found interesting using it (briefly) in the North Sea, was the extent to which permanent platforms were missing from the database. I've already said that the FMS will thow up waypoints onto the ND/PFD and generally they will also have a red obstacle 'blob' inside them when displaying the EGPWS. Even on the relatively restricted routes I was using, there were several waypoints that did not have 'blobs' inside them.
The problem of updating a database with mobile installations is a difficult one which I guess can only really be done by some form of real time active interrogation process. Something along the lines of Skytrac type technology, with the mobile installation transmitting updates of its position via satellite, and the EGPWS database downloading them and updating itself whilst in flight.
I still think there is room for improvement in the basic GPWS modes for the offshore role.
One thing I found interesting using it (briefly) in the North Sea, was the extent to which permanent platforms were missing from the database. I've already said that the FMS will thow up waypoints onto the ND/PFD and generally they will also have a red obstacle 'blob' inside them when displaying the EGPWS. Even on the relatively restricted routes I was using, there were several waypoints that did not have 'blobs' inside them.
The problem of updating a database with mobile installations is a difficult one which I guess can only really be done by some form of real time active interrogation process. Something along the lines of Skytrac type technology, with the mobile installation transmitting updates of its position via satellite, and the EGPWS database downloading them and updating itself whilst in flight.
I still think there is room for improvement in the basic GPWS modes for the offshore role.
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EGPWS and TAWS
Nick, guys and gals
Informative threads like this need to be read by those that make this kit so they can get an insight into how we think and what we do. Can anyone get Honeywell or Garmin chaps to log in and read all about it? Would somebody with the right contacts please oblige.
If we know how they were thinking and they know how we are thinking we might just get some clarity here.
As one who used to dabble in making bespoke furniture it would never cease to amaze me that when I sat down with my sketch book and roughed out what the customer described to me and then showed it to him he would reveal that I had gotten the wrong end of the stick completely. I think that syndrome will apply to all but identical twins.
I live in eternal hope that the guy who actually made it it will come along and shine his light into these dark corners. On the other hand maybe he doesn't have a f
clue!
G
Informative threads like this need to be read by those that make this kit so they can get an insight into how we think and what we do. Can anyone get Honeywell or Garmin chaps to log in and read all about it? Would somebody with the right contacts please oblige.
If we know how they were thinking and they know how we are thinking we might just get some clarity here.
As one who used to dabble in making bespoke furniture it would never cease to amaze me that when I sat down with my sketch book and roughed out what the customer described to me and then showed it to him he would reveal that I had gotten the wrong end of the stick completely. I think that syndrome will apply to all but identical twins.
I live in eternal hope that the guy who actually made it it will come along and shine his light into these dark corners. On the other hand maybe he doesn't have a f
clue!G
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Geoff and JimL:
I certainly agree that the operational kits we develop are ALL "works in progress" and subject to improvement, especially those that attempt to predict the future, like an EGPWS. What I am astounded with is the willingness to ignore better systems until the perfect system is arrived at.
Since CFIT/FITWO is the single biggest problem we face operationally, anything that makes a significant reduction in CFIT accidents should be embraced, especially if the cost is small. Since I can show even the most jaded ppruner that ONE CFIT accident avoided will retrofit the entire world's helicopter fleet with EGPWS, it seems obvious to me.
What I can be faulted for is being unclear about the adaptability and flexibility of the EGPWS in terms of "learning" as we use it. This thread shows genuine concerns as to EGPWS perfection, and also shows that it has important capabilities today. I can easily call the PM at Honeywell and help organize some way to foster upgrades that make it better in stages as we learn more (I would wage such a system exists right now, but do not know for sure). We could invite users and regulators (or retired regulators
) to help advise how to change the EGPWS software rules to match field experience.
I don't believe any change in sensors is needed (this is the really expensive change). I do believe changes in how the data base is improved in the oil patch must be made. This means the "EGPWS Evolution Committee" would have some tasks already defined.
I certainly agree that the operational kits we develop are ALL "works in progress" and subject to improvement, especially those that attempt to predict the future, like an EGPWS. What I am astounded with is the willingness to ignore better systems until the perfect system is arrived at.
Since CFIT/FITWO is the single biggest problem we face operationally, anything that makes a significant reduction in CFIT accidents should be embraced, especially if the cost is small. Since I can show even the most jaded ppruner that ONE CFIT accident avoided will retrofit the entire world's helicopter fleet with EGPWS, it seems obvious to me.
What I can be faulted for is being unclear about the adaptability and flexibility of the EGPWS in terms of "learning" as we use it. This thread shows genuine concerns as to EGPWS perfection, and also shows that it has important capabilities today. I can easily call the PM at Honeywell and help organize some way to foster upgrades that make it better in stages as we learn more (I would wage such a system exists right now, but do not know for sure). We could invite users and regulators (or retired regulators
) to help advise how to change the EGPWS software rules to match field experience.I don't believe any change in sensors is needed (this is the really expensive change). I do believe changes in how the data base is improved in the oil patch must be made. This means the "EGPWS Evolution Committee" would have some tasks already defined.
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I don't understand the fixation on moving rigs. They don't move that often, and there aren't that many of them. I don't often fly around in IMC at less than 500'. The only time I'm that low is when I'm on final approach, and then I'm required to avoid all radar targets by 1/2 mile anyway. Moving rigs are just red herrings in this discussion. They will likely never be in any database, and don't need to be. There will always be obstacles not in the database, and blindly relying on having them is begging to die.
I agree with Nick. Just because a system isn't perfect (and no system is) is no reason to reject it. If it's even marginally better than the one it replaces, why not use it? Cutting off one's nose to spite one's face is ridiculous. EGPWS, while certainly not perfect, is better than anything else, so why refuse to consider it? Work for improvements, certainly, but rejecting it out of hand just because it can still be improved is just silly.
I agree with Nick. Just because a system isn't perfect (and no system is) is no reason to reject it. If it's even marginally better than the one it replaces, why not use it? Cutting off one's nose to spite one's face is ridiculous. EGPWS, while certainly not perfect, is better than anything else, so why refuse to consider it? Work for improvements, certainly, but rejecting it out of hand just because it can still be improved is just silly.
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Two more Norwegian S-92's return to base for landing
There has been a lot of "incidents" in Norway lately.
One S-92 flew 90 min. (or was it 90 miles?) on one engine with passengers onboard, another one return to shore for landing after a false engine-fire light. All within the last month!! And today, according to the newspapers, 2 more had to return for landing. One with a false engine fire light again, and one with redused power due to metal chips in the transmission.
What's the deal with all these false lights? Hopefully the pilots and operators will continue to follow their procedures even if they think it's a false indication, cause if they don't you can be certain something will go wrong and it will come back and bite them.....That's just how good old Murphy works!!
Article in norwegian: http://www.bt.no/lokalt/bergen/article313924.ece
One S-92 flew 90 min. (or was it 90 miles?) on one engine with passengers onboard, another one return to shore for landing after a false engine-fire light. All within the last month!! And today, according to the newspapers, 2 more had to return for landing. One with a false engine fire light again, and one with redused power due to metal chips in the transmission.
What's the deal with all these false lights? Hopefully the pilots and operators will continue to follow their procedures even if they think it's a false indication, cause if they don't you can be certain something will go wrong and it will come back and bite them.....That's just how good old Murphy works!!
Article in norwegian: http://www.bt.no/lokalt/bergen/article313924.ece
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Nick and Gomer
Nobody to my knowledge has knocked back the EGPWS and nobody is saying that we shouldn't use it. What we are saying is "do we fully understand it and how it works in the offshore world?".
Undeniably the manufacturers have been slow to answer our queries and I suspect that their appreciation of the complex environment in which we work is not quite as comprehensive as their appreciation of overland ops.
Remember sods law - if it can happen then it will - one day. Remember Sioux City DC10, the Everglades DC9 of Valujet and countless others. Nothing to do with CFIT but excellent examples of what can happen when designs are inadequate or procedures are full of holes.
We are, I'm afraid duty-bound to ensure there are no traps in the EGPWS waiting to snare the unsuspecting pilot. In the meantime we can make the most of a great idea and not give those that introduced it the slightest opportunity to call us 'churlish'.
As to the continuing saga of the rigs and the radar can we put that to bed by simply saying that the 'E for enhanced' part of the EGPWS relies on a terrain database populated with data about the position and height of all obstructions.
If this function can live with an incomplete data-base of obstructions then OK, but if it cannot then we have to find a fix for all the obstructions we may encounter.
G
Undeniably the manufacturers have been slow to answer our queries and I suspect that their appreciation of the complex environment in which we work is not quite as comprehensive as their appreciation of overland ops.
Remember sods law - if it can happen then it will - one day. Remember Sioux City DC10, the Everglades DC9 of Valujet and countless others. Nothing to do with CFIT but excellent examples of what can happen when designs are inadequate or procedures are full of holes.
We are, I'm afraid duty-bound to ensure there are no traps in the EGPWS waiting to snare the unsuspecting pilot. In the meantime we can make the most of a great idea and not give those that introduced it the slightest opportunity to call us 'churlish'.
As to the continuing saga of the rigs and the radar can we put that to bed by simply saying that the 'E for enhanced' part of the EGPWS relies on a terrain database populated with data about the position and height of all obstructions.
If this function can live with an incomplete data-base of obstructions then OK, but if it cannot then we have to find a fix for all the obstructions we may encounter.
G
Last edited by Geoffersincornwall; 9th Nov 2006 at 16:16. Reason: typo
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Nick
First of all, I approve of your big beastie - I don't fly it operationally, but I have flown it and I have sung it's praises before. But on the subject of EGPWS I have to disagree. Those who reject the current generation of EGPWS for helicopters that spend most of their working life in an offshore environment are not necessarily "willling to ignore better systems until the perfect system is arrived at". Instead, they acknowledge the reality that day-to-day (even more importantly, night-to night) in my back-yard anyway, EGPWS is a backward step (at least until I can select what I want to hear and when, and until it does not degrade the warning systems I already have). AND we all know that it is NOT "works-in-progress" for us - no matter how much progress the equipment designers and manufacturers make, once the kit is fitted to my machine, that's it - my boss will not spend money to upgrade to a better standard unless our customers (or legislators) tell him to.
Bottom line - right now I don't want it, and if I could disable it for every night and IMC flight offshore, I would.
Zeb.
First of all, I approve of your big beastie - I don't fly it operationally, but I have flown it and I have sung it's praises before. But on the subject of EGPWS I have to disagree. Those who reject the current generation of EGPWS for helicopters that spend most of their working life in an offshore environment are not necessarily "willling to ignore better systems until the perfect system is arrived at". Instead, they acknowledge the reality that day-to-day (even more importantly, night-to night) in my back-yard anyway, EGPWS is a backward step (at least until I can select what I want to hear and when, and until it does not degrade the warning systems I already have). AND we all know that it is NOT "works-in-progress" for us - no matter how much progress the equipment designers and manufacturers make, once the kit is fitted to my machine, that's it - my boss will not spend money to upgrade to a better standard unless our customers (or legislators) tell him to.
Bottom line - right now I don't want it, and if I could disable it for every night and IMC flight offshore, I would.
Zeb.
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Whats the big deal with spurious fire warnings, the good old 61 and Pumas had them on a fairly regular basis, but it didn't make front page news in those days, think this was the main reason that cockpit mirrors were installed on both types.
Over the years I can recall several cases where different types had to fly back single engine, but no one outside of the company knew about it.
The problem we all have to deal with nowadays is that everything has to be reported, even a minor problem like one of your instuments fluctuating on start, will require an incident report, a few years ago the indicator would be replaced and away you go.
If false warnings are biggest problem on 92. it must be some machine.
Over the years I can recall several cases where different types had to fly back single engine, but no one outside of the company knew about it.
The problem we all have to deal with nowadays is that everything has to be reported, even a minor problem like one of your instuments fluctuating on start, will require an incident report, a few years ago the indicator would be replaced and away you go.
If false warnings are biggest problem on 92. it must be some machine.
After years of operating without mirrors, it was treated as a bit of a joke when they finally appeared on the scene: about 1973, I think
Whats the big deal with spurious fire warnings, the good old 61 and Pumas had them on a fairly regular basis, but it didn't make front page news in those days
In those days PPRuNe was still to be born.
ATN
In those days PPRuNe was still to be born.
ATN
On the whole, this sounds exactly like the Sikorsky machine I fly at the moment...the Seahawk. Put a new transmission in and she'll make metal for a while (ie. chips). These ol girls have such big, chunky transmissions that It'd take a small nuclear detonation to destroy them. And fire lights? Obviously not to be taken LIGHTLY (thats a pun...get it?) we have them all too frequently...usually a bit of water in the cannon plug.
Ya know, it all boils down to the newsies having portable scanners and picking up the pan call (or the RTB call) and blowing it all out of proportion in order to make it SEEM LIKE news.
I tend to agree that this doesn't seem at all like a problem for the airframe overall.
HP
Ya know, it all boils down to the newsies having portable scanners and picking up the pan call (or the RTB call) and blowing it all out of proportion in order to make it SEEM LIKE news.
I tend to agree that this doesn't seem at all like a problem for the airframe overall.
HP
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Headline news in Norway
The norwegian oil workers have unions that take safety issues very seriously, and if they don't want to fly with the S-92, they'll get rid of it. Last night they got to voice their concern on national broadcast tv, it was the very top story:
http://www1.nrk.no/nett-tv/forside/
upper right corner, click on play. This link is only valid today.
http://www1.nrk.no/nett-tv/forside/
upper right corner, click on play. This link is only valid today.
From the web:
S-92 Incidents
Thursday November 9th we experienced a return flight due to indication failure in the engine fire detection system. NOR 546 departed Flesland at 14:42 local time enroute for Gullfaks A, with 18 passengers and 2 crew.
At 15:20 the fire warning light for engine 1 started to flash intermittently. Based on similar incidents lately the crew rapidly concluded that this was an indication of false warning. However, knowing that the engine fire detection system was not working properly the crew elected to abort the flight and return to Bergen for technical investigation.
Air Traffic Control was informed about the indication failure and clearance was obtained to return to maintenance base at Flesland. The rest of the flight back to Flesland was carried out as normal. It has to be emphasized that not any kind of priority or emergency was declared by the crew and it was purely considered as a "technical return to base" situation and the passengers were briefed accordingly. It was a surprise to the crew to discover that the airport authority had raised the emergency preparedness to "full alert" on arrival at Flesland at 15:37.
Passengers were disembarked upon arrival and escorted to the terminal where they received a detailed briefing by the crew. Passengers awaiting other S-92 departures received briefing from our Chief Pilot S-92.
Norsk Helikopter has during the last months experienced three (3) incidents related to the engine fire detection system. All three incidents has been generated by indication failure in the fire warning system for the engines. Based on these incidents Norsk Helikopter introduced an internal inspection procedure of all sensors in the system on 50 hours interval. The manufacturer, Sikorsky Aircraft has been consulted on the failures and a investigation team is arriving in Stavanger tomorrow to review and inspect the failed parts (sensors).
We as operator has full confidence in the Sikorsky S-92 product that we are operating and as fleet leader, we will by November 20th pass the threshold of 10.000 revenue hours on our total S-92 fleet.
However, the failures we have experienced in the engine fire warning system is not acceptable and we will together with Sikorsky Aircraft and Vendors do our outmost to ensure that this is rectified and proper corrective actions implemented immediately.
We ensure you all that Safety in our operations is our number one objective and it will always be
Thursday November 9th we experienced a return flight due to indication failure in the engine fire detection system. NOR 546 departed Flesland at 14:42 local time enroute for Gullfaks A, with 18 passengers and 2 crew.
At 15:20 the fire warning light for engine 1 started to flash intermittently. Based on similar incidents lately the crew rapidly concluded that this was an indication of false warning. However, knowing that the engine fire detection system was not working properly the crew elected to abort the flight and return to Bergen for technical investigation.
Air Traffic Control was informed about the indication failure and clearance was obtained to return to maintenance base at Flesland. The rest of the flight back to Flesland was carried out as normal. It has to be emphasized that not any kind of priority or emergency was declared by the crew and it was purely considered as a "technical return to base" situation and the passengers were briefed accordingly. It was a surprise to the crew to discover that the airport authority had raised the emergency preparedness to "full alert" on arrival at Flesland at 15:37.
Passengers were disembarked upon arrival and escorted to the terminal where they received a detailed briefing by the crew. Passengers awaiting other S-92 departures received briefing from our Chief Pilot S-92.
Norsk Helikopter has during the last months experienced three (3) incidents related to the engine fire detection system. All three incidents has been generated by indication failure in the fire warning system for the engines. Based on these incidents Norsk Helikopter introduced an internal inspection procedure of all sensors in the system on 50 hours interval. The manufacturer, Sikorsky Aircraft has been consulted on the failures and a investigation team is arriving in Stavanger tomorrow to review and inspect the failed parts (sensors).
We as operator has full confidence in the Sikorsky S-92 product that we are operating and as fleet leader, we will by November 20th pass the threshold of 10.000 revenue hours on our total S-92 fleet.
However, the failures we have experienced in the engine fire warning system is not acceptable and we will together with Sikorsky Aircraft and Vendors do our outmost to ensure that this is rectified and proper corrective actions implemented immediately.
We ensure you all that Safety in our operations is our number one objective and it will always be
I'd say this is pretty good situational awareness, others may disagree
