If the powers that be implement the AAIB recommendations then I agree by default my concerns and the concerns of many others will be addressed. The issue then will be all the other Airfields with an NDB off the Airfield and only one dme. Liverpool RW 27 as an example - exactly the same latent error. Unlike Dundee, good radar, highly alert ATC ensuring no Aircraft overshoots into Manchester Airspace and no high ground to bite you.

So the idea would be to spend a bunch of public money, and change a lot of approaches, with the confusion potential this has, because of one pilot who failed to set up the correct approach? It's all very sad and all that, but where do you stop? Airports can only have one approach because you might set up the wrong one?

Because he's dead you mean? It's very sad, condolences to the family and so on.

Let's suppose he'd survived the crash. People on here would have been all over him because he'd set up Direct DND and then tried to use that to fly an ILS. That what's the report says, or at least suggests as strongly as it dares, and is the only reasonable inference from the observed facts.

We've all done the wrong thing when under pressure, and for sure we've all forgotten to flip a frequency or the HSI mode. But there's a lot more to this than just not flipping a button. Yes, he COULD have been under such pressure that he set up completely the wrong approach and then failed to notice despite several "huh?" moments - of which never seeing the glideslope would certainly be one.

I'll happily redact "couldn't be bothered to" to "failed to" if it makes you happier. But it's still a very poor reason for making an expensive and disruptive change - which could well lead to another accident when someone is mentally flying the old approach.

Not sure if my point is clear. In my opinion and many others is that the AAIB have not considered a valid point. The approach plate is ambiguous and I beleive the Pilot confidently tracked outbound 8 miles from the DND NDB to his base turn. Improving the approach plate would not require lots of public money, it would only be an ammendment of the DME frequency against the stated distance.
I understand that not all of you will agree but this small addition is a very small price to pay in the name of safety. The bowtie pyramid should of picked this up. After all, with no safety net at Dundee this accident could easily happen again.

Having looked at the UKAIS page for the Dundee ILS / LOC approach, whether the base turn was made at 8 nm from the NDB or as a dme range is not really the issue.
To me the issue is the descent starts inbound at either glideslope capture cross checked with 6.7 dme, or if a Localiser procedure at 6.7d which is a dme distance, so the dme should be tuned and used.
I can understand tracking inbound to the NDB using gps especially as it is on the coast and may have some errors but once at the beacon, surely you fly the procedure using the correct aids?
Of course we are assuming that there was a working ils receiver in the aeroplane!

Just my tuppence worth.

Bingofuel. I'm sorry I have to disagree. It is highly likely that this Pilot was suckered into this fateful trap. Put yourself in the Pilots seat and imagine the situation. Southerly heading to the DND, IMC and workload relatively high. DND tuned into the ADF and a direct to DND tuned into the GPS. Counting down the miles to the DND with 1 mile to run quick check of distance outbound and track required to base turn. The plate says 8 miles, Heading 255 degrees. Begin your descent, moderate rain, blustery conditions still in IMC and the Aircraft being bufferted to the extent that you are focused on flying the Aircraft. Aviate - Navigate - Communicate. You turn the Aircraft inbound and in all of this forget that you are still calculating your distance from the DND and begin your descent early. You know what happens next. My point is if the ident was next to the 8d it is highly probable this would of been the error trap that the Pilot needed and would of realised as he approached the DND at the beginning of the approach.
In the AAIB conclusion they state that mistaking GPS distance from the DND with DME distances is a common error made by Pilots. To me it's a simple solution - Put the ident next to the D8. Make it obvious because what we have at the moment is a very poor depiction and anyone could of made this mistake. A Very sad event indeed.

He was a professional pilot and familiar with Dundee!!!!!!???

Why would he not use the correct procedure? I would guess the aircraft had a few unservicabilities.

The other thing that came to mind was written in one of the fora (?) recently was behavior described as "Normalisation of deviance."

Forgive me weathergirly, but would you commence your descent, without capture of the GS, or the LOC for that matter. Particularly when you were very aware of the high ground to the North, and that the procedure takes you over it, hence staying at 2200 until capture of at least one of them.

Sorry, this was classic spatial disorientation, with CFIT. Call it overload, call it what you like, but I feel this is what happened.

I'd expect to see some kind of turning if it was spatial disorientation. It appears the flight path was pretty much a direct line for the beacon after turning inbound too the crash site. More like loss of situational awareness due to duff nav gear setup and/or bad interpretation of the plate

Sorry Piper, you are correct. Situational awareness, rather than spatial.

For me one of the lessons is don't mix and match GPS with an instrument approach which is based on "hard" radio aids.

I venture to suggest that if this a/c had not been equipped with GPS this accident would not have happened. That said I am of course aware that there are other threats associated with flying the "raw data" instrument approach.

It might have been better to fly the instrument approach from overhead DND using basic radio aids only with GPS as confirmation.

The 8nm West features in these previous incidents

ASN Aircraft accident 11-NOV-1983 Cessna 310Q G-AZYI

Interesting thing about the 310 crash and the additional ACCIDENT mentioned in the above link is both these accidents were early 80's and prior to GPS

Correct me if I'm wrong but this was before provision of ILS/DME at Dundee so these a/c were flying NDB approach?