Jaguars and S/Puma in near miss over North Sea
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UK CAA Report on July 2002 near miss
Report from The Press and Journal (Scotland):
Looking on the CAA UK site, I found the original:
And finally:
** Analysis of Airprox in UK Airspace - Report No 9: July-Dec 2002
Published October 2003
CAA 'AGHAST' AT JETS NEAR-MISS WITH HELICOPTER
27 October 2003
Two RAF jets and a civilian helicopter came within moments of colliding off the coast of Aberdeen in July last year, it has emerged.
The Jaguar jets passed just 100ft above the Super Puma helicopter as it was returning to Aberdeen from an oil rig.
Details of the incident have been published by the Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) UK Airprox Board.
Its report states that a controller at Lossiemouth caused the near miss by advising the Jaguar pilots to take the same path and by giving misleading information about the helicopter's height.
The military controller was not disciplined because he was only advising the aircraft, which were not directly under his control.
They were not in cloud and were ultimately responsible for seeing what was ahead.
The lead jet only spotted the helicopter when it was 300 metres away and it was too late to take evasive action.
The report said: "At these speeds, the helicopter pilot had about five seconds to effect a change in his flight path."
The pilot pitched the nose of his craft down to avoid the jets, which passed 100ft above.
The CAA report said confusion arose partly because the air traffic controller told the lead pilot - who was instructing a refresher student - that there was another aircraft in the area but did not say it was a helicopter.
The pilot wrongly assumed it must be one of the three Jaguars which made up his own formation. The jets were then cleared to turn into a flight path heading toward the Super Puma.
The board's report said: "Pilot and controller members were aghast that the controller could have done so without clarifying if the Jaguar crew could see the helicopter."
The report said it had been a "close call". It added: "This should be used as an example to aircrew and controllers of how accumulated small errors can lead to dangerous situations. Poor communication, assumptions and a lack of positive control all contributed."
The CAA report did not identify the operator of the Super Puma.
27 October 2003
Two RAF jets and a civilian helicopter came within moments of colliding off the coast of Aberdeen in July last year, it has emerged.
The Jaguar jets passed just 100ft above the Super Puma helicopter as it was returning to Aberdeen from an oil rig.
Details of the incident have been published by the Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) UK Airprox Board.
Its report states that a controller at Lossiemouth caused the near miss by advising the Jaguar pilots to take the same path and by giving misleading information about the helicopter's height.
The military controller was not disciplined because he was only advising the aircraft, which were not directly under his control.
They were not in cloud and were ultimately responsible for seeing what was ahead.
The lead jet only spotted the helicopter when it was 300 metres away and it was too late to take evasive action.
The report said: "At these speeds, the helicopter pilot had about five seconds to effect a change in his flight path."
The pilot pitched the nose of his craft down to avoid the jets, which passed 100ft above.
The CAA report said confusion arose partly because the air traffic controller told the lead pilot - who was instructing a refresher student - that there was another aircraft in the area but did not say it was a helicopter.
The pilot wrongly assumed it must be one of the three Jaguars which made up his own formation. The jets were then cleared to turn into a flight path heading toward the Super Puma.
The board's report said: "Pilot and controller members were aghast that the controller could have done so without clarifying if the Jaguar crew could see the helicopter."
The report said it had been a "close call". It added: "This should be used as an example to aircrew and controllers of how accumulated small errors can lead to dangerous situations. Poor communication, assumptions and a lack of positive control all contributed."
The CAA report did not identify the operator of the Super Puma.
Airprox Report - 3 July 2002
An Aircraft Proximity (Airprox) report has been filed with the Civil Aviation Authority involving two military jets and a Super Puma Helicopter. The incident took place 26 miles north north west of Aberdeen on Wednesday 3 July at 1005 hours.
The Super Puma Helicopter was en-route to Aberdeen and was receiving an air traffic service from RAF Lossiemouth. The incident took place at approximately 1,000 feet.
These details are subject to assessment by the independent UK Airprox Board. During 2001 there were 82 airprox incidents involving civil air transport and 78% of these were assessed as having no risk of collision.
An Aircraft Proximity (Airprox) report has been filed with the Civil Aviation Authority involving two military jets and a Super Puma Helicopter. The incident took place 26 miles north north west of Aberdeen on Wednesday 3 July at 1005 hours.
The Super Puma Helicopter was en-route to Aberdeen and was receiving an air traffic service from RAF Lossiemouth. The incident took place at approximately 1,000 feet.
These details are subject to assessment by the independent UK Airprox Board. During 2001 there were 82 airprox incidents involving civil air transport and 78% of these were assessed as having no risk of collision.
Airprox 104/02 on 3 Jul 02 - involving Jaguars x 2 and an AS332L2 : Risk B **
RECOMMENDATION: That the MOD considers, through HQ STC Flight Safety and Ops Spt ATC, a review of the guidance promulgated to military controllers in JSP 318A, about expressing the vertical position of ac by reference to the appropriate height/altitude/flight level datum when included within traffic information.
MoD Action: The MoD considers that the training received by military controllers should leave them in no doubt as to the dangers of mixing height, altitude and flight level information. Likewise the need for caution is emphasised in JSP 318A. However, several areas within JSP 318A have been identified where improvements could be made and these are being implemented in due course in the new JSP 552. Meanwhile, these changes and lessons learned will be highlighted to military ATC controllers, the Central ATC School, the ATC Examining Board and the ASACS community.
RECOMMENDATION: That the MOD considers, through HQ STC Flight Safety and Ops Spt ATC, a review of the guidance promulgated to military controllers in JSP 318A, about expressing the vertical position of ac by reference to the appropriate height/altitude/flight level datum when included within traffic information.
MoD Action: The MoD considers that the training received by military controllers should leave them in no doubt as to the dangers of mixing height, altitude and flight level information. Likewise the need for caution is emphasised in JSP 318A. However, several areas within JSP 318A have been identified where improvements could be made and these are being implemented in due course in the new JSP 552. Meanwhile, these changes and lessons learned will be highlighted to military ATC controllers, the Central ATC School, the ATC Examining Board and the ASACS community.
** Analysis of Airprox in UK Airspace - Report No 9: July-Dec 2002
Published October 2003
Last edited by Heliport; 31st Oct 2003 at 00:26.
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This is an interesting one.
Yes, there are always near misses - sorry, "Airproxes". Yes, people make mistakes.
However...
One thing we all know about the North Sea is that there are oilrigs out there, which need servicing, and there needs to be transit routes to and from them.
Another thing we all know is that there are military ranges out there, and refuelling areas, and there needs to be transit routes to and from these.
We also always know that there are other aircraft using the same airspace as us.
As soon as we make assumptions, we put ourselves in danger. Assume that you are the only aircraft operating "in these conditions" or "nobody else ever uses this route" and you reduce the margin of safety.
Use a lower level of ATC service because of the workload on you or the perceived workload on the controller and you reduce the safety margins further. Allow yourself to be distracted by something in the cabin or something your mate is doing on the flight deck (or in his cockpit) and you reduce the safety margins even further.
How far do they need to be reduced to cause an accident? Nobody knows - until it's too late.
In airspace like the North Sea, around Newcastle and various other sites, military and civilian traffic merge well only with extreme caution and vigilance on both parts.
I can't find the original report of this incident, but it sounds like there was a severe amount of complacency and lack of communication on the part of one or two military personnel here.
There is no excuse whatsoever for complacency, or for making assumptions. Assumptions are the mother of all f
k-ups. What's more, they make people dead.
Military traffic is still (UKAB Report 9) causing far more than its fair share of airproxes. It is time that the MoD (and particularly the RAF) recognised there is a severe problem in their ranks, and addressed it.
Despite a steady decline in Military flying in UK airspace, Mil:Mil airproxes increased last year by 50%. Incidents in which safety was not assured increased by 74%. They were involved in half of all last year's airprox incidents. In the great majority of Mil:Civil airproxes, the military pilots was deemed to be at fault.
Yet the message we keep getting is how professional they are. I don't deny that. But I would argue that perhaps their training is severely lacking.
It is also worth noting that the vast majority of airprox incidents last year are attributed to controller, rather than pilot, error.
Yes, there are always near misses - sorry, "Airproxes". Yes, people make mistakes.
However...
One thing we all know about the North Sea is that there are oilrigs out there, which need servicing, and there needs to be transit routes to and from them.
Another thing we all know is that there are military ranges out there, and refuelling areas, and there needs to be transit routes to and from these.
We also always know that there are other aircraft using the same airspace as us.
As soon as we make assumptions, we put ourselves in danger. Assume that you are the only aircraft operating "in these conditions" or "nobody else ever uses this route" and you reduce the margin of safety.
Use a lower level of ATC service because of the workload on you or the perceived workload on the controller and you reduce the safety margins further. Allow yourself to be distracted by something in the cabin or something your mate is doing on the flight deck (or in his cockpit) and you reduce the safety margins even further.
How far do they need to be reduced to cause an accident? Nobody knows - until it's too late.
In airspace like the North Sea, around Newcastle and various other sites, military and civilian traffic merge well only with extreme caution and vigilance on both parts.
I can't find the original report of this incident, but it sounds like there was a severe amount of complacency and lack of communication on the part of one or two military personnel here.
There is no excuse whatsoever for complacency, or for making assumptions. Assumptions are the mother of all f
k-ups. What's more, they make people dead.Military traffic is still (UKAB Report 9) causing far more than its fair share of airproxes. It is time that the MoD (and particularly the RAF) recognised there is a severe problem in their ranks, and addressed it.
Despite a steady decline in Military flying in UK airspace, Mil:Mil airproxes increased last year by 50%. Incidents in which safety was not assured increased by 74%. They were involved in half of all last year's airprox incidents. In the great majority of Mil:Civil airproxes, the military pilots was deemed to be at fault.
Yet the message we keep getting is how professional they are. I don't deny that. But I would argue that perhaps their training is severely lacking.
It is also worth noting that the vast majority of airprox incidents last year are attributed to controller, rather than pilot, error.
Last edited by HugMonster; 2nd Nov 2003 at 22:04.
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As a foreign ATCO, I've not been impressed with the RAF fast jet flight safety culture. Airspace bust and total lack of nowledge regarding (our) national rules and procedures seem to be the order of the day.
Btw: CAOC3 grounded a sqd from same homebase as these Jags
last winter, they did however get to fly after a new and extensive "in-brief".
Btw: CAOC3 grounded a sqd from same homebase as these Jags
last winter, they did however get to fly after a new and extensive "in-brief".
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There have been quite a few cases of foreign NATO pilots receiving inadequate briefings in the UK, as well. Consequently, their understanding of the rules and procedures is also inadequate, and their performance similarly below par. It's not just RAF pilots misbehaving in the skies above Tromsų.
In this case, however, RAF pilots were in UK airspace which, presumably, they knew well, and knew the possibility of helos operating between the rigs and the mainland.
Furthermore, one assumes that the ATCO could see the relative speed of the aircraft on his screen, yet failed to alert the Jaguar mates to the likely traffic type.
I echo the comments above. This was, as far as I can see, a case of complacency, lack of attention to detail and lack of professionalism.
In this case, however, RAF pilots were in UK airspace which, presumably, they knew well, and knew the possibility of helos operating between the rigs and the mainland.
Furthermore, one assumes that the ATCO could see the relative speed of the aircraft on his screen, yet failed to alert the Jaguar mates to the likely traffic type.
I echo the comments above. This was, as far as I can see, a case of complacency, lack of attention to detail and lack of professionalism.
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Try this link for the consolidated stats.
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/423/Analys...t%20No%209.pdf
I think you will find that there are a number of intersting messages that can be taken on board.
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/423/Analys...t%20No%209.pdf
I think you will find that there are a number of intersting messages that can be taken on board.
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M609
Link to Airprox Reports
These are the latest reports.
You'll see 'Airprox Archive' in the menu box on the left of the screen for previous reports.
Link to Airprox Reports
These are the latest reports.
You'll see 'Airprox Archive' in the menu box on the left of the screen for previous reports.
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It's not just the fast jets!
(I have posted this in both Military Aircrew and Rotorheads)
The military aircraft and those who support them (FRA etc) seem to be increasingly disregarding all the information printed on their charts with the introduction of the MDA's. They also seem to miss the fact that the base of most MDA's are well above the HMR's for a reason, but still insist on conducting exercises at low level below them, right in the teeth of sustained helicopter operations. We have a JMC on at the moment and all the visiting aircraft call us as per the ACN, but local based jets (no names, no pack drill) still get in the way and make life difficult for everyone.
Do these crews actually brief the HMR's? It seemingly is becoming the norm to ignore them and use the "It's class G mate..." excuse. Class G it may be, but I always thought CFS tought AIRMANSHIP as well!
Believe it or not, it is not always Air Traffic's fault when two aircraft get close in the North Sea, especially when the aircraft are not always in radar cover, or are at the limits of cover. Military Fast Jet jockeys are reluctant to tell even their own controllers (both ATC and Fighter Controllers)what they are doing and the first we both know is when a pilot calls to say "I'd like to report an airprox".
At my unit, it is very difficult even when providing the highest service we can (Modified RAS) and with the aircrew being VERY aware of other airspace users, a 5 ship of fast movers working SFC to FL240 end up in a mix up all round your Super Puma doing 120 kts. Where does he go? Which way to turn? Climb? Descend? Co-ordinate with a Fighter Control Unit? Very difficult!
We can only provide crews with the information we have, which at best can be ancient history by the time we get it.
To the Mil guys reading this, I would be interested in your views on the North sea HMR's and why you get stuck in about them day after day seemingly disregarding the promulgated routes, and the information passed on traffic through Buchan and Neat. Each one of these helis carries up to 21 people!
To the North sea crews reading this, Hope this helps to emphasise that we are trying our best to keep you in the loop with regard to the mil activity and to avoid it, but we have, at present, no way of esuring that you wont come face to face with a fast pointy thing on the HMR's (especially when working Information...remember no radar!).
Rant over. Not pointing the finger at anyone, just keen to get views!!
TJFC
The military aircraft and those who support them (FRA etc) seem to be increasingly disregarding all the information printed on their charts with the introduction of the MDA's. They also seem to miss the fact that the base of most MDA's are well above the HMR's for a reason, but still insist on conducting exercises at low level below them, right in the teeth of sustained helicopter operations. We have a JMC on at the moment and all the visiting aircraft call us as per the ACN, but local based jets (no names, no pack drill) still get in the way and make life difficult for everyone.
Do these crews actually brief the HMR's? It seemingly is becoming the norm to ignore them and use the "It's class G mate..." excuse. Class G it may be, but I always thought CFS tought AIRMANSHIP as well!
Believe it or not, it is not always Air Traffic's fault when two aircraft get close in the North Sea, especially when the aircraft are not always in radar cover, or are at the limits of cover. Military Fast Jet jockeys are reluctant to tell even their own controllers (both ATC and Fighter Controllers)what they are doing and the first we both know is when a pilot calls to say "I'd like to report an airprox".
At my unit, it is very difficult even when providing the highest service we can (Modified RAS) and with the aircrew being VERY aware of other airspace users, a 5 ship of fast movers working SFC to FL240 end up in a mix up all round your Super Puma doing 120 kts. Where does he go? Which way to turn? Climb? Descend? Co-ordinate with a Fighter Control Unit? Very difficult!
We can only provide crews with the information we have, which at best can be ancient history by the time we get it.
To the Mil guys reading this, I would be interested in your views on the North sea HMR's and why you get stuck in about them day after day seemingly disregarding the promulgated routes, and the information passed on traffic through Buchan and Neat. Each one of these helis carries up to 21 people!
To the North sea crews reading this, Hope this helps to emphasise that we are trying our best to keep you in the loop with regard to the mil activity and to avoid it, but we have, at present, no way of esuring that you wont come face to face with a fast pointy thing on the HMR's (especially when working Information...remember no radar!).
Rant over. Not pointing the finger at anyone, just keen to get views!!
TJFC
