Trust levers during F/O take-off

[Pilot Pete]

My recollection of Britannia and MyTravel is the same.

Not so for Britannia any more. In common with many operators these days they are aligning more with the Boeing philosophy, which for the 73/75 and 76 seems to be that the captain decides and conducts the reject, the F/O only rejecting for incapacitation.

I've flown for airlines that do allow the F/O to both call 'stop' (PF or PNF) and indeed do the reject as PF. Certainly deploying the speedbrake is an easier task for the captain IMHO, and I guess the philosophy is that the captain being the only one to announce a stop should lead to fewer 'incorrect' rejects. I can see both sides of the argument, but you have to look at the lowest common denominator and with a significant number of 200hr F/Os these days (here in the UK) I guess that has a bearing..........

PP

eggplantwalking - nope, we drive on the left, which IS the right side!

Sorry egg, have to agree, WE drive on the correct side as it allows us to draw our swords and fend off the blaggards on the opposite side of the track!

[tamalai]

moggie,

what an absolute load of Bo##ox, anyone who aborts a 390 ton 747 on a limiting runway around V1 wants their head examining !!! at V1 you maybe have 4500 feet of runway remaining and a max energy stop will undoubtably result in a wheel fire/evacuation and all that entails...................
better to take it into the air, sort the problem whatever it maybe, it's not as though time is going to be a limiting factor, probably got 100+ tons of gas so flying round for a couple of hours whilst you get things set ain't a problem then a nice leisurely approach with the full runway length available will result in a far more satisfactory outcome............................

[moggiee]

tamalai/Max Angle

Properly briefed and trained, the FO having permission to call "STOP" or him/her being allowed to close the thrust levers themselves is not a problem.

The issue of "unnecessary rejection" is solved by the BA type brief - giving the FO a clearly defined list of permissible occurances. Typically, this will be :

Any Fire
Engine failure (two indicators required)
Obviously blocked runway
Serious handling difficulty
Pilot incapacitiation

The Captain may call "STOP" for anything else he/she deems appropriate.

In addition, a cut of speed - 80kt for example - will be applied below which the crew will stop for any failure, above which they will only stop for major occurances.

Surely, with everything clearly defined like this, everyone knows where the limits of their authority lie and the risk of that unneccesary rejection is eliminated.

[Techman]

moggiee make a lot of sense.

If the FO is not capable of making a Stop/Go decision, as per the brief below, then there appears to be a training problem.

It seems to me that the most difficult part of an RTO is the actual decision to do so. And if training is only given to half of those in a position to perform one, then the outcome of an RTO or even a continue, in the case where the trained part is incapacitated, is dubious at best.

We spend a lot of time in the sim training both pilots for scenarios that are at best very unlikely, so why not train the pilots onboard to an equal standard when it come to an abort?

[Centaurus]

Moggie. Horsefeathers, old chap. Any max weight high speed abort on a limiting runway length is a dangerous event. There is no shortage of accidents that were caused by near V1 aborts, and in any case the chances of red hot brakes catching fire are significant. In contrast, there are very few reports of accidents directly caused by the aircraft continuing a take off from below V1 even allowing for the inevitable reduced screen height.

With regard to a copilot being responsible for initiating and conducting the abort while the captain looks on in keen interest, then this is a sure fire legal case of the captain abrogating his own command responsibity.

The fact that the captain has allocated a "leg" to the copilot should not mean that the copilot now becomes the captain and assume full command responsibility. That is illegal. Certainly in the latest Boeing 737NG FCTM there is an unequivocal statement: "The decision to reject is the responsibility of the captain and must be made prior to V1 speed. If the captain is PM he should initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously."

If operators wish to vary from that procedure then that is their prerogative. But just remember that the Regs say it is the captain that carries the can. And always remember the lawyers are watching you.

[L337]

Centaurus:

Out of interest,

Are you suggesting that I vary BA SOPs (approved by the CAA and in compliance with JAR ops) because of what Boeing say in there generic flight manual ?

[moggiee]

L337

I believe that Centaurus is suggesting just that. However, how the legal eagles would view the decision by the Captain to disregard the JAA approved company SOP for a critical phase of flight is anyone's guess.

[rubik101]

Having flown with many operators over the years and used both systems I have to say that I consider the Captain deciding and then carrying out the abort sequence is the only safe way to go. For reasons that would need pages to explain, any other method is just so frought with potential mess ups as to be not worth the efort of writing the SOP.
FO calls a fault, Captain decides. That is what he is paid for, to make Command Decisions.

[JW411]

Moggiee:

You have obviously never ever been in a wide-bodied jet at MTOW on a critical runway. If you ever had and had seen just how little runway is left (most of it marked with red lights) you would not be coming out with the junior jet-jockey remarks that you are.

If you shut those throttles at V1, then you have absolutely NO option but to stop. Don't forget that if you get absolutely everything right and react within a millisecond you are still going to be in the prepared overrun (not necessarily on the runway) for you are required to be able to stop in ASDA and not in TORA.

As an experienced old phart let me tell you that it is much better to be up there with a whole book full of options (plenty of fuel, find a better/longer airfield, find better weather, burn or dump down to a reasonable weight before making an approach etc etc). Up there you have so much choice; down there you have absolutely NO choice once you have shut the throttles.

I freely admit that there have been several occasions when I have discussed the options beforehand with my crew and we have all agreed that nothing would be said after V1 - 20 knots for we all agreed that going was a much better option.

Some aircraft are poor goers and great stoppers but most serious flying machines are great goers and poor stoppers!

[L337]

FWIW, and I know it sounds pompous, I am a 747-400 training Captain with BA. So have seen the end of plenty of runways, and when it is the FOs sector, his hands are on the thrust levers.

That's how we train, and it works on the line, and in the simulator.

Moggiee has given you BA SOPs. No more no less. So to abuse him by calling him a "junior jet-jockey" seems a little unfair.

Every month BA has rejected take offs. No doubt if it was causing incidents the CAA would have something to say. BA has operated like this for generations. No problem.

One of the great things about BA is that it treats FOs as capable pilots, and responsible adults. It makes for a safe flight deck, and an easier transition to the left hand seat.

L337

[moggiee]

JW411

Thanks for your comments - as my first WAT limited take-off on a critical runway in a wide body jet was conducted in 1986, I probably no longer fall into the category of junior jet jockey!!

As L337 says, I am giving you the BA SOP (and others in the UK) - I have direct experience of teaching these SOPs to pilots on the airlines in question.

You may not agree with me - fine, that is your perogative. However, unless YOU have experience with a number of different airline SOPs on the Eastern side of the Atlantic, I would suggest that you think more carefully yourself before opening your trap.

It never pays to make assumptions about people's experience, does it?

Anyway, the thread is about whether or not the FO may handle the thrust levers, not about the merits of stop/go at V1 - we all seem to have digressed.

I repeat my assertion that if the FO is properly trained and briefed, there is no more risk involved with him/her handling the TLs than with the Captain doing it. A stop before V1 is a stop before V1 - the physics involved are the same regardless of who handles the thrust levers.

Maybe I should amend my previous post - with the properly trained, properly briefed FO at the controls, there will be no more "unnecessary" RTOs than with the Captain doing it. Therefore my 100-to-1 statement would be irrelevant.

I would be interested to hear if L337 could tell us what percentage of his company's RTOs are initiated by the FO as Handling Pilot and what percentage by the Captain as HP (of course, there will be none on which the Captain closes the TLs when the FO is HP - that would be non-SOP).

[Max Angle]

with the properly trained, properly briefed FO at the controls, there will be no more "unnecessary" RTOs than with the Captain doing it.

Do you have any data to back that up?. Boeing and Airbus have both decided that the best way is for the Captain to handle the thrust levers during take-off and to make the go/no go decision. Both those companies have conducted, and continue to conduct, extensive research into RTO's using data drawn from a huge worldwide fleet of jet transports. Neither company has seen fit to change it’s advice on the subject, in fact it's probably the only thing the two of them agree on.

[moggiee]

Max Angle

............and what evidence do YOU have to suggest that a properly trained, properly briefed FO is a liability at the controls?

As L337 will attest, there is plenty of first hand evidence within his company and others which will indicate otherwise.

[bufe01]

my opinion

HI THERE,
IN MY HUMBLE OPINION WE HAVE THREE BASIC ASPECTCS IN THIS MATTER:

1. WHO TAKES THE DECISION (AND I THINK IT SHOULD BE THE CAPT)
2. WHO HANDLE WHAT
3. SOP THAT HAVE TO BE CLEAR, FULLY UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOWED (WE ALL DO THE SAME THING, NOTE DEVIATIONS AND EVENTUALLY CHANGE IT. DOING DIFFERENT THINGS WITH DIFFERENT CREW IS DANGEROUS AND BASICALLY WILL NEVER BRING TO A FINAL SOLUTION)

...THEN THERE ARE THE 2 BIG VARIABLES AIRCRAFT THAT SOMETIMES MAKE PROCEDURES BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY ARE MADE AND PILOTS WITH THEIR EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING LEVEL.

I'M MILITARY AND FLY B707s, I BELIEVE WHAT EGGPLANT SAID IS THE BEST PROCEDURE FOR THAT PLANE BUT MIGHT BE DIFFERENT FOR OTHERS. IN THE AIR FORCE WE ARE A SMALL BUNCH OF PILOTS, FLY A LOT TOGHETER AND KNOW EACH OTHER WELL SO TEAMWORK IS SOMEWHAT EASIER, I GUESS IT WOULD NOT BE THE SAME BETWEEN PILOTS WHO FLY TOGHETER ONCE A YEAR AND DONT KNOW EACH OTHER VERY WELL.

I MYSELF HAVE TWO OR THREE FIRM POINTS, THAT COMES FROM REAL RTOs, BUT THAT'S MY GENERAL IDEA.
CIAO

HI THERE,
IN MY HUMBLE OPINION WE HAVE THREE BASIC ASPECTCS IN THIS MATTER:

1. WHO TAKES THE DECISION
2. WHO HANDLE WHAT
3. SOP THAT HAVE TO BE CLEAR, FULLY UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOWED (WE ALL DO THE SAME THING, NOTE DEVIATIONS AND EVENTUALLY CHANGE IT. DOING DIFFERENT THINGS WITH DIFFERENT CREW IS DANGEROUS AND BASICALLY WILL NEVER BRING TO A FINAL SOLUTION)

...THEN THERE ARE THE 2 BIG VARIABLES AIRCRAFT THAT SOMETIMES MAKE PROCEDURES BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY ARE MADE AND PILOTS WITH THEIR EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING LEVEL.

I\'M MILITARY AND FLY B707s, I BELIEVE WHAT EGGPLANT SAID IS THE BEST PROCEDURE FOR THAT PLANE BUT MIGHT BE DIFFERENT FOR OTHERS. IN THE AIR FORCE WE ARE A SMALL BUNCH OF PILOTS, FLY A LOT TOGHETER AND KNOW EACH OTHER WELL SO TEAMWORK IS SOMEWHAT EASIER, I GUESS IT WOULD NOT BE THE SAME BETWEEN PILOTS WHO FLY TOGHETER ONCE A YEAR AND DONT KNOW EACH OTHER VERY WELL.
CIAO

[Max Angle]

and what evidence do YOU have to suggest that a properly trained, properly briefed FO is a liability at the controls?

None, other than the fact that the worlds two biggest jet transport manufactures are very clearly in favour of the Captain making the decision to reject. To be blunt about it, the idea of a 300 hour pilot with a few weeks on line being required to make that sort of decision is absolutely ludicrous. You can brief and train people all you like but things are rarely clear cut and in the heat of the moment what counts is what they won't have, experience.

I have a lot of respect for the BA operation, it has proved itself to be a safe way to operate but they are clearly out of step with the aircraft makers and most other operators on this one. The procedures that Airbus and Boeing recommend are based on RTO incidents from all over the world and must carry some weight. I am surprised that any airline, however large and experienced, sees fit to ignore that advice.

[moggiee]

Of course.............because BA are different they MUST be wrong!

Remember, Airbus and Boeing have to write an Operation Manual that covers the whole world. This will include some states and companies who have, shall we say, "questionable" safety and training standards. This is partly done to avoid being sued into oblivion in the USA.

An airline as an entity can examine it's own historical data and produce an SOP that works best for them. Surely this make more sense than having to write a compromise SOP which has to legislate for organisations and situations that have no relevance to them.

However, if you prefer "one size fits all".......................

[L337]

Absolutely. The manufacturer has a whole raft of agendas when writing it's operations procedures. And it is always with the litigation lawyer calling the shots.

Crossing fingers as I write this.

BA has operated this way for generations. Literally. To date no incident has occurred because a FO has made a bad decision. And as the worlds largest operator of 747-400s, It seems to work for us.

300 hour pilots do not get to fly 747-400s or the 777. Obviously.

However on a daily basis 300 hour pilots, of A320s, B737, B757, B767s, get to have their hands on the thrust levers on takeoff, and amazingly.... no incidents.

maybe it is all down to excellent training!!

Then I would say that.

What we have here is a clash of cultures. On one hand we have the "Man and dog", and on the other "Adult adult". Because it is different does not make it "absolutely ludicrous"

L337

[Centaurus]

Many years ago, a major Australian domestic airline operating DC9's had a policy of the first officer conducting the take off with hands on throttles all the way to V1. However, the company operations manual stated that any abort would be executed by the captain while the first officer resumed a monitoring role during the abort. It worked fine for a couple of years.

Then one day, an F/O was doing the take off (his hands on the throttles) when a flock of birds suddenly appeared from nowhere and scattered in front of the aircraft which was 10 knots below V1 but accelerating rapidly.

To the captain's astonishment, the F/O instinctively whipped closed both throttles and commenced a full scale abort by which time the aircraft had gone past VR because of the delay by the F/O in getting on to the brakes.

The captain took a couple of precious seconds to wonder what the f....k was wrong with the F/O, initially thinking that the F/O had experienced a not so subtle incapacitation. The captain had no option but to continue the abort process and the DC9 went off the end of the runway at slow speed, with consequent tyre damage and buggered brakes.

Immediately after the incident, the airline changed it's policy and made it a directive that once take off power had been set, the captain took over the thrust levers until passing V1. As far as I recall (it was a long time ago), the captain in all major airlines in Australia, retains control of the thrust levers regardless of which pilot is executing the take off.

When asked by the investigators why he aborted the take off without reference to the captain, the F/O stated that it was an instinctive action when he saw the birds. The F/O had over 5000 hours, most of which were on airline aircraft.

There was no bird strike, but the cost of repairs and down-time of the DC9 was significant. On a more critical length runway, the final result could have been disastrous.

All the superb simulator training in the world (as espoused by some contributors to this forum), cannot replace command experience. It is commendable that first officers of some of the airlines mentioned in these posts are top class steely-eyed professionals who, except for annoying lack of a high seniority number, would surely deserve to be captains with the same type of eyes. This ideal (steely-eyed professionals), is not a universal trait in all airlines. Which may explain why Boeing and Airbus make it clear in their manuals, that the captain keeps his hand on the thrust lever until V1 and also conducts a rejected take off if one becmoes necessary.

[Quidnunc]

Just for the record, something that a lot of people here have failed to notice: Boeing and Airbus build aircraft. Airlines operate aircraft.

BA and most airlines have more experience opertaing a/c than either Boeing or Airbus. As such, they should decide on an SOP that suits them and their operating enviroment.

I don't expect the builder of my house to tell me how to live in it. I'll put the furniture where I want, and move around it in the way I want.

Boeing and Airbus are NOT the authority on SOPs - they are the authority on how to build a/c.

[eggplantwalking]

Quidnunc
.....and in your house, the lights are "on" but nobody is home!