Beyond belief

[moggiee]

Originally Posted by Chuck Ellsworth

Is a " Commander " the same as a pilot when referring to the person flying these light single engine airplanes??

Or does the term commander require some special training?

It simply means "the pilot in command of the aeroplane". In this case, the pilot who was flying the aeroplane was licenced as a PPL holder, held a "Single Engine Pilot (SEP)" rating and had signed for the aeroplane - making him "commander" in the eyes of the CAA and the law.

The training and licencing system assumes that the pilot is also commander as it is a single pilot aeroplane.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

Yeh, moggiee, it just sounds weird.

[Contacttower]

Yeh, moggiee, it just sounds weird.

Well its the language the AAIB chose to use I suppose...

What they did was stupid...and the report does rather 'speak for itself' in that respect but to think what must have been going through their minds, the panic that must have set in as they realised that their chances of making a successful approach were almost nil and that they were running out of fuel....their last moments must have been terrible beyond words.

[KeyPilot]

A really shocking report. The young pilot was very foolish but was totally betrayed by several others who should have known better - one of whom also losing his life.

Does anyone know which FTO the aircraft was from?

[bjornhall]

Maybe the problem here wasn't insufficient training or supervision; perhaps the pilot had learnt too much.

Namely, that there is one set of rules you use in training and for check flights, and another, completely different set of rules you use "in the real world".

I can not imagine that there is any pilot who isn't taught during basic training that you don't fly in IMC as a non-rated pilot in a non-IFR aircraft. If the pilot considered flying under these conditions to be acceptable, then that is something he must have learnt after and outside of his PPL and ATPL training.

So maybe there isn't a lot we should learn from this accident after all ...

[englishal]

the operator of the aeroplane has the right (some would say duty) to advise the hirer that what he intends to do is illegal. His decision to take off into IMC took him outside the privileges of his ratings and thus the FTO lending hi the aeroplane were complicit, given that they would have been aware of the weather at BPL at the time of take off.

Rubbish.

There is an exam in the PPL called "Human factors and performance"....The pilot should have known about the aeronautical decision making process, and should have decided to stay on the ground....The FTO shouldn't have to spoon feed every baby pilot that walks through the door. Indeed the dispatcher may not even have known the pilots ratings......

Sorry that some people died as a result, which is very sad, but unless people learn from other's mistakes and have a bit of common sense then these sorts of accidents will continue. I think we'll see a rise in them with the end of the IMC rating....

[gasax]

This place is great at 'moral outrage' the finger pointing stuff. At the end of the day we have a very unforgiving hobby - as I tell my friends if iot all goes right it is pretty boring, if it goes wrong it very exciting, it is goes very wrong its nasty.

Callous though it may be this is evolution in action. As for the hirer or some other party being at fault? If you cann't take responsibility for your own well being and actions then you are not going to last long.

[wsmempson]

Wow!

A real cautionary tale with so many opportunities for problems, it does rather begger belief.

So, just to recap, A low hours pilot, who is arguably not current, takes off in an a/c that is over-weight and out of w/b, with no working nav equipment other than a hand-held gps, into IMC for which he is not rated. A braver man than I, and those are only the probems he had on the way out.

It does seem a bit surprising that a/ the training organisation let him go and b/ that his passengers (who were also pilots - one of whom was an ex-instructor) didn't stop him.

A genuinely tragic and avoidable accident.

[PompeyPaul]

what must have been going through their minds, the panic that must have set in as they realised that their chances of making a successful approach were almost nil and that they were running out of fuel....their last moments must have been terrible beyond words.

I agree, a very sad tail. The fact that the altimeter was set incorrectly also makes me think that panic had set in some time before the accident. I really feel for them. RIP

For the finger pointers, and "I would never do that" brigade, you should hang your heads in shame for some of your posts.

[FullyFlapped]

I've no particular desire to get myself or Proon on the receiving end of a writ, so I'll be careful what I say : but I do wonder what part money had to play in the tragic tale. I just wonder if there were any financial pressures on anyone to complete this recovery flight ...

This is also the second report I've read recently where wrong altimeter settings may well have played a part in proceedings. I don't quite understand how two pilots, actively considering very low flight, and obviously in decent verbal comms with ATC can have got that so wrong - even given that I can well imagine the increasing sense of panic which must have been setting in once they realised just how deep in the mire they were, poor souls.

Sad, sad, sad. RIP.

FF

[micromalc]

RIP

This is so sad on so many levels..my respects to the families.

[Superpilot]

A few people have touched upon how this is down to lack of training or poor awareness. If a person receives instruction and passes exams on the subject then the training cannot be blamed in anyway. Some people are completely aware of potential problems but take risks in the face of these. You might be the best taught pilot out there and completely aware of all the problems you could face but this does not make you a good pilot if you have the sort of mentality to take risks. Which is exactly what has happened in this tragic situation. This guy was being offered 4 hours in a PA28 for the cost of peanuts. This added to his determination. If you’re determined to go flying even if it’s a bad day then that is down to your own mentality, not always lack of training and poor awareness.

[A and C]

I shall say no more than this AAIB report will become required reading for my PPL students.

[BackPacker]

5. The failure to check weather en-route quite possibly shows a poor standard of training - I am frequently surprised by the number of CPL holders who have never been made aware of the existence of the "VOLMET" system and the same applies to an even larger percentage of PPL holders. If the weather had been checked, then there would have been an opportunity to divert en-route to somewhere like Welshpool or Liverpool.

I agree about checking the weather in general, but I doubt whether mentioning VOLMET is appropriate in this case. Yes, Blackpool is on VOLMET (London North 126.6) but at the low levels GA flies at, reception can be difficult at best, unless you are very close to the antenna. And even if you can get decent reception, it requires a second com box which, the way I read the report, this plane did not have, and it requires a few minutes of fairly dedicated listening to the detailed weather reports of some eight other airports before Blackpool comes up.

VOLMET has its place, but I think that place is in well-equipped (dual comms) aircraft, up high, flown by a single pilot with plenty spare mental capacity (ie. very current and in the cruise), or multi-pilot. For the rest of us, well, you can always ask for a weather report from whatever ATC unit you're talking to. Especially if you found during flight preparation, that the weather at your destination would be marginal.

[FlyingForFun]

What a tragic, senseless loss of life.

I wonder if I can throw some fuel on the fire, by suggesting that the "Commander" was maybe not as much to blame as some posters (and the AAIB) are suggesting?

The AAIB report suggests that the Commander may have thought that his "experienced passenger" was in fact an instructor. In which case, is it not likely that he thought that the "instructor" would be Commander of the flight? Especially since he was out of currency.

Now, the picture is rather different. Maybe the Commander knows that the flight is well outside of his limits, but he has an experienced instructor sat next to him. Maybe he believes that the flight is to be carried out IFR, with an instrument-rated instructor supervising him at the controls? Since he has no instrument training, he would not be expected to know what the instrument minima are, nor what equipment might be legally or practically required for an instrument flight. Certainly when teaching IMC rating or IR students I help them out with weather decisions at the start of the course (in the same way a PPL instructor helps his students out with weather decisions at the start of a PPL course), so it would be reasonable for the "student" to expect his "instructor" to check the weather and make the go/no-go decision?

Which now raises the question, why did the "experienced passenger" let the flight go ahead? Legally he had no responsibility to make such a decision, and if my hypothesis that the Commander thought he was an instructor is right, there is no reason to suspect that he knew this..... but, if the Commander did not have the experience to know that what he was undertaking was dangerous even for a suitably qualified pilot, then surely the passenger must have known this?????

FFF
------------------

[llanfairpg]

Nothing unusual about these accidents.

November 1972 Graham Hill at Elstree with Luton wide open.

within 35 minutes same at Birmingham with EMA wide open, CFI of the Warwickshire Aero Club killed.

Attitude is the main killer--wrong attitude produces the wrong decisions

[xraf]

Although FFF makes several very good points, and God knows we've all relied on the 'experienced guy' on occasion, unfortunately after an accident its the letter of the law not the usual practice at FTO's that counts. The younger guy here was P1 - end of story and incidentally, I suspect the 'experienced' one in this case wasn't as 'experienced' as the P1 thought.

Notwithstanding, there are clearly many and various other circumstances surrounding this extremely sad case and recrimination is now mostly pointless but I wanted to chuck in my 2p on a specific aspect which just might help someone somewhere.

The main thing I have to add is that training in the discipline of command is largely missing from PPL training. It was certainly missing from mine! However, luckily for me after about 5 minutes in the RAF system that soon changed.

I dont mind telling anyone that there are times without number I have wondered quite literally how I survived those first couple of hundred hours before that. I try not to be the 'old fart' these days but that long forgotton trait of 'Captaincy' has saved many lives when light aircraft were not hi-tech, glass screen, gps driven pretend airliners.

PPL Instructors should spend at least some time (and I know some do) talking about how once a PPL is in your pocket, you are in command, even if you have a 10,000 hour ATPL/IR TRE..TRI skygod... etc etc etc sitting alongside you, if its your P1 its your decision.... and yes sometimes its difficult to voice your opinion but a quick read of this AAIB report should hammer the point home!

Also point out to trainees that the airlines themsleves have a serious and growing problem with the 'gradient' in the cockpit especially with younger fATPLs and they include it in their courses now and the crusty old farts are having to learn it too.

Anyway, as always condolences to all involved and as someone has already said this report should be required reading for all!

Regards

Xraf

[Contacttower]

I think if the younger pilot did believe the older one to be an instructor that would explain a lot...one sometimes sees a mentality among student pilots or even qualified PPLs that 'it will be OK since I have an instructor on board' and hence mentally they relieve themselves of some of the consideration for the flight and also of any worry they may have.

I agree 'command' decision making should be underlined more and the state of play should have been made clearer before they got into the aircraft. The situation where a new PPL is flying P1 but has a more experienced pilot next to him (but not an instructor) so they can 'take over' if things get difficult is not always ideal because it can lead to confusion over 'who is in charge'.

[BackPacker]

It might even be so that the younger pilot did not consider him to be PIC at all. After all, according to the report, he had said to the CFI that he was not legally allowed to fly with passengers because of the 90-day rule. The CFI then told him that he would fly with a more experienced pilot and this may well have lead him to the conclusion that the older pilot would be PIC.

This is then reinforced through the fact that the older pilot had made the decision to fill the tanks to the brim. In a -140, with four adults on board, that's not something you do without consulting the PIC. So again this may have give the impression that the older pilot would be PIC.

[Life's a Beech]

Kiwi

Indeed, a lot to learn. As eharding (who should check some profiles before suggesting people have "sod-all hours") might consider, no-one is going to learn anything if we don't discuss the issue. A and C has clearly learnt what I think is the most important lesson - we instructors are all imperfect, and there is always value in pointing our students to other sources of learning.

Flying for Fun (and englishal, who brings up HP&L)

There is also risky shift to consider. A group of people will often take decisions that are less cautious than any one member of the group would make. Everyone thinks it is OK if no-one else has raised any objection. This whole exercise was a committee decision, that had actually been made by the time the aircraft commander had arrived.

Then we consider authority gradient (like cockpit gradient, but some decisions made outside the cockpit and considering other people than crew). This is an inexperienced pilot - about 40 hours on his PPL. He is given a decision, as a fait accompli, by more experienced pilots. He doesn't make a decision to go (or indeed not to refuel in Exeter). He simply does not question decisions already made, which should rightly have been made by him. All (f)ATPLs know the dangers of steep cockpit gradient, but have also been taught the dangers of flat, or reversed cockpit gradient, when a weak, inexperienced commander flies with assertive, experienced crew. They were not crew, but did act like they were!

The club also gave him something I constantly work with my fine ops staff to make sure my crews are not given - an unworkable plan. There was no way he could get back safely before nightfall, when his flying privileges no longer apply. The flight could not be completed in the time available before nightfall. He could fly the sectors, but did not have time to refuel. Fuelling at Exeter is reasonably swift, but with only one pump, and that on the South side (note they went to the North) would have delayed their return beyond nightfall.