Latest CAA prosecutions

[piperarcher]

Just seen your post Archer. I disagree. This could have been catastrophic. The guy didn't even see the 80 seat 25 odd Tonne airliner lined up on the runway. Started by a simple mistake but not remedied in the way an instrument rated pilot should have done so. Personally I think he got off lightly.

Not disagreeing with you, it could have been, though there werent enough facts to make anything other than a loose thought on the matter. For example I wondered whether he was visual or not, or was he on an IMC approach. If he was visual, then he should have elected his own go-around, if not, then as Peter says, do you faff around and go back to the MAP. I just have an IMCr, I dont have a full IR so these are just open questions on my part. It's all part of the learning curve seeing what other people think :-)

[B2N2]

With regard to the Birmingham incident...

I don't think fining the guy was the right thing to do, yes he should have checked back with the last frequency but considering the suspected radio failure I can imagine a lot of pilots doing the same as he did under the pressure of the moment.

As for not seeing the Q400 the AAIB actually stated in their report that it would have been likely that the pilot would not see the aircraft considering the colour of the runway surface in that area and the likely focus point for viewing the runway from the approach path.

It was a poor display of airmanship perhaps but I fail to see the point in fining guy.

You are correct, they should have taken his license iso a fine.
Classic case of getting behind the airplane after a simple distraction and too much money with not enough skill.
If we just assume similar weather conditions for the sake of the discussion.
Here is an approach and landing onto RWY 15 at Birmingham in 2007
If you can't be bothered to wait skip to 2:30

You Tube

And they are saying that it may have been hard to see an aircraft of this size on the threshold waiting?


At 8 miles at 120 kts he would have had 4 minutes to change the frequency back to approach or to double check the frequency with the approach plate which he should have had on his lap or close by. He should have done an approach briefing where he verified the frequencies.
He should have been in contact with the tower at 6.7DME at the FAF.
The approach plate is here:
http://www.californiaair.co.uk/Route...IACS/ILS15.pdf
ILS was out of service and he buggered up the approach at one point being 700 feet high. He also did not configure the airplane till visual at 1.3 NM
The AAIB report is here:
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...TV%2010-11.pdf
From the report:

51 years
Commander’s Flying Experience: 1,100 hours (of which 180 were on type)
Last 90 days - 30 hours
Last 28 days - 12 hours

And a previous thread here:http://www.pprune.org/private-flying...unded-bhx.html

[172driver]

Agree with BackPacker here - I've had my 'strange encounters' with these guys at 1000ft. Scary stuff.

[peterh337]

That's why I never fly that low. Take off and go straight up to at least 2000ft.

Illegality aside (and that you*tube video is an incredibly stupid thing to go public with because so much of that flight was not just under 500ft from people but more like under 20ft in some cases) one can understand why they fly so low: it is a lot more exciting.

Flying a paramotor at 2000ft, not only is the ground barely moving (it is only barely moving at 150kt as far as I am concerned, especially over N France ) but you will be going backwards a lot of the time

[Contacttower]

You are correct, they should have taken his license iso a fine.

Sorry I'm not sure I understand; do you mean they should have taken his licence as well or instead of being fined?

I'm not sure what other action was taken by/against the pilot in the aftermath in terms of licences and training but I would have thought the most sensible thing to do would have been some kind of mandatory retraining/re-education process to address airmanship deficiencies; the overall tone of the report suggested the pilot was somewhat overloaded by the situation and that sort of 'tunnel vision' which being overloaded creates is what lead to the incident which occurred.

I'm not sure what the situation is with regard to his licence being suspended because he held an FAA licence which was being used in Europe, not sure if the FAA were made aware of the incident or not or what action they would have taken. Certainly in the US an incident like that would have led to a review of the pilot in question and their licence/competence.

Fining (and why not prison for the worst offenders?) however is a good punishment for people who have knowingly broken rules with regard to flying without licences, forging maintenance paperwork and well established air law like not flying within 500ft of a person/structure.

It is a pretty poor punishment for incompetence though IMHO, in the same way that the general criminalisation of incidents/accidents that involve 'pilot error' is generally bad for flight safety.

[Gertrude the Wombat]

BTW the report doesn't mention the use of light signals - aren't tower staff supposed to clear the dust from their Aldis lamps in this kind of situation? Aldis lights are (or at least were at some time) mandatory equipment, ISTR?

Yes.

After the pilot has signalled the need for this service by going around, flying deadside at 600', waggling his wings, and squawking 7600 (if available).

[Contacttower]

From the AAIB report it seems that Birmingham either did not have a lamp or at least it was not in an operational condition. Subsequent tests using one revealed that due to the location of the tower a white light could only be seen at 1 NM and a coloured light not at all.

I remember as a cadet on a AEF flight having a red flair fired up just before landing, prompting a go-around, because we had get too close to the aircraft in front, even though we had been cleared to land by the tower. That would be the obvious way to stop a landing in cases like the Birmingham incident.

[flybymike]

I see that the CAA are using mode S to positively identify cases for prosecution. That should deter further uptake (and use) somewhat.

I once had what I thought was radio failure in the circuit (turned out to be a headset not fully plugged in) I overflew the tower, got a green flashing light but didn't wait for steady green before landing (couldn't remember the light drill and no transponder) Nothing further was said about the matter by anyone.

Ref the incident in question, without a positive clearance I would have gone around myself but I have some sympathy for the pilot. We all misdial frequencies from time to time.

[peterh337]

After the pilot has signalled the need for this service by going around, flying deadside at 600', waggling his wings, and squawking 7600 (if available).

On an IFR flight?

without a positive clearance I would have gone around myself

What about the lost comms procedure for IFR?

Where do you draw the line?

I have never heard of the lost comms procedure terminating at a specific distance left to run

Some bigger airports do publish a specific procedure for lost comms, however.

[Zulu Alpha]

The CAA vs. Barke is blatantly unfair. It was a declared emergency and the Sukhoi could have had structural damage, fuel leaks, control problems or anything. Things only a pilot could know and that would not be visible from the chase plane. Or even a radio malfunction. The emergency authority of the pilot overrules any kind of traffic clearance. Besides it was an A/G aerodrome, fer chrissakes.

Adam,

I was at this event and the issue was his departure. He had smoke on and I think the CAA interpreted his actions as trying to show off a few minutes before an airshow started. In doing so he hit two parked aircraft and flew low over a large crowd. Inches lower and he would have crashed into the crowd.
I think the CAA action was entirely justified.
I would agree that the description in the list doesn't quite say this but quite a few of the descriptions seem unclear.

[dublinpilot]

In the Birmingham incident, I wonder if the CAA felt that there was more to it, and that the "I thought the radio had failed" wasn't a genuine excuse. In other words that the pilot intensionally ignored ATC and decided to blame it on a radio failure?

It would explain why they decided to prosecute, but it would be hard to understand why a pilot would do such a thing.

Maybe I'm grasping at straws, but can't help but feel that there is more to it than in the summary given.

[Zulu Alpha]

Dublinpilot,

I suspect that the offences listed are only what can be proven beyond reasonable doubt in court.

As you say, there may have been more to these than the report states.

[peterh337]

I suspect that the offences listed are only what can be proven beyond reasonable doubt in court.

Yes, but one should not be convicted on hearsay.

According to contemporary reports, the TBM pilot was almost lynched after he landed, with the aircraft blocked in by vehicles so it could not "escape". Clearly there is more to this than has come out, but I know nothing one way or the other. I was just making the points that

1) you cannot have a "lost comms" procedure and then set it aside and bust the pilot if you think it wasn't genuine or was the result of a pilot error

2) you cannot know the actual flight conditions as seen by the pilot so cannot say the other aircraft was seen by him (which is why "VFR in IMC" is almost never prosecuted except in the best witness-supported (or the most vindictive, like the German cases) scenarios

A VFR pilot cannot land (ATC case) without a landing clearance unless it is an emergency but this is not the case for IFR on a properly filed IFR route.

I guess we will never know what happened.

Another thing is that NG cases are not listed

[AdamFrisch]

Thanks for clearing that up, Zulu Alpha.

[dublinpilot]

Had Mad Jock really been banned? I see that he's got a banned avatar beside his name earlier in this thread.

What happened?

[hingey]

I agree with contacttower, fining is acceptable for deliberate violation of regulations but the majority of incidents, pilot error, should require alternative action. In FAA land, isn't recurrency training/ pilot evaluation flight a requirement following an incident?

At BHX, the pilot screwed up. Impounding his aircraft and fining him sounds like something
a) to satisfy the bigger customers ie the airlines,
b) the French would do.

At EXT not so long ago Dash lined up without clearance whilst a 737 landed on the reciprocal runway. Two professional pilots made an error and afaik were not fined, instead received additional training. Imagine if it had been a light aircraft...

h

[B2N2]

As far as the Birmingham incident is concerned:

The aircraft was on a private flight from Voghera, Italy to Birmingham Airport. It was being flown by the chairman of a business with the intention of attending a meeting in Birmingham; he departed Voghera at 0843 hrs. En-route he stopped at Angers, France and Antwerp, Belgium to collect members of his staff who were also to attend the meeting.

Addional external pressure factors to land at the intended destination.
That's a classic one in risk-management.

There were NOTAMs in force at Birmingham Airport in respect of the replacement of the Runway 15 ILS and availability of navigation aids; these were not noted by the pilot prior to commencing the flight to Birmingham.

Unaware of the need to fly a NDB approach, considering how he flew it he was out of practice. Flew the approach between 177 and 200 (!) knots. I have no expereince in a TBM but that is outrageous, even for a pilot very experienced on type, which he was not. If you look at his vertical profile he was 700 feet too high at some point.
The radio hickup should have been his last "warning flag" out of three:

1. Unexpected approach for the ILS being out of service
2. Unstable approach, at some point 700 feet too high
3. Unable to contact tower

At this point he should have initiated the missed approach and contact the radar facility.
This has absolutely nothing to do with the rules for Comms failure, IFR or VFR.
He never checked the frequency, never switched back to approach and never tried Comm 2.
At 180 kts and 7 miles he had 2:20 to sort himself out before touching down.
At 120 kts and 7 miles that would have been 3:30.

Data recorded on the TBM suggests that the pilot became visual with the runway at about 600 ft aal (900 ft amsl) and at a range of about 1.3 nm from the threshold. When interviewed, he was unsure of the point at which he became visual but the position indicated by the data appears to be reasonable. He configured the aircraft for landing with the gear and first stage of flap, waited for the speed to reduce below the full flap limit speed of 122 kt and then selected landing flap. He visually checked that the runway was clear while correcting the aircraft’s flightpath and then landed. The tower controller assessed that the TBM touched down abeam the Bravo intersection, about 270 m from the displaced threshold and 170 m short of the main touchdown markers.

All of this at 1.3 miles. That airplane should have been configured for approach at 7 miles.

On vacating the runway the TBM pilot contacted Ground on the #1 radio without difficulty.

That's his last nail in the coffin right there.

Ref the incident in question, without a positive clearance I would have gone around myself but I have some sympathy for the pilot. We all misdial frequencies from time to time.

I agree with you, however the consequences are sometimes much more serious then other times.
We all make mistakes, even nice people. This case there could have been 50 fatalities for something that would have been clearly avoidable and is a matter of stupidity and arrogance. Clearly a pilot overstepping his skill boundaries by a mile.

he gained a stand alone FAA Private Pilot’s certificate in the USA in December 2006. He completed his Instrument Rating (IR) at the same time and last renewed it in June 2010 in Italy. He was required to fly an NDB approach during his initial flight test but was not required to fly one during his renewal test. The TBM pilot could not recall flying an NDB approach between his initial IR test and the incident.

He should never have attempted this approach or gone missed on the third thing going wrong.
I am no drama-queen but a Q400 full of fuel, that could have been 50 fatalities.

[peterh337]

The bit about the NDB approach is silly because nobody who flies for real flies NDB approaches with the ADF

One flies them with a GPS, autopilot-coupled.

Obviously, one could never say that at the CAA interview.

Addional external pressure factors to land at the intended destination.
That's a classic one in risk-management.

I must avoid carrying passengers then

You are right but what is one to do? You can't use this kind of info, except to form a possible psychological profile behind something.

[BackPacker]

Re the Birmingham incident, why was the Q400 allowed to line up, given the fact that there was an aircraft on the approach and closing fast? Don't the approach and tower controller coordinate things?

[B2N2]

I must avoid carrying passengers then

Nope, the external stress factor was being the boss, flying yourself and the ones below you on the totem pole to a meeting that you propably called for.
Zooming along in your bright shiney airplane and loosing face if you can't land the thing.

Re the Birmingham incident, why was the Q400 allowed to line up, given the fact that there was an aircraft on the approach and closing fast? Don't the approach and tower controller coordinate things?

Looks like he was told to slow down by ATC and then switched to tower.