Gloomy News from North Weald
Guest
Posts: n/a
Gloomy News from North Weald
I have just read the AAIB Report on the midair between the Yak 50 and the Cessna at North Weald earlier this year: <A HREF="http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/dec00htm/gingr.htm" TARGET="_blank">http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/dec00htm/gingr.htm</A>
This made for sobering reading, especially on the subject of circuit joins, r/t terminology and sky-sharing by standard puddle jumpers and energetic high performance aircraft. Those of us who fly to/from North Weald will, no doubt, often have joined the Circuit whilst some hot ship is doing its stuff below you or somewhere nearby. That's part of the fun of the place, and long may it continue, but, hands up: how often have we joined other than downwind, and have we always been 100% sure of where the rocketship had got to? Base joins from Willingale or from near Harlow, and straights ins, are pretty common (overheads are no-go because Stansted comes down to 1500 feet above the field). I'll go back to downwind joins now, although the Cessna in the accident had properly joined that way. If I get my Christmas wish and acquire a share in something sparkly, which may live at North Weald, I don't think I'll be in a rush to go run and breaking a lot.
I fly from North Weald a lot, and consider it my favourite airfield. I did not know any of the people involved in the tragedy and express my sympathy to their families and friends. The accident seemed to be the sort of thing which could have happened to anyone, given the particular combination of circumstances, some of which are peculiar to places with high aerobatic/warbird populations. I just hope that the accident is not used by those who seek to close the airfield for commercial gain.
Anyway, a report worth reading IMHO: definitely one of those "There but...." moments.
This made for sobering reading, especially on the subject of circuit joins, r/t terminology and sky-sharing by standard puddle jumpers and energetic high performance aircraft. Those of us who fly to/from North Weald will, no doubt, often have joined the Circuit whilst some hot ship is doing its stuff below you or somewhere nearby. That's part of the fun of the place, and long may it continue, but, hands up: how often have we joined other than downwind, and have we always been 100% sure of where the rocketship had got to? Base joins from Willingale or from near Harlow, and straights ins, are pretty common (overheads are no-go because Stansted comes down to 1500 feet above the field). I'll go back to downwind joins now, although the Cessna in the accident had properly joined that way. If I get my Christmas wish and acquire a share in something sparkly, which may live at North Weald, I don't think I'll be in a rush to go run and breaking a lot.
I fly from North Weald a lot, and consider it my favourite airfield. I did not know any of the people involved in the tragedy and express my sympathy to their families and friends. The accident seemed to be the sort of thing which could have happened to anyone, given the particular combination of circumstances, some of which are peculiar to places with high aerobatic/warbird populations. I just hope that the accident is not used by those who seek to close the airfield for commercial gain.
Anyway, a report worth reading IMHO: definitely one of those "There but...." moments.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I knew the cessna captain and I am very very sad that he is gone, he was a top pilot & a very nice guy.
To lose the young pax also is doubly tragic,
I know the capt' would have done all he possibly could to avoid the incident.
I read the report also, very very sad to read,a truly awful way to go :-(
one of those awful tragic incidents that should not occur, but tragically do at times.
rest in peace all involved & kindest respects
& thoughts to the families & friends.
To lose the young pax also is doubly tragic,
I know the capt' would have done all he possibly could to avoid the incident.
I read the report also, very very sad to read,a truly awful way to go :-(
one of those awful tragic incidents that should not occur, but tragically do at times.
rest in peace all involved & kindest respects
& thoughts to the families & friends.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I recently had an opportunity to review the wreckage of this accident held at the AAIB. there was soberingly little of it left. The energies involved must have been very very high. At least some consolation might be taken in the fact that it was over quickly.
RIP
WWW
RIP
WWW
Guest
Posts: n/a
FNG
---------------------------------------------
"I don't think I'll be in a rush to go run and breaking a lot."
"The accident seemed to be the sort of thing which could have happened to anyone, given the particular combination of circumstances, some of which are peculiar to places with high aerobatic/warbird populations"
---------------------------------------------
Having just read the report and looked at the diagrams which form part of it the question has to be asked - Did the Yak Pilot REALLY know what he was doing as far as a run and break is concerned. This accident could NOT have happened to anyone. It happened to somebody who didn't execute the manoeuver properly, and took another aircraft with him. Have a look through the diagrams derived from the radar recording, now read how it should have been done:
Approach the Initial Point remaining OUTSIDE the circuit. At the IP call "c/s - Initials". Fly down the dead side, using the fly through to establish where the other circuit traffic is. Once you know where the other traffic is turn crosswind at any point, calling "c/s - on the break - (intentions)". Fit in, call final and land.
Nothing in what I've said above bears any relationship to what happened. The guy didn't do it properly, and paid the ultimate price.
In an A/G, uncontrolled environment you owe it not only to yourself, but other airspace users to FOLLOW THE PUBLISHED PROCEDURES. This occasion caused an accident, but lets be honest - how many of us have had near misses at similar airfields, in a similar traffic environment, through people doing their own thing. I've had a couple caused by inconsiderate buffoons - I don't believe I'm the only one
CM
---------------------------------------------
"I don't think I'll be in a rush to go run and breaking a lot."
"The accident seemed to be the sort of thing which could have happened to anyone, given the particular combination of circumstances, some of which are peculiar to places with high aerobatic/warbird populations"
---------------------------------------------
Having just read the report and looked at the diagrams which form part of it the question has to be asked - Did the Yak Pilot REALLY know what he was doing as far as a run and break is concerned. This accident could NOT have happened to anyone. It happened to somebody who didn't execute the manoeuver properly, and took another aircraft with him. Have a look through the diagrams derived from the radar recording, now read how it should have been done:
Approach the Initial Point remaining OUTSIDE the circuit. At the IP call "c/s - Initials". Fly down the dead side, using the fly through to establish where the other circuit traffic is. Once you know where the other traffic is turn crosswind at any point, calling "c/s - on the break - (intentions)". Fit in, call final and land.
Nothing in what I've said above bears any relationship to what happened. The guy didn't do it properly, and paid the ultimate price.
In an A/G, uncontrolled environment you owe it not only to yourself, but other airspace users to FOLLOW THE PUBLISHED PROCEDURES. This occasion caused an accident, but lets be honest - how many of us have had near misses at similar airfields, in a similar traffic environment, through people doing their own thing. I've had a couple caused by inconsiderate buffoons - I don't believe I'm the only one
CM
Guest
Posts: n/a
The report said the the 'run and break' procedure was, basically, a military procedure.
Why allow this at a civilian field?
If I was flying in the area, and I heard someone report the 'initial', or 'on the break', I would have no clue even where to look!
Sad accident, but shows the dangers of mixing joining procedures to suit yourself, rather than everyone else.
Like Chilli said, stick with the Published Procedures.
Why allow this at a civilian field?
If I was flying in the area, and I heard someone report the 'initial', or 'on the break', I would have no clue even where to look!
Sad accident, but shows the dangers of mixing joining procedures to suit yourself, rather than everyone else.
Like Chilli said, stick with the Published Procedures.
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: north of barlu
Posts: 6,207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
First let me say that i have an axe to grind here ,i was on the same BAe146 trainning course as the cessna pilot and found him to be a very professional aviator who always took the time to make sure that things were done correctly , this seems to be reflected in the fact that he had joined the CCT IAW the published procedure.
Then when flying downwind he even sees an aircraft coming at high speed from behind and below making a rapid turn at the last moment to try to avoid , the guy must have been keeping a good look out.
Contrast this with the yak CCT entry , non standard high speed with a pull up into the down wind leg that if he monitered the radio he should have known had trafic and as his was a non standard join he should have given way to.
Three are now dead because a pilot did not follow the published procedure or wait untill the CCT was clear befor performing this "run and break" that is totaly incompatable with normal practice.
Some of you may not like what i have writen but a guy i had a lot of respect for and a young lad are dead because of an inpulsive and irisponsable stunt.
Then when flying downwind he even sees an aircraft coming at high speed from behind and below making a rapid turn at the last moment to try to avoid , the guy must have been keeping a good look out.
Contrast this with the yak CCT entry , non standard high speed with a pull up into the down wind leg that if he monitered the radio he should have known had trafic and as his was a non standard join he should have given way to.
Three are now dead because a pilot did not follow the published procedure or wait untill the CCT was clear befor performing this "run and break" that is totaly incompatable with normal practice.
Some of you may not like what i have writen but a guy i had a lot of respect for and a young lad are dead because of an inpulsive and irisponsable stunt.
Guest
Posts: n/a
A & C - Sad but true. If I had been in the Cessna and had heard the standard run & break calls I wouldn't even know where to start looking. The earlier description of a military run & break seems to me to be similar to a standard civilian dead side join except that the "run" is done dead side at low level, and closer in to the field, before pulling up and turning crosswind instead of running dead side into wind at circuit height.
arrow 2
arrow 2
Guest
Posts: n/a
I am a Yak 52 pilot based at North Weald. I had the good fortune to meet, on a couple of brief occasions, the pilot of the Yak 50 that was involved in the tragic midair collision at North Weald. I was not at the aerodrome the day of the accident, but it was of course an indescribable shock to the friends and family of all who died.
To echo a posting on the R&M board in the thread regarding the fatal Spitfire incident earlier this year, many, I would hope most, people believe that the dead, both those in the Cessna and the pilot of the Yak 50, should be allowed to rest in peace. This appears, sadly, to be a sentiment not shared by Chilli Monster and A and C, whose posts would be deeply upsetting to the family of the pilot of the Yak 50, were they to ever have the misfortune to read them. I sincerely hope that they do not have that misfortune.
It seems to me, that each of you has read the report and decided to wade in with emotive posts in assessing what was, in the AAIB’s words:
“[a] collision [that] occurred because the pilots of both aircraft did not see the other aircraft in sufficient time to take effective avoiding action.”
Chilli Monster
Your question whether the Yak pilot “REALLY [knew] what he was doing”, and your conclusion that “he didn’t do it properly” do you no justice and are not supported by any evidence and certainly not by the AAIB report.
The Yak pilot was a member of the Aerostars and as such, was a highly accomplished formation aerobatic display pilot, authorised by the CAA to conduct such flying in the UK. It is standard practice for a run and break to be flown by the Aerostars to recover the formation of aircraft to the aerodrome. The Aerostars includes at least one current senior RAF officer who is completely aware – more than you, I would suspect – as to the correct procedure for the flying of a run and break. Having seen the whole team, and each individual member of the team, fly a run and break at North Weald on many occasions, I think it is reasonable to assume that the pilot of the Yak 50 knew exactly how to fly an accurate run and break manoeuvre. Certainly I do not think that you are qualified to ask the question when the AAIB did not do so and when the pilot is not here to answer the allegation.
As to whether he flew it “properly”: how can you fairly reach such a conclusion? He had just reached a point that he regarded as being the Initial Point (hence his “initials” radio call). The radar track shows that he had not commenced the run or the break. His manoeuvring prior to the “initials” call was arguably outside the circuit area – in fact it was almost as far away as he could get without infringing the Stansted Zone. So for you to imply that what he did bore no relation to the paragraph you post describing how a run and break should be flown seems to me not to be supported by the evidence. A fairer conclusion was that, having flown over his property, he was positioning himself for the “run” from outside the circuit.
What is absolutely tragic, with 20/20 hindsight, is that his track to the initials point conflicted with the track of the Cessna, that had flown a downwind leg that was perhaps wider and more extended that the Yak pilot was expecting (bear in mind that the 20 runway at North Weald is some 1900 metres long). Perhaps, knowing that the Cessna was in the circuit, the Yak pilot was looking for him / expecting him to be, in a circuit that was closer to the aerodrome – I don’t know.
The fact is that the Aerostars are not the only aeroplanes to fly a run and break at North Weald, whether or not in formation. Most of the non-Aerostars Yaks do so (including myself), most of the jets based there do so, most of the other Warbirds do so (Mustangs, Harvards, Dakotas etc). So it has become a commonly flown procedure at North Weald.
A and C
You said: “Contrast this with the yak CCT entry, non standard high speed with a pull up into the down wind leg that if he monitored his radio he should have known had traffic…”
I believe that the report shows that the Yak pilot had NOT entered the circuit. As I said above, I believe that the Yak pilot was positioning for his run prior to breaking into the circuit. He was most certainly NOT flying a “pull up into the downwind” – his radio transmissions indicated he was positioning to fly a run and break – the run is flown down the dead side of the runway centreline (at North Weald this is flown not below 500 feet), followed by a break to the right to join the downwind leg of the right hand circuit.
Secondly, the AAIB report indicates that the Yak pilot WAS monitoring his radio, he having initially called visual on the Cessna and then later having requested a position on the Cessna. He was well aware that the Cessna was in the circuit – perhaps he felt that his left hand turn toward initials was sufficient outside the circuit as to be outside the expected base leg turn of the Cessna? We will never know.
You also called the manoeuvre “an inpusive and irisponsable stunt”. I think that this is simply an unnecessary insult to a man who has tragically died as a result of an accident involving two aeroplanes. Nowhere does the AAIB describe the intended run and break manoeuvre as irresponsible or impulsive. As I mentioned previously, the flying of run and break approaches to North Weald has become a common and accepted (by the local flying community) way of joining the circuit. It is perhaps one of the many features of North Weald that endear it to so many people, pilots and non-pilots alike.
In the end we are left with a terrible accident. You may have your own views on why it happened or who was to blame, but please do not use this forum to cast grave aspersions on any of those involved, particularly when you lack the qualifications to do so. The AAIB report is itself educative enough.
To echo a posting on the R&M board in the thread regarding the fatal Spitfire incident earlier this year, many, I would hope most, people believe that the dead, both those in the Cessna and the pilot of the Yak 50, should be allowed to rest in peace. This appears, sadly, to be a sentiment not shared by Chilli Monster and A and C, whose posts would be deeply upsetting to the family of the pilot of the Yak 50, were they to ever have the misfortune to read them. I sincerely hope that they do not have that misfortune.
It seems to me, that each of you has read the report and decided to wade in with emotive posts in assessing what was, in the AAIB’s words:
“[a] collision [that] occurred because the pilots of both aircraft did not see the other aircraft in sufficient time to take effective avoiding action.”
Chilli Monster
Your question whether the Yak pilot “REALLY [knew] what he was doing”, and your conclusion that “he didn’t do it properly” do you no justice and are not supported by any evidence and certainly not by the AAIB report.
The Yak pilot was a member of the Aerostars and as such, was a highly accomplished formation aerobatic display pilot, authorised by the CAA to conduct such flying in the UK. It is standard practice for a run and break to be flown by the Aerostars to recover the formation of aircraft to the aerodrome. The Aerostars includes at least one current senior RAF officer who is completely aware – more than you, I would suspect – as to the correct procedure for the flying of a run and break. Having seen the whole team, and each individual member of the team, fly a run and break at North Weald on many occasions, I think it is reasonable to assume that the pilot of the Yak 50 knew exactly how to fly an accurate run and break manoeuvre. Certainly I do not think that you are qualified to ask the question when the AAIB did not do so and when the pilot is not here to answer the allegation.
As to whether he flew it “properly”: how can you fairly reach such a conclusion? He had just reached a point that he regarded as being the Initial Point (hence his “initials” radio call). The radar track shows that he had not commenced the run or the break. His manoeuvring prior to the “initials” call was arguably outside the circuit area – in fact it was almost as far away as he could get without infringing the Stansted Zone. So for you to imply that what he did bore no relation to the paragraph you post describing how a run and break should be flown seems to me not to be supported by the evidence. A fairer conclusion was that, having flown over his property, he was positioning himself for the “run” from outside the circuit.
What is absolutely tragic, with 20/20 hindsight, is that his track to the initials point conflicted with the track of the Cessna, that had flown a downwind leg that was perhaps wider and more extended that the Yak pilot was expecting (bear in mind that the 20 runway at North Weald is some 1900 metres long). Perhaps, knowing that the Cessna was in the circuit, the Yak pilot was looking for him / expecting him to be, in a circuit that was closer to the aerodrome – I don’t know.
The fact is that the Aerostars are not the only aeroplanes to fly a run and break at North Weald, whether or not in formation. Most of the non-Aerostars Yaks do so (including myself), most of the jets based there do so, most of the other Warbirds do so (Mustangs, Harvards, Dakotas etc). So it has become a commonly flown procedure at North Weald.
A and C
You said: “Contrast this with the yak CCT entry, non standard high speed with a pull up into the down wind leg that if he monitored his radio he should have known had traffic…”
I believe that the report shows that the Yak pilot had NOT entered the circuit. As I said above, I believe that the Yak pilot was positioning for his run prior to breaking into the circuit. He was most certainly NOT flying a “pull up into the downwind” – his radio transmissions indicated he was positioning to fly a run and break – the run is flown down the dead side of the runway centreline (at North Weald this is flown not below 500 feet), followed by a break to the right to join the downwind leg of the right hand circuit.
Secondly, the AAIB report indicates that the Yak pilot WAS monitoring his radio, he having initially called visual on the Cessna and then later having requested a position on the Cessna. He was well aware that the Cessna was in the circuit – perhaps he felt that his left hand turn toward initials was sufficient outside the circuit as to be outside the expected base leg turn of the Cessna? We will never know.
You also called the manoeuvre “an inpusive and irisponsable stunt”. I think that this is simply an unnecessary insult to a man who has tragically died as a result of an accident involving two aeroplanes. Nowhere does the AAIB describe the intended run and break manoeuvre as irresponsible or impulsive. As I mentioned previously, the flying of run and break approaches to North Weald has become a common and accepted (by the local flying community) way of joining the circuit. It is perhaps one of the many features of North Weald that endear it to so many people, pilots and non-pilots alike.
In the end we are left with a terrible accident. You may have your own views on why it happened or who was to blame, but please do not use this forum to cast grave aspersions on any of those involved, particularly when you lack the qualifications to do so. The AAIB report is itself educative enough.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Southern Cross
I think 15 years Military ATC experience and 5 years Civil, but working at MoD airfields means that I know what I'm talking about as far as the manoeuver is concerned. I've lost many friends over those 20 years in all fields of flying. Healthy discussion afterwards prevents the same happening again.
I'm not 'trashing' the guys ability, but looking at the diagram in the report you have to wonder what was going on, and why he was in that position when ostensibly heading for the IP of Rwy 20. He had called Initials, yet was nowhere near the IP. Initials is followed by a flythrough of the deadside, NOT away from the airfield. It is this point in the AAIB report which is worth considering. Why, after overflying the house did he turn left towards the live side instead of right towards the IP?
We will, of course, never know.
[This message has been edited by Chilli Monster (edited 13 December 2000).]
I think 15 years Military ATC experience and 5 years Civil, but working at MoD airfields means that I know what I'm talking about as far as the manoeuver is concerned. I've lost many friends over those 20 years in all fields of flying. Healthy discussion afterwards prevents the same happening again.
I'm not 'trashing' the guys ability, but looking at the diagram in the report you have to wonder what was going on, and why he was in that position when ostensibly heading for the IP of Rwy 20. He had called Initials, yet was nowhere near the IP. Initials is followed by a flythrough of the deadside, NOT away from the airfield. It is this point in the AAIB report which is worth considering. Why, after overflying the house did he turn left towards the live side instead of right towards the IP?
We will, of course, never know.
[This message has been edited by Chilli Monster (edited 13 December 2000).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
AC-DC
Look again at the AAIB diagram, using the 1900m runway as a guide to scale, and ask yourself whether the collision took place in what we would normally define as a circuit.
I suspect that neither a/c was where the other's pilot expected it to be.
As a matter of interest, further to Beagler's points, formation teams also use a run and break as a safe way of splitting up and landing a formation. There is a great deal of formation flying at North Weald and flying a run and break on every landing keeps pilots current on tight, disciplined circuits.
Look again at the AAIB diagram, using the 1900m runway as a guide to scale, and ask yourself whether the collision took place in what we would normally define as a circuit.
I suspect that neither a/c was where the other's pilot expected it to be.
As a matter of interest, further to Beagler's points, formation teams also use a run and break as a safe way of splitting up and landing a formation. There is a great deal of formation flying at North Weald and flying a run and break on every landing keeps pilots current on tight, disciplined circuits.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I was the Air Trafficker that was the prime witness to the accident and the one mentioned in the AAIB report.I also knew the C150 guy and my wife worked with his Fiancee.
Let me just say this.
This was a terribley distressing accident.I watched the whole accident from about -12seconds to impact.The AAIB report was as I would expect it to be.Wholey professional,impartial and,in my view Correct.Alot of lessons can be learned at the the expense of the most precious of things,the lives of fellow aviators.NO-ONE IS TO BLAME FOR THIS TRADGEDY.However I feel that everyone reading this must sit back and think.Is YOUR LOOKOUT in the circuit what it could be?ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE PROCEDURES OF OTHER USERS OF YOUR BASE?I too fly.My profession is one where safety is the priority.I also fly with other pilots.There are very few in my 16 years flying,10 years ATC,that keep adequate lookout.Please,next time you are up,think.If joining on a right base look left,below,above,forward and right.LISTEN to the RADIO.If you are not sure where other traffic is,broadcast(or ask in an ATC environment)that you ARE THERE and you ARE ORBITING until you are sure WHERE everyone else is.
As I said no-one here was to blame.It was an accident started by a sequence of events.BUT WE ALL CAN LEARN SOMETHING.
FOR GOODNESS SAKE MAKE LOOKOUT (especially in the ciruit)one of your T O P Priorities
May you rest in peace my friends.
Autothrottle
Let me just say this.
This was a terribley distressing accident.I watched the whole accident from about -12seconds to impact.The AAIB report was as I would expect it to be.Wholey professional,impartial and,in my view Correct.Alot of lessons can be learned at the the expense of the most precious of things,the lives of fellow aviators.NO-ONE IS TO BLAME FOR THIS TRADGEDY.However I feel that everyone reading this must sit back and think.Is YOUR LOOKOUT in the circuit what it could be?ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE PROCEDURES OF OTHER USERS OF YOUR BASE?I too fly.My profession is one where safety is the priority.I also fly with other pilots.There are very few in my 16 years flying,10 years ATC,that keep adequate lookout.Please,next time you are up,think.If joining on a right base look left,below,above,forward and right.LISTEN to the RADIO.If you are not sure where other traffic is,broadcast(or ask in an ATC environment)that you ARE THERE and you ARE ORBITING until you are sure WHERE everyone else is.
As I said no-one here was to blame.It was an accident started by a sequence of events.BUT WE ALL CAN LEARN SOMETHING.
FOR GOODNESS SAKE MAKE LOOKOUT (especially in the ciruit)one of your T O P Priorities
May you rest in peace my friends.
Autothrottle
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: north of barlu
Posts: 6,207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Southern cross i have to say that when flying at a civil airfield you must be aware that other trafic may not even know what a run and break is and that the guy in the other aircraft may have only just got his/her licence and will expect all trafic to abide with the SOP,s.
If an aircraft is performing a non standard join then it is the captains responsability to give way to trafic that is established in the CCT ,this is as true for a base leg join as it is for a run and break.
The other question that should be asked is can the non standard join be made safely with the curent trafic conditions.
In my opinion the run and break is not compatable with a normal civil CCT and should only be performed when all pilots in the CCT are fully aware of the maneuver.
If an aircraft is performing a non standard join then it is the captains responsability to give way to trafic that is established in the CCT ,this is as true for a base leg join as it is for a run and break.
The other question that should be asked is can the non standard join be made safely with the curent trafic conditions.
In my opinion the run and break is not compatable with a normal civil CCT and should only be performed when all pilots in the CCT are fully aware of the maneuver.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Chilli Monster
Whilst not 100% clear on the exact timing, the AAIB report implies that the “initials” call was made after the Yak 50 made the left climbing turn, ie the call was made as he was now turning towards the aerodrome, not as he was turning away as you suggest. I do not read the report as suggesting that the call was made and only then did the climbing left turn away from the field commence – indeed I personally regard that as highly unlikely.
As to why the turn was left instead of right, the AAIB report highlights that gliding was active east of the aerodrome (as is regularly the case). The Yak is likely, in my opinion, to have wished to remain clear of the eastern side (which a right turn might have taken him towards), although sadly, we cannot know. Perhaps, as Ivchenko and I have theorised, the Yak pilot was not expecting that the Cessna was as wide and long downwind as he was and thought that a left turn away from known gliding activity was the safest, having regard how far North he was at that time. Again, we cannot know although I would personally give considerable credence to this possibility.
A and C
As a Yak pilot at North Weald, and knowing many of the other Yak / Warbird pilots based at North Weald, I can honestly say that people flying run and break circuit entries at North Weald do NOT, in my experience, recklessly dive in – we are aware that established circuit traffic (and indeed all other traffic) must be considered and avoided. It is common that a pilot intending to so enter does so having waited for other traffic to clear or become in a position where the manoeuvre can be safely executed. If anything, I believe that pilots of aircraft executing these manoeuvres do so with a heightened awareness of safety, of other aircraft and of the need to compensate for the fact that the pilots of those other aircraft may not understand what you are planning to do.
I think that the AAIB report indicates that having made his climbing turn, the Yak pilot was trying to establish where the Cessna had got to prior to commencing the run. It is reasonable, in my opinion, to conclude that he was doing that for the safety reasons and that, as the AAIB report concludes, it was only the fact that neither aircraft saw the other that the accident occurred.
Whilst not 100% clear on the exact timing, the AAIB report implies that the “initials” call was made after the Yak 50 made the left climbing turn, ie the call was made as he was now turning towards the aerodrome, not as he was turning away as you suggest. I do not read the report as suggesting that the call was made and only then did the climbing left turn away from the field commence – indeed I personally regard that as highly unlikely.
As to why the turn was left instead of right, the AAIB report highlights that gliding was active east of the aerodrome (as is regularly the case). The Yak is likely, in my opinion, to have wished to remain clear of the eastern side (which a right turn might have taken him towards), although sadly, we cannot know. Perhaps, as Ivchenko and I have theorised, the Yak pilot was not expecting that the Cessna was as wide and long downwind as he was and thought that a left turn away from known gliding activity was the safest, having regard how far North he was at that time. Again, we cannot know although I would personally give considerable credence to this possibility.
A and C
As a Yak pilot at North Weald, and knowing many of the other Yak / Warbird pilots based at North Weald, I can honestly say that people flying run and break circuit entries at North Weald do NOT, in my experience, recklessly dive in – we are aware that established circuit traffic (and indeed all other traffic) must be considered and avoided. It is common that a pilot intending to so enter does so having waited for other traffic to clear or become in a position where the manoeuvre can be safely executed. If anything, I believe that pilots of aircraft executing these manoeuvres do so with a heightened awareness of safety, of other aircraft and of the need to compensate for the fact that the pilots of those other aircraft may not understand what you are planning to do.
I think that the AAIB report indicates that having made his climbing turn, the Yak pilot was trying to establish where the Cessna had got to prior to commencing the run. It is reasonable, in my opinion, to conclude that he was doing that for the safety reasons and that, as the AAIB report concludes, it was only the fact that neither aircraft saw the other that the accident occurred.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I think that we should all read and re-read Autothrottle's posting.
Let's all try to learn from this in the true aviators' fashion without letting our own personal prejudices and opinions get in the way.
Incidents like these should make us review our outlooks on life.
B
Let's all try to learn from this in the true aviators' fashion without letting our own personal prejudices and opinions get in the way.
Incidents like these should make us review our outlooks on life.
B
Guest
Posts: n/a
As a NW based pilot I would like to extend my sincere condolences to all concerned in this tragic accident.
As has been mentioned earlier in this thread, North Weald is a wonderful place in which modern and vintage aviation (and everything in between) meets, which provides a very different scenario for pilots to operate in.
As a jet operator, I would like to explain the need and principle for a run-and-break manouevre and its' implications.
As jet a/c are typically quite fast in their operation and also heavy, it is difficult to reduce speed quickly and eficiently, and the noise footprint of a 1970's 80's jet is significantly large. Therefore, a run-and-break manouevre not only slows the a/c down quickly by producing large amounts of drag due to 'g' pulled on the break, but also makes sure that the 'downwind' leg is not only very short, but is also flown at idle power for most of the leg, hence noise pollution is restricted.
The call 'Initial' is made when level at 1000 feet agl up to 250 Kt(at NW) - 500 feet or less elsewhere, on the extended centreline. However, I have known pilots call Initial on an effective extended base (which I do not condone).
The a/c is then flown at 1000' agl down the centreline of the runway, and at the centre of the runway, a sharpish turn is made toward the downwind and the throttle retarded to idle. The a/c climbs slighty to 1100' agl, and then commences a gentle progressive turn onto final approach lowering flap and gear, turning final at approx 115Kt, which is carried until short final which comes back to approx 90Kt at the threshold (depending on weight). A decision to land should be made at 200' agl as there is usually a 10-15 second delay on acquiring full power from idle from old engined jet a/c!
I hope this helps give an insight to jet a/c mixing at ga airfields. I will always make myself available to discuss such issues in the name of safety.
H
------------------
Wizz, Bang, Pop !
As has been mentioned earlier in this thread, North Weald is a wonderful place in which modern and vintage aviation (and everything in between) meets, which provides a very different scenario for pilots to operate in.
As a jet operator, I would like to explain the need and principle for a run-and-break manouevre and its' implications.
As jet a/c are typically quite fast in their operation and also heavy, it is difficult to reduce speed quickly and eficiently, and the noise footprint of a 1970's 80's jet is significantly large. Therefore, a run-and-break manouevre not only slows the a/c down quickly by producing large amounts of drag due to 'g' pulled on the break, but also makes sure that the 'downwind' leg is not only very short, but is also flown at idle power for most of the leg, hence noise pollution is restricted.
The call 'Initial' is made when level at 1000 feet agl up to 250 Kt(at NW) - 500 feet or less elsewhere, on the extended centreline. However, I have known pilots call Initial on an effective extended base (which I do not condone).
The a/c is then flown at 1000' agl down the centreline of the runway, and at the centre of the runway, a sharpish turn is made toward the downwind and the throttle retarded to idle. The a/c climbs slighty to 1100' agl, and then commences a gentle progressive turn onto final approach lowering flap and gear, turning final at approx 115Kt, which is carried until short final which comes back to approx 90Kt at the threshold (depending on weight). A decision to land should be made at 200' agl as there is usually a 10-15 second delay on acquiring full power from idle from old engined jet a/c!
I hope this helps give an insight to jet a/c mixing at ga airfields. I will always make myself available to discuss such issues in the name of safety.
H
------------------
Wizz, Bang, Pop !