PPRuNe Forums

PPRuNe Forums (https://www.pprune.org/)
-   Passengers & SLF (Self Loading Freight) (https://www.pprune.org/passengers-slf-self-loading-freight-61/)
-   -   BA delays at LHR - Computer issue (https://www.pprune.org/passengers-slf-self-loading-freight/595169-ba-delays-lhr-computer-issue.html)

Caribbean Boy 5th Jun 2017 17:22


Originally Posted by BigFrank (Post 9793172)
I believe that the significance of the asterisk in this table is that these 2 apparently separate companies are effectively one entity thereby controlling over 15% of IAG

No, only 7.175% of CRMC holding is held by Europacific Growth Fund.

Caribbean Boy 5th Jun 2017 17:34


Originally Posted by BigFrank (Post 9793179)
¿ How could a company such as IAG not have a substantial Spanish input ?

The Chairman and CEO BA, the CFO and the Director of Global Services are all managing mainly British assets and British people, and do not have to be Spanish. But I believe that the politics of the company requires an equal number of Brits and Spanish reporting to Willie Walsh, even if it meant appointing the chief executive of unimpressive Vueling to be the CEO of BA.

scr1 5th Jun 2017 18:15

British Airways IT chaos was caused by human error - BBC News

now saying someone puled a plug out

pax britanica 5th Jun 2017 18:56

That could be true but it would be ludicrous , there isnt a big red switch or a 3 pin plug that youcan turn off/pull out on these things.

If something like that happened what does it say for BA security and risk management thata low level contractor can shut down the entire airline with one mistake or maybe even deliberate act. farcical. Any mission critical facility of that scale and class should never allow one individual workign alone , especially where complex or HV power is involved just for safety reasons let alone business protection. How does the business know that one guy isnt , drunk, drugged, dumped by wife /girl. Facing a disciplinary, bribed, malicious etc etc etc A complete joke

dmsims 5th Jun 2017 19:10

There is only 1 UPS?

[sarc]

SteppenHerring 5th Jun 2017 19:40


Originally Posted by pax britanica (Post 9793621)
That could be true but it would be ludicrous , there isnt a big red switch

There will be a big red switch somewhere to cut all power in the event of (for instance) a fire. This will bring all power down in an uncontrolled manner leading to all sorts of bad stuff. Activating it when the building isn't actually on fire would be a Very Bad Thing to do.

Similarly, just turning everything back on again and assuming that it will all just start up and resume would be a Very Bad Thing.

RAT 5 5th Jun 2017 20:45

There will be a big red switch somewhere to cut all power in the event of (for instance) a fire. This will bring all power down in an uncontrolled manner leading to all sorts of bad stuff.

I'm not an IT wizzkid, more a dinosaur. Please excuse: but as an engineer/pilot of sorts I would like to think that in the event of having to evacuate and switch off a working system, by a 'kill switch' it would not be harmful and uncontrolled. The expectation would be that it would be used again after the emergency. Why do you say it would not be protected and "lead to all sorts of bad stuff."? Back to the topic, before this becomes an IT classroom, why would BA have a system that was so vulnerable to an emergency shutdown?

Tay Cough 5th Jun 2017 20:47

A kill switch is a great idea. Especially when there is an entirely separate backup system in a different location.

Hang on...

SteppenHerring 5th Jun 2017 21:31


Originally Posted by RAT 5 (Post 9793735)
I'm not an IT wizzkid, more a dinosaur. Please excuse: but as an engineer/pilot of sorts I would like to think that in the event of having to evacuate and switch off a working system, by a 'kill switch' it would not be harmful and uncontrolled.

That's why the Big Red Button is never to be used. It's there to cut all power immediately to protect (for instance) the fire brigade. In aircraft terms, it's like hitting the engine fire extinguisher.

The difference it that the aircraft engine isn't throwing tons of information at several hundred other engines at the time.

Banana4321 5th Jun 2017 21:56


Originally Posted by SteppenHerring (Post 9793782)
That's why the Big Red Button is never to be used. It's there to cut all power immediately to protect (for instance) the fire brigade. In aircraft terms, it's like hitting the engine fire extinguisher.

The difference it that the aircraft engine isn't throwing tons of information at several hundred other engines at the time.

Agreed.

It's a little bit more complicated than that.

PAXboy 6th Jun 2017 01:24

This from BBC:

Willie Walsh. chief executive of IAG, said an engineer disconnected a power supply, with the major damage caused by a surge when it was reconnected.
He said there would now be an independent investigation "to learn from the experience". However, some experts say that blaming a power surge is too simplistic.

Mr Walsh, appearing at an annual airline industry conference in Mexico on Monday, said: "It's very clear to me that you can make a mistake in disconnecting the power. "It's difficult for me to understand how to make a mistake in reconnecting the power," he said.

He told reporters that the engineer was authorised to be in the data centre, but was not authorised "to do what he did".

Also on Monday, Mr Walsh apologised again for the incident, saying: "When you see customers who suffered, you wouldn't want it to happen to any airline or any business."

He added: ""I wouldn't suggest for one minute we got communications right at BA, we didn't."
I wonder if they have an 'emergency planning department' or ever waste their time on 'role play' and 'testing' ...:hmm::rolleyes:

aox 6th Jun 2017 01:35

"very clear"

Why is Mr Walsh using one of Theresa May's catchphrases?

Caribbean Boy 6th Jun 2017 01:35

Perhaps Willie Walsh would like to revise his full backing for Alex Cruz who in the first two days of the crisis was nowhere to be seen except in videos wearing a high-vis jacket in a room full of computers.

WHBM 6th Jun 2017 04:59


Originally Posted by Caribbean Boy (Post 9793931)
Perhaps Willie Walsh would like to revise his full backing for Alex Cruz who in the first two days of the crisis was nowhere to be seen except in videos wearing a high-vis jacket in a room full of computers.

Hasn't Willie done that already ?


He added: ""I wouldn't suggest for one minute we got communications right at BA, we didn't."
I presume as Chief Exec Alex Cruz is as responsible for communications as for other aspects.

bbrown1664 6th Jun 2017 09:28


Originally Posted by pax britanica (Post 9793621)
That could be true but it would be ludicrous , there isnt a big red switch or a 3 pin plug that youcan turn off/pull out on these things.

If something like that happened what does it say for BA security and risk management thata low level contractor can shut down the entire airline with one mistake or maybe even deliberate act. farcical. Any mission critical facility of that scale and class should never allow one individual workign alone , especially where complex or HV power is involved just for safety reasons let alone business protection. How does the business know that one guy isnt , drunk, drugged, dumped by wife /girl. Facing a disciplinary, bribed, malicious etc etc etc A complete joke

For safety reasons, EVERY data room in EVERY data centre will have big red push stops around the walls to kill the power in an emergency. This kills everything instantly and does not shut anything down graciously. As a result, bringing things back up after an EMERGENCY STOP button has been activated can take a lot longer than if you had shut things down cleanly.

I personally have hit the big red button accidentally in the past due to it being un-guarded and being placed right at waist height next to a rack I had to move. IT happens in IT. Not much you can do as the engineer in the room when it all goes quiet except for apologise and help start bringing things back up again.

RichardBeeb 6th Jun 2017 09:42

Fred, can you check your email again...ta.

Anyone out there have first hand experience of how you switch these systems on and off. Drop me a line [email protected] (Transport Correspondent)

Heathrow Harry 6th Jun 2017 09:58

"bringing things back up after an EMERGENCY STOP button has been activated can take a lot longer than if you had shut things down cleanly."

see my post on the Forties Oil Platform - 2 minutes to close down - 3 days to bring back up.... as bbrown says the clue is in the word "EMERGENCY".....................

Ian W 6th Jun 2017 10:44


Originally Posted by scr1 (Post 9793589)

From that article:

However, an email leaked to the media last week suggested that a contractor doing maintenance work inadvertently switched off the power supply.The email said: "This resulted in the total immediate loss of power to the facility, bypassing the backup generators and batteries... After a few minutes of this shutdown, it was turned back on in an unplanned and uncontrolled fashion, which created physical damage to the systems and significantly exacerbated the problem."
This is an admission that the BA system was not designed as a fault tolerant system. It should not be possible to fail a distributed fault tolerant system by failing one data center however untidily. Similarly, by definition an untidy restart that caused various failures in an already 'failed' data center should be completely transparent to users just extend the length of time for that data center to be brought back up.

I can remember walking around doing acceptance testing in a system that _was_ fault tolerant randomly failing servers, disk drives boards within servers power supplies etc. and the system just kept going as it was designed to. The BA system was obviously not designed to be fault tolerant. Or the system had been put into a state where it was not fault tolerant by people not knowing what they were doing.

Heidhurtin 6th Jun 2017 10:45


Originally Posted by bbrown1664 (Post 9794205)
For safety reasons, EVERY data room in EVERY data centre will have big red push stops around the walls to kill the power in an emergency. This kills everything instantly and does not shut anything down graciously. As a result, bringing things back up after an EMERGENCY STOP button has been activated can take a lot longer than if you had shut things down cleanly.

I personally have hit the big red button accidentally in the past due to it being un-guarded and being placed right at waist height next to a rack I had to move. IT happens in IT. Not much you can do as the engineer in the room when it all goes quiet except for apologise and help start bringing things back up again.

Whereas I have spent the last 2 years disconnecting these "big red switches" whenever I find one in any of my DC's (usually in the smaller installations). There are gas suppression systems to take care of any fire situation and automatic disconnection of electrical supplies to cater for any electrical fault (down to individual circuit level).
There is simply no need for a master cut off switch to kill the whole hall. It's not as if there are big mechanical nasties whirling around and looking to cause injury to the unwary (think workshop or factory) which certainly need some form of emergency manual intervention capability.

Without repeating other posts, I agree about an uncontrolled restart causing damage though, seen that one personally.

RichardBeeb 6th Jun 2017 11:09

Uncontrolled restarts
 
How does an restart work though? How easy is it to get it wrong? Wrong sequence?


All times are GMT. The time now is 03:12.


Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.