UK Over Water Singles- Update: Sensible Decision
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Risk - this is what has to be addressed.
As stated clearly above we are in a position to assess the risk against cost and likelyhood and act accordingly.
I am a non smoker but I can be killed by inhaling passive smoke, so I must wear a mask.
I am a pedestrian and can be killed by a motor vehicle mounting the pavement unprotected by a suitable barrier.
Both the above are in the hands of government and thay will do absolutely nothing about these dangers.
However they feel obliged to demand we protect ourselves against ourselves, STRANGE and unbalanced reasonong!
Twins can make the journeys across most common routes within the British Isles without requiring floats, ELT, life raft, immersion suit, and life jacket. However, these items should be worn/carried if you see that the risk to you is such that without them you would endanger yourself and others. The personal choice for private pilots and their passengers.
If I were able to buy a helicopter and my journeys were so often over water I would equip myself with all these safety features. However if it was once a year then I would accept the risk.
My opinion
As stated clearly above we are in a position to assess the risk against cost and likelyhood and act accordingly.
I am a non smoker but I can be killed by inhaling passive smoke, so I must wear a mask.
I am a pedestrian and can be killed by a motor vehicle mounting the pavement unprotected by a suitable barrier.
Both the above are in the hands of government and thay will do absolutely nothing about these dangers.
However they feel obliged to demand we protect ourselves against ourselves, STRANGE and unbalanced reasonong!
Twins can make the journeys across most common routes within the British Isles without requiring floats, ELT, life raft, immersion suit, and life jacket. However, these items should be worn/carried if you see that the risk to you is such that without them you would endanger yourself and others. The personal choice for private pilots and their passengers.
If I were able to buy a helicopter and my journeys were so often over water I would equip myself with all these safety features. However if it was once a year then I would accept the risk.
My opinion
Gatvol
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Interesting comment above regarding Smoking and Government involvement. The biggest joke in the States is too listen to the Government scream and threaten the Cigarette Industry and then pass out subsidies to Tobacco Farmers......
I guess to equate one should think that if Aircraft cannot fly based on Government Regulations, there will be no accidents.....
I guess to equate one should think that if Aircraft cannot fly based on Government Regulations, there will be no accidents.....
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As the sole reason given by the CAA for this proposed change is to bring us into line with ICAO, I thought I'd get to the roots. Why does ICAO exist and what was the intention when they had their Chicago Convention in 1944 ?
"WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that co-operation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically;
Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end."
Which obviously means, let's do everything we can to stop UK helicopter pilots being able to cause "friction" anywhere else !
This is a terrible time - we are being restricted to our island. (There's obviously an Australian behind this somewhere....)
"WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that co-operation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends;
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically;
Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end."
Which obviously means, let's do everything we can to stop UK helicopter pilots being able to cause "friction" anywhere else !
This is a terrible time - we are being restricted to our island. (There's obviously an Australian behind this somewhere....)
Last edited by headsethair; 7th Dec 2003 at 16:14.
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If these are indeed simply ICAO requirements can any PPRUNERs tell us which ICAO member countries currently comply with all this stuff for private flights?
I suspect a large round number of other ICAO states comply with these standards.
The CAA needs to stop knee-jerking and start thinking properly about risk (fat chance). Except, of course, we are told that they aren't going to be able to regulate themselves in the future. Much more important for Europe will be what the EASA proposes .................
I suspect a large round number of other ICAO states comply with these standards.
The CAA needs to stop knee-jerking and start thinking properly about risk (fat chance). Except, of course, we are told that they aren't going to be able to regulate themselves in the future. Much more important for Europe will be what the EASA proposes .................
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I suppose they could just implement it without consultation.....just like any other Quango.
But take a look at the recent Rule 5 consultation. 99 out of a 100 housewives disagreed with the restructuring of Rule 5(1)(e), to include a blanket "not below 500ft" rule, as in France etc. I hear that the CAA are now not planning to change it, so it can work to the sensible aviators advantage IF enough people disagree and write in with their concerns.
Z
But take a look at the recent Rule 5 consultation. 99 out of a 100 housewives disagreed with the restructuring of Rule 5(1)(e), to include a blanket "not below 500ft" rule, as in France etc. I hear that the CAA are now not planning to change it, so it can work to the sensible aviators advantage IF enough people disagree and write in with their concerns.
Z
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Z - agree with your point. All UK single-engine pilots should write with their views - by all means using the HCGB template as a basis. But include relevant personal experience. How many over water flights have you done (not within autorotational distance of land) in the past 5 years ? How many of those finished with a ditching ? And when you do fly over water what precautions do you take ?
If our community can show that the stats don't back up this change and that we do behave responsibly, then we have every chance of saving our freedom. I cannot believe that the CAA really want this change - one of their test pilots owns a floatless R22.
Write to:
David Beaven General Aviation Department (Policy) Civil Aviation Authority 1W Aviation House Gatwick Airport South Gatwick West Sussex RH6 0YR e-mail: [email protected] to arrive no later than 31 January 2004.
And take a look at what the ICAO has to say in its Convention : "international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically"
EQUALITY - with fixed wing ? ECONOMICALLY - confining a fleet of private helis to the mainland of the UK because of the costs and impossibility of compliance. Even worse if you live in Northern Ireland.
In any case, wasn't ICAO set-up for commercial aviation ? Why are private pilots being forced to comply with the Convention ? Do we need Flying Lawyer ?
If our community can show that the stats don't back up this change and that we do behave responsibly, then we have every chance of saving our freedom. I cannot believe that the CAA really want this change - one of their test pilots owns a floatless R22.
Write to:
David Beaven General Aviation Department (Policy) Civil Aviation Authority 1W Aviation House Gatwick Airport South Gatwick West Sussex RH6 0YR e-mail: [email protected] to arrive no later than 31 January 2004.
And take a look at what the ICAO has to say in its Convention : "international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically"
EQUALITY - with fixed wing ? ECONOMICALLY - confining a fleet of private helis to the mainland of the UK because of the costs and impossibility of compliance. Even worse if you live in Northern Ireland.
In any case, wasn't ICAO set-up for commercial aviation ? Why are private pilots being forced to comply with the Convention ? Do we need Flying Lawyer ?
Last edited by headsethair; 8th Dec 2003 at 14:30.
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In regard to floats;-
I have deployed floats once and the port one didn't inflate.
I have set the switches to arm the floats many times and on one occasion the floats, due to corrosion within the switches, inflated and I was well set for the overwater flight at the much reduced IAS.
A Question. - What is the performance criterior that floars are tested to? It's ok fitting floats but, in what situation will they provide the safety to the helicopter occupants. And more importantly when would it be better if they were not fitted.
The idea of floats in their present form is outdated and miss directed as to their functionality. A review is required before any acceptance of such devices is made mandatory.
In regard to over water flights;-
I have to agree that some form of bouyancy aid that would guarantie a safe landing on water and keep me and the helicopter safe until rescue was achieved is a definite plus.
I have spent many nervos minutes over water planning in my mind what to do if!. I am sure I would be doing the same thing even if floats were fitted because they are not guaranteed to work everytime.
I have worn immersion suit, life jacket and carried a life raft but not had floats fitted on these occasions.
A point of note.
As far as I can work it out. It is impossible for a pilot to deploy a life raft on his/her own.
I think the aero industry should again look at the developments within the automobile industry and 'modernise' before making legislation which on the surface (please accept the pun) iis only performing the 'rubber stamp syndome'
I have deployed floats once and the port one didn't inflate.
I have set the switches to arm the floats many times and on one occasion the floats, due to corrosion within the switches, inflated and I was well set for the overwater flight at the much reduced IAS.
A Question. - What is the performance criterior that floars are tested to? It's ok fitting floats but, in what situation will they provide the safety to the helicopter occupants. And more importantly when would it be better if they were not fitted.
The idea of floats in their present form is outdated and miss directed as to their functionality. A review is required before any acceptance of such devices is made mandatory.
In regard to over water flights;-
I have to agree that some form of bouyancy aid that would guarantie a safe landing on water and keep me and the helicopter safe until rescue was achieved is a definite plus.
I have spent many nervos minutes over water planning in my mind what to do if!. I am sure I would be doing the same thing even if floats were fitted because they are not guaranteed to work everytime.
I have worn immersion suit, life jacket and carried a life raft but not had floats fitted on these occasions.
A point of note.
As far as I can work it out. It is impossible for a pilot to deploy a life raft on his/her own.
I think the aero industry should again look at the developments within the automobile industry and 'modernise' before making legislation which on the surface (please accept the pun) iis only performing the 'rubber stamp syndome'
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Will private single engine F/W be banned from flying within gliding distance of land?
Money spent of floats would be much better spent on something which would help stop ditchings. Any suggestions??
Money spent of floats would be much better spent on something which would help stop ditchings. Any suggestions??
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Floats over water
Hello,
I was reading the postings regarding the potential requirement for floats to be installed for overwater flight. I understand the concerns regarding the debate from an operators point of view and will not presnet a position regarding the debate. I wanted your members to be aware that Apical Industries of Oceanside California has developed the first breakthrough in helicopter flotation since floats were invented for helicopters. Apical has certified and patented an emergency float system that has integrated liferafts installed on the floats. The system has two independent inflation systems one for the floats and a seperate system for the life rafts. The life rafts have three deployment points, one in the cockpit and one at each aft door of an aircraft externally mounted. Any of the deployment points for the raft system will inflate both rafts. The system is so light that we have installed them on aircraft as light as a 206 A model. We have a system certified for the 206,206L,407, 412 and are currently awaiting approval for the AS-350/355 AND BO-105. Companies like Petrolem Helicopters and Airlogistics have made commitments to convert their entire fleet to the system. We will also be certifying an emergency float system and an emergency float system with rafts for the R-44 that will be available to all R-44 owners not just Marinier models. Thank you for the opportunity to present this information.
Ron Gladnick
Apical Industries
I was reading the postings regarding the potential requirement for floats to be installed for overwater flight. I understand the concerns regarding the debate from an operators point of view and will not presnet a position regarding the debate. I wanted your members to be aware that Apical Industries of Oceanside California has developed the first breakthrough in helicopter flotation since floats were invented for helicopters. Apical has certified and patented an emergency float system that has integrated liferafts installed on the floats. The system has two independent inflation systems one for the floats and a seperate system for the life rafts. The life rafts have three deployment points, one in the cockpit and one at each aft door of an aircraft externally mounted. Any of the deployment points for the raft system will inflate both rafts. The system is so light that we have installed them on aircraft as light as a 206 A model. We have a system certified for the 206,206L,407, 412 and are currently awaiting approval for the AS-350/355 AND BO-105. Companies like Petrolem Helicopters and Airlogistics have made commitments to convert their entire fleet to the system. We will also be certifying an emergency float system and an emergency float system with rafts for the R-44 that will be available to all R-44 owners not just Marinier models. Thank you for the opportunity to present this information.
Ron Gladnick
Apical Industries
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I've sent my e-mail to Mr Beaven and we're writing to our customers informing them of what the proposal will mean to our type of flying. Hopefully the more people that write the more our case will be heard. Does anyone know approximately how many PPL(H) holders there are currently in the UK so we can work out roughly what number of responses will be listened to?
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THE HARD STATS
I have a copy of CAA stats listing all water ditchings for UK reg helis (twin and single) for the last 15 years.
Total number : 9, no fatalities no major injuries
TWIN TURBINE: 4 total, mainly North Sea. 2 engine failures (incl one that lost both engines), 1 transmission, 1 lightning strike.
SINGLE TURBINE : 2 total. 1 Engine failure, 1 transmission
SINGLE PISTON : 3 total. 1 loss of control (but still managed a safe ditch), 1 transmission, 1 undetermined but loss of power.
Floats were deployed for all twins - in one case the speed of landing on the water ripped off the floats.
Singles did not deploy floats.
And the results in all cases were exactly the same.
Now compare these miniscule stats with fixed wing single ditchings..........single helis are being unfairly "singled out".
There is nothing in that stats to prove that floats save lives. I would post the CAA report here - but I'm not certain about copyright. I will email the report to Heliport and he can decide what to do.
Total number : 9, no fatalities no major injuries
TWIN TURBINE: 4 total, mainly North Sea. 2 engine failures (incl one that lost both engines), 1 transmission, 1 lightning strike.
SINGLE TURBINE : 2 total. 1 Engine failure, 1 transmission
SINGLE PISTON : 3 total. 1 loss of control (but still managed a safe ditch), 1 transmission, 1 undetermined but loss of power.
Floats were deployed for all twins - in one case the speed of landing on the water ripped off the floats.
Singles did not deploy floats.
And the results in all cases were exactly the same.
Now compare these miniscule stats with fixed wing single ditchings..........single helis are being unfairly "singled out".
There is nothing in that stats to prove that floats save lives. I would post the CAA report here - but I'm not certain about copyright. I will email the report to Heliport and he can decide what to do.
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"It may well be buried somewhere in the CAA's website"
No it isn't - it is a specially prepared report based on parameters I filed with the CAA last week. Have emailed Heliport - I can't see why it can't be posted. The CAA say it must only be used for Flight Safety purposes - and that must surely mean it can be posted here in the interests of safety.
No it isn't - it is a specially prepared report based on parameters I filed with the CAA last week. Have emailed Heliport - I can't see why it can't be posted. The CAA say it must only be used for Flight Safety purposes - and that must surely mean it can be posted here in the interests of safety.
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THE CAA STATS
Following are CAA records for the last 15 years. There have been 9 recorded "ditchings" in that period.
SUBJECT: DITCHINGS BY UK REGISTERED HELICOPTERS
PERIOD : SINCE 1 JANUARY 1988
A/C Type Sikorsky S61 OccNum 198802141
Date 13 Jul 1988 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : ENGINE FIRE WARNING. A/C DITCHED. ALL 21 OCCUPANTS RESCUED. A/C BURNED & SANK.
A/C AT 1500FT WHEN THERE WAS AN UNUSUAL NOISE ACCOMPANIED BY HIGH FREQUENCY VIBRATION. NR2 ENGINE FIRE WARNING ILLUMINATED & DRILLS CARRIED OUT BUT NR1 ENGINE FIRE WARNING FOLLOWED & SMOKE OBSERVED. SUCCESSFUL DITCHING & EVACUATION COMPLETED AS CABIN FILLED WITH DENSE SMOKE. SHORTLY AFTER ALIGHTING CONTROLS FROZE. A/C CONTINUED TO BURN WITH AN "INTENSE WHITE FLAME" IN AREA OF FORWARD GEARBOX & EVENTUALLY BROKE UP & SANK. EXAMINATION OF RECOVERED WRECKAGE REVEALED FAILURE BEGAN WITHIN NR2 POWER TURBINE WHERE NR5 BEARING CAGE HAD BROKEN-UP, SHOWING SIGNS OF SEVERE WEAR & OVERTEMPERATURE. NR4 BEARING & MAIN GEARBOX CONNECTING SHAFT ALSO DISPLACED CAUSING NR2 ENGINE AFT SUPPORT TUBE ASSEMBLY BREAKAGE. AAIB BULLETIN 1/89 & ACCIDENT REPORT 3/90 REFER. CAA CLOSURE: CAUSE OF NR5 BEARING FAILURE NOT POSITIVELY ESTABLISHED. CAA RESPONSES TO AAIB RECOMMENDATIONS ARE CONTAINED IN FOLLOW-UP ACTION ON ACCIDENT REPORT (FACTAR) NO.F3/90.
A/C Type Sikorsky S61 OccNum 198803819
Date 10 Nov 1988 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : LOW GEARBOX OIL PRESSURE WARNING ACCOMPANIED BY VIBRATION. A/C DITCHED, INVERTED & SANK. 13 POB SAFE.
WHINING/RUMBLING NOISE HEARD & LOW GEARBOX OIL PRESSURE INDICATION OCCURRED. PILOT INTENDED TO DIVERT TO RIG BUT WITH ONSET OF HF VIBRATION DECIDED TO DITCH. A/C ROLLED RIGHT & OVERTURNED IN 45MPH WINDS. 11 PAX & 2 CREW EVACUATED SAFELY & RESCUED BY SAR SERVICE. A/C SANK ON FOLLOWING DAY BUT WRECKAGE RETRIEVED FOR INVESTIGATION. A 30DEG (8IN) SEGMENT OF HELICAL GEAR WHEEL (P/N:S6135-20620-3) WAS MISSING (PIECES FOUND IN BOTTOM OF GEARBOX) DUE TO FATIGUE FAILURE CAUSED BY IMPURITIES IN THE STEEL. FAILURE ORIGINATED AT A GEAR TOOTH. AAIB BULLETIN 1/89 & ACCIDENT REPORT 1/90 REFER. CAA EMERG AD 030-01-89 IDENTIFIES GEARS FROM SAME BATCH OF STEEL AS FAILED ITEM & REQUIRES THEIR REMOVAL FROM SERVICE WITHIN 100HRS. SIKORSKY SUBSEQUENTLY REVISED THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS TO ENSURE PURITY OF STEEL. CAA CLOSURE: CAA RESPONSES TO AAIB RECOMMENDATIONS ARE CONTAINED IN FOLLOW-UP ACTION ON ACCIDENT REPORTS (FACTAR) NO.F1/90.
A/C Type Bolkow 105 OccNum 198901315
Date 25 Apr 1989 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : DOUBLE ENGINE FLAMEOUT DUE SNOW/SLUSH INGESTION. DITCHED IN SEA. NO INJURIES.
DURING AN OIL POLLUTION SURVEY THE A/C WAS POSITIONING TO LAND WHEN, AFTER ENCOUNTERING SLEET SHOWERS AT 2400FT (OAT +1 DEG C), BOTH ENGINES FAILED. AUTOROTATION ESTABLISHED & FLOATS INFLATED (AFTER INADVERTENT SELECTION OF FUEL JETTISON DUE PROXIMITY OF SWITCHES). A/C LANDED ON SEA WITH SOME FORWARD SPEED, THE RIGHT FRONT & BOTH REAR FLOAT BAGS BECAME PARTIALLY DETACHED. OCCUPANTS TRANSFERRED TO LIFERAFT & WERE SOON PICKED UP BY LOCAL CAR FERRY. AFTER A/C HAD BEEN TOWED ASHORE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT ONLY TWO FUEL BOOSTER PUMPS WERE STILL WORKING & THAT ALL PUMPS WERE CORRODED AS A RESULT OF SALT WATER INTRUSION. HOWEVER, NO OTHER DEFECT WAS FOUND TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DOUBLE ENGINE FAILURE WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO SNOW/SLUSH INGESTION. A/C HAD BEEN FLYING IN A COLD, UNSTABLE NORTHERLY AIRSTREAM WITH A MIXTURE OF RAIN & SNOW SHOWERS & TEMPS VARYING BETWEEN +3 & -2 DEG C. CALIBRATION CHECK OF THE OAT GAUGE REVEALED UNDERREAD OF 2 DEG C & A PARALLAX ERROR OF 5 DEG C DUE TO THE POSITION OF THE NEEDLE ABOVE THE DIAL FACE. AAIB BULLETIN 9/89 REFERS. FLIGHT MANUAL AMENDMED TO REQUIRE CONTINUOUS OPERATION OF IGNITION SYSTEM FOR FLIGHT IN FALLING SNOW. SB BO105-80-111 INTRODUCES MBB KIT NO 105-96233 OR 105-96238.CAA CLOSURE- NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.
A/C Type Enstrom F28 OccNum 199101850
Date 12 Jun 1991 Location SNOWDONIA
UK Reportable Accident : WHILE HOVERING OVER LAKE, STRONG DOWNDRAUGHT CAUSED A/C TO SETTLE INTO WATER & SINK. NO INJ TO 2 POB.
THE A/C WAS ENGAGED IN AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY OF A RESERVOIR DAM & WAS OPERATING IN THE LEE OF HIGH GROUND RISING 150FT ABOVE WATER LEVEL. LOCALISED POCKETS OF TURBULENCE & DOWNDRAUGHTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN AFFECTING THE AREA. ON COMPLETION OF AN EXTENDED HOVER INTO A 210DEG/15-20KT WIND, THE A/C WAS TURNED & ACCELERATED DOWNWIND & IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO LOSE HEIGHT. ALTHOUGH FULL POWER WAS APPLIED, MAIN ROTOR RPM DECAYED RAPIDLY. A DITCHING WAS CARRIED OUT & BOTH OCCUPANTS ESCAPED BEFORE THE A/C SANK. THE A/C WAS RECOVERED FROM THE WATER & SUBSEQUENT INSPN REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF ANY MECHANICAL FAILURE. CAA CLOSURE: APPROPRIATE INFORMAL ACTION TAKEN.
A/C Type Bell 206 Jet Ranger OccNum 199200843
Date 20 Mar 1992 Location IRISH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : ENGINE FAILURE. MAYDAY. DITCHED INTO SEA & SANK. 1 POB RESCUED.
ENGINE OUT WARNING IN CRUISE. ENTERED AUTOROTATION. RELIGHT ATTEMPTED. DITCHED SUCCESSFULLY & EVACUATED A/C. DINGHY DROPPED TO PILOT IN WATER BY PASSING LIGHT A/C, PILOT RESCUED BY SAR HELICOPTER. A/C NOT RECOVERED. SEE AAIB BULLETIN 06/92, REF : EW/G92/03/09. CAA CLOSURE:NO CAA ACTION APPROPRIATE.
A/C Type SA332 Super Puma OccNum 199500167
Date 19 Jan 1995 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : Lightning strike to tail rotor. A/c ditched following loss of tail rotor control. Occupants evacuated into liferaft.
AAIB Formal investigation. The helicopter was conducting a charter flight, ferrying 16 maintenance engineers from Aberdeen to the Brae oilfield. Having just passed a position 120nm on the 062deg radial from the Aberdeen VHF omnirange (VOR) radio beacon, and whilst beginning its descent from 3000 feet above mean sea level (amsl), the helicopter was struck by lightning. This resulted in severe vibration which, a few minutes later, developed into a loss of tail rotor control, necessitating an immediate ditching in heavy seas. The ditching was executed successfully and the helicopter remained upright enabling the passengers and crew to board a heliraft, from which they were subsequently rescued. There were no injuries sustained and the passengers and crew were later returned to Aberdeen by helicopter and ship. Despite six to seven metre waves and a 30kt southerly wind, the helicopter remained afloat for some three hours and thirty minutes before it was brought alongside a safety vessel. However, whilst secured to this vessel the helicopter's flotation bags punctured and it sank some two hours later, at 1803 hours. AAIB Aircraft Accident Report 2/97 contains 8 Safety Recommendations which are addressed by CAA FACTOR F28/97. Tail rotor blades fitted to this a/c were of an early standard & not resistant to lightning strikes of the magnitude experienced in this accident. DGAC AD 96-099-059 requires that a/c flying in hostile areas, such as the North Sea, are equipped with blades of the latest standard. Mfr mods 332A07-41569 & 332A07-66150 also refer. CAA Closure: Hazard now controlled by action stated.
A/C Type Agusta Bell 206 OccNum 199502589
Date 29 Jun 1995 Location ALDERNEY 14N
UK Reportable Accident : A/c ditched into sea following engine power loss. A/c sank. No injuries.
In cruise at about 500ft AMSL, sudden severe 'kick' in yaw accompanied by abnormal mechanical noises from engine/transmission & engine chip warning. Pilot transmitted Mayday &, when another disturbance in yaw occurred followed by loss of engine power, initiated autorotation onto sea. A/c rolled left, filled with water & inverted. Although engineer escaped quickly, pilot initially had difficulty in vacating cockpit. However, he was wearing a lifejacket fitted with short term air supply system (STASS), with up to 3 minutes breathable air & was "extremely beneficial" in aiding escape. Another a/c heard Mayday & located site within 10 minutes. SAR helicopter arrived soon after & both survivors were winched aboard within 30 minutes of accident. Wreckage was not recovered but, from description of events, it was concluded that probable cause of accident was a major mechanical failure of engine gearbox assembly. See AAIB Bulletin 9/95, Ref : EW/G95/06/21. CAA CLOSURE-As wreckage not recovered no technical investigation possible. No further CAA action appropriate.
A/C Type Robinson R22 OccNum 199603615
Date 14 Aug 1996 Location GALWAY
UK Reportable Accident : Loud bang together with rapid yaw to left & total power loss. Autorotative ditching in sea. No injuries.
Abrupt left yaw had occurred at 1500ft after take off & then again at 1000ft after carb heat applied. Investigation by Irish authorities.
A/C Type Robinson R44 OccNum 200300426
Date 27 Jan 2003 Location Antarctic
UK Reportable Accident : The helicopter ditched in the sea off Antartica following an engine failure. Both crew members evacuated into a life raft and were rescued. AAIB AARF investigation.
Two pilots were flying an R44 from Cabo de Hornos in Southern Chile to Teniente Marsh Airbase on King George Island, Antarctica. After approximately 4 hours and 400 miles they experienced an engine vibration followed shortly by engine failure which forced them to ditch. They survived in a liferaft for the next 10 hours until rescued by the Chilean Navy. The helicopter sank and has not been recovered and as such the cause of the accident cannot be positively determined. See AAIB Bulletin 7/2003, ref: EW/G2003/01/18.
CAA Closure: No CAA action appropriate.
SUBJECT: DITCHINGS BY UK REGISTERED HELICOPTERS
PERIOD : SINCE 1 JANUARY 1988
A/C Type Sikorsky S61 OccNum 198802141
Date 13 Jul 1988 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : ENGINE FIRE WARNING. A/C DITCHED. ALL 21 OCCUPANTS RESCUED. A/C BURNED & SANK.
A/C AT 1500FT WHEN THERE WAS AN UNUSUAL NOISE ACCOMPANIED BY HIGH FREQUENCY VIBRATION. NR2 ENGINE FIRE WARNING ILLUMINATED & DRILLS CARRIED OUT BUT NR1 ENGINE FIRE WARNING FOLLOWED & SMOKE OBSERVED. SUCCESSFUL DITCHING & EVACUATION COMPLETED AS CABIN FILLED WITH DENSE SMOKE. SHORTLY AFTER ALIGHTING CONTROLS FROZE. A/C CONTINUED TO BURN WITH AN "INTENSE WHITE FLAME" IN AREA OF FORWARD GEARBOX & EVENTUALLY BROKE UP & SANK. EXAMINATION OF RECOVERED WRECKAGE REVEALED FAILURE BEGAN WITHIN NR2 POWER TURBINE WHERE NR5 BEARING CAGE HAD BROKEN-UP, SHOWING SIGNS OF SEVERE WEAR & OVERTEMPERATURE. NR4 BEARING & MAIN GEARBOX CONNECTING SHAFT ALSO DISPLACED CAUSING NR2 ENGINE AFT SUPPORT TUBE ASSEMBLY BREAKAGE. AAIB BULLETIN 1/89 & ACCIDENT REPORT 3/90 REFER. CAA CLOSURE: CAUSE OF NR5 BEARING FAILURE NOT POSITIVELY ESTABLISHED. CAA RESPONSES TO AAIB RECOMMENDATIONS ARE CONTAINED IN FOLLOW-UP ACTION ON ACCIDENT REPORT (FACTAR) NO.F3/90.
A/C Type Sikorsky S61 OccNum 198803819
Date 10 Nov 1988 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : LOW GEARBOX OIL PRESSURE WARNING ACCOMPANIED BY VIBRATION. A/C DITCHED, INVERTED & SANK. 13 POB SAFE.
WHINING/RUMBLING NOISE HEARD & LOW GEARBOX OIL PRESSURE INDICATION OCCURRED. PILOT INTENDED TO DIVERT TO RIG BUT WITH ONSET OF HF VIBRATION DECIDED TO DITCH. A/C ROLLED RIGHT & OVERTURNED IN 45MPH WINDS. 11 PAX & 2 CREW EVACUATED SAFELY & RESCUED BY SAR SERVICE. A/C SANK ON FOLLOWING DAY BUT WRECKAGE RETRIEVED FOR INVESTIGATION. A 30DEG (8IN) SEGMENT OF HELICAL GEAR WHEEL (P/N:S6135-20620-3) WAS MISSING (PIECES FOUND IN BOTTOM OF GEARBOX) DUE TO FATIGUE FAILURE CAUSED BY IMPURITIES IN THE STEEL. FAILURE ORIGINATED AT A GEAR TOOTH. AAIB BULLETIN 1/89 & ACCIDENT REPORT 1/90 REFER. CAA EMERG AD 030-01-89 IDENTIFIES GEARS FROM SAME BATCH OF STEEL AS FAILED ITEM & REQUIRES THEIR REMOVAL FROM SERVICE WITHIN 100HRS. SIKORSKY SUBSEQUENTLY REVISED THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS TO ENSURE PURITY OF STEEL. CAA CLOSURE: CAA RESPONSES TO AAIB RECOMMENDATIONS ARE CONTAINED IN FOLLOW-UP ACTION ON ACCIDENT REPORTS (FACTAR) NO.F1/90.
A/C Type Bolkow 105 OccNum 198901315
Date 25 Apr 1989 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : DOUBLE ENGINE FLAMEOUT DUE SNOW/SLUSH INGESTION. DITCHED IN SEA. NO INJURIES.
DURING AN OIL POLLUTION SURVEY THE A/C WAS POSITIONING TO LAND WHEN, AFTER ENCOUNTERING SLEET SHOWERS AT 2400FT (OAT +1 DEG C), BOTH ENGINES FAILED. AUTOROTATION ESTABLISHED & FLOATS INFLATED (AFTER INADVERTENT SELECTION OF FUEL JETTISON DUE PROXIMITY OF SWITCHES). A/C LANDED ON SEA WITH SOME FORWARD SPEED, THE RIGHT FRONT & BOTH REAR FLOAT BAGS BECAME PARTIALLY DETACHED. OCCUPANTS TRANSFERRED TO LIFERAFT & WERE SOON PICKED UP BY LOCAL CAR FERRY. AFTER A/C HAD BEEN TOWED ASHORE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT ONLY TWO FUEL BOOSTER PUMPS WERE STILL WORKING & THAT ALL PUMPS WERE CORRODED AS A RESULT OF SALT WATER INTRUSION. HOWEVER, NO OTHER DEFECT WAS FOUND TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DOUBLE ENGINE FAILURE WHICH IS ATTRIBUTED TO SNOW/SLUSH INGESTION. A/C HAD BEEN FLYING IN A COLD, UNSTABLE NORTHERLY AIRSTREAM WITH A MIXTURE OF RAIN & SNOW SHOWERS & TEMPS VARYING BETWEEN +3 & -2 DEG C. CALIBRATION CHECK OF THE OAT GAUGE REVEALED UNDERREAD OF 2 DEG C & A PARALLAX ERROR OF 5 DEG C DUE TO THE POSITION OF THE NEEDLE ABOVE THE DIAL FACE. AAIB BULLETIN 9/89 REFERS. FLIGHT MANUAL AMENDMED TO REQUIRE CONTINUOUS OPERATION OF IGNITION SYSTEM FOR FLIGHT IN FALLING SNOW. SB BO105-80-111 INTRODUCES MBB KIT NO 105-96233 OR 105-96238.CAA CLOSURE- NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.
A/C Type Enstrom F28 OccNum 199101850
Date 12 Jun 1991 Location SNOWDONIA
UK Reportable Accident : WHILE HOVERING OVER LAKE, STRONG DOWNDRAUGHT CAUSED A/C TO SETTLE INTO WATER & SINK. NO INJ TO 2 POB.
THE A/C WAS ENGAGED IN AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY OF A RESERVOIR DAM & WAS OPERATING IN THE LEE OF HIGH GROUND RISING 150FT ABOVE WATER LEVEL. LOCALISED POCKETS OF TURBULENCE & DOWNDRAUGHTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN AFFECTING THE AREA. ON COMPLETION OF AN EXTENDED HOVER INTO A 210DEG/15-20KT WIND, THE A/C WAS TURNED & ACCELERATED DOWNWIND & IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO LOSE HEIGHT. ALTHOUGH FULL POWER WAS APPLIED, MAIN ROTOR RPM DECAYED RAPIDLY. A DITCHING WAS CARRIED OUT & BOTH OCCUPANTS ESCAPED BEFORE THE A/C SANK. THE A/C WAS RECOVERED FROM THE WATER & SUBSEQUENT INSPN REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF ANY MECHANICAL FAILURE. CAA CLOSURE: APPROPRIATE INFORMAL ACTION TAKEN.
A/C Type Bell 206 Jet Ranger OccNum 199200843
Date 20 Mar 1992 Location IRISH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : ENGINE FAILURE. MAYDAY. DITCHED INTO SEA & SANK. 1 POB RESCUED.
ENGINE OUT WARNING IN CRUISE. ENTERED AUTOROTATION. RELIGHT ATTEMPTED. DITCHED SUCCESSFULLY & EVACUATED A/C. DINGHY DROPPED TO PILOT IN WATER BY PASSING LIGHT A/C, PILOT RESCUED BY SAR HELICOPTER. A/C NOT RECOVERED. SEE AAIB BULLETIN 06/92, REF : EW/G92/03/09. CAA CLOSURE:NO CAA ACTION APPROPRIATE.
A/C Type SA332 Super Puma OccNum 199500167
Date 19 Jan 1995 Location NORTH SEA
UK Reportable Accident : Lightning strike to tail rotor. A/c ditched following loss of tail rotor control. Occupants evacuated into liferaft.
AAIB Formal investigation. The helicopter was conducting a charter flight, ferrying 16 maintenance engineers from Aberdeen to the Brae oilfield. Having just passed a position 120nm on the 062deg radial from the Aberdeen VHF omnirange (VOR) radio beacon, and whilst beginning its descent from 3000 feet above mean sea level (amsl), the helicopter was struck by lightning. This resulted in severe vibration which, a few minutes later, developed into a loss of tail rotor control, necessitating an immediate ditching in heavy seas. The ditching was executed successfully and the helicopter remained upright enabling the passengers and crew to board a heliraft, from which they were subsequently rescued. There were no injuries sustained and the passengers and crew were later returned to Aberdeen by helicopter and ship. Despite six to seven metre waves and a 30kt southerly wind, the helicopter remained afloat for some three hours and thirty minutes before it was brought alongside a safety vessel. However, whilst secured to this vessel the helicopter's flotation bags punctured and it sank some two hours later, at 1803 hours. AAIB Aircraft Accident Report 2/97 contains 8 Safety Recommendations which are addressed by CAA FACTOR F28/97. Tail rotor blades fitted to this a/c were of an early standard & not resistant to lightning strikes of the magnitude experienced in this accident. DGAC AD 96-099-059 requires that a/c flying in hostile areas, such as the North Sea, are equipped with blades of the latest standard. Mfr mods 332A07-41569 & 332A07-66150 also refer. CAA Closure: Hazard now controlled by action stated.
A/C Type Agusta Bell 206 OccNum 199502589
Date 29 Jun 1995 Location ALDERNEY 14N
UK Reportable Accident : A/c ditched into sea following engine power loss. A/c sank. No injuries.
In cruise at about 500ft AMSL, sudden severe 'kick' in yaw accompanied by abnormal mechanical noises from engine/transmission & engine chip warning. Pilot transmitted Mayday &, when another disturbance in yaw occurred followed by loss of engine power, initiated autorotation onto sea. A/c rolled left, filled with water & inverted. Although engineer escaped quickly, pilot initially had difficulty in vacating cockpit. However, he was wearing a lifejacket fitted with short term air supply system (STASS), with up to 3 minutes breathable air & was "extremely beneficial" in aiding escape. Another a/c heard Mayday & located site within 10 minutes. SAR helicopter arrived soon after & both survivors were winched aboard within 30 minutes of accident. Wreckage was not recovered but, from description of events, it was concluded that probable cause of accident was a major mechanical failure of engine gearbox assembly. See AAIB Bulletin 9/95, Ref : EW/G95/06/21. CAA CLOSURE-As wreckage not recovered no technical investigation possible. No further CAA action appropriate.
A/C Type Robinson R22 OccNum 199603615
Date 14 Aug 1996 Location GALWAY
UK Reportable Accident : Loud bang together with rapid yaw to left & total power loss. Autorotative ditching in sea. No injuries.
Abrupt left yaw had occurred at 1500ft after take off & then again at 1000ft after carb heat applied. Investigation by Irish authorities.
A/C Type Robinson R44 OccNum 200300426
Date 27 Jan 2003 Location Antarctic
UK Reportable Accident : The helicopter ditched in the sea off Antartica following an engine failure. Both crew members evacuated into a life raft and were rescued. AAIB AARF investigation.
Two pilots were flying an R44 from Cabo de Hornos in Southern Chile to Teniente Marsh Airbase on King George Island, Antarctica. After approximately 4 hours and 400 miles they experienced an engine vibration followed shortly by engine failure which forced them to ditch. They survived in a liferaft for the next 10 hours until rescued by the Chilean Navy. The helicopter sank and has not been recovered and as such the cause of the accident cannot be positively determined. See AAIB Bulletin 7/2003, ref: EW/G2003/01/18.
CAA Closure: No CAA action appropriate.
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Heli v. Fixed Wing
So - now the Fixed Wing stats for the same period (15 years) - all UK registered aircraft ditchings (heli figures in brackets):
Total 28 (9)
TWIN 4 (4)
SINGLE 24 (5)
INJURIES 13 (0)
FATALITIES 5 (0)
CAUSES:
Singles: 16 engine failures, 4 fuel starvations, 2 loss of control, 1 fire (and that ignores the partridge in the pear tree who got there due to loss of control.) In the same period single helis had just 5 total : 2 engine, 2 trans, 1 loss of control.
Twins: 3 engine failures, 1 fuel. (Twin helis 2 engine, 1 trans, 1 lightning strike.)
Additionally there were 2 incidents of liferafts failing to inflate and one incident cause by floats coming loose.
Why are we being singled out ? Why are helis being asked to do more than fixed wing when it is plain that any problems lie firmly in the FW camp ?
Total 28 (9)
TWIN 4 (4)
SINGLE 24 (5)
INJURIES 13 (0)
FATALITIES 5 (0)
CAUSES:
Singles: 16 engine failures, 4 fuel starvations, 2 loss of control, 1 fire (and that ignores the partridge in the pear tree who got there due to loss of control.) In the same period single helis had just 5 total : 2 engine, 2 trans, 1 loss of control.
Twins: 3 engine failures, 1 fuel. (Twin helis 2 engine, 1 trans, 1 lightning strike.)
Additionally there were 2 incidents of liferafts failing to inflate and one incident cause by floats coming loose.
Why are we being singled out ? Why are helis being asked to do more than fixed wing when it is plain that any problems lie firmly in the FW camp ?
Last edited by headsethair; 18th Dec 2003 at 00:45.
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Headsethair -
I thought the single helis had 5 ditchings - your bracketed comparison figures show them as having had 2??
I dont think there is any point trying to compare helis and fixed-wings. These stats are all well and good, but it's impossible to make a case without knowing the number of flights involved to give a percentage figure of flights ending in the drink.
And to be honest, how well would we really come out in a straight comparison vs single fixed-wing, when the air over the English Channel in summer is chock-a-block with small planks on their way to France for lunch? There may have been 5 times more fixed-wing incidents, but check out Le Touq on a sunny weekend and see what the ratio of G-Planks to G-Helos is. I think you'll find it well in excess of 5:1.
I totally agree that if people want to risk their lives flying single-engined over water, rotary or fixed-wing, then the CAA should let them get on with it.
If you try to justify the "no floats" argument by comparing incidents vs fixed-wing, I think you're on a loser. On the other hand if you point to the actual low NUMBER of helicopter incidents over that period, you might be heading along on the right lines.
I thought the single helis had 5 ditchings - your bracketed comparison figures show them as having had 2??
I dont think there is any point trying to compare helis and fixed-wings. These stats are all well and good, but it's impossible to make a case without knowing the number of flights involved to give a percentage figure of flights ending in the drink.
And to be honest, how well would we really come out in a straight comparison vs single fixed-wing, when the air over the English Channel in summer is chock-a-block with small planks on their way to France for lunch? There may have been 5 times more fixed-wing incidents, but check out Le Touq on a sunny weekend and see what the ratio of G-Planks to G-Helos is. I think you'll find it well in excess of 5:1.
I totally agree that if people want to risk their lives flying single-engined over water, rotary or fixed-wing, then the CAA should let them get on with it.
If you try to justify the "no floats" argument by comparing incidents vs fixed-wing, I think you're on a loser. On the other hand if you point to the actual low NUMBER of helicopter incidents over that period, you might be heading along on the right lines.