PHI helicopter down in GoM
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Far to many of the accidents, assuming they are recorded as such, seem to be investigated at a superficial level, presumably at best being done by FAA for NTSB.
I wonder if its time the NTSB did the sort of systematic systemic study they did on bush flying in Alaska in the late 70s (again a bunch used to doing the business in extreme conditions) but with a bit more effort on the operators and FAA.
I still find it a little surprising that there are about 25 heli operators, of all sizes, working offshore in the GoM.
I wonder if its time the NTSB did the sort of systematic systemic study they did on bush flying in Alaska in the late 70s (again a bunch used to doing the business in extreme conditions) but with a bit more effort on the operators and FAA.
I still find it a little surprising that there are about 25 heli operators, of all sizes, working offshore in the GoM.
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I'm a little surprised that Europeans still think the US does things the way they're done in Europe. That has never been the case, in any category.
The offshore helicopter industry here is more mature - we've been flying offshore oil support since 1949, and a culture has formed, which is difficult if not impossible to change, of get-it-done-whatever-the-cost. That, coupled with the current tide of crippling & eliminating government oversight over absolutely everything, means the FAA and the government in general is going to do as little as possible, down to a goal of nothing at all. The requirements for reporting an aircraft incident as an accident are different here, this is nothing new. Don't expect it to change. Helicopter pilots here are incredibly conservative, most take Rush Limbaugh as a model, applaud the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, and acutely resent any government regulation.
To start an offshore helicopter business, all you need is money (or credit) in the bank and an optimistic outlook. Anyone can do it, and it's done every day. FAA oversight tends to be minimal, and the smaller the company the less attention the FAA pays. They put minimums in the operations manual, & then it's just a wink and a nod. If the FAA asks, they can show the minimums, & they'll swear they never permit breaking them. It can never be proven, unless the acts are really egregious. I know of one operator that essentially had no weather minimums, and the only flight time ever logged was time billed to the customer. Ferry and maintenance time just wasn't logged at all, so inspections were based only on customer time. One pilot finally called the FAA, and finally they pulled the company's certificate for a couple of months, the company swore never to do it again, & they were back in business as usual. Actually punishing an operator for pressuring pilots to fly below minimums has never happened, nor will it.
I don't claim any of this is intelligent, I'm just reporting the facts.
The offshore helicopter industry here is more mature - we've been flying offshore oil support since 1949, and a culture has formed, which is difficult if not impossible to change, of get-it-done-whatever-the-cost. That, coupled with the current tide of crippling & eliminating government oversight over absolutely everything, means the FAA and the government in general is going to do as little as possible, down to a goal of nothing at all. The requirements for reporting an aircraft incident as an accident are different here, this is nothing new. Don't expect it to change. Helicopter pilots here are incredibly conservative, most take Rush Limbaugh as a model, applaud the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, and acutely resent any government regulation.
To start an offshore helicopter business, all you need is money (or credit) in the bank and an optimistic outlook. Anyone can do it, and it's done every day. FAA oversight tends to be minimal, and the smaller the company the less attention the FAA pays. They put minimums in the operations manual, & then it's just a wink and a nod. If the FAA asks, they can show the minimums, & they'll swear they never permit breaking them. It can never be proven, unless the acts are really egregious. I know of one operator that essentially had no weather minimums, and the only flight time ever logged was time billed to the customer. Ferry and maintenance time just wasn't logged at all, so inspections were based only on customer time. One pilot finally called the FAA, and finally they pulled the company's certificate for a couple of months, the company swore never to do it again, & they were back in business as usual. Actually punishing an operator for pressuring pilots to fly below minimums has never happened, nor will it.
I don't claim any of this is intelligent, I'm just reporting the facts.
Gomer Pylot wrote:
I've noticed that too, and you're right, Gomer. It *is* funny, how many helicopter pilots here in the US do look at that drug-dealing, loud-mouthed bigot as some sort of God. Rush Limbaugh, that is. Makes you wonder...
Or maybe not. Helicopter pilots are fiercely independent. Their autonomous nature spills over into other areas of their lives. Witness how hard it is to get them to organize. Witness how many of them are dissatisfied with the federal government, no matter which party is in power. It's bizarre. They are nothing like airline (or other fixed-wing) pilots, as esteemed newsman Harry Reasoner pointed out all those years ago in his essay, "Helicopter Pilots are Different."
But how does this affect their decision-making process when it comes to weather? On one hand, you might think that their "You can't tell ME what to do!" attitude might prevent them from being coerced into bad situations. But there's another more prevalent attitude: "I'm all alone and I've got to get the job done." Too eager to please. And that's what leads to weather accidents. We tend to think that the "White Knight Syndrome" only applies to EMS pilots. In fact, helicopter pilots in all market segments are similarly afflicted.
On the other hand, sometimes you get forced into that uncomfortable space between the rock and the hard place. Weather decisions are not always cut-and-dried. It's nice to say, "Just make a 180," but sometimes when you've been zig-zagging your way toward someplace, there is no guarantee that a simple 180 will bring you back into the clear.
Which begs the question: Should a VFR pilot in the GOM turn around at the first sign of weather below his cross-country minimums? If so, there'd be whole days (if not weeks) when not a lot got done in the GOM. Obviously, some compromises have to be made between what's totally safe and what's practical.
The reality is that you sometimes fly in crummy weather that is perhaps a little above your company minimums. Then you run into a line of crap, but it looks isolated, so you deviate around it, do another "Direct-To" on the GPS and keep going. On a long flight, this may happen more than once. Maybe there are enough "clear" (read: above-minimum) areas to persuade you to keep going. Maybe you're talking to the rig/platform on the FM and they SWEAR it's clear-blue-and-22.
And maybe you try to zig around one bad area, but it puts you into a "room" with no exit. So you circle but find that the way you came in is blocked (weather does move, especially when the wind is high)...and there's no platform visible to set down on. Your heart goes into your throat as you look at that tiny artificial horizon that's not even directly in front of you but skewed off to the left (or you're in a BO105 that doesn't even have the flight instruments arranged in the "sacred six"). And you think to yourself, "Hmm. Might have pushed it just a *bit* too far this time, mate."
Been there.
And no amount of regulation, oversight or training will ever prevent situations like that from occurring. There are no easy solutions. No matter how good the IFR pilot is, 206's are not good IFR platforms. Nothing is without enough fuel to punch-in and go someplace with good weather. And if we carried that, then we wouldn't be able to carry much payload.
It might sound cavalierly negligent to say, "Weather accidents in the GOM are just the nature of the business," but I believe that it is true. We've always had weather accidents, and we likely always will. But if you really, really want to reduce them to an "acceptable" level, I would focus my pilot training on recognizing the peculiar weather patterns that exist in the GOM. It took me a long time to gather my stash of knowledge, and there was no book from which to learn it.
Perhaps someone should write one.
Helicopter pilots here are incredibly conservative, most take Rush Limbaugh as a model, applaud the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger, and acutely resent any government regulation.
Or maybe not. Helicopter pilots are fiercely independent. Their autonomous nature spills over into other areas of their lives. Witness how hard it is to get them to organize. Witness how many of them are dissatisfied with the federal government, no matter which party is in power. It's bizarre. They are nothing like airline (or other fixed-wing) pilots, as esteemed newsman Harry Reasoner pointed out all those years ago in his essay, "Helicopter Pilots are Different."
But how does this affect their decision-making process when it comes to weather? On one hand, you might think that their "You can't tell ME what to do!" attitude might prevent them from being coerced into bad situations. But there's another more prevalent attitude: "I'm all alone and I've got to get the job done." Too eager to please. And that's what leads to weather accidents. We tend to think that the "White Knight Syndrome" only applies to EMS pilots. In fact, helicopter pilots in all market segments are similarly afflicted.
On the other hand, sometimes you get forced into that uncomfortable space between the rock and the hard place. Weather decisions are not always cut-and-dried. It's nice to say, "Just make a 180," but sometimes when you've been zig-zagging your way toward someplace, there is no guarantee that a simple 180 will bring you back into the clear.
Which begs the question: Should a VFR pilot in the GOM turn around at the first sign of weather below his cross-country minimums? If so, there'd be whole days (if not weeks) when not a lot got done in the GOM. Obviously, some compromises have to be made between what's totally safe and what's practical.
The reality is that you sometimes fly in crummy weather that is perhaps a little above your company minimums. Then you run into a line of crap, but it looks isolated, so you deviate around it, do another "Direct-To" on the GPS and keep going. On a long flight, this may happen more than once. Maybe there are enough "clear" (read: above-minimum) areas to persuade you to keep going. Maybe you're talking to the rig/platform on the FM and they SWEAR it's clear-blue-and-22.
And maybe you try to zig around one bad area, but it puts you into a "room" with no exit. So you circle but find that the way you came in is blocked (weather does move, especially when the wind is high)...and there's no platform visible to set down on. Your heart goes into your throat as you look at that tiny artificial horizon that's not even directly in front of you but skewed off to the left (or you're in a BO105 that doesn't even have the flight instruments arranged in the "sacred six"). And you think to yourself, "Hmm. Might have pushed it just a *bit* too far this time, mate."
Been there.
And no amount of regulation, oversight or training will ever prevent situations like that from occurring. There are no easy solutions. No matter how good the IFR pilot is, 206's are not good IFR platforms. Nothing is without enough fuel to punch-in and go someplace with good weather. And if we carried that, then we wouldn't be able to carry much payload.
It might sound cavalierly negligent to say, "Weather accidents in the GOM are just the nature of the business," but I believe that it is true. We've always had weather accidents, and we likely always will. But if you really, really want to reduce them to an "acceptable" level, I would focus my pilot training on recognizing the peculiar weather patterns that exist in the GOM. It took me a long time to gather my stash of knowledge, and there was no book from which to learn it.
Perhaps someone should write one.
PPRuNe Time
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Missing pilot named
HOUSTON (Dow Jones)--The Coast Guard called off a search late Sunday for any survivors of a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico, the second such accident befalling Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHEL) in two months.
The accident killed pilot Quan C. Le, 61, who had flown for Petroleum Helicopters since 1980, and two others.
According to the Coast Guard, an offshore supply boat picked up the radio beacon signal from the missing Bell helicopter Friday afternoon from underwater. An oil sheen and debris from the aircraft were also visible in the area.
As reported, the helicopter was shuttling two passengers between offshore oil and gas facilities in the Gulf.
The two workers were employees of Royal Dutch/Shell Group (RD) unit Shell Oil Co. and headed to a Shell-operated natural gas pipeline hub platform, according to a statement from the company.
Shell declined Monday to release the names of the two employees, both of whom worked for the company's Shell Gas Transmission unit.
Ed Gatza, manager of field human resources for Petroleum Helicopters, said the company would continue looking for the aircraft.
"PHI won't stop," he said. "We're continuing with search and recovery efforts."
The company didn't have a statement about the cause of the accident, but Gatza said Le was a "very experienced pilot".
The small helicopter - manufactured by Textron Inc. (TXT) unit Bell Helicopter - disappeared about 10:45 a.m. CDT (1545 GMT) Friday en route to an offshore oil facility about 70 miles south of Cameron, La.
Another Petroleum Helicopters aircraft crashed Aug. 13 when it hit the helipad of an offshore platform while trying to take off, killing three and injuring two others.
According to a preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board, the earlier accident happened as the aircraft lifted off in winds of about 23 knots in the Eugene Island section of the Gulf of Mexico.
Oil and gas companies depend on helicopters to move employees to and from offshore platforms and drilling rigs, especially when storm systems rip through the Gulf.
Petroleum Helicopters transports more than 1 million passengers for the oil and gas industry each year, according to the company's Web site.
source
The accident killed pilot Quan C. Le, 61, who had flown for Petroleum Helicopters since 1980, and two others.
According to the Coast Guard, an offshore supply boat picked up the radio beacon signal from the missing Bell helicopter Friday afternoon from underwater. An oil sheen and debris from the aircraft were also visible in the area.
As reported, the helicopter was shuttling two passengers between offshore oil and gas facilities in the Gulf.
The two workers were employees of Royal Dutch/Shell Group (RD) unit Shell Oil Co. and headed to a Shell-operated natural gas pipeline hub platform, according to a statement from the company.
Shell declined Monday to release the names of the two employees, both of whom worked for the company's Shell Gas Transmission unit.
Ed Gatza, manager of field human resources for Petroleum Helicopters, said the company would continue looking for the aircraft.
"PHI won't stop," he said. "We're continuing with search and recovery efforts."
The company didn't have a statement about the cause of the accident, but Gatza said Le was a "very experienced pilot".
The small helicopter - manufactured by Textron Inc. (TXT) unit Bell Helicopter - disappeared about 10:45 a.m. CDT (1545 GMT) Friday en route to an offshore oil facility about 70 miles south of Cameron, La.
Another Petroleum Helicopters aircraft crashed Aug. 13 when it hit the helipad of an offshore platform while trying to take off, killing three and injuring two others.
According to a preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board, the earlier accident happened as the aircraft lifted off in winds of about 23 knots in the Eugene Island section of the Gulf of Mexico.
Oil and gas companies depend on helicopters to move employees to and from offshore platforms and drilling rigs, especially when storm systems rip through the Gulf.
Petroleum Helicopters transports more than 1 million passengers for the oil and gas industry each year, according to the company's Web site.
source
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PF1, here's a novel idea. How about raising the VFR weather minimums? 500/3 for single-engine and 300/2 for multi-engine are the most conservative that I know of. Many operators use lower. Flying a hundred or two nautical miles with the weather right at those minimums, & there's a good chance they've gone lower both behind you and ahead of you. More than once I've been flying along with a 500' ceiling & decent visibility and had the sky fall on me. Intense rain, visibility nil, and no platform to put it on, no radar to find a platform or the beach or clear weather, it's just get down on the water, go slow, & pray a lot. The 180 turn doesn't always work. If the minimums were higher, it would be harder to get trapped; the chances of that happening are nil, though, because safety just isn't nearly as high a priority as making short-term profits by keeping contracts, & the oil companies just want to get the flights done, a few casualties are just part of making maximum profits. The only way to get things changed is for all the pilots to get together & force the changes, & I certainly won't be holding my breath waiting for that.
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Whilst not wishing to prejudge the reason(s) for this accident, and only in the context of the comments on this thread:
There is some deja vu here. In another thread in a discussion of FARs and their (non) compliance with the ICAO Standard (in the context of the Rules-of-the-Air Annex 2):
it was postulated that the US does not comply with the ICAO Standard, and alleviates helicopters (FAR 91.119(d)), because pilots are quite capable of making appropriate decisions and flying safely without any rule.
Gomer Pylot is very perceptive in his comment;
however, that is not a good reason not to re-assess the operational standards of the GOM (if that is not an oxymoron) now that the accident record has reached unacceptable proportions.
What we must particularly guard against, is the move to export the operational standards of the GOM to the rest of the world - they may be acceptable to the US (which must now be in doubt) but they are not appropriate elsewhere.
It may be that the re-assessment process has already started - an accident such as this is likely to be unacceptable to the Oil Company to which it occurred.
Whilst 'on air' it might be appropriate to comment on 212man's posting and clarify that the statistics given earlier were based on accidents as defined by the FAA (FAA and Europe adopt the ICAO definition of an accident). His comment might be related to the practice of not including ditching incidents when they do not fall within the scope of the definition (when damage does not ensue) - itself quite bizarre.
There is some deja vu here. In another thread in a discussion of FARs and their (non) compliance with the ICAO Standard (in the context of the Rules-of-the-Air Annex 2):
4.6 Except when necessary for take-off or landing, or except by permission from the appropriate authority, a VFR flight shall not be flown:
a) over the congested areas of cities, towns or settlements or over an open-air assembly of persons at a height less than 300 m (1 000 ft) above the highest obstacle within a radius of 600 m from the aircraft;
b) elsewhere than as specified in 4.6 a), at a height less than 150 m (500 ft) above the ground or water.
a) over the congested areas of cities, towns or settlements or over an open-air assembly of persons at a height less than 300 m (1 000 ft) above the highest obstacle within a radius of 600 m from the aircraft;
b) elsewhere than as specified in 4.6 a), at a height less than 150 m (500 ft) above the ground or water.
Gomer Pylot is very perceptive in his comment;
The offshore helicopter industry here is more mature - we've been flying offshore oil support since 1949, and a culture has formed, which is difficult if not impossible to change, of get-it-done-whatever-the-cost.
What we must particularly guard against, is the move to export the operational standards of the GOM to the rest of the world - they may be acceptable to the US (which must now be in doubt) but they are not appropriate elsewhere.
It may be that the re-assessment process has already started - an accident such as this is likely to be unacceptable to the Oil Company to which it occurred.
Whilst 'on air' it might be appropriate to comment on 212man's posting and clarify that the statistics given earlier were based on accidents as defined by the FAA (FAA and Europe adopt the ICAO definition of an accident). His comment might be related to the practice of not including ditching incidents when they do not fall within the scope of the definition (when damage does not ensue) - itself quite bizarre.
That is what I was referring to and, yes, somewhat bizarre.
I agree about the company involved and will watch with interest.
I agree about the company involved and will watch with interest.
"Just a pilot"
Folks, this was AN accident. You can't read anything into it. I knew the pilot and the area, albeit years ago. He was a very, very experienced pilot. Something went terribly awry, and now he's dead. A rule wouldn't have changed that outcome if the threat of death didn't.
There's nothing especially difficult in the area, or indeed, in the GOM. It's a large and mature market with it's own way of doing things. But EMS has it's idiosynchratic methods, as does utility, flight instruction, etc. They relate to the task at hand, nothing more.
Yes, customers ask pilots to do things that are unwise- but not just in the GOM. It happens all the time, in every profession. Knowing what's reasonable and how to accomplish that is what we're paid for. I've refused customer requests thousands of times, as the pilot involved has done -nothing unique or exceptional.
Yes, it's been an especially eventful few months in the Gulf. If anybody knows of a common point in this group of events, beyond geography, I'd like to hear it. The geographic connection is easy- on any flyable day, there are hundreds of helos in the GOM. Hundreds of operations means thousands of operations daily, and millions of pilot decisions. Increased exposure...
There's nothing especially difficult in the area, or indeed, in the GOM. It's a large and mature market with it's own way of doing things. But EMS has it's idiosynchratic methods, as does utility, flight instruction, etc. They relate to the task at hand, nothing more.
Yes, customers ask pilots to do things that are unwise- but not just in the GOM. It happens all the time, in every profession. Knowing what's reasonable and how to accomplish that is what we're paid for. I've refused customer requests thousands of times, as the pilot involved has done -nothing unique or exceptional.
Yes, it's been an especially eventful few months in the Gulf. If anybody knows of a common point in this group of events, beyond geography, I'd like to hear it. The geographic connection is easy- on any flyable day, there are hundreds of helos in the GOM. Hundreds of operations means thousands of operations daily, and millions of pilot decisions. Increased exposure...
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PPFan Writes:"...he merely left out the phrase "when you inadvertently encounter them."
You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off. It makes me believe more and more that Companies think they can get that extra mile by having pilots test the weather a bit more since they have that "Instrument Rating".
It will happen again, just a matter of time. I had a newbie try that on me years ago. headed right for one of those many number class thunderstorms...."I can see under it". I cancelled the mission and she ended up killing herself and a couple others years later in a similar Go/NoGo situation....But she was Instrument Rated.
Experience is no excuse when you mess with Mother Nature, she will give you an extreme spanking.
You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off. It makes me believe more and more that Companies think they can get that extra mile by having pilots test the weather a bit more since they have that "Instrument Rating".
It will happen again, just a matter of time. I had a newbie try that on me years ago. headed right for one of those many number class thunderstorms...."I can see under it". I cancelled the mission and she ended up killing herself and a couple others years later in a similar Go/NoGo situation....But she was Instrument Rated.
Experience is no excuse when you mess with Mother Nature, she will give you an extreme spanking.
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Devil 49
Yes but one of 14 so far this year, five fatal.
Operating Standards and their enforcement!
The statistics were rates not headline figures - the number of helicopters involved in the GOM is not an issue.
Why do pilots constantly defend the indefensible - is it because the common thread running through these accidents is human factors?
My view (having examined all of the accident reports) would be that there is an organisational issue at play here. If here is no predominant common cause then look to a system which does not prevent such accidents.
Folks, this was AN accident. You can't read anything into it.
Yes, it's been an especially eventful few months in the Gulf. If anybody knows of a common point in this group of events, beyond geography, I'd like to hear it. The geographic connection is easy- on any flyable day, there are hundreds of helos in the GOM. Hundreds of operations means thousands of operations daily, and millions of pilot decisions. Increased exposure...
The statistics were rates not headline figures - the number of helicopters involved in the GOM is not an issue.
Why do pilots constantly defend the indefensible - is it because the common thread running through these accidents is human factors?
My view (having examined all of the accident reports) would be that there is an organisational issue at play here. If here is no predominant common cause then look to a system which does not prevent such accidents.
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B Sousa writes
Yes, if you have a radar. Most helicopters here don't.
The truth is that we can beat this dead horse ad infinitum, but it won't change anything. No one in the U.S. government, nor in management in any oil company, nor in any helicopter company, give a rat's a$$ what anyone in a primarily British forum says. Or any other forum, for that matter. What counts is money, and the oil companies have the money, thus the power, to do whatever they want. There will be no more regulation, period. I'll bet the rent money on that.
You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off.
The truth is that we can beat this dead horse ad infinitum, but it won't change anything. No one in the U.S. government, nor in management in any oil company, nor in any helicopter company, give a rat's a$$ what anyone in a primarily British forum says. Or any other forum, for that matter. What counts is money, and the oil companies have the money, thus the power, to do whatever they want. There will be no more regulation, period. I'll bet the rent money on that.
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Looks like the Coast Guard called off the search after three days. I hope the pilot finds happier landings in the big unknown that we will all face someday. Condolenses to the families of the three lost souls. 
It boils down to one of two things I suppose. There are those who get up in the morning ready for another shift and think:
"it'll never happen to me", and there are others who think:
"there isn't a problem doing what I'm doing".
For all those who think outside this psychological twister......
Why are you still doing it?????
I suggest one answer might be:
the person is too weak willed to move on
"it'll never happen to me", and there are others who think:
"there isn't a problem doing what I'm doing".
For all those who think outside this psychological twister......
Why are you still doing it?????
I suggest one answer might be:
the person is too weak willed to move on
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Gomer Pylot writes: "Yes, if you have a radar. Most helicopters here don't. "
Dam Gomer, Im glad to hear that, in 33 years of flying I have never seen Radar in a small helicopter......Im talking about Flight Planning. You know, get a brief before you fly..........Or dont they do that either.
Im not envious of flying the gulf either. Bigger balls than I have. If its over my head its too deep. Just doing tours out of STT or crossing from Florida down Island is just about all I want to see.
Hey, this is an accident that could have been prevented as are most. We all who fly, know that folks get pushed to bring in the money. My original posts were pointing to the fact that VFR Pilots should remain VFR. Inadvertant to me, means someone pushed it for whatever reason. BTDT and have been lucky...Hopefully lessons learned.... To me Companies have an agenda when they want you to fly VFR Equiped Aircraft in VFR Conditions and you MUST have an Instrument rating...... Bet that agenda is $$$$
Stay Safe, you cant cash the check if your dead......
Dam Gomer, Im glad to hear that, in 33 years of flying I have never seen Radar in a small helicopter......Im talking about Flight Planning. You know, get a brief before you fly..........Or dont they do that either.
Im not envious of flying the gulf either. Bigger balls than I have. If its over my head its too deep. Just doing tours out of STT or crossing from Florida down Island is just about all I want to see.
Hey, this is an accident that could have been prevented as are most. We all who fly, know that folks get pushed to bring in the money. My original posts were pointing to the fact that VFR Pilots should remain VFR. Inadvertant to me, means someone pushed it for whatever reason. BTDT and have been lucky...Hopefully lessons learned.... To me Companies have an agenda when they want you to fly VFR Equiped Aircraft in VFR Conditions and you MUST have an Instrument rating...... Bet that agenda is $$$$
Stay Safe, you cant cash the check if your dead......
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If you're offshore, it's difficult if not impossible to see a radar. And lots of us stay offshore the entire hitch. The weather reports you get are what you see out the window, & what you hear on the radio as you dodge around the thunderstorms. There is very little weather reporting offshore. Putting in ASOS systems would cost the government or some company money. Money has been appropriated, but the administration doesn't want to release it. As always, follow the money.
Hey Bert, there are some things you don't understand about the GOM.
Yes, we do flight planning. All of our shore bases have satellite weather. However, most offshore locations do not. And we often find ourselves initiating long platform-to-platform flights without the ability to any in-depth follow-up flight planning other than what was done that morning prior to sunrise, prior to launch.
Not only that, but the various satellite weather providers depict precip in different ways. And they seem to be pretty pessimistic. You'll see large areas of dark green and think, "Gee, it must be raining pretty good there," only to find out that it's not raining at all. Or you'll do the "You Are Here" thing and see that your specific location is under a big yellow blob, yet it's only raining lightly outside. You see enough of this and finally realize that the satellite picture is of some general value but is far from totally accurate.
And Bert, you betray your lack of knowledge of overwater flight when you make statements like, "You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off..." I think you were referring to thunderstorms there, no? Oh Bert, if they were the ONLY thing we had to worry about! But they're not. In fact, running into a thunderstorm is not even high up on the risks, weather-wise. They're pretty easy to see, even in the worst weather we fly in. There are other hazards.
Gomer Pylot mentioned an interesting phenomenon in an earlier post. We all probably think that rain occurs in rather small, isolated areas, like out the bottom of cumulus clouds. But I have been flying along under a fairly even 500 or 600 foot overcast when the sky literally fell - the whole thing just started raining for miles and miles around. One second it's not raining, next second it is - seemingly out of nowhere. When that happens, you can't even turn and run for a clear area. Sometimes the rain is so heavy that you can't see sh*t.
But even that pales next to flying under a solid 500 foot overcast and having fog form underneath you. I'm not talking about little wispy strands of sea fog, but whole areas suddenly turning white. It happened to me on one peculiar November day and I will never forget it. I'd seen fog "roll-in" before; I'd just never seen it just materialize like that. At first, I wasn't at all sure how it would play out. But I called on the radio and found where it was better, and so went there.
I've run into solid walls of creeping fog that a horror movie director would kill to film. I've been flying in fog "mazes" while thinking to myself, "This is REALLY stupid." I've been sitting on platforms and had fog banks over-run the place with a swiftness that I never would have believed. I've seen fog down on the water in 25 knots of wind.
I've seen cold fronts pass through and then back up as warm fronts within the span of a mid-day nap.
I've seen little (what I call) "front-lets" in which there is scant direct evidence other than a sudden, 180 degree shift in wind direction and temperature. If you didn't catch the little burble of turbulence when you flew through it, you might not even notice. In fact, one morning, an Air Log pilot heading to a platform nearby to mine flew through one, missed the change of wind, and crashed as he tried to land in the direction he thought the wind was coming from. The wind on the beach was out of the north; the wind offshore was out of the south. That was an interesting day...
I've seen little lines of cumulus clouds bisecting my flight path in the morning as the sun was starting to warm them. Instead of ducking under, I'd decide to climb over. And sometimes I found that the cloud's growth rate exceeded the climb-ability of my aircraft. Without enough lateral clearance to go between the spires, I'd have to admit defeat, backtrack and just go under like everyone else.
I've seen calm, hot summer days when I'd be flying along at 1,000 feet. The water would be featureless and flat. It, the sky and the air would all merge into the same color grey. The visibility might be 3 miles or 30 miles or .3 miles. If there was not a platform or boat to look at, you simply could not tell. Remember the summer that Mexico had forest fires burning out of control? (Blender Pilot probably does - I think it was around 1995.) That was miserable for us in the GOM as the southerly winds carried all that smoke and soot northward.
Yes, fifteen years of living offshore and flying VFR aircraft in the GOM has let me see some strange and wonderful examples of Mother Nature in all her glory. And yes, there are plenty of hazards out in the GOM other than t-storms.
I'm not saying that an Instrument Rating makes one cocky or cavalier. But if I were running a company, I'd insist that all of my VFR pilots would *NOT* be instrument-rated. I would tell them, "If you go inadvertent-IMC you are GOING to die." Boy, I'll bet you'd see some really conservative pilots then, eh? Sometimes I think that the only reason I ever survived till now is that: a) I knew I was not instrument-current and didn't delude myself that I could "simply" fly on the gauges if necessary; and b) I was often flying a BO105 with the flight instruments arranged in some weird and utterly random way on a console that was well out of my direct vision.
People think that the GOM is a place for barely-qualified pilots to go to build time while waiting for that real job. Not true. Not true at all.
Yes, we do flight planning. All of our shore bases have satellite weather. However, most offshore locations do not. And we often find ourselves initiating long platform-to-platform flights without the ability to any in-depth follow-up flight planning other than what was done that morning prior to sunrise, prior to launch.
Not only that, but the various satellite weather providers depict precip in different ways. And they seem to be pretty pessimistic. You'll see large areas of dark green and think, "Gee, it must be raining pretty good there," only to find out that it's not raining at all. Or you'll do the "You Are Here" thing and see that your specific location is under a big yellow blob, yet it's only raining lightly outside. You see enough of this and finally realize that the satellite picture is of some general value but is far from totally accurate.
And Bert, you betray your lack of knowledge of overwater flight when you make statements like, "You can paint those puppys on radar before you take off..." I think you were referring to thunderstorms there, no? Oh Bert, if they were the ONLY thing we had to worry about! But they're not. In fact, running into a thunderstorm is not even high up on the risks, weather-wise. They're pretty easy to see, even in the worst weather we fly in. There are other hazards.
Gomer Pylot mentioned an interesting phenomenon in an earlier post. We all probably think that rain occurs in rather small, isolated areas, like out the bottom of cumulus clouds. But I have been flying along under a fairly even 500 or 600 foot overcast when the sky literally fell - the whole thing just started raining for miles and miles around. One second it's not raining, next second it is - seemingly out of nowhere. When that happens, you can't even turn and run for a clear area. Sometimes the rain is so heavy that you can't see sh*t.
But even that pales next to flying under a solid 500 foot overcast and having fog form underneath you. I'm not talking about little wispy strands of sea fog, but whole areas suddenly turning white. It happened to me on one peculiar November day and I will never forget it. I'd seen fog "roll-in" before; I'd just never seen it just materialize like that. At first, I wasn't at all sure how it would play out. But I called on the radio and found where it was better, and so went there.
I've run into solid walls of creeping fog that a horror movie director would kill to film. I've been flying in fog "mazes" while thinking to myself, "This is REALLY stupid." I've been sitting on platforms and had fog banks over-run the place with a swiftness that I never would have believed. I've seen fog down on the water in 25 knots of wind.
I've seen cold fronts pass through and then back up as warm fronts within the span of a mid-day nap.
I've seen little (what I call) "front-lets" in which there is scant direct evidence other than a sudden, 180 degree shift in wind direction and temperature. If you didn't catch the little burble of turbulence when you flew through it, you might not even notice. In fact, one morning, an Air Log pilot heading to a platform nearby to mine flew through one, missed the change of wind, and crashed as he tried to land in the direction he thought the wind was coming from. The wind on the beach was out of the north; the wind offshore was out of the south. That was an interesting day...
I've seen little lines of cumulus clouds bisecting my flight path in the morning as the sun was starting to warm them. Instead of ducking under, I'd decide to climb over. And sometimes I found that the cloud's growth rate exceeded the climb-ability of my aircraft. Without enough lateral clearance to go between the spires, I'd have to admit defeat, backtrack and just go under like everyone else.
I've seen calm, hot summer days when I'd be flying along at 1,000 feet. The water would be featureless and flat. It, the sky and the air would all merge into the same color grey. The visibility might be 3 miles or 30 miles or .3 miles. If there was not a platform or boat to look at, you simply could not tell. Remember the summer that Mexico had forest fires burning out of control? (Blender Pilot probably does - I think it was around 1995.) That was miserable for us in the GOM as the southerly winds carried all that smoke and soot northward.
Yes, fifteen years of living offshore and flying VFR aircraft in the GOM has let me see some strange and wonderful examples of Mother Nature in all her glory. And yes, there are plenty of hazards out in the GOM other than t-storms.
I'm not saying that an Instrument Rating makes one cocky or cavalier. But if I were running a company, I'd insist that all of my VFR pilots would *NOT* be instrument-rated. I would tell them, "If you go inadvertent-IMC you are GOING to die." Boy, I'll bet you'd see some really conservative pilots then, eh? Sometimes I think that the only reason I ever survived till now is that: a) I knew I was not instrument-current and didn't delude myself that I could "simply" fly on the gauges if necessary; and b) I was often flying a BO105 with the flight instruments arranged in some weird and utterly random way on a console that was well out of my direct vision.
People think that the GOM is a place for barely-qualified pilots to go to build time while waiting for that real job. Not true. Not true at all.
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So, as always, it's a money thing. Nobody wants to invest in IFR machines and IF trained pilots to operate them.
Nobody is willing to pay for proper en-route weather reporting.
There is a certain stubborness about flying single engine helicopters with little lifting capacity, so it's not feasible to bolt equipment to it or fly multi crew.
In my experience, VFR only pilots and A/C limit themselves severely in the number of options when things turn sour, while an IFR capable crew and A/C will climb and turn away. In my view, it's not worth the risk.
I'm amazed that where Shell are paying lots of money on improved flight safety over the North Sea, they are willing to let their employees fly single engine VFR in the GOM, losing some of them in the process.
Nobody is willing to pay for proper en-route weather reporting.
There is a certain stubborness about flying single engine helicopters with little lifting capacity, so it's not feasible to bolt equipment to it or fly multi crew.
In my experience, VFR only pilots and A/C limit themselves severely in the number of options when things turn sour, while an IFR capable crew and A/C will climb and turn away. In my view, it's not worth the risk.
I'm amazed that where Shell are paying lots of money on improved flight safety over the North Sea, they are willing to let their employees fly single engine VFR in the GOM, losing some of them in the process.
Gatvol
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PPrune Fan #1. Very Good, You have probabaly said it best on this topic. Many different weather conditions that those of us who do not fly there, will not encounter.....
As to painting things, the example I was using was from a situation I got into while flying from Trent Lott to Panama City. I had been jumping down through crap from Ft Worthless on my way to the islands.. Weather sucked with rain coming in from the Gulf. rather than go throuigh Pensacolas airspace I decided to take it out about 30 miles offshore. No biggie, as I had popouts etc....
I got into some crap that had me flying back to shore to find a place to set down. Broke clear and back to Gulf shores for a breather. Gathered all the old guys I saw who flew there daily, and with their heads together picked their brains on how to go Eastbound. They showed me their Weather Reports which showed all the Squalls heading inland. All were consistent and had about 30 minute breaks between. Timed things right and flew between with no problem. Those were the painting I used.
Again you answered it great as to what you have available. and it probabaly makes more sense to all of us as to why this accident happened.....
As to painting things, the example I was using was from a situation I got into while flying from Trent Lott to Panama City. I had been jumping down through crap from Ft Worthless on my way to the islands.. Weather sucked with rain coming in from the Gulf. rather than go throuigh Pensacolas airspace I decided to take it out about 30 miles offshore. No biggie, as I had popouts etc....
I got into some crap that had me flying back to shore to find a place to set down. Broke clear and back to Gulf shores for a breather. Gathered all the old guys I saw who flew there daily, and with their heads together picked their brains on how to go Eastbound. They showed me their Weather Reports which showed all the Squalls heading inland. All were consistent and had about 30 minute breaks between. Timed things right and flew between with no problem. Those were the painting I used.
Again you answered it great as to what you have available. and it probabaly makes more sense to all of us as to why this accident happened.....