Apache down, Cobra not
Thread Starter
Joined: Mar 2004
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From: ?
Yes, there is a post. It was the one I posted before.
I tried to tell you that the Palestinensians have no MANPAD's. That's why the Israeli Gunships can operate at an altitude where they don't expose themselves to gunfire. I don't believe that it is an advantage regarding a MANPAD threat, to fly at 3000 ft because of the reaction time for counter measures. The important thing for the safety for an helicopter is the cone of threat. The higher the helicopter, the larger the area at the ground from where the helicopter can be shot. A low and fast flying helicopter is a hard target for a missile. Everybody who operated a Stinger knows that.
I tried to tell you that the Palestinensians have no MANPAD's. That's why the Israeli Gunships can operate at an altitude where they don't expose themselves to gunfire. I don't believe that it is an advantage regarding a MANPAD threat, to fly at 3000 ft because of the reaction time for counter measures. The important thing for the safety for an helicopter is the cone of threat. The higher the helicopter, the larger the area at the ground from where the helicopter can be shot. A low and fast flying helicopter is a hard target for a missile. Everybody who operated a Stinger knows that.
Joined: Dec 2001
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 3
From: Philadelphia PA
More info from a source recently returned from the theater...
His comment was that the Army were entirely too predictable. They flew along the same routes at 500' agl, in tight formation a lot of the time.
He cited several examples of Army helicopters that had been shot down where they had been flying and turning over the same point on the ground for several days.
Navy and Marine helicopters were grounded if their countermeasures were unserviceable, where many Army helicopters didn't even have countermeasures...
Evidently the Army general in charge of aviation wouldn't let his people fly below 500' because he was certain he would lose more to flying into the ground than to enemy fire.
This particular individual said they never went above 50' agl unless it was to cross power lines....
Hope that helps return this to the subject at hand.
His comment was that the Army were entirely too predictable. They flew along the same routes at 500' agl, in tight formation a lot of the time.
He cited several examples of Army helicopters that had been shot down where they had been flying and turning over the same point on the ground for several days.
Navy and Marine helicopters were grounded if their countermeasures were unserviceable, where many Army helicopters didn't even have countermeasures...
Evidently the Army general in charge of aviation wouldn't let his people fly below 500' because he was certain he would lose more to flying into the ground than to enemy fire.
This particular individual said they never went above 50' agl unless it was to cross power lines....
Hope that helps return this to the subject at hand.
Joined: Jul 2001
Posts: 1,084
Likes: 1
From: the cockpit
Lu, I guess you are going to go off the grapes again....
To paraphrase your post then you could have said:
"I found no supporting evidence for my claim that the US Army lied to it's Apache pilots about invunerability and therefore withdraw it unconditionally. Although the Apache was designed to be ballistically tolerant, no one in their right mind would believe it would survive a ZSU-234 engagement".
BTW, the word "invulnerability", is that USA speak for "not vulnerable" or "survivability"?
Robbo and hotzen go back a page and review Nick's three types of weapon environments. That may add to your comments.
Shawn, are you saying that the US Army aviators have been ordered to fly above 500 ft AGL? I guess that MANPADS are not considered a threat then. I have always tried to avoid the small arms envelope - fly 50 ft or less, or NB 2000ft unless you absolutely have to. At 500 ft, they are smack bang in the least survivable height band for SA - sounds like Somalia where they were apparently shot down from 300 ish ft.
To paraphrase your post then you could have said:
"I found no supporting evidence for my claim that the US Army lied to it's Apache pilots about invunerability and therefore withdraw it unconditionally. Although the Apache was designed to be ballistically tolerant, no one in their right mind would believe it would survive a ZSU-234 engagement".
BTW, the word "invulnerability", is that USA speak for "not vulnerable" or "survivability"?
Robbo and hotzen go back a page and review Nick's three types of weapon environments. That may add to your comments.
Shawn, are you saying that the US Army aviators have been ordered to fly above 500 ft AGL? I guess that MANPADS are not considered a threat then. I have always tried to avoid the small arms envelope - fly 50 ft or less, or NB 2000ft unless you absolutely have to. At 500 ft, they are smack bang in the least survivable height band for SA - sounds like Somalia where they were apparently shot down from 300 ish ft.
Joined: May 2002
Aviation Qualifications: ATP+Mil
Posts: 18,633
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From: Downeast
Shawn,
In Somalia, after the Bad Day event, the US Army put in place a VFR airway setup around Moga. We inherited that routine and it made me wonder then why such things happen. Knowing the Army mentality...it does not surprise me that similar things happened in Iraq. The key is in making one self "unpredictable" as possible. If I wish to mug you...all you have to do is follow the same path at the same time at the same height at the same speed......and WHAM! GOTCHA!
Using Hover fire techniques in the open desert or an urban area that is not divided by a MLR with opposing forces nicely divided between over there and right here....just sets the guys up for trouble. In Somalia, Task Force Ranger became predictable and used the same tactics repeatedly. Then to do it in the daylight to boot....just begged for trouble.
My hat is off to the courage those guys demonstrated during that fight....but I would suggest it could have been avoided by use of different tactics. Critiques of that action confirm that.
In Somalia, after the Bad Day event, the US Army put in place a VFR airway setup around Moga. We inherited that routine and it made me wonder then why such things happen. Knowing the Army mentality...it does not surprise me that similar things happened in Iraq. The key is in making one self "unpredictable" as possible. If I wish to mug you...all you have to do is follow the same path at the same time at the same height at the same speed......and WHAM! GOTCHA!
Using Hover fire techniques in the open desert or an urban area that is not divided by a MLR with opposing forces nicely divided between over there and right here....just sets the guys up for trouble. In Somalia, Task Force Ranger became predictable and used the same tactics repeatedly. Then to do it in the daylight to boot....just begged for trouble.
My hat is off to the courage those guys demonstrated during that fight....but I would suggest it could have been avoided by use of different tactics. Critiques of that action confirm that.
Joined: Dec 2001
Posts: 1,835
Likes: 3
From: Philadelphia PA
I find it interesting that Marine officers are almost required to read Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War'. I have yet to hear an Army person quoting it.
They may know how many rivets there are in the tailboom, however...
They may know how many rivets there are in the tailboom, however...
