ex Military Jet Trainers (JP's, L39 etc.)
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<<NoD, how would you measure accident rates then?>> Accidents per hour flown.
<<Number of a/c divided by number of accidents. seems fine to me.>> Sorry, no - its b*llocks / meaningless.
<< I haven't got access to the data you require>> Fine - nor have I... and in fact, doubt anyone has without a lot of work.
<< No. of hours flown per accident is far more meaningful>> Exactly...
Misleading data is worse than no data at all. So lets settle on that - we don't have any meaningful accident rate data here. The CAA might?
I am not getting into a discussion about disabled seats in a JP. I do not fly a JP with disabled seats. The CAA approve it under certain circs. Other may have experience / thoughts.
<<NoD and others who fly these machines what would YOU do? In what situation would you use the seat?>>
The drills / rules are that you eject unless you judge you are in a good position, at your decision point, to successfully force land the aircraft on a hard runway. I will therefore follow the rules. Many of us in the RAF, however, had a potentially alternative agenda in certain circumstances, largely relating to surface condition and wind. That was a totally personal decision for each of us, outside the "rules", and it remains as such for me.
<<How likely is it that someone will leave their pride and joy that early?>> Bear in mind that the cause of a forced landing (serious engine failure), and/or any landing that is not totally contained on a hard runway, will almost certainly "write off" the aircraft, in that any extensive form of repair for a JP is likely to exceed the cost of getting another.
<<How confident are you that it would lead to a successful outcome.>> Very. Or I wouldn't be there...
<<In civvy hands it is now a 75% FAILURE rate.>>
Please back this up. Quote some figures and/or the example accidents that form this analysis. Please exclude the following accidents which have either nothing to do with the seviceability of the seat system, and/or the lesson has been learnt, or your RAF v Civvy comparison is meaningless:
1. JP Bradwell. Landing in the sea inadequately dressed and equipped will kill anyone. Seat worked perfectly.
2. Seat fell out of JP Colchester. Lesson learnt, applied to deactivated seats anyway.
3. L39 Duxford. Seat worked exactly as advertised. Regretfully it was used well outside limits, but don't see how you can blame it for that.
4. Strikemaster near Hull (?). Again, seems seats worked exactly as advetrtised.
5. JP in West Country (double fatality). Less said about this the better, but aircraft and seat had nothing to do with the outcome.
6. Oxygen starvation on airtest. A good lesson here re the Oxygen system for all. As a principle, I am avoiding doing flights requiring the use of Oxygen - it is not necessary, and if it becomes so, will require more revision of the system and equipment from me to be happy.
<<How many pilots who fly JP's and the like are aware of these issues?>>
In the group I am in (JPs) - well aware of these, and many other issues. And the CAA seem well happy with they way it is run (but can always be improved, and is being with their monitoring) - I'll leave it to them to conduct the overisght - not you I'm afraid.
<<If you don't like my points, then refute them with EVIDENCE>>
This is what is getting annoying. You make a series of unfounded allegations - and then expect everyone else to produce the evidence to refute your spurious allegations - a very strange form of debate! How about YOU produce some statisitical or other evidence (which your "types on register" / "accidents" is NOT) to back up any allegations/ points you would like to make, and we can have a meaningful discussion. As a starter for 10, please back up this 75% failure rate you keep quoting (and don't just say "the man from MB quoted it"!)
Final point:
<<historic jets >>
Ummmm..... When I think of "historic jets" I think of jets of historical value, a rarity value, and maybe of good looks and/or performance e.g. "classics". Much as I enjoy flying the JP, it is pretty ugly (especially the 3/4), has little historical importance and nil rarity value. Whilst they are not significantly endangering third parties, and are operated in an manner satisfactory to the CAA, I think they are best kept flying if there are people out there wanting to, and able to afford to.
NoD
<<Number of a/c divided by number of accidents. seems fine to me.>> Sorry, no - its b*llocks / meaningless.
<< I haven't got access to the data you require>> Fine - nor have I... and in fact, doubt anyone has without a lot of work.
<< No. of hours flown per accident is far more meaningful>> Exactly...
Misleading data is worse than no data at all. So lets settle on that - we don't have any meaningful accident rate data here. The CAA might?
I am not getting into a discussion about disabled seats in a JP. I do not fly a JP with disabled seats. The CAA approve it under certain circs. Other may have experience / thoughts.
<<NoD and others who fly these machines what would YOU do? In what situation would you use the seat?>>
The drills / rules are that you eject unless you judge you are in a good position, at your decision point, to successfully force land the aircraft on a hard runway. I will therefore follow the rules. Many of us in the RAF, however, had a potentially alternative agenda in certain circumstances, largely relating to surface condition and wind. That was a totally personal decision for each of us, outside the "rules", and it remains as such for me.
<<How likely is it that someone will leave their pride and joy that early?>> Bear in mind that the cause of a forced landing (serious engine failure), and/or any landing that is not totally contained on a hard runway, will almost certainly "write off" the aircraft, in that any extensive form of repair for a JP is likely to exceed the cost of getting another.
<<How confident are you that it would lead to a successful outcome.>> Very. Or I wouldn't be there...
<<In civvy hands it is now a 75% FAILURE rate.>>
Please back this up. Quote some figures and/or the example accidents that form this analysis. Please exclude the following accidents which have either nothing to do with the seviceability of the seat system, and/or the lesson has been learnt, or your RAF v Civvy comparison is meaningless:
1. JP Bradwell. Landing in the sea inadequately dressed and equipped will kill anyone. Seat worked perfectly.
2. Seat fell out of JP Colchester. Lesson learnt, applied to deactivated seats anyway.
3. L39 Duxford. Seat worked exactly as advertised. Regretfully it was used well outside limits, but don't see how you can blame it for that.
4. Strikemaster near Hull (?). Again, seems seats worked exactly as advetrtised.
5. JP in West Country (double fatality). Less said about this the better, but aircraft and seat had nothing to do with the outcome.
6. Oxygen starvation on airtest. A good lesson here re the Oxygen system for all. As a principle, I am avoiding doing flights requiring the use of Oxygen - it is not necessary, and if it becomes so, will require more revision of the system and equipment from me to be happy.
<<How many pilots who fly JP's and the like are aware of these issues?>>
In the group I am in (JPs) - well aware of these, and many other issues. And the CAA seem well happy with they way it is run (but can always be improved, and is being with their monitoring) - I'll leave it to them to conduct the overisght - not you I'm afraid.
<<If you don't like my points, then refute them with EVIDENCE>>
This is what is getting annoying. You make a series of unfounded allegations - and then expect everyone else to produce the evidence to refute your spurious allegations - a very strange form of debate! How about YOU produce some statisitical or other evidence (which your "types on register" / "accidents" is NOT) to back up any allegations/ points you would like to make, and we can have a meaningful discussion. As a starter for 10, please back up this 75% failure rate you keep quoting (and don't just say "the man from MB quoted it"!)
Final point:
<<historic jets >>
Ummmm..... When I think of "historic jets" I think of jets of historical value, a rarity value, and maybe of good looks and/or performance e.g. "classics". Much as I enjoy flying the JP, it is pretty ugly (especially the 3/4), has little historical importance and nil rarity value. Whilst they are not significantly endangering third parties, and are operated in an manner satisfactory to the CAA, I think they are best kept flying if there are people out there wanting to, and able to afford to.
NoD
I'm not a Shuttleworth pilot, but I know a few. They don't require Test Pilots - it just happens that TPs are high-ability pilots best able to cope with the demands of oddball control systems, frequent failures, and a constant process of deciding whether to fly at-all.
There are a few non-TP pilots at Shuttleworth. Frankly, if I had the time and was within a sensible driving distance, I'd be sorely tempted to knock on their door myself. I LIKE oddball aeroplanes.
G
There are a few non-TP pilots at Shuttleworth. Frankly, if I had the time and was within a sensible driving distance, I'd be sorely tempted to knock on their door myself. I LIKE oddball aeroplanes.
G
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<<By your calculations a bomber crew on their final mission have an enormously reduced chance of being shot down than at the beginning of operation>> I am afraid your grasp of maths and statistics is not up to this debate...
FD is correct. The chance of the bomber crew being shot down on their 30th mission is tiny compared to the first - and this is ignoring the fact that they are more experienced. It is because, given the large odds of being shot down on any particular misison, it is highly unlikely they will get to the 30th mission to be in a position to be shot down.
Now I do not expect everyone to have a grasp of statistics sufficient to understand this. However, I do of someone who is trying (and failing) to form arguments based on statistics, and despite FD explaining it to you in a very clear way, you still refuse to accept it. Forget <<...the system of cumulating risk is a standard one ...>> unless you can show that to be the case... Again, unfounded allegations from you with nothing to back it up...
NoD
FD is correct. The chance of the bomber crew being shot down on their 30th mission is tiny compared to the first - and this is ignoring the fact that they are more experienced. It is because, given the large odds of being shot down on any particular misison, it is highly unlikely they will get to the 30th mission to be in a position to be shot down.
Now I do not expect everyone to have a grasp of statistics sufficient to understand this. However, I do of someone who is trying (and failing) to form arguments based on statistics, and despite FD explaining it to you in a very clear way, you still refuse to accept it. Forget <<...the system of cumulating risk is a standard one ...>> unless you can show that to be the case... Again, unfounded allegations from you with nothing to back it up...
NoD
Let's not confuse singular risk and cumulative risk here chaps / chappesses. Using the Bomber Command example I'll try to clarify the situation:
1. Singular Risk: All other things being equal a crew had an equal chance of being shot down on their first op as on their last one if one discounts the benfits of greater experience etc.
2. Cumulative Risk: As the period of time that the risk is taking place and / or the number of risk events (ops) reduces, the chance of being shot down reduces proportionally as explained by Flyin 'Dutch'
1. Singular Risk: All other things being equal a crew had an equal chance of being shot down on their first op as on their last one if one discounts the benfits of greater experience etc.
2. Cumulative Risk: As the period of time that the risk is taking place and / or the number of risk events (ops) reduces, the chance of being shot down reduces proportionally as explained by Flyin 'Dutch'
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Thanks NoD, the figures about the ejection stats came straight from a senior chap at Martin Bakers. I won't give his name here, but he was certainly in a position to know this, especially as he also has a company that overhauls seats for the civvy market as well. I will stress that these are his personal opinions, NOT those of MB. How he got the data I'm not sure, but why would he provide false figures?
All data I have quoted has been given by very well respected people in the Historic world. I won't post their names here without their permission. Sounds a bit shonky I know.
The JP crash at Bradwell where the chap was killed is an example of not having the right kit.
"Had he been wearing a life jacket and been able to inflate it he would, although lapsing rapidly into
unconsciousness and suffering from hypothermia, most probably have survived with his head
supported clear of the water, for the 20 minutes or so that it took for the airborne rescue services to
arrive on the scene." This is the final paragraph of the AAIB report.
In that case, the seat worked, but the SYSTEM failed since part of it wasn't there. ie no life jacket or life raft attached to the seat.
I'm happy to see that the accidents are being taken note of, especially in regard to the oxygen system. That was a lucky escape.
My point is that there should be a way of operating these machines and finding probs before there is an accident.
Your seats are 'live', but do all the systems work as they should? I'm sure they do, but that may not always be the case for others.
The biggest potential worry is not really with current seats, but how are overhaulers and groups going to cope when newer jets with far more sophisticated seats come on to the market? If we can nail problems now. I worry about it simply because of the lack of current regulation. In my mind this leaves a gap that could be exploited to the detriment of future operations. It's easier to work with clear guidelines than a mish mash or none at all.
I'll apologise if my tone has offended anybody, that certainly wasn't the intention, nor was it supposed to accusatory. As I've said before NoD, it sounds as if your group is well run. It is not down to me to tell the CAA what to do, but it is up to us how we operate our a/c. If we are content to just do what the letter of the law says and no more, what sort of message is that.
But I do feel very strongly about this subject mainly due to having known people who have been killed because of stupid mistakes of theirs or of others and had to deal with their families and the consequences, any hint of a lax safety culture is something I find very hard to stomach.
The Definition of a 'historic' a/c is not really laid down in any U.K documents. There is no mention in the ANO for example, but there is a mention in the EASA rules.
"ANNEX II OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 1592/2002 (ANNEX II COVERS WHAT IS EXCLUDED FROM EASA REGULATIONS) STATES:
aircraft having a clear historical relevance, related to:
participation in a noteworthy historic event; or
(ii) a major step in the development of aviation; or
(iii) a major role played in the armed forces of a Member State;
and meeting one or more of the following criteria:
its initial design is established as being more than 40 years old;
(ii) its production stopped at least 25 years ago;
(iii) fewer than 50 aircraft of the same basic design are still registered in the Member States;"
Whilst the JP wasn't really a major step in the development of aviation! It did have a major role in the training of military pilots.
This is the only mention of historic that I know of, that also came coutesy of a speaker.
I will concede the point about risk, but how you count risk in a mathematical sense compared to how we personally percieve risk is very different. Crews and Associations often quote the risk added together to form a cumulative total. This may not be mathematically correct, but it gives an idea of the enormous risks they faced.
Another way is that if we lose 8 a/c a year eventually we may end up with the situation of NO historics anymore. Unlikely, but possible. Stats are irrelevant to that end, but they are very useful in trend analysis, though their use becomes less clear as numbers dwindle. (1 spurious event can have a much larger affect on the statistics than in real life.)
The Shuttleworth collection mainly uses TP's for a couple of reasons they are of a known standard and have the ability to move quickly from type to type.
I believe that for the first year of their tenure at Old Warden they don't even get to fly, but have to prove their motivation by helping out.
Then there is a very progressive training regime moving slowly from type to type. The a/c themselves are categorised together, eg. wing warping, radial engine etc and the pilots are taught on those groups.
Genghis, I thought you had to be invited to fly for them?
All data I have quoted has been given by very well respected people in the Historic world. I won't post their names here without their permission. Sounds a bit shonky I know.
The JP crash at Bradwell where the chap was killed is an example of not having the right kit.
"Had he been wearing a life jacket and been able to inflate it he would, although lapsing rapidly into
unconsciousness and suffering from hypothermia, most probably have survived with his head
supported clear of the water, for the 20 minutes or so that it took for the airborne rescue services to
arrive on the scene." This is the final paragraph of the AAIB report.
In that case, the seat worked, but the SYSTEM failed since part of it wasn't there. ie no life jacket or life raft attached to the seat.
I'm happy to see that the accidents are being taken note of, especially in regard to the oxygen system. That was a lucky escape.
My point is that there should be a way of operating these machines and finding probs before there is an accident.
Your seats are 'live', but do all the systems work as they should? I'm sure they do, but that may not always be the case for others.
The biggest potential worry is not really with current seats, but how are overhaulers and groups going to cope when newer jets with far more sophisticated seats come on to the market? If we can nail problems now. I worry about it simply because of the lack of current regulation. In my mind this leaves a gap that could be exploited to the detriment of future operations. It's easier to work with clear guidelines than a mish mash or none at all.
I'll apologise if my tone has offended anybody, that certainly wasn't the intention, nor was it supposed to accusatory. As I've said before NoD, it sounds as if your group is well run. It is not down to me to tell the CAA what to do, but it is up to us how we operate our a/c. If we are content to just do what the letter of the law says and no more, what sort of message is that.
But I do feel very strongly about this subject mainly due to having known people who have been killed because of stupid mistakes of theirs or of others and had to deal with their families and the consequences, any hint of a lax safety culture is something I find very hard to stomach.
The Definition of a 'historic' a/c is not really laid down in any U.K documents. There is no mention in the ANO for example, but there is a mention in the EASA rules.
"ANNEX II OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 1592/2002 (ANNEX II COVERS WHAT IS EXCLUDED FROM EASA REGULATIONS) STATES:
aircraft having a clear historical relevance, related to:
participation in a noteworthy historic event; or
(ii) a major step in the development of aviation; or
(iii) a major role played in the armed forces of a Member State;
and meeting one or more of the following criteria:
its initial design is established as being more than 40 years old;
(ii) its production stopped at least 25 years ago;
(iii) fewer than 50 aircraft of the same basic design are still registered in the Member States;"
Whilst the JP wasn't really a major step in the development of aviation! It did have a major role in the training of military pilots.
This is the only mention of historic that I know of, that also came coutesy of a speaker.
I will concede the point about risk, but how you count risk in a mathematical sense compared to how we personally percieve risk is very different. Crews and Associations often quote the risk added together to form a cumulative total. This may not be mathematically correct, but it gives an idea of the enormous risks they faced.
Another way is that if we lose 8 a/c a year eventually we may end up with the situation of NO historics anymore. Unlikely, but possible. Stats are irrelevant to that end, but they are very useful in trend analysis, though their use becomes less clear as numbers dwindle. (1 spurious event can have a much larger affect on the statistics than in real life.)
The Shuttleworth collection mainly uses TP's for a couple of reasons they are of a known standard and have the ability to move quickly from type to type.
I believe that for the first year of their tenure at Old Warden they don't even get to fly, but have to prove their motivation by helping out.
Then there is a very progressive training regime moving slowly from type to type. The a/c themselves are categorised together, eg. wing warping, radial engine etc and the pilots are taught on those groups.
Genghis, I thought you had to be invited to fly for them?
Last edited by Say again s l o w l y; 5th Dec 2003 at 22:01.
Genghis, I thought you had to be invited to fly for them?
I'm sure somebody like Aerbedane can give us chapter and verse.
G
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SaS...
We're getting somewhere maybe...
<<the figures about the ejection stats came straight from a senior chap at Martin Bakers>> But this is my point. YOU are making the argument, not him. You can only really quote his figures if you can also quote the context or limitations he made them in. Remember - he has a vested interest. The military pay him lots of money, he provides good seats. He feels vulnerable because those seats are now outside the military, his good name might be at risk, due factors beyond his control - and he will make his argument, and present his stats on that basis. Please do not just lap it up...
<<The JP crash at Bradwell where the chap was killed is an example of not having the right kit>> Exactly, but nothing to do with MB, or the seat. In fact largely nothing to do with anyone other than the unfortunate chap concerned, and the group he was flying for, and their supervisory system.
We are fortunate enough to be able to assess our own risks, and decisions, without a total cotton wool atmosphere (despite the best efforts of certain Government depts). The Bradwell lack of flying kit put no 3rd party at risk (the aircraft was abandoned anyway). Great shame for his family, but that is the risk HE took. And unless he was completely off his rocker, he KNEW that when he took off... Should his family be protected from his less than ideal decisions, despite information and advice being available, and the consequences well known?
<<but the SYSTEM failed >> Disagree anything failed, other than he operated the aircraft in a manner exposing himself to a risk for which neither he, nor the seat, was equipped.
<<but how are overhaulers and groups going to cope when newer jets with far more sophisticated seats come on to the market>> You go on about a SMS, and Risk Analysis, and then say this! The whole point of the SMS is to use the current experience (JP or whatever you use) when you analyse these "new seats". You cannot condemn the JP because of some future possibility. So lets deal with the JP for now. As and when something new comes in, it will be looked under SMS / RA, see if there are lessons from the JP experience, and apply them. The CAA will then decide the operating requirements...
<<But I do feel very strongly about this subject mainly due to having known people who have been killed because of stupid mistakes of theirs or of others and had to deal with their families and the consequences, any hint of a lax safety culture is something I find very hard to stomach>> Fine, I can your problem / concern. But can / should we legislate against people's own mistakes? As I said above, for Bradwell, it is all pretty clear cut.
The Historic comment was slightly tic - but under the criteria you mention it seems it applies.
<<These thoughts came up as I wrote a project about one particular crash>> Which one? And will you share it with anyone? If it came by eMail I would not discuss its contents here, or elsewhere without your say so.... PM me for my address if you let me see it...
NoD
We're getting somewhere maybe...
<<the figures about the ejection stats came straight from a senior chap at Martin Bakers>> But this is my point. YOU are making the argument, not him. You can only really quote his figures if you can also quote the context or limitations he made them in. Remember - he has a vested interest. The military pay him lots of money, he provides good seats. He feels vulnerable because those seats are now outside the military, his good name might be at risk, due factors beyond his control - and he will make his argument, and present his stats on that basis. Please do not just lap it up...
<<The JP crash at Bradwell where the chap was killed is an example of not having the right kit>> Exactly, but nothing to do with MB, or the seat. In fact largely nothing to do with anyone other than the unfortunate chap concerned, and the group he was flying for, and their supervisory system.
We are fortunate enough to be able to assess our own risks, and decisions, without a total cotton wool atmosphere (despite the best efforts of certain Government depts). The Bradwell lack of flying kit put no 3rd party at risk (the aircraft was abandoned anyway). Great shame for his family, but that is the risk HE took. And unless he was completely off his rocker, he KNEW that when he took off... Should his family be protected from his less than ideal decisions, despite information and advice being available, and the consequences well known?
<<but the SYSTEM failed >> Disagree anything failed, other than he operated the aircraft in a manner exposing himself to a risk for which neither he, nor the seat, was equipped.
<<but how are overhaulers and groups going to cope when newer jets with far more sophisticated seats come on to the market>> You go on about a SMS, and Risk Analysis, and then say this! The whole point of the SMS is to use the current experience (JP or whatever you use) when you analyse these "new seats". You cannot condemn the JP because of some future possibility. So lets deal with the JP for now. As and when something new comes in, it will be looked under SMS / RA, see if there are lessons from the JP experience, and apply them. The CAA will then decide the operating requirements...
<<But I do feel very strongly about this subject mainly due to having known people who have been killed because of stupid mistakes of theirs or of others and had to deal with their families and the consequences, any hint of a lax safety culture is something I find very hard to stomach>> Fine, I can your problem / concern. But can / should we legislate against people's own mistakes? As I said above, for Bradwell, it is all pretty clear cut.
The Historic comment was slightly tic - but under the criteria you mention it seems it applies.
<<These thoughts came up as I wrote a project about one particular crash>> Which one? And will you share it with anyone? If it came by eMail I would not discuss its contents here, or elsewhere without your say so.... PM me for my address if you let me see it...
NoD
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Good points, there was definately a bit of salt pinching about the MB presentation, but I feel most of the points were very valid.
The project was on the JP crash at Bradwell and I'm happy for anyone to have a copy of it, but I'd like to wait for it to come back from the lecturers first. Should be in the New Year at some point as I'm away from the 17th.
A lot of the insurance requirements are now far stricter than CAP 632 and this is causing a lot of problems in the display world where unless a pilot has all the ticks in the boxes, then they won't get insurance. The problem being how do you get experience in a particular type without flying it?
We always talk about risk to us personally, but our actions directly influence many others. In the Bradwell crash the only person who was killed was the pilot, but what about the effect on the emergency services and especially to his family and friends. Taking unnecessary risks does seem to be selfish in that if the worst happens, it is not you who has to deal with it. I make the comment unnecessary for a reason, there is always a level of risk attached to any activity, but we owe it to the people around us that we do our damnest to cut the odds as much as possible.
I stood behind the wife and child of a pilot whilst he was displaying and I'll never forget the moment he hit the ground and the look on their faces......
I don't want to condemn the JP in anyway, I like seeing them fly and have thought about getting a share in one at some point, but the point is that any lessons we can learn about the civillian use of seats may be useful when more advanced seats come on the market. A bit of get the basics right first if you will.
I still feel that the pilot is a pretty important part of an ejection system and by his omission caused a life to be lost. MB would count this as a success though.
The project was on the JP crash at Bradwell and I'm happy for anyone to have a copy of it, but I'd like to wait for it to come back from the lecturers first. Should be in the New Year at some point as I'm away from the 17th.
A lot of the insurance requirements are now far stricter than CAP 632 and this is causing a lot of problems in the display world where unless a pilot has all the ticks in the boxes, then they won't get insurance. The problem being how do you get experience in a particular type without flying it?
We always talk about risk to us personally, but our actions directly influence many others. In the Bradwell crash the only person who was killed was the pilot, but what about the effect on the emergency services and especially to his family and friends. Taking unnecessary risks does seem to be selfish in that if the worst happens, it is not you who has to deal with it. I make the comment unnecessary for a reason, there is always a level of risk attached to any activity, but we owe it to the people around us that we do our damnest to cut the odds as much as possible.
I stood behind the wife and child of a pilot whilst he was displaying and I'll never forget the moment he hit the ground and the look on their faces......
I don't want to condemn the JP in anyway, I like seeing them fly and have thought about getting a share in one at some point, but the point is that any lessons we can learn about the civillian use of seats may be useful when more advanced seats come on the market. A bit of get the basics right first if you will.
I still feel that the pilot is a pretty important part of an ejection system and by his omission caused a life to be lost. MB would count this as a success though.
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SaS
I agree, both with your sentiments, but principally because you put the onus on we, not the law e.g. the CAA.
CAP 632 is quite clear that we should carry the flying kit etc. etc. It comes down to personal responsibility. So long as you are not suggesting that this should all go down the regulatory route... Whilst it leads on occasion to sad results, human life is far richer for the opportunity to do things outside a cotton wool environment. Look at the effective demise on school trips, all due the Govt prosecuting teachers, and requiring mounds of "risk assessments" prior to feeding the ducks...
NoD
We always talk about risk to us personally, but our actions directly influence many others. In the Bradwell crash the only person who was killed was the pilot, but what about the effect on the emergency services and especially to his family and friends. Taking unnecessary risks does seem to be selfish in that if the worst happens, it is not you who has to deal with it. I make the comment unnecessary for a reason, there is always a level of risk attached to any activity, but we owe it to the people around us that we do our damnest to cut the odds as much as possible.
CAP 632 is quite clear that we should carry the flying kit etc. etc. It comes down to personal responsibility. So long as you are not suggesting that this should all go down the regulatory route... Whilst it leads on occasion to sad results, human life is far richer for the opportunity to do things outside a cotton wool environment. Look at the effective demise on school trips, all due the Govt prosecuting teachers, and requiring mounds of "risk assessments" prior to feeding the ducks...
NoD
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Absolutely. The last thing I want is for the regulators to come and force us into anything. I would like all pilots and operators to take the lead in regard to safety matters and issues. Some already do, but there are many out there who do the minimum required and even flount the meaning of the rules on technicalities. This can only ever be a short term, because the moment there is an incident, the rules would get tightened up in an instant to the detriment of us all.
CAP 632 is only applicable to ex-military a/c, but it could really be used by anyone as a basis.
If we do it, then there will be little or no reason for some government agency to clamp down on us. If they try that, then I'll be with Drapes up in the hills with a Martini-Henry rifle!
CAP 632 is only applicable to ex-military a/c, but it could really be used by anyone as a basis.
If we do it, then there will be little or no reason for some government agency to clamp down on us. If they try that, then I'll be with Drapes up in the hills with a Martini-Henry rifle!
