trouble on takeoff
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I started learning to fly 40 years ago in single engined aircraft. The procedures and disciplines were well spelled out for total loss of engines (i.e. One) upon takeoff. In the successive 40 years with an increasing number of engines to handle, the procedures and techniques for loss of all engines on takeoff has not changed one jot.
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Boeing 737 said: "the problem was that inadequate thrust had been applied to lift off, because false readings from the N1 compressor were been relayed to the cockpit due to ice forming in the engines."
The first part of this statement is absolutely correct sir. The problem was because engine anti-ice was not selected and the N1 was not crossed check against the primary thrust setting instruments: EPR. I believe it was a 200 series. Such a shame but a valuable lesson for the rest of us.
The EPR indicated take-off thrust because of the P2 sensor being iced up which gave a false EPR indication. An indication which grossly exagerated the actual EPR. The N1 indications were actually correct. They just did not take note of them. This would of told them that something was terribly amiss.
This is why many companys that operate the old 200 series with the JT8D TurboFan engines cross check the N1 indication when take-off EPR is set as a SOP. The Air Florida crew were not used to operating in adverse weather conditions as is evident from the accident investigation that followed.
Again, an expensive lesson we are all beneficiaries of today.
The first part of this statement is absolutely correct sir. The problem was because engine anti-ice was not selected and the N1 was not crossed check against the primary thrust setting instruments: EPR. I believe it was a 200 series. Such a shame but a valuable lesson for the rest of us.
The EPR indicated take-off thrust because of the P2 sensor being iced up which gave a false EPR indication. An indication which grossly exagerated the actual EPR. The N1 indications were actually correct. They just did not take note of them. This would of told them that something was terribly amiss.
This is why many companys that operate the old 200 series with the JT8D TurboFan engines cross check the N1 indication when take-off EPR is set as a SOP. The Air Florida crew were not used to operating in adverse weather conditions as is evident from the accident investigation that followed.
Again, an expensive lesson we are all beneficiaries of today.
ea306,
Actually the FO did note incorrect engine readings and stated something like "nah, that's not right" two or three times. However either he should have been more forceful or the Captain should've listened.
Of course, anti-icing would've helped to. The one on the aircraft, not the engines of the plane in front.
All my understanding of this is from the report, so....
Actually the FO did note incorrect engine readings and stated something like "nah, that's not right" two or three times. However either he should have been more forceful or the Captain should've listened.
Of course, anti-icing would've helped to. The one on the aircraft, not the engines of the plane in front.
All my understanding of this is from the report, so....
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It doesn't matter whether an airliner has 2, 3 or 4 engines, the climb rate at max weight with one failed is 3% or less. That is 150 ft in the first mile, or some scared drivers on the M25 if it's Heathrow. With a second engine failure the aircraft will descend - rapidly. The only option would be to try to land straight ahead and aim the fuselage between trees or buildings. Designers keep the engines separate for this reason. All the examples quoted above are not engine failures as such - they are cases of low thrust due to some other cause such as icing.
The BAC 111 example is a good one. It was some German charter airline I think. The 111 had a water injection system to boost takeoff thrust, fed from a demineralised water tank in the tail. The airline kept the water in big plastic drums on a rack marked, "Zehr puren wasser, nur fur das BAC 111" or some such krautese. They had a 707 in earlier in the day and needed to drain some fuel out of it for some reason. Not having a suitable container they used one of the empty plastic water drums. They then put it back on the rack with the full ones! Of course this meant that the fuel got put into the 111's water tank where it floated on top of the water until just after lift-off. Once fuel started flowing where water was supposed to both engines quit. The BAC 111 took some stick in the German press about this as one tank fed both engines. However, if you put the wrong fuel in any aircraft all the engines will stop. It's been done.
The BAC 111 example is a good one. It was some German charter airline I think. The 111 had a water injection system to boost takeoff thrust, fed from a demineralised water tank in the tail. The airline kept the water in big plastic drums on a rack marked, "Zehr puren wasser, nur fur das BAC 111" or some such krautese. They had a 707 in earlier in the day and needed to drain some fuel out of it for some reason. Not having a suitable container they used one of the empty plastic water drums. They then put it back on the rack with the full ones! Of course this meant that the fuel got put into the 111's water tank where it floated on top of the water until just after lift-off. Once fuel started flowing where water was supposed to both engines quit. The BAC 111 took some stick in the German press about this as one tank fed both engines. However, if you put the wrong fuel in any aircraft all the engines will stop. It's been done.
