007H

Apologies for being a stubborn bugger:E There was a tragic PC12 crash at altitude which APPEARS to be Stall, spin, spiral dive, overstress!
With aircraft handling you cannot look at one area in isolation anymore than when I used to race cars I had to know about oversteer, understeer, slides, throttle control, Spins etc etc etc. They all added up to handling a car and being comfortable at speed out of shape.

The same goes with flying IMO. While we all hope to never get into an inadvertent situation its when we least expect, when we miss the recovery at incipient that those basic skills can save you.

If you never experience a spin are you going to sit there wondering if your in a spin or spiral dive? Easy to confuse if you have never experienced a spin yet both requiring very different recovery techniques and both requiring prompt identification and rectification!
So in that respect spinning in itself is irrelevant but handling is not.
I have had some old school instructors/examiners in the past who would put you and the aircraft twins included through your paces (twins up at 10=12K)

I would like to see more towards handling pilots rather than plane drivers.
If for no more than all these technological advancements become a real safety addition rather than a cover up for inadequate training.

Looking at the Cirrus recovery it worried me whether at different CoG the chute wires cables could not entangle themselves around the aircraft.
At that Altitude in that aircraft there was NO excuse not to recover other than a lack of training IMO.

Pace

First the chute system is designed to recover from any attitude including a spin. With over 30 activations in Cirrus and many more in other aircraft, your entanglement concern is not an issue. There was one issue very early on (see Australian accident) which resulted in an SB. As far as the accident that started this thread, it appears to be a cross country that wasn't quite half way when there was engine trouble at altitude. The pilot talked to ATC (I've listened to the recording) and diverted to Pickens County. When he saw he wouldn't make it he pulled. As for what was reported as a dive, I suspect that was really after the initial chute pull. It is a staged sequence. First the rocket fires which makes a loud sound. People on the ground have reported that this catches your attention. In this accident the guy on the ground heard a loud bang. As the rocket pulls the chute out, the plane points nose down with an unfurled chute behind it. The reefing cutters then fire and release the straps to the nose and the plane becomes horizontal as those rip out from the sides. All this happens quickly.

Well, you are 30 years out of date in your thinking. Flight training used to emphasise maneouvers and handling exercises and resulted in pilots who crashed planes because they were inadequately trained in decision-making, SRM, integrating modern systems into their flying and real-world scenarios that present threats. The emphasis in Cirrus training is very much the modern approach. A Cirrus pilot needs the skills to autonomously captain an aircraft on long trips across a variety of environments, making the right decisions and using the right resources. A traditional "handling" focused course, like the UK PPL, teaches people "captaincy" only to the extent of operating an obsolete aircraft in ideal conditions under the close supervision of a school in the local area of that school.

Of course any pilot needs basic handling skills. But I think you are wrong that there is a systematic problem with handling skills or technology substituting for handling skills in GA. Most studies identify decision-making and SRM as the key problems. Let's face it, handling skills and methods haven't changed much since the 1930s. All the vast improvements in commercial aviation safety since then are the result of technology and CRM/SOP methods. Handling has nothing to do with it. So ironically, my view would use your own words but reversed, I think that training should focus more on producing all-round "plane drivers" and not just "handling pilots".

I can't say I am an expert on any of this, so please take it as a friendly exchange of different views and no more!

Paul

Firstly I am not knocking the Cirrus or chute system as I think it is an amazing development in light single GA aircraft.
I hope others follow suit and also build in such a system to their aircraft as I feel it does and can save lives in what can be a very cruel passion if things go wrong.
I have just two concerns one that pilots maybe lulled into situations above their or the aircraft limits.
Two that priority should still be piloting skills and abilities with this system complimenting those skills and abilities not covering the lack of skills and abilities.
Apart from that I am convinced of the chutes reliability and potential to save lives.

Pace

421C

I have the greatest respect for your knowledge and considered opinion.
I cannot agree with you on this subject and do not agree that handling is 30 years out of date. Maybe more handling would have helped the outcome of the very very sad and tragic PC12 crash ?
Regardless yes we have much higher technology and more complicated airspace but little changes in aviation.
Anyway best to agree to disagree on this one : )
Looking forward to flying the Cirrus on a regular basis

Pace

Pace

To be clear, I am not saying handling is out of date! I am saying that a view of pilot training that focuses on handling and maneuvers and does not integrate technology, SRM, decision-making, scenario/LOFT training etc is out of date.

To some extent I am not really arguing with you, but against a certain kind of traditional view of training that emphasises the minutae of handling exercises and ignores the rest, particularly in having a suspcion of "over reliance on technology" whilst teaching zilch about any GA technology developed since the 1960s. I'd characterise much UK training this way.

On the PC12 tragedy, it is hard to say. Certainly, on the margin, in some thunderstorm encounters, I guess real skill in handling might just save the day. There's always a story out there where amazing "right stuff" averted disaster, my favourite is the IAF pilot who landed an F15 with one wing. But the banal point remains that I don't think deficiencies in handling skills are a major issue for GA safety. Perhaps the odd damage to landing gear etc. The PC12 descended >10000' in ~30s. That ain't a spin. Practical training on weather planning, storm detection and avoidance, threat and error management etc I think is going to help more than aeros training in the event you encounter a storm.

brgds
421C

This one?

1983 Negev mid-air collision - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

When to pull the handle, when not to?

Pace: My comment was regarding your fear about entanglement.

Be careful with general statements including being able to recover at altitude. One chute pull involved a CFI and aerobatic pilot who was at something like 16,000'. He was in clear air but over an undercast. The next thing he knew he was upside down in the clouds. The speculation involves rapidly building clouds which can rise at 5000'/minute. I back his decision to pull rather than try to recover in the clouds and over mountains. An interesting side note was that the Christmas ornaments in the luggage compartment survived intact.

Paul

I think we can get lost in the technology facts are that airframes other than being built out of composites have changed little in layout in 60 years!
Technology yes and the ability to reliably lower an aircraft and it's occupants to the ground safely had to be one of the most exciting developments!
When everything is running right flying is pretty easy it's when the technology breaks down or things go wrong that we are left with basic flying and handling skills.
IR flying is actually a handling flying skill hence why in a test we are expected to hand fly in the raw! No autopilot and minimal nav!
The same goes with pure handling.
421 C highlighted the high descent rate with the PC12! As not being a spin ! How many spins end up in a spiral dive and without knowing and being familiar with both confusion could easily cause the incorrect recovery methods and hence a breakup of the airframe!
Technology and terminology is all fantastic but most important of all is still handling piloting skills which in themselves lead to correct descision making !

Pace

We don't know anything about what the pilot in the PC12 was or was not trying to do. Maybe the aeroplane had entered a spin previously and he'd already recovered that using exceptional skills before something else happened. Maybe the aeroplane wouldn't allow him to recover...Who knows, but I do know the PC12 is not authorised for intentional spins making it no different to a Cirrus in that respect. So why don't we forget about that accident in relation to this discussion as it is not relevant.

This really is the big question point for me.

I have blatantly planned and made my mid up when I will use the chute:

1) that in the event of virtually all off airport landings for what ever reason (unless I can guarantee the quality of the surface which is unlikely)

2) In the event I lose control of the aircraft through pilot error, disorientation, mechanical failure.

3) Over Sea requiring a ditching.

4) Find myself out of my depth in conditions I can not assure a safe landing due to WX, ice or anything else I should have totally avoided but for whatever reason failed to.

This is at odds with other's, and I can fully understand why, because I use to think in exactly the same way. In four years of flying with the CAPS and observing outcomes of both successful and unsuccessful off airport landings my attitude has changed to what it is now.

I understand others will cite that as lack of confidence, insufficient training, being a cop out and becoming a passenger for the ride rather than control the aircraft to the ground.

I firmly believe none of those are valid, but my firm opinion as PIC on what I consider the safest and least life threatening option when in an uncontrolled situation, under extreme pressure, into a totally unknown and unexpected landing area.

Sooner or later there will be one or more CAPS pulls that do not turn out well and this will skew the so far 100% success rate quite dramatically, The CAPS is far from risk free, high winds, landing on wires, or a road, all sorts of factors could go wrong, but for me this is still the choice I have made and hope if ever I need to take the decision it will be taken in time to save me and my PAX rather than leave it to late and then the option has gone.

Others have a totally different opinion, in fact I would guess the vast majority of the GA population would not agree with this stance and maybe think it irresponsible , a reasonable proportion of the Cirrus owners would agree but certainly a fair few would not.

It is not a fair to compare this attitude if say a 172 had a BRS would I choose the same strategy, maybe, maybe not, for off airfield landings, A 172 with bigger wheels, lower landing speed is much better equipped to land with a better outcome in random fields.

007H

We are probably not as far apart as when to pull the chute as you imagine!
Loss of control ? I would attempt recovery but add a ceiling where I knew there was still room to effectively use the chute! Failure to recover use the chute.

Engine failure ? I may use the chute depending on what's below !

Night ? Definate use of chute

Over fog or very low cloud use chute

Engine failure over densely built up area? I would try to Glide clear with responsibility to those on the ground! If no chance of gliding clear use chute!

Over water ? Depends on water conditions and winds although the two don't go together! Heavy winds heavy seas : )

I would avoid the chute where the aircraft is flyable but this discussion has opened up other options for using it !

Would it encourage me to push my luck ? Probably yes if I am
Being honest : )

Pace

Pace, agree with that, I think the area we would probably not agree over a pint is the risk ratio of landing in fields, we did cover that in detail so no need to go over again but I still think a very good debate as may provoke thoughts.

Who is saying that handling is not important? No-one. But what handling skills don't do is trump everything else. I could equally reverse what you've said....eg. when handling skills break down, we are left with technology. Professional pilots of the 1930s or 1950s I am sure had a high level of your right-stuff "handling skills". But they crashed all the time.

Take CFIT. Historically, one of the biggest killers in CAT or GA. What the @?!%* does handling have to do with CFIT avoidance? There's a plateau beyond which no amount of navigation, CRM and SOP training is going to improve CFIT accident rates because crews of one or two human pilots are going to make mistakes. The vast improvement beyond this plateau was down, initially, to GPWS and, ultimately, EGPWS. Of course, it doesn't eliminate CFIT entirely, but it has done for all practical purposes enroute, although not in the final approach phase if people are going to descend below minima or attempt approaches in IMC to VFR airports.

It's easy, sadly, to read of CFIT accidents in light aircraft in Europe. I don't ever remember reading of an enroute CFIT in a light aircraft equipped with TAWS. You could argue that TAWS in light aircraft might lead to "over-reliance" and over-confidence and thus more danger. But, I believe the evidence is that this is totally false and that TAWS is a major safety benefit.

With technology, training and handling, my sense is the right answer is balance. Let's use the Air France crash in the South Atlantic as an example. It led to loads of forum pontificators bemoaning the loss of real-man handling skills in airline flying. As a totally non-expert GA bloke I am not going to have a view with much validity, but, nevertheless, my view is that modern airline technology and training methods avoid 10 or 100 accidents for every one that could be attributed to a lack of handling skill. I am sure the industry has taken on lessons from the AF tragedy, but I doubt it will change the balance I mention in terms of technology and training.

In GA, let's face it, the balance of training is towards handling and maneouvers. It's better in the US, but certainly very traditional in the UK. A Cirrus pilot still has to complete courses and pass checkrides predominantly related to handling. Being realistic, after 100 years of people being taught to fly small airplanes I don't think we will see major improvements in what handling skills can be expected of a typical private pilot. Similarly, I don't see that serious GA accidents are significantly down to handling skill issues, certainly not ones that could be avoided by more 'extreme' aerobatic or spin training.

It seems to me that the Cirrus philosophy is down to augmenting the basic private pilot's "hygiene level" handling skills with safety technology. The recommendations of the Cirrus training community on CAPS deployment I think simply recognise the reality of risk. If CAPS has a very low risk (say 5%), then deployment in a scenario where attempting a non-CAPS emergency landing or recovery has a risk of more than 5% is the right thing. It is not "complacent" or "over-reliant", it is the correct decision-making. Yes, the success rate of forced landings or loss of control at higher altitudes should be quite high. But if the success rate of CAPS deployment is higher, then shouldn't pilots deploy?

My sense of your concern about "over reliance" is that, in fact, the Cirrus community became concerned with "under reliance" - ie. that there were too many fatal accidents without CAPS deployment where pilots were relying on their handling skills and not on the technology, hence the emphasis on deployment in recent years.

Note that this is entirely a statistical argument. One rarely reads of an accident report where better actions by the pilot wouldn't have avoided a tragedy. Of course one could point back to that and say "well if he'd had 5hrs proper aeros training etc etc". But the point on CAPS is that given the realistic plateau that one can get to with private pilot handling training, there are many scenarios where CAPS deployment is statistically the better course of action, even if someone could read about it afterwards and think with superior handling skills, they'd have saved the day.

brgds
421C

Except that population stats are not valid for any individual except the average one, who probably doesn't exist.

If I have an engine failure, and I see loads of nice looking fields (which frankly is the case most of the time when flying in half decent wx) and somebody tells me the chance of killing myself in a field landing is 5%, and the chance of killing myself under the chute is 3%, I will still go for the field landing.

Perhaps with a "decision height" equal to the min chute activation height...

It's like the stats about flying being similarly risky to motorcycle riding. With about 100k miles on bikes, in the 1970s and 80s, I don't buy that at all. Bikes are much more risky to the careful rider because most bike deaths are (and always have been) caused by a car driver - often in a manner where the car driver gets away with it. With all the half blind drivers, and many crazy drivers, I wouldn't ride a bike now if you paid me for it.

The other thing is that if I land smack down vertically with a say 20G shock under a chute, and the plane is salvaged and repaired, I will still want to chuck away all the avionics, but the insurance company isn't going to pay for that.

Many people say that the instant your engine stops, the plane is the property of the insurance company. That is actually true only if you are a self fly hire flyer (whatever happens you can stick a finger up and walk away) or in very narrow circumstances (engine failure at night, above "impossible" terrain, above a forest, above a low overcast/fog) but the rest of the time an aircraft owner will be considering his flying future which is likely to be impacted by a really stupid aircraft write-off decision.

I consider myself to be an average pilot, but given a decent starting height I would hope to be able to do a field landing, in the same way I can fly a glide approach onto a 18m wide runway, etc. And if I am not established on a nice "final" at the chute decision height, I will pull the chute.

421C good post,

I think in the USA there are several Cirrus CFIT with TAWS enroute, they do have much bigger mountains that certainly you sometimes wonder in ammazment at what on earth was the pilot was thinking taking off in the weather / night / icing etc etc. It happens and Pilots in all GA types will keep on killing themselves.

Anyway back to this CAPS pull, preliminary report has come out and I have to say a bit confusing, did he have total loss of power or shut the engine down? which would seem odd for a prop over speed.

Either way he felt he lost control by around 1000ft despite initially have sufficient altitude and speed. Once realised he had lost control and not going to make the runway he pulled the chute so in my mind did the right thing and walked away.



NTSB Identification: ERA12LA473
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, July 22, 2012 in Pickens, SC
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N138CK
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.



This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.


On July 22, 2012, at 1705 eastern daylight time, N138CK, a Cirrus SR-22, was substantially damaged during a forced landing in Pickens, South Carolina. The commercial pilot and three passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the flight that departed Cobb County Airport-Mc Collum Field (RYY), Atlanta, Georgia, and was destined for Piedmont Triad International Airport (GSO), Greensboro, North Carolina. The business flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91.

According to the pilot, he fueled the aircraft "to the tabs" and performed a preflight and run-up inspection prior to takeoff from RYY. No abnormalities were noted during the inspections. The pilot departed, and as the airplane climbed through an altitude of 800 feet, he noted the oil temperature was "in the green" (about 190 deg) and the airspeed was about 130 knots.

A few minutes later, the pilot felt a "wiggle," or a slight vibration from the engine, as the airplane continued to climb. The engine RPMs began to rise rapidly and he noted an engine oil pressure warning on the primary flight display (PFD). The pilot applied full mixture, turned the fuel pump on, and manipulated the throttle. He also assured the magnetos were in the "on" position. The pilot thought he may have had a propeller overspeed condition, so he reduced the throttle; however, the RPMs remained high. He then secured the engine and declared an emergency with Greer Approach Control, with whom he had been communicating. The air traffic controller informed the pilot that Pickens County Airport (LQK) was at his "10:00 and 4 miles," and the pilot turned toward the field and prepared for a forced landing. He noted the RPMs were not decreasing as he pitched the airplane down for the descent (the airspeed was about 110-120 knots). The pilot attempted unsuccessfully to restart the engine, and then re-secured it while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 23 at LQK. He believed he had plenty of airspeed and altitude, when he turned base at 1,200 feet, and added one notch of flaps.

As the pilot added the flaps, he felt the handling characteristics of the airplane change, and it began to feel "mushy." He then retracted the notch of flaps and the condition became worse. As the airplane descended through 1,000 feet, the pilot felt as if he had "lost control of the airplane" and decided to pull the emergency parachute. The parachute deployed and within seconds the airplane settled into the trees. The airplane remained suspended in the trees until emergency personnel arrived on-scene and rescued the occupants.

Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed the presence of oil on the underside of the airplane. An examination of the engine was planned for a later date after the airplane was recovered from the trees.

Peter that is a perfectly reasonable argument and strategy and probably a fairly safe one, the key is to at least constantly consider CAPS before it gets to late and then not an option.

Manufacturers recommendations is 2000ft but it is pretty much from practical evidence still proven successful at 1000ft and much lower, I would still pull lower if in a bad place.

My main personal problem with your strategy is the ability to positively identify a "nice field" what looks good at 1000ft can look horrible on the ground and the Cirrus is not forgiving in marginal terrain with an awful lot of energy at anywhere from 60-70 knots or higher if bothched.

I also think the chance of killing yourself, landing under stress in the best looking filed available is higher than 5%, who know but I would think death or serious injury in a Cirrus in this scenario maybe somewhere from 10-20% for the average guys. But I appreciate my guess no better than yours.

The stretching the glide if coming up short is another problem leading to a fatal stall.

007H

It does worry me your concern at a forced landing!
If a pilot stretches the glide and stalls that is a fault in the pilot or training.
With a forced landing even with a slight wind your ground speed will not be that high.
The difference is you will be in command of where you go in the air and even on the ground.
If the field is rougher than you thought you may damage the undercarriage ?
But I do not believe that there are that many fatalities or serious injuries from
Forced landings as long as you keep the thing flying and do not stall out!
With the chute pulled you no longer have any control and on windy days may not just have to suffer a high descent rate into the ground but also 30 odd kts forward speed.
You will also wreck the aircraft while in a forced landing you may have no damage or minimal damage compared to the chute.
Even taking out a hedge is not that big a deal!
Yes NO suitable landing site pull the chute but I still do not see the chute as an answer to all!

Pace

While we practice PFl's on generally good vis days with a cosy instructor sat by our side (for most) and often go around at x 100ft it is a whole different ball game with the full on stress of a genuine engine failure, adrenaline pumping around and a host of other worries, plenty have stalled it in when trying a forced landing including several Cirrus Fatal's of Pilots far more competent than myself.

You will have a degree of control but massively reduced and if you do not like what you see as you get closer then options are minimal to say the least.

Or cartwheel, flip, bounce and still stall it in.

As above, you, I or any other Pilot could stall in a forced landing situation, how ever competent they think they are, it could and does happen.

Generally very true other than the rate of descent at 17knots I do not consider that high, the more worrying factor is a strong wind could as well as add to forward momentum it could drag the aircraft once landed, that is a genuine risk to be considered when deciding on using CAPS.

Various Chute pull aircraft have been fully repaired and put back in service but that would not be a consideration I would factor in to my decision making process. If I write off the aircraft so be it.

You may have minimal damage in a forced landing or you may have a dead pilot and passengers, the odds are to high in my book to be landing Cirrus in fields.

I flew over Kent today with this in my mind today and to be frank there were few fields I would fancy when you factor in those with high crops, steepish inclines, trees at each end, walls and sturdy looking fences, Animals etc A few weeks ago I would have added water logged fields to the list.

No worries, so am I..

I wonder how much this debate is flavoured by various pilots practice in emergencies?

Jock and I often seem to be on the same side in debates like this, and I wonder how much this is flavoured by the currency we try to maintain?

I was raised at my mother's knee (well, an RAF flying instructor or 6 anyhow) who brought me up to believe firmly that regularly practicing emergencies is an essential part of your personal life insurance.

So, most months I will take the time to do a PFL or two, a stall or two, and usually something else - maybe a flapless approach or a simulated fire. And so, whilst I won't claim I'm perfect, I'm reasonably confident of my ability to handle most stuff going wrong with reasonable competence.

But, particularly since I've become an instructor, I've become very aware that many PPLs do not practice PFLs, or any other potential emergency, from one year to the next. This perhaps explains why given the option of a parachute many PPLs choose to plan for the "CAPS option" in preference to many other things that they have been trained to do, but never practiced since.

G

I wonder how many Cirruses where the chute wasn't pulled but the aircraft was in fully flying condition (e.g. "just" an engine failure) ended up injuring or killing occupants as a result of a forced landing which was attempted to an apparently suitable site but which for some reason didn't work out.

My recollection of no-chute-pulled crashes is that most were not survivable.

I also wonder if the aircraft tends to catch fire easily. There is a video out there from a security camera, showing an SR20/22 crashing into a car park, at a fair old flying speed, and exploding into a huge fireball literally the instant it hits the ground.

The only burn death in a Cirrus was a case where the pilot's seatbelt jammed. The copilot got out.

There is at least one case where the pilot had an engine failure at altitude and died during the off airport landing. A partner in the plane said the pilot was dismissive of the chute and had stated he believed an off airport landing would be a better choice.

Genghid exactly my point for a number of posts now.

Its all very well those preaching how well they would do in a forced landing all i can add is i have pulled the leaver on enough pilots to add that i agree with you many will not do a good job however much they may think otherwise.

Put me in an aircraft with a pilot drawn randomnly and i would far rather they pull the chute that demonstrate their forced landing skills.

With apologies thats the way i see it and i suspect just as you if you ask most instructors they would agree with you.

Fuji

But I thought all the Cirrus pilots were highly trained and far advanced over pilots from 30 years ago?

Other than stall spin accidents in a forced landing which are avoidable what are the statistics for serious injury/death in a forced landing?

What is the CIRRUS view on this because it does not recommend using the chute unless a suitable landing area cannot be found for a forced landing.
You would be going against PPL training as well as the manufacturers recommendation so it might be wise to get the CAA blessing as well as CIRRUS?
I am being serious with this as you may be right but if you are you still need the CAA and Cirrus on board for what is a controversial new way

Pace

Fuji for me put me in a Cirrus with an instructors or professional Pilot and I would rather they pull the Chute than demonstrate their forced landing skills, they may well have a better chance than your average guy but there would in my opinion be plenty who did not make a very good job of it.

Pace old chap that is nonsense and you know it, nobody is trying to make that suggestion, there are plenty of poorly or inadequately trained Cirrus Pilots just like any other GA type.

I am not sure, it is also hard to come up with a statistic as I accept a successful forced landing is not, or I do not think an incident that needs reporting. So is a non event from a reporting point of view.

Forced landings and CAPS for engine failure or fuel exhaustion are fairly rare, most deaths are still CFIT, VFR into IMC and handling on aproach / landing. All Pilot error.

The risk of dying in a Cirrus (and I assume most GA aircraft) due to mechanical failure is small.

I am serious, why do I as PIC need to get any one on board, CAA or Cirrus or anyone?

I have made my own mind up of my strategy. Each PIC with the tools available can decide from their training, knowledge and skill what is in their opinion their best chance of survival and when and when not to use the chute.

As you said the only area most of us disagree strongly in is the choice of a forced landing off airport or the use as a general preference of the Chute in this situation.

007H

Because there are training procedures for engine failure and forced landings which are part of the PPL and inground as a SOP by the CAA.
This would go against all we are taught so would need an approval by the CAA who would have to satisfy themselves that there is a safety case in using the chute as a SOP!

They in turn would consult with the manufacturers for their opinion.
Their opinion does not follow your own and as such to make up your own procedures could cause insurance problems.

Ie worst case scenario flying over a large tarmac runway you have an engine failure and pull the chute.
The insurance company would be in their rights to question paying out over a home made non approved procedure

Pace

That really isn't the case I am afraid. If you encounter an event that isn't defined you can make it up on the hoof otherwise you are leaving your backside wide open.

I know this isn't normally a Private pilot concern but there have been quite a few cases where Pro pilots have stepped outside the normal abnormal procedures and then been taken to task afterwards and also there estates have been sued post event.

There is currently huge court cases with AF477 with the company manufacturer and pilots estates all involved.

Genghis I agree with your point, other than many PPL's who fly Cirrus have had virtually zero training on using the chute, never practiced it in a sim, pretty much forget about it day by day flying.

When the crunch comes and they need it they are totally unprepared and have no strategy and die with a perfectly good chute on board.


So I think the general training of Cirrus Pilots has fallen well short and maybe reflects something like a string of 13 fatal's and in the same period only 2 CAPS pulls, this specific one being one of them.

There was some work done on engine failures in the UK from around 2000 which came out at around;

50% no significant damage, no injury

25% Significant damage minor injury

25% Significant damage, serious injury / death

I strongly suspect that a busy guy with a Cirrus would rather rely on the tec than “waste” time practising PFL’s etc every month.

Rod1

As a open question 007 what do you think should be the minimum training and should there be recurrent type training?

It almost sounds like you need a type rating for this machine.

You seem to need a far greater depth of system knowledge and procedures than your normal sod it read the POH kick the tyres light the fire SEP.

Now Pace we have been through this. Cirrus say you should consider using the chute if a forced landing can be secured with LITTLE or NO risk. Whatever the rights or wrongs, no regulatory authority or insurance company is going to challenge the commanders assessment of whether or not he considered there was little or no risk. For my own interest, I have started a trawl through the AAIB reports; it is interesting the number of forced landing that do involve injury. If I find time I might post my findings. There is an interesting report I was reading only just now. Unfortunately the pilot and his apssenger were seriously injured. In the interview he was frank. He was asked the last time he had practiced a PFL; it was during his last flight review over eighteen months previous. Of how many pilots is that true? In fact how many pilots aren't asked to demonstrate a PFL during their review? I know of a few. Its all very well your highlighting what pilots SHOULD do but as I have said before we live in a real world, in which pilots DON'T regularly practice PFLs, in fact they probably don't practice them at all.

Not withstanding as you well know the PPL is designed to cover the "basic" elements of pilot training. It considers the use of a chute no more than the use of a personal parachute. The CAA are happy I fly aeros in the UK without a chute, whereas in France it would be illegal for me to do so, and I could be prosecuted or the insurance company could refuse to pay out, if I had an accident while flying aeros without a chute.

I did come across another interesting statistic. If just half the pilots involved in fatal Cirrus accidents in circumstances where they could have used the chute and did not, had deployed the chute, then the Cirrus fatality record would be significantly less than the rest of the GA fleet (in fact by over half). Of course that assumes the chute changed the outcome, but I suspect that is a safe bet in the majority of cases.

Again while I enjoy the debate I would put it to you that your dis-service is as great but sowing seeds that a pilot should be reluctant to use the chute on the basis that he SHOULD be able to carry out a successful forced landing. I would argue (albeit based entirely on my own perception) that most pilots would be better off pulling the chute rather than ever considering a conventional forced landing if their sole priority was to minimise personal injury. How often when an instructor does some PFLs does the chat go as follow;

First PFL - 500 feet, so are we going to make the field or go through the hedge?

Pilot; hmm, its not looking good is it?

Instructor - how about another go.

Instructor - third time lucky, then. ;)

Trouble is when it happens for real you only get one chance, and there is no instructor to suggest your choice of field, glide angle etc might not be a good one.

I think the outcome of many forced landing is OK because it seems to me aircraft are surprisingly good at going through hedges, walls, roofs, etc and more often than not flipping over. Unfortunately that means the outcome can be a bit of a lottery and even a "good" landing in a field can result in an inverted aircraft with the problems than can ensue.

Fuji you and 007H may be totally correct as I have said this is new ground and goes against conventional thinking and pilot training!
That does not mean you or 007H are wrong as your arguments are convincing!
But regardless without support from
The manufacturer and the CAA we are left in uncharted waters!
The Cirrus SOP should read " in event of engine failure we recommend in most circumstances that the chute is deployed! Only if the pilot is over a secure landing site and very confident of his abilities should a forced landing be contemplated. In
Most circumstances Cirrus recommend an immediate deployment of the chute regarding engine failure ".
Surely you must see that it is not me you need to convince but the CAA and Cirrus who have better access to relevant statistics.
It is very raw of you to accuse me of encouraging pilots not to use the chute when all inam
Doing is stating the CAA and Cirrus position !
Btw you are convincing me slowly : )

G I agree that currency is a big factor.

Also linked into this is the number of times you have done said procedures.

While working as an instructor everything gets hard wired so to speak because your doing them 10 times a week. So even if I haven't flown a SEP in a year and get a PFL or stalling there isn't much thinking happens and it also doesn't matter if it on the blind side either. Most PFL's demonstrated were always LH circuits so most of the time I never saw the landing point anyway after choosing until we rolled out.

The whole thing I believe with forced landings is the way they are taught. If they have always been knocked off at 500ft your going to have problems. If your instructor was getting you to below fence level you are far far more prepared for the unlikely event. Yes from the instructor point of view there is more risk of the engine farting when you want to go around but...... The students are trained properly.


Its the same with the twin stuff these days. My last LPC the examinor failed the inside engine in a 30 degree climbing V2+10 turn. After I sorted it out I did mention he was a brave bastard to do that in the aircraft and it should maybe be left to the sim. But the rudder was in and nose lowered before I had even realised that the engine was being failed. He laughed and said don't worry I won't do it with an FO.

Did make me think though about some of the noise abatement V2+10 departure procedures if some of them shouldn't be Captain only departures.

And G I would reword that post it could be interpreted as you had lots of "uncles" as a kid.

Interestingly the Fatality figure in the USA is 17%.

And that brings me to point 2, in general, UK flight instruction is rubbish. Training in the USA seems much more tailored to what you want to fly and how to use the kit. I bet, for example, someone who buys a new cirrus, does their PPL in THAT cirrus with a FI who specialises in training IN the Cirrus, then does the Cirrus FITS course, and knows what every knob an button does is a far better Cirrus pilot than even a UK FI who has been asked to "convert" someone to the Cirrus. They might not be that great a Tomahawk pilot though, but that doesn't matter as they will never ever fly such a piece of rubbish in their life.

Try finding a FI in the UK who can teach you to fly GPS approaches with your 430W? Well I did actually, but the FI is a US CFII.......In fact, while I am on a rant, try finding a FI who has a valid IR in the UK. Ok, if they have come straight from Oxford, but ask them 13 monts later if it is still valid.

People who keep arguing about the parachute do so because they don't understand it. It is white-mans-magic to them, not how they were taught...oooohhh noooo mrs, I would never take to the lifeboat in the event of the ship sinking. I would....

If the factory says...If you use the parachute higher than X altitude, less than X knots, then there is a 2% chance you're going to kill yourself, and your engine fails above X and you are below X speed and you know there is a 17% chance you will die carrying out a forced landing.....hmmm, pull the red knob, no question, unless you are ASSURED landing.

Rod

The 25% serious damage injury or death figure!
Do we know a breakdown oh those FLs ?
My guess is a large percentage will
Be stall spin?
That comes back to training as there is NO reason for an aircraft to stall other than incorrect pilot handling or training!
The idea that you are better landing into something unfriendly rather than crashing from a stall spin!
I would like to know the stats where serious injury or death are a result of a successful forced landing under control into unsuitable or an insufficient landing site?
I bet that potion is not great ?

Pace

There is very little difference between the first statement and your second line. In other words for the pilot to believe he can make a forced landing with little or no risk he needs to be confident in his ability and happy the site is good. If not, Cirrus are saying consider using the chute. I see nothing ambiguous, likely to confuse the CAA or the insurers.

Your first line adds dangerous ambiguity by including the phrase "in most circumstances". The circumstances have been made clear. If the pilot considers there is more than a little risk associated with a conventional forced landing, use the chute. He might consider this to be the case for all sorts of reasons including his skills not being up to scratch given the weather and conditions or because he considers the available sites are unsuitable.

As I commented earlier the USA is so litigious that you would not give an edict unless you could guarantee the outcome; you cant and no one has suggested otherwise.

10 instructors current and up to speed could make perfectly good forced landings and in most circumstances their decision would be the correct decision, and 10 long in the tooth PPLs who have also long given up practicing forced landings could find it goes badly wrong in 50% of the cases and so in most circumstances they would be right to reach for the chute.

The simple truth as I suspect you know is the lawyers will have laboured carefully over this one, and concluded this is the correct balance between laying themselves open for a writ and over gilding the lily. I think they have got it about right.

If the UK rate is 25% for serious injury or death, then saying that a US rate of 17% death is better is a bit of a stretch. I had the option of putting a BRS in my aircraft, I researched it and decided against. The weight of the BRS will have caused some fatal accidents due to reduced performance.

Rod1

Pace,

I agree with your logic. The stats were from an article I found around 2000. The conclusion split was the bit I kept in my head and it is why I practice PFL’s regularly. I find it hard to understand why a pilot in current practice would have an issue unless he was very unlucky. Glider pilots land out all the time and the death rate is very very low.

Rod1