PA34 down in the Alps
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What a tragedy
It's always easy to make a better decision in retrospect but if he had taken a more westerly track down over the rhone valley and along the coast to Cannes they would probably have been fine.
He must have had some reason for thinking that the weather was better over the mountains, maybe his departure weather briefing showed that or perhaps it just looked less black that way.
What a terrible tragedy for this family.
RIP
SB
He must have had some reason for thinking that the weather was better over the mountains, maybe his departure weather briefing showed that or perhaps it just looked less black that way.
What a terrible tragedy for this family.
RIP
SB
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There are a few cardinals in life like don't f@ck with a truck like wise with mountains and wx are not a good mix considering the safety alt is 14500? over the ALPS. Even if it was a clear day I would have taken a way westerly track staying away from the granite.
Easy said from my arm chair. May God rest their souls. When a child is involved its gut wrenching.
Easy said from my arm chair. May God rest their souls. When a child is involved its gut wrenching.
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Do ye think TAWS or EGPWS will help decrease such accidents over time?
TAWS/EGPWS should prevent you flying into terrain in IMC but only if you are in control of the plane at the time. The thing is that enroute one should never need it; if you are navigating OK, and in control OK, you should be above the MSA because you know where you are and you planned the flight on that route.
because someone acquires an IR and flies a twin doesn't mean that they wouldn't enjoy a bit of spectacular sight seeing.
How true. On a long trip last year, I decided to fly one of the legs VFR instead of IFR, primarily for the view. That turned out to have been a big mistake and one that still bothers me now. There was unforecast IMC, with mountains below, and I ended up climbing over the whole lot, at max perf, to FL140 "due weather", got cleared through everything and the controller didn't bat an eyelid - you can guess this was not anywhere near the UK
Sometimes one has to sod the view and do it properly and go IFR. Those with an IR have worked absolutely damn hard for it and should use it as intended.
as long as you have enough 'outs'
One always needs an OUT. Sometimes there isn't one, for hopefully a brief period, like landing at certain airports where there are houses down below. But if flying in potentially icing conditions, one either must have VMC above the MSA, or be able to climb to VMC on top. There is no other way. Every plane, even a Seneca with boots, will ice up over a few hundred miles of freezing IMC.
TAWS/EGPWS should prevent you flying into terrain in IMC but only if you are in control of the plane at the time. The thing is that enroute one should never need it; if you are navigating OK, and in control OK, you should be above the MSA because you know where you are and you planned the flight on that route.
because someone acquires an IR and flies a twin doesn't mean that they wouldn't enjoy a bit of spectacular sight seeing.
How true. On a long trip last year, I decided to fly one of the legs VFR instead of IFR, primarily for the view. That turned out to have been a big mistake and one that still bothers me now. There was unforecast IMC, with mountains below, and I ended up climbing over the whole lot, at max perf, to FL140 "due weather", got cleared through everything and the controller didn't bat an eyelid - you can guess this was not anywhere near the UK
Sometimes one has to sod the view and do it properly and go IFR. Those with an IR have worked absolutely damn hard for it and should use it as intended.as long as you have enough 'outs'
One always needs an OUT. Sometimes there isn't one, for hopefully a brief period, like landing at certain airports where there are houses down below. But if flying in potentially icing conditions, one either must have VMC above the MSA, or be able to climb to VMC on top. There is no other way. Every plane, even a Seneca with boots, will ice up over a few hundred miles of freezing IMC.
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I was over that way doing some flying just before xmas. The weather was actually quite good but there was some overlying cloud which between Courchevel and Chambery had to be decended under and scooting around the valleys got to Chambery. Was with a competent instructor at the time...picked up my plane and went back to Courchevel and went straight up to F120 for that short trip, told myself in no uncertain terms that I wouldn't fancy flying something around the valleys.
I think miselou's comment of mountains being a certainty not a risk is very relevant.
However, condolences may we all learn something.....
just to add....the aircraft I was flying actually has TAWS, and I noted then that if you got the warning to avoid terrain in a mountain range then it would just steer you into the other side of the mountains. The only 'out' would be up. That option lies with the performance of your aircraft.
I think miselou's comment of mountains being a certainty not a risk is very relevant.
However, condolences may we all learn something.....
just to add....the aircraft I was flying actually has TAWS, and I noted then that if you got the warning to avoid terrain in a mountain range then it would just steer you into the other side of the mountains. The only 'out' would be up. That option lies with the performance of your aircraft.
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Do ye think TAWS or EGPWS will help decrease such accidents over time?
Moving to a full EGPWS unit and flying upper airways IFR, I have found the terrain function less frequently useful - it is there for the (hopefully) very very rare occassion when you might go badly wrong, whereas the VFR terrain awareness was always regularly useful when mountains or significant terrain were around.
For VFR flight over terrain (especially 'going places' VFR when the risk of inadvertent marginal VMC or IMC is higher) and IFR over mountains in non-pressurised a/c (when weather or icing might force a loss of terrain seperation) I think TAWS-type equipment has a very major safety benefit.
This used to be a >$20,000 cost but is now much more accessible with the Garmin TAWS upgrade or the GMX200
rgds
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The issue of the accident involving a us glide slope was discussed recently.
TAWS would probably have avoided that accident and many others. Whether it would have helped in this case is meaningless speculation because we dont know whether a loss of control occurred first. However TAWS in a glass cockpit setup provides superb situational awareness if unexpected weather avoidance becomes necessary.
TAWS would probably have avoided that accident and many others. Whether it would have helped in this case is meaningless speculation because we dont know whether a loss of control occurred first. However TAWS in a glass cockpit setup provides superb situational awareness if unexpected weather avoidance becomes necessary.
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TAWS/GPWS - all very useful, but when you get such an alert you usually have a matter of seconds to react to it.
If you don't practice such manouvres on a regular basis AND the aircraft is not capable of producing the instant power required to get you out of that particular problem, you are, to put it mildly, stuffed.
If you don't practice such manouvres on a regular basis AND the aircraft is not capable of producing the instant power required to get you out of that particular problem, you are, to put it mildly, stuffed.
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TAWS/GPWS - all very useful, but when you get such an alert you usually have a matter of seconds to react to it.
If you don't practice such manouvres on a regular basis AND the aircraft is not capable of producing the instant power required to get you out of that particular problem, you are, to put it mildly, stuffed.
If you don't practice such manouvres on a regular basis AND the aircraft is not capable of producing the instant power required to get you out of that particular problem, you are, to put it mildly, stuffed.
Most mountain accidents I have read about that apply to aircraft flying for transport (ie. excluding sport flying in and out of mountain strips) are controlled flight into terrain in IMC due to navigation and awareness lapses by pilots (and occasionally controllers) rather than situations where weather avoidance or aircraft loss of control 'forced' an impact. In avoiding these CFIT situations I think modern TAWS, even from a handheld device like the Garmin 496, is a major safety benefit.
The last minute "pull up" alert which comes too late may apply to CFIT late in the approach (eg. an undershoot or descent below minima on finals) but TAWS/EGPWS seems very relevant to the large category of CFIT accidents that used to happen in cruise and decent.
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Alpine sightseeing
Looking at the radar (I know - retrospect again) it looks very much like one wouldn't have seen much (if flying at the MEA) on the flight in question (if this was the reason why they were over the mountains in the first place). Below MEA you take your life in your hands flying in that kind of terrain. It would undoubtedly have been a very uncomfortable ride with icing and CBs to negotiate and even as a pilot I would have been seriously unhappy to be aboard that aircraft on that route on that day at that height.
Call be a coward but the only time I would take the route through the mountains would be in really good VFR conditions (even if I was filed IFR) with no frontal activity forecast and usually in the airway talking to ATC with TAWS and TCAS switched on.
TAWS helps you check where the spiky granite really is - very useful if you are crossing the Alps at night and can't see a thing - it reassures you that you are in fact in the middle of the airway (and usually shows you why the airway is where it is).
Once again a tragic waste of life,
SB
Call be a coward but the only time I would take the route through the mountains would be in really good VFR conditions (even if I was filed IFR) with no frontal activity forecast and usually in the airway talking to ATC with TAWS and TCAS switched on.
TAWS helps you check where the spiky granite really is - very useful if you are crossing the Alps at night and can't see a thing - it reassures you that you are in fact in the middle of the airway (and usually shows you why the airway is where it is).
Once again a tragic waste of life,
SB
Thread Starter
Video of the recovery operation accessible from
http://rhone-alpes-auvergne.france3....8231167-fr.php
(see half way down the page)
Quotes all three dead as being Americans, resident in London, with one being a university doctor, a Simon Averboush - although the commentator has such a heavy accent the surname is difficult to distinguish.
I think one of the interesting points is did the P1 choose the direct routing because a mild dogleg to the right away from the mountains was precluded by even worse weather?
Does anyone know what version of the PA34 it was? Because a Seneca III, IV or V would presumably have given him a much better performance cushion in climbing away from any ice or granite.
Skua
http://rhone-alpes-auvergne.france3....8231167-fr.php
(see half way down the page)
Quotes all three dead as being Americans, resident in London, with one being a university doctor, a Simon Averboush - although the commentator has such a heavy accent the surname is difficult to distinguish.
I think one of the interesting points is did the P1 choose the direct routing because a mild dogleg to the right away from the mountains was precluded by even worse weather?
Does anyone know what version of the PA34 it was? Because a Seneca III, IV or V would presumably have given him a much better performance cushion in climbing away from any ice or granite.
Skua
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I will be very interested in the background to the flight and decision making when the investigation is published. Although I fly a different type, the mission profile is very similar to my typical flights.
With these apparently available facts:
Freezing level below MSA, significant precip, potentially thick icing layer, mountainous terrain (pilot unlikely to be intimately familiar with the valleys), IR rated pilot (apparently not deiced twin) and a destination to Cannes.
What was the decision making process or lack of information that resulted in a decision to go VFR below a cloud deck in mountainous terrain, rather than IFR on top (maybe no O2?) or VFR/IFR to the west with MEAs below the freezing level?
From where we sit today, clearly none of us would have done that route. But I am sure if the pilot was reading this forum he to would be comfortable that he would never fly that plan. Hence the likelihood there is a significant insight for us all when the facts come out.
With these apparently available facts:
Freezing level below MSA, significant precip, potentially thick icing layer, mountainous terrain (pilot unlikely to be intimately familiar with the valleys), IR rated pilot (apparently not deiced twin) and a destination to Cannes.
What was the decision making process or lack of information that resulted in a decision to go VFR below a cloud deck in mountainous terrain, rather than IFR on top (maybe no O2?) or VFR/IFR to the west with MEAs below the freezing level?
From where we sit today, clearly none of us would have done that route. But I am sure if the pilot was reading this forum he to would be comfortable that he would never fly that plan. Hence the likelihood there is a significant insight for us all when the facts come out.
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To get any insight into this we would need to know the route he was flying. Obviously this is known; whether it will come out prior to the accident report in a year or two's time, is another matter.
My feeling is that aircraft performance was not an issue in this case - other than possibly preventing an IFR flight in VMC on top, due to aircraft operating ceiling limitations.
However, in the latter case, an absolutely key factor is oxygen carriage: did he carry it? If you don't carry o2, then you are chucking away about half of your vertical operating space. You have shut off the most favoured weather escape option even before you departed, and you have excluded yourself from climbing into VMC during much of the year in N Europe. On that (presumed) route, the MOCA is about 9700ft and not having o2 leaves you with no vertical options at all.
Can anybody come up with TAFs/METARs for departure, destination and say Lyon?
MMF - your post crossed with mine and I agree. However, we will never find out what & why the pilot knew & decided, etc. Unless he confided in somebody who stayed on the ground. A vital bit of info would be the radar track & Mode C return.
My feeling is that aircraft performance was not an issue in this case - other than possibly preventing an IFR flight in VMC on top, due to aircraft operating ceiling limitations.
However, in the latter case, an absolutely key factor is oxygen carriage: did he carry it? If you don't carry o2, then you are chucking away about half of your vertical operating space. You have shut off the most favoured weather escape option even before you departed, and you have excluded yourself from climbing into VMC during much of the year in N Europe. On that (presumed) route, the MOCA is about 9700ft and not having o2 leaves you with no vertical options at all.
Can anybody come up with TAFs/METARs for departure, destination and say Lyon?
MMF - your post crossed with mine and I agree. However, we will never find out what & why the pilot knew & decided, etc. Unless he confided in somebody who stayed on the ground. A vital bit of info would be the radar track & Mode C return.
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mm_flynn
Yes, I couldnt agree more. It is very easy in hindsight to wonder about the decision making that lead to an accident of this type, however lest we forget this would seem to have been a very expereinced pilot, who was well qualified and an intelligent man. It is a whole lot easier to avoid weather operating in the local patch on short flights. This was getting on for a four hour flight over some treacherous terrain in the middle of winter.
I0540
I suspect he did not have oxygen, given that there were three aboard including a baby or very young child. Given the graph I dont think he would have found clear air on top, and as he did not have de-icing a climb might have not provided a solution.
Yes, I couldnt agree more. It is very easy in hindsight to wonder about the decision making that lead to an accident of this type, however lest we forget this would seem to have been a very expereinced pilot, who was well qualified and an intelligent man. It is a whole lot easier to avoid weather operating in the local patch on short flights. This was getting on for a four hour flight over some treacherous terrain in the middle of winter.
I0540
I suspect he did not have oxygen, given that there were three aboard including a baby or very young child. Given the graph I dont think he would have found clear air on top, and as he did not have de-icing a climb might have not provided a solution.
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From the BBC website
Tributes paid to air crash victim
Dr Awerbuch's website said he was an experienced financial economist
Tributes have been paid by colleagues to a financial economist who died with his partner and son in a light aircraft which crashed in the French Alps.
Dr Shimon Awerbuch and Maria Ribiero, who lived in Hove, East Sussex, died with Dr Awerbuch's seven-year-old son, Everett, on 10 February.
Dr Awerbuch was a senior fellow at the University of Sussex.
"He was unfailingly enthusiastic and very supportive of other colleagues," said Professor Gordon Mackerron.
Dr Awerbuch and Ms Ribiero were US nationals who had lived in the UK for a number of years.
The Israeli-born financial economist specialised in energy, regulatory economics and market restructuring.
'Exciting ideas'
He had also advised government agencies in the US, Europe, Mexico, the United Nations and the World Bank.
He had taught graduate and undergraduate courses in the science and technology policy research department at the University of Sussex.
"He had lots of exciting and creative ideas," said friend and colleague Prof Mackerron.
"He was making some important breakthroughs, which we thought were terribly exciting, which it is sad to say he is no longer able to follow up."
Dr Awerbuch was the pilot of a Piper Seneca which crashed in France on Saturday.
The aircraft was bound for Cannes when Dr Awerbuch contacted air traffic control in France to say he was having trouble in a snow storm.
The plane disappeared from radar screens moments later. A mountain rescue team working on foot eventually found the crash scene, at Grand Veymont, on Sunday. The plane appeared to have hit a rock face and broken apart on impact, killing all three on board instantly.
Tributes paid to air crash victim
Dr Awerbuch's website said he was an experienced financial economistTributes have been paid by colleagues to a financial economist who died with his partner and son in a light aircraft which crashed in the French Alps.
Dr Shimon Awerbuch and Maria Ribiero, who lived in Hove, East Sussex, died with Dr Awerbuch's seven-year-old son, Everett, on 10 February.
Dr Awerbuch was a senior fellow at the University of Sussex.
"He was unfailingly enthusiastic and very supportive of other colleagues," said Professor Gordon Mackerron.
Dr Awerbuch and Ms Ribiero were US nationals who had lived in the UK for a number of years.
The Israeli-born financial economist specialised in energy, regulatory economics and market restructuring.
'Exciting ideas'
He had also advised government agencies in the US, Europe, Mexico, the United Nations and the World Bank.
He had taught graduate and undergraduate courses in the science and technology policy research department at the University of Sussex.
"He had lots of exciting and creative ideas," said friend and colleague Prof Mackerron.
"He was making some important breakthroughs, which we thought were terribly exciting, which it is sad to say he is no longer able to follow up."
Dr Awerbuch was the pilot of a Piper Seneca which crashed in France on Saturday.
The aircraft was bound for Cannes when Dr Awerbuch contacted air traffic control in France to say he was having trouble in a snow storm.
The plane disappeared from radar screens moments later. A mountain rescue team working on foot eventually found the crash scene, at Grand Veymont, on Sunday. The plane appeared to have hit a rock face and broken apart on impact, killing all three on board instantly.
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I agree that planning is very important, but the planning process should not stop when airborne.
Multi crew procedures, say for take-off, are a good example of how decisions can be made clear cut in a phase of flight where ambiguity will kill. I.e." below x kts. we will stop for blah blah and above y kts.we will continue etc etc.". No deviation. I try to apply the same criteria for critical decisions on any flight, particularly when alone and I don't have the luxury of another crew member to temper my enthusiasm. In this situation I would like to think that at the onset of I.M.C. I would have made an immediate 180 degree turn and gone back. This plan would have been made long before the situation had arisen, hopefully preventing me from making the wrong decision when I was under stress.
I love piston engined aeroplanes but don't like to mix them with mountains and ice. Under-powered light twins are no match for the type of conditions that prevailed over the Alps on Saturday.
I have read on this thread about oxygen, performance, icing and how this situation might have been survivable, but:
What would have happened if the aircraft had suffered an engine failure whilst the pilot had been attempting the climb to the sector safe altitude, which, incidentally, would have taken several minutes even with both engines operating ?
When was the last time any of us was tested for performance under the enormous stress this poor guy was under ? Like most of you, I have been in places I didn't want to be in an aeroplane and it ain't nice !
Faced with these factors there was only one option, turn back.
Perhaps the pilot was attempting to do just that, we will find out in due course.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but the chance of making an error can be reduced if, whilst during the first 2 hours or so of this type of flight when the conditions are V.M.C.and the autopilot is on, that one thinks about the potentially most hazardous part of the journey and plans for when things turn to rat sh#t.
Multi crew procedures, say for take-off, are a good example of how decisions can be made clear cut in a phase of flight where ambiguity will kill. I.e." below x kts. we will stop for blah blah and above y kts.we will continue etc etc.". No deviation. I try to apply the same criteria for critical decisions on any flight, particularly when alone and I don't have the luxury of another crew member to temper my enthusiasm. In this situation I would like to think that at the onset of I.M.C. I would have made an immediate 180 degree turn and gone back. This plan would have been made long before the situation had arisen, hopefully preventing me from making the wrong decision when I was under stress.
I love piston engined aeroplanes but don't like to mix them with mountains and ice. Under-powered light twins are no match for the type of conditions that prevailed over the Alps on Saturday.
I have read on this thread about oxygen, performance, icing and how this situation might have been survivable, but:
What would have happened if the aircraft had suffered an engine failure whilst the pilot had been attempting the climb to the sector safe altitude, which, incidentally, would have taken several minutes even with both engines operating ?
When was the last time any of us was tested for performance under the enormous stress this poor guy was under ? Like most of you, I have been in places I didn't want to be in an aeroplane and it ain't nice !
Faced with these factors there was only one option, turn back.
Perhaps the pilot was attempting to do just that, we will find out in due course.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but the chance of making an error can be reduced if, whilst during the first 2 hours or so of this type of flight when the conditions are V.M.C.and the autopilot is on, that one thinks about the potentially most hazardous part of the journey and plans for when things turn to rat sh#t.
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I don't particularly disagree with anything you say, a4fly, but you are assuming certain things which may be true but which we don't actually know.
I guess you are assuming he was flying VFR and then inadvertently entered IMC. OK, that kills loads of pilots, and if this pilot was a novice then it would be a open and shut case of "here goes another", another useful slide for the CAA safety seminar, etc.
While I am not going to write anything here which amounts to inside knowledge, and commendably neither has anybody else, yet, this pilot was not a novice. You can also look him up on the FAA database: he was instrument rated, PPL/ME.
This doesn't rule out the possibility of it indeed being a simple explanation like the above, but it makes it a lot less likely.
In normal GA operations, it isn't so much the "survivability" of the situation that is in issue. It is not getting anywhere near it in the first place. A flight like this would have been done IFR/airways, with oxygen, in VMC, or not at all. Often, there is a VFR "on the deck" option when the IFR one is closed due to very high or nasty IMC at/above airway MEAs, but this isn't feasible over this kind of terrain. One should be at FL150 or whatever, and making weather avoidance decisions from tens of miles back, while still in sunshine.
A bit of a mystery, really.
Many twin pilots choose to fly VFR to avoid Eurocontrol enroute charges, but a Seneca can be certified at 1999kg. However, VFR is pretty useless for frequent European travel which this man was doing, by all accounts.
The issues with engine failures are a redherring. Single engine pilots accept engine failure as a risk and live with it. If they didn't nobody would fly a SEP over water, over mountains, over forests (unless it's a Cirrus). In return they get the performance of a twin but with about half the running cost, and probably well under half the maintenance cost of an old twin.
I guess you are assuming he was flying VFR and then inadvertently entered IMC. OK, that kills loads of pilots, and if this pilot was a novice then it would be a open and shut case of "here goes another", another useful slide for the CAA safety seminar, etc.
While I am not going to write anything here which amounts to inside knowledge, and commendably neither has anybody else, yet, this pilot was not a novice. You can also look him up on the FAA database: he was instrument rated, PPL/ME.
This doesn't rule out the possibility of it indeed being a simple explanation like the above, but it makes it a lot less likely.
In normal GA operations, it isn't so much the "survivability" of the situation that is in issue. It is not getting anywhere near it in the first place. A flight like this would have been done IFR/airways, with oxygen, in VMC, or not at all. Often, there is a VFR "on the deck" option when the IFR one is closed due to very high or nasty IMC at/above airway MEAs, but this isn't feasible over this kind of terrain. One should be at FL150 or whatever, and making weather avoidance decisions from tens of miles back, while still in sunshine.
A bit of a mystery, really.
Many twin pilots choose to fly VFR to avoid Eurocontrol enroute charges, but a Seneca can be certified at 1999kg. However, VFR is pretty useless for frequent European travel which this man was doing, by all accounts.
The issues with engine failures are a redherring. Single engine pilots accept engine failure as a risk and live with it. If they didn't nobody would fly a SEP over water, over mountains, over forests (unless it's a Cirrus). In return they get the performance of a twin but with about half the running cost, and probably well under half the maintenance cost of an old twin.
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Single engine pilots accept engine failure as a risk and live with it.
I agree.
ME is not necessarily the answer. Clearly we dont know what happened in this case but over the Alps dirft down on one engine would be a major factor particularly if performance had been effected in other ways and in any event one engine in those conditions, even if current, is going to be very challenging.
I agree.
ME is not necessarily the answer. Clearly we dont know what happened in this case but over the Alps dirft down on one engine would be a major factor particularly if performance had been effected in other ways and in any event one engine in those conditions, even if current, is going to be very challenging.
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Originally Posted by IO 540
...is the well known attitude in France to American aircraft. So if on a VFR flight, one might think twice before declaring an emergency and infringing some bit of their copious military airspace, in the expectation that one is going to get well and truly turned over following a landing.
If as you suggest you 'might think twice about declaring an emergency' because of the N painted on the side of your aircraft then may I very humbly suggest that you reconsider your actions before you next fly to France. There's no place in the air for an attitude like that.
Ian
Last edited by IanSeager; 15th Feb 2007 at 13:02.