Bmi B734 1989
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Bmi B734 1989
Like most of the folks around my own age (and, okay, maybe even a bit younger 
), I recall hearing about this prang beside a UK motorway, very close to the runway. I remember being saddened by it because I'd always thought that British Midlands was a good operation with very good crews and I always wondered how this had happened. I also remember being relieved to hear that it hadn't been the result of terrorism but, being out of the loop for progress in the investigation, I never heard the final report of the cause.
You might laugh now but I've finally seen something that appears to be the full story of the prang, on "Seconds from Disaster" on the National Geographic Channel. If this report was as factual as it seems to have been, there was NO REQUIREMENT for crews, converting to the, then, brand new 734, to undergo simulator training. Now, okay, I'm prepared to accept that simulator training might not have detected the problem that caused this tragic disaster, there will always be a nagging doubt that it just MIGHT have brought the scenario to light before there was any loss of life.
The aspect that particularly annoyed me in this prang was that the 734 had been certified by the American FAA, assumably based on the information supplied by Boeing. There was no indication in the 1-hour story I saw to indicate whether or not the American FAA was the subject of litigation as a result of this prang. Yes, Boeing acted very quickly to rectify the fault and simulator flights were mandated thereafter but... was this a case of shutting the gate after the horse had bolted?
I feel sure that this prang would have been discussed, probably fairly hotly, in this Forum (or another) at the time, but I didn't join PPRuNe until the following year, so I have no knowledge of anything that might've been discussed at the time. I apologise if this seems like I'm raking up ancient history, but I was quite upset because every regulator in the world accepts American FAA certification without question, yet this prang highlights the need to question every certification by the FAA.
That's probably over the top, considering the safety record of American built airline aircraft going back to the days of the DC-3 and maybe even earlier. But we are now in the 21st century, which is a far more litigious era than any that have gone before it. Indeed, there's probably a pretty reasonable argument to suggest that the latter part of the 20th century was almost the same and I can only think that, if there was no legal action against the FAA, it can only be because the UK wasn't like that, in those days.
If so, the FAA got off very lightly indeed.
Now, I know there were other things happening in 1989 but I hope that, if the Mods see fit to retain this topic, they will mercilessly deal with any attempts to side-track this discussion with any other aspects of that year. I had my own problems back then and I certainly have no desire to raise them here.
Can anyone shed any further light on this very tragic prang and, especially, on any action that was lauched, at law, either against the FAA or the UK CAA (who accepted the FAA certification of the 734)? Does anyone know if there were repercussions anywhere else in the world - including the USA?
), I recall hearing about this prang beside a UK motorway, very close to the runway. I remember being saddened by it because I'd always thought that British Midlands was a good operation with very good crews and I always wondered how this had happened. I also remember being relieved to hear that it hadn't been the result of terrorism but, being out of the loop for progress in the investigation, I never heard the final report of the cause.You might laugh now but I've finally seen something that appears to be the full story of the prang, on "Seconds from Disaster" on the National Geographic Channel. If this report was as factual as it seems to have been, there was NO REQUIREMENT for crews, converting to the, then, brand new 734, to undergo simulator training. Now, okay, I'm prepared to accept that simulator training might not have detected the problem that caused this tragic disaster, there will always be a nagging doubt that it just MIGHT have brought the scenario to light before there was any loss of life.
The aspect that particularly annoyed me in this prang was that the 734 had been certified by the American FAA, assumably based on the information supplied by Boeing. There was no indication in the 1-hour story I saw to indicate whether or not the American FAA was the subject of litigation as a result of this prang. Yes, Boeing acted very quickly to rectify the fault and simulator flights were mandated thereafter but... was this a case of shutting the gate after the horse had bolted?
I feel sure that this prang would have been discussed, probably fairly hotly, in this Forum (or another) at the time, but I didn't join PPRuNe until the following year, so I have no knowledge of anything that might've been discussed at the time. I apologise if this seems like I'm raking up ancient history, but I was quite upset because every regulator in the world accepts American FAA certification without question, yet this prang highlights the need to question every certification by the FAA.
That's probably over the top, considering the safety record of American built airline aircraft going back to the days of the DC-3 and maybe even earlier. But we are now in the 21st century, which is a far more litigious era than any that have gone before it. Indeed, there's probably a pretty reasonable argument to suggest that the latter part of the 20th century was almost the same and I can only think that, if there was no legal action against the FAA, it can only be because the UK wasn't like that, in those days.
If so, the FAA got off very lightly indeed.
Now, I know there were other things happening in 1989 but I hope that, if the Mods see fit to retain this topic, they will mercilessly deal with any attempts to side-track this discussion with any other aspects of that year. I had my own problems back then and I certainly have no desire to raise them here.
Can anyone shed any further light on this very tragic prang and, especially, on any action that was lauched, at law, either against the FAA or the UK CAA (who accepted the FAA certification of the 734)? Does anyone know if there were repercussions anywhere else in the world - including the USA?
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Search Google for 'Kegworth Air Disaster' and pull up a comfy chair for the evening.
There is an AAIB report on the accident. I am not aware of 'no simulator training' but I believe the fan blades that failed ('larger' CFM-56-2 blades) were not flight tested but given approval on the basis of computer simulations.
There is an AAIB report on the accident. I am not aware of 'no simulator training' but I believe the fan blades that failed ('larger' CFM-56-2 blades) were not flight tested but given approval on the basis of computer simulations.
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ozexpat
Saw it come down, pretty similar situation to the BA777 except it didnt make the grass. I'm a non pilot but i think the no simulator was down to differences training between the 737-300 the crew were trained on and the 737-400. Both crew were also new on type not sure if this was attributed in the AAIB report.
Saw it come down, pretty similar situation to the BA777 except it didnt make the grass. I'm a non pilot but i think the no simulator was down to differences training between the 737-300 the crew were trained on and the 737-400. Both crew were also new on type not sure if this was attributed in the AAIB report.
As one who was working for British Midland at the time of the accident, let me see if I can throw a little more light on the subject for you.
You are correct that we had no simulator training for the conversion from the -300's to the -400's, there were no -400 configured simulators at the time. We were given a handout of the differences from the -300's which IIRC concentrated on the greater weights, different speeds (we flew fixed speed schedules depending on the weights), the different air conditioning system, the new digital engine instrumentation, and the "bumpers" on the rear fuselage. This was then followed by 2 sectors with a Line Training Captain.
I am not sure where we are with the litigation process, and whether the FAA are being held accountable or not. In any case the FAA are only really bit players in this case, as the aircraft was British registered (G-OBME), and had been certified by the UK CAA and held a UK C of A. There are a number of differences between 737's that are certified by the CAA and those certified by the FAA.
I am not sure that you are correct when you say that simulator sessions became mandatory after the accident. We at British Midland subsequently introduced the -500's, and the procedure was the same, a hand out on the differences and then a couple of line sectors with a training Captain. (FWIW I now fly -800's with and without winglets, and -900's and I received no differences training, obviously not for bmi!)
Other things that may not be widely known are that about 6-8 weeks after the accident Midland had another identical fan blade failure, as did the then Dan-Air on one of their -400's and the CAA did ground the -400's "for a few days".
As we now know CFM extrapolated the data from the -B1 engine series (20K), and came up with the -C1(23.5K) that we had on the -400. (Note. I don't know whether the -B2 (22k) came before or after the -C1). And we now know that the engine didn't behave exactly as predicated by the computer model. Should the engine have been introduced without further flight testing? With hindsight NO
It's been a long time since I read the AAIB report but, IIRC the primary cause of the accident was found to be the failure of the fan blade, with contributory factors being the incorrect actions by the operating crew.
I believe the litigation process is still ongoing.
I hope that helps.
You are correct that we had no simulator training for the conversion from the -300's to the -400's, there were no -400 configured simulators at the time. We were given a handout of the differences from the -300's which IIRC concentrated on the greater weights, different speeds (we flew fixed speed schedules depending on the weights), the different air conditioning system, the new digital engine instrumentation, and the "bumpers" on the rear fuselage. This was then followed by 2 sectors with a Line Training Captain.
I am not sure where we are with the litigation process, and whether the FAA are being held accountable or not. In any case the FAA are only really bit players in this case, as the aircraft was British registered (G-OBME), and had been certified by the UK CAA and held a UK C of A. There are a number of differences between 737's that are certified by the CAA and those certified by the FAA.
I am not sure that you are correct when you say that simulator sessions became mandatory after the accident. We at British Midland subsequently introduced the -500's, and the procedure was the same, a hand out on the differences and then a couple of line sectors with a training Captain. (FWIW I now fly -800's with and without winglets, and -900's and I received no differences training, obviously not for bmi!)
Other things that may not be widely known are that about 6-8 weeks after the accident Midland had another identical fan blade failure, as did the then Dan-Air on one of their -400's and the CAA did ground the -400's "for a few days".
As we now know CFM extrapolated the data from the -B1 engine series (20K), and came up with the -C1(23.5K) that we had on the -400. (Note. I don't know whether the -B2 (22k) came before or after the -C1). And we now know that the engine didn't behave exactly as predicated by the computer model. Should the engine have been introduced without further flight testing? With hindsight NO
It's been a long time since I read the AAIB report but, IIRC the primary cause of the accident was found to be the failure of the fan blade, with contributory factors being the incorrect actions by the operating crew.
I believe the litigation process is still ongoing.
I hope that helps.
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My thanks to all who have responded. I did a Google search for "Kegworth Air Disaster" and found more hits than Rocky handed out in all his movies! 
It seems that the story I saw on the National Geographic Channel was pretty close to the truth but had probably oversimplified a few aspects, such as the mandated simulator training.
It's a pity that the AAIB report didn't jump out at me from the Google search. I'll have to try a special search for that, as soon as I have a bit more spare time than is available right now.
It also seems that the UK CAA require a few differences from FAA type certification standards so it's possible that any law suit would be directed at the CAA rather than the FAA. This probably means that there won't be any such action because, so far as I'm aware, the UK isn't as litigious as the USA.
Given that the conversion training was limited to hand-out information on the differences, this was undoubtedly seen as being appropriate at the time. I suppose it's all too easy to sit back, knowing that we've learned more about cockpit ergonomics, engine handling, CRM, etc. in the meantime and then find fault with the training system that was in place at the time.
The sad fact is that we never know what we don't know until it bites us. This is undoubtedly why we keep learning, also why training systems are continually improving. We live and learn - at the expense of those who didn't have the same opportunity - and hope we never fall into that situation.
My thanks to all for the enlightenment on this very sad tragedy.
It seems that the story I saw on the National Geographic Channel was pretty close to the truth but had probably oversimplified a few aspects, such as the mandated simulator training.It's a pity that the AAIB report didn't jump out at me from the Google search. I'll have to try a special search for that, as soon as I have a bit more spare time than is available right now.
It also seems that the UK CAA require a few differences from FAA type certification standards so it's possible that any law suit would be directed at the CAA rather than the FAA. This probably means that there won't be any such action because, so far as I'm aware, the UK isn't as litigious as the USA.
Given that the conversion training was limited to hand-out information on the differences, this was undoubtedly seen as being appropriate at the time. I suppose it's all too easy to sit back, knowing that we've learned more about cockpit ergonomics, engine handling, CRM, etc. in the meantime and then find fault with the training system that was in place at the time.
The sad fact is that we never know what we don't know until it bites us. This is undoubtedly why we keep learning, also why training systems are continually improving. We live and learn - at the expense of those who didn't have the same opportunity - and hope we never fall into that situation.
My thanks to all for the enlightenment on this very sad tragedy.
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Oz - from the 'Tech Log' sticky comes the link to AAIB and from there comes http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/sites/aai...990_g_obme.cfm
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BOAC... thanks for that - I must learn to check the Tech Log stickies more often! I opened that link and found the link to the report, in PDF format. For a reason that I'm yet to figure out, I couldn't dowload the file over this steam-driven dial-up connection.
Guess it'll have to wait until the next time I'm able to access broadband...
Thanks for the link - and the wake-up call!
I opened that link and found the link to the report, in PDF format. For a reason that I'm yet to figure out, I couldn't dowload the file over this steam-driven dial-up connection.Guess it'll have to wait until the next time I'm able to access broadband...
Thanks for the link - and the wake-up call!
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The M1 has been widened since the accident and the original embankment has long since disappeared, but I believe there is a memorial on the overbridge immediately north of the EMA approach lights
RC
RC
i think the BBC also made a programme about the accident ?
yes the similarties with 777 at LHR 2 weeks ago are profound...
2 more seconds maybe and the 737 would have been on the flat grass too....
the captain, kevin hunt was a lovely man,
i worked for BMA at LHR 1977-85 and had the pleasure for many years in doing his turnarounds and loadsheets at london, everyone then was EMA based.
he was probably among one of the nicest guys in the left had seat we had, i also flew several times sitting behind him on the jump seat on dc9's
a gentlemen.
i hope he is still around and if anyone knows him then please pass my regards
roger (traffic duty ops cordinator LHR)
yes the similarties with 777 at LHR 2 weeks ago are profound...
2 more seconds maybe and the 737 would have been on the flat grass too....
the captain, kevin hunt was a lovely man,
i worked for BMA at LHR 1977-85 and had the pleasure for many years in doing his turnarounds and loadsheets at london, everyone then was EMA based.
he was probably among one of the nicest guys in the left had seat we had, i also flew several times sitting behind him on the jump seat on dc9's
a gentlemen.
i hope he is still around and if anyone knows him then please pass my regards
roger (traffic duty ops cordinator LHR)
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As SLF I hope the professionals will not mind me asking a question which has always been in my mind related to this incident.
Having travelled past the crash site many times since I can confirm that the memorial plaque is indeed on the bridge over the motorway leading into Kegworth.
The aircraft was aproaching from south of EMA, had shut down 1 engine and I believe declared an emergency, why then did the aircraft take what I assume is the normal routeing into EMA, i.e. pass the airport before turning right for a further 2 right turns onto final approach. Why did it not turn immediately right and then make left turns onto finals and thus reduce the total distance travelled, maybe it would then have made the runway?
Having travelled past the crash site many times since I can confirm that the memorial plaque is indeed on the bridge over the motorway leading into Kegworth.
The aircraft was aproaching from south of EMA, had shut down 1 engine and I believe declared an emergency, why then did the aircraft take what I assume is the normal routeing into EMA, i.e. pass the airport before turning right for a further 2 right turns onto final approach. Why did it not turn immediately right and then make left turns onto finals and thus reduce the total distance travelled, maybe it would then have made the runway?
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not so long ago there were a documentary on discovery channel doing a reconstruction of this event , keep a look out it will probably repeat several times
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why then did the aircraft take what I assume is the normal routeing into EMA
This will help: http://aviation-safety.net/photos/di...0&vnr=1&kind=G
he was probably among one of the nicest guys in the left had seat we had, i also flew several times sitting behind him on the jump seat on dc9's
a gentlemen.
Hear, hear. I jumpseated with him once, too, and he was, indeed charming, and blessed with a great sense of humour. Popular with the D/Os at Teesside, too.
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The aircraft was aproaching from south of EMA, had shut down 1 engine and I believe declared an emergency, why then did the aircraft take what I assume is the normal routeing into EMA, i.e. pass the airport before turning right for a further 2 right turns onto final approach. Why did it not turn immediately right and then make left turns onto finals and thus reduce the total distance travelled, maybe it would then have made the runway?
Somewhere (AAIB Report?)there is a ground track plot of this incident. I seem to recall that 'ME was north of the airfield by around ten miles or so when the problem arose, and had to lose considerable height in a wide arc.
r
a gentlemen.
Hear, hear. I jumpseated with him once, too, and he was, indeed charming, and blessed with a great sense of humour. Popular with the D/Os at Teesside, too.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The aircraft was aproaching from south of EMA, had shut down 1 engine and I believe declared an emergency, why then did the aircraft take what I assume is the normal routeing into EMA, i.e. pass the airport before turning right for a further 2 right turns onto final approach. Why did it not turn immediately right and then make left turns onto finals and thus reduce the total distance travelled, maybe it would then have made the runway?
Somewhere (AAIB Report?)there is a ground track plot of this incident. I seem to recall that 'ME was north of the airfield by around ten miles or so when the problem arose, and had to lose considerable height in a wide arc.
r
hi midland331 (as in bd331 lol, that flight had the best hot breakfast ever served on BMA it came from the george hotel at MME lol)
did we ever meet?
did we ever meet?
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Saw it come down, pretty similar situation to the BA777 except it didnt make the grass. I'm a non pilot
yes the similarties with 777 at LHR 2 weeks ago are profound...
