The inaugural flight came as a surprise to the passengers...
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@ Peakcrew a very rational and reasoned post with which i fully concur.
It seems that the current ethos makes absolute safety a secondary consideration. The beancounters calculate the compensation-cost of failure and compare it with the cost of eliminating / mitigating that potential failure.
Still, we get the old saw, "if you think safety's expensive, try having an accident" Yet that's exactly how the insurance industry makes a profit and how big business has altered it's ethical and moral stance.......or has it?
Ralph Nader is the man who started the whole consumer protection movement, His book, "UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED" gives a real insight into Corporate greed and cynicism. Chevrolet knowingly built a fundamentally unsafe and flawed design purely because the buying public would (they thought! ) not uncover the accident statistics. They had calculated that "hush-money" and compensation would be cheaper than building something safer.
We, as paying punters, have a right to distrust businesses who have been less than honest and transparent.
We have a choice, take our coin elsewhere until the customer-provider balance is restored.
It seems that the current ethos makes absolute safety a secondary consideration. The beancounters calculate the compensation-cost of failure and compare it with the cost of eliminating / mitigating that potential failure.
Still, we get the old saw, "if you think safety's expensive, try having an accident" Yet that's exactly how the insurance industry makes a profit and how big business has altered it's ethical and moral stance.......or has it?
Ralph Nader is the man who started the whole consumer protection movement, His book, "UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED" gives a real insight into Corporate greed and cynicism. Chevrolet knowingly built a fundamentally unsafe and flawed design purely because the buying public would (they thought! ) not uncover the accident statistics. They had calculated that "hush-money" and compensation would be cheaper than building something safer.
We, as paying punters, have a right to distrust businesses who have been less than honest and transparent.
We have a choice, take our coin elsewhere until the customer-provider balance is restored.
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Thanks, Steve. However, going back to the original post in the thread - what would you do if the plane you thought you were going to be on was substituted for a 787? I'm awkward enough individually to say "I'm not getting on that!", take the financial hit, and then start a legal case to find out the extent to which we, as passengers, can be given the stark choice of boarding a certain plane when there is credible evidence that there are significant safety issues, or lose time and money. Essentially, it would be a challenge to discover when it is that the contractual conditions presented by the airline are unreasonable.
However, if I'm with my wife, that option would not be available ... if you know what I mean
However, if I'm with my wife, that option would not be available ... if you know what I mean
Last edited by peakcrew; 8th Aug 2013 at 14:27.
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I, too, believe I follow exquisitely reasoned decision analysis, but at the end of the day, I make a decision that is informed by my gut as well as by my head. For example, I believe the statistics generally suggest (but are not absolutely conclusive) that major North American and Western European (and, not being British, I include the UK with Europe 
) air carriers are safer than other carriers. Thus, unless the price difference is alarming, I will prefer to ride with the former. But if, say, I am in Asia and the only in-country choice is a local carrier, I will happily take that carrier even if I would decline it for an international flight. And note, too, the statistics suggest that carriers in the second group are far safer for their international flights than they are for their home-country domestic flights.
But so much for airlines. Let's talk about jet transports. Since the 1950s Comet, there have been no transports introduced that have had glaring design flaws that have significantly impinged on safety. And for those of you who say, what about the Turkish DC-10 or Habsheim A320, the answer for the former was not that the cargo door was intrinsically unsafe, it was just that verifying its full closure was not failsafe, and for the latter, it was poor pilot decision-making coupled with unfamiliarity with how quickly the plane would begin to climb in a GA. That is not to say that all of these modern jets have been perfect from the get-go -- just that the entities that design and build these planes have become so good at what they do, that your incremental increase in safety by choosing to avoid a particular new model (in preference for taking a possibly poorly maintained older model) will be vanishingly small relative to all of the risks you face over the course of year.
) air carriers are safer than other carriers. Thus, unless the price difference is alarming, I will prefer to ride with the former. But if, say, I am in Asia and the only in-country choice is a local carrier, I will happily take that carrier even if I would decline it for an international flight. And note, too, the statistics suggest that carriers in the second group are far safer for their international flights than they are for their home-country domestic flights.But so much for airlines. Let's talk about jet transports. Since the 1950s Comet, there have been no transports introduced that have had glaring design flaws that have significantly impinged on safety. And for those of you who say, what about the Turkish DC-10 or Habsheim A320, the answer for the former was not that the cargo door was intrinsically unsafe, it was just that verifying its full closure was not failsafe, and for the latter, it was poor pilot decision-making coupled with unfamiliarity with how quickly the plane would begin to climb in a GA. That is not to say that all of these modern jets have been perfect from the get-go -- just that the entities that design and build these planes have become so good at what they do, that your incremental increase in safety by choosing to avoid a particular new model (in preference for taking a possibly poorly maintained older model) will be vanishingly small relative to all of the risks you face over the course of year.
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("put the battery in a box: the same thing might happen again, but at least we'll keep going"), without any extra information as to the root-cause, it wouldn't get passed by me or anyone else
If the former, I'm interested to understand what you feel is lacking for the following reasons: (sorry if a bit long-winded)
In the example you are using, the 787 battery, Boeing and the FAA and everyone else has said, publicly, that they do not know the root cause. So the solution has had to be to build, and I presume test, a solution that will protect the airplane in the event of every single cell going into thermal runaway. In addition the solution will prevent a single cell causing a cascade failure of the others. On top of that there is much enhanced monitoring and control of the battery environment.
As an engineer I'm not happy that the root cause was not found, but as an engineer I know that very occasionally that will be the case, especially when the evidence is well and truly fried! So in that situation you do what Boeing have done, assume the 'nuclear' failure could occur and design for it.
If the latter, what possible reason would the two bodies have for knowingly and 'with malice a forethought' allow the thing to keep flying until a known risk of a catastrophic event occurred? Such an event, in today's world could, and most likely would, destroy both organizations.
I'm not being antagonistic, just trying to follow the logic.
Last edited by fenland787; 8th Aug 2013 at 19:30.
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Seenitall - the flaw in the DC10 was not the cargo door (although that was a known problem, as evidenced by the Windsor (Ont) incident, and others before the THY crash), but the impact on control of the aircraft following any explosive decompression. The DC10 had far less redundancy than other contemporary wide bodies, and the control lines ran together through the non-reinforced non-vented floor. Any floor damage was therefore a significant risk. One of McDonnel's sub-contractors (IIRC Convair), had discovered the flaw in hull tests long before the aircraft first flew. The massive decompression associated with a cargo door blowing out, guaranteed loss of control of the aircraft.
However, those in the know, for whatever reason, chose not to take any action until after the THY crash. Contemporary studies in the aftermath described the FAA's approach during the DC10 development and certification as "fat, dumb and happy".
I would recommend getting hold of a copy of "Destination Disaster", which describes in great detail the DC10 development history, as essential reading for those in the "trust in those who know what they are doing" camp.
However, those in the know, for whatever reason, chose not to take any action until after the THY crash. Contemporary studies in the aftermath described the FAA's approach during the DC10 development and certification as "fat, dumb and happy".
I would recommend getting hold of a copy of "Destination Disaster", which describes in great detail the DC10 development history, as essential reading for those in the "trust in those who know what they are doing" camp.
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Good point Hipennine. A number of aircraft prangs are ascribed to 'must land itis' and similar terms to indicate that the schedule set down by mgmt MUST be adhered to.
In almost every big man-made disaster, it is usually not long before it emerges that someone (or some people) were warning of the danger a fair time beforehand. Two examples:
Each can person must take their own decisions and live with them. I recall a personal conversation with Sir Hermann Bondi, KCB, FRS, an Austrian mathematician. Having experienced Nazism and got out in time, he said, "I come from a culture where no govt statement is believed - until it is categorically denied."
I prefer to let time be the judge of the 787, which will mature and be fine. One day.
In almost every big man-made disaster, it is usually not long before it emerges that someone (or some people) were warning of the danger a fair time beforehand. Two examples:
- The Shuttle Challenger failure on 28 January 1986 found:
NASA managers had known contractor Morton Thiokol's design of the SRBs contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings since 1977, but failed to address it properly. They also disregarded warnings from engineers about the dangers of launching posed by the low temperatures of that morning and had failed in adequately reporting these technical concerns to their superiors.
- In London the Kings Cross station escalator fire of 18 November 1987 had been warned of by engineers in WRITING. No action had been taken.
London Underground were strongly criticised in the report for their attitude to fires underground, underestimating the hazard because no one had died in a fire. Staff were expected to send for the Fire Brigade only if the fire was out of control, dealing with it themselves if possible. Fires were called smouldering and staff had little or no training to deal with fires or evacuation.
I prefer to let time be the judge of the 787, which will mature and be fine. One day.
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Thanks, fenland, for your comments.
Any REC has a mixture of experts and lay members (as you may know), and we'll call in additional experts if needed, especially if there is something controversial or exceptionally difficult. Of course, we don't have to second-guess any other bodies, since any REC has the power to allow/deny any proposal as long as sufficient reasons are given. There is also an appeals process available to the researchers.
Now, with the issue here, we have one group of people (Boeing and airlines) that stand to lose/gain considerably depending on the decisions made. We also have a safety regulatory body which relies heavily on the information given by at least one of the parties (Boeing). On the other hand, we have a body of opinion from people who do not [seem to] have any advantage from decisions made, but which seems to have some reliability. Some of that opinion questions the use of lithium batteries at all, other sources question the use of the actual packs - this seems to have been borne out in incidents that have occurred, in which the separation of the cells seems to have been insufficient to control thermal runaway. Despite this, the solution which has been accepted by the safety authority can be phrased as, "Well, neither the interested parties nor we can find any actual reason for why this incident with novel technology (in this type of environment) has happened more than once, nor state reliably what might happen if it occurred whilst in flight. However, we accept the solution is to put the troublesome technology in a box that we hope will prevent any further incidents turning into catastrophes, and we'll hope for the best." To stick with aviation history, to my mind this is as if the safety body at the time of the Comet said, "Ah well, we don't know what the problem is, but let's put four-point harnesses on every seat and add an oxygen mask for each passenger. That should stop the effects of explosive decompression, and we'll hope for the best." This is unacceptable to my mind, and to several other posting on here.
I know that with any mechanical device, and even more so with electro-mechanical devices (that may not be quite the right phrase, but it seems to describe the new electricity-dependent planes well enough), there are going to be "unknown unknowns" - the things that could not really be anticipated, but for which the cause might seem obvious afterwards - and crash investigations often find these after the event. However, what we have with the 787 is at least one "known unknown", and on a plane capable of carrying 300+ people - and that has to be remembered here: the passengers and crew are *people*, not "self-loading freight" or whatever dehumanising term is in vogue at the moment - it is not acceptable to run on the equivalent of a rally driver sticking some gaffer tape and cable-ties around a broken bit to get to the end of the event (yes, I've done that. You might also infer from previous posts that I've had a lot to do with old Land-Rovers!) And this, to me seems to be where an REC would depart from the air-safety regulator here. Since there is no advantage to the passengers from letting the 787 fly with its "known unknown" battery problem - airlines have other planes with no "known unknowns" which can fulfil the needs of the people to get safely from A to B - we wouldn't let it through.
I am aware that, as a newbie here, I am coming across as a Boeing-hater. This isn't the case. I actually prefer Boeing to Airbus (Boeings seem better screwed together than Airbus'), and I would hate to see Boeing take a hit on this. However, I cannot see how it benefits anyone - Boeing, airlines, safety bodies, or the people that fly on them - to have this plane flying with a huge question-mark over it. I hope that I am wrong in my fears, and that in two or three years I will happily come on here and say so, and that I've just enjoyed my first flight on one. But if there is a loss in flight, and hundreds killed, as a result of a battery issue will reduce passenger - and investor - confidence so much that Boeing may well become just another old name.
Sorry for the long post.
Any REC has a mixture of experts and lay members (as you may know), and we'll call in additional experts if needed, especially if there is something controversial or exceptionally difficult. Of course, we don't have to second-guess any other bodies, since any REC has the power to allow/deny any proposal as long as sufficient reasons are given. There is also an appeals process available to the researchers.
Now, with the issue here, we have one group of people (Boeing and airlines) that stand to lose/gain considerably depending on the decisions made. We also have a safety regulatory body which relies heavily on the information given by at least one of the parties (Boeing). On the other hand, we have a body of opinion from people who do not [seem to] have any advantage from decisions made, but which seems to have some reliability. Some of that opinion questions the use of lithium batteries at all, other sources question the use of the actual packs - this seems to have been borne out in incidents that have occurred, in which the separation of the cells seems to have been insufficient to control thermal runaway. Despite this, the solution which has been accepted by the safety authority can be phrased as, "Well, neither the interested parties nor we can find any actual reason for why this incident with novel technology (in this type of environment) has happened more than once, nor state reliably what might happen if it occurred whilst in flight. However, we accept the solution is to put the troublesome technology in a box that we hope will prevent any further incidents turning into catastrophes, and we'll hope for the best." To stick with aviation history, to my mind this is as if the safety body at the time of the Comet said, "Ah well, we don't know what the problem is, but let's put four-point harnesses on every seat and add an oxygen mask for each passenger. That should stop the effects of explosive decompression, and we'll hope for the best." This is unacceptable to my mind, and to several other posting on here.
I know that with any mechanical device, and even more so with electro-mechanical devices (that may not be quite the right phrase, but it seems to describe the new electricity-dependent planes well enough), there are going to be "unknown unknowns" - the things that could not really be anticipated, but for which the cause might seem obvious afterwards - and crash investigations often find these after the event. However, what we have with the 787 is at least one "known unknown", and on a plane capable of carrying 300+ people - and that has to be remembered here: the passengers and crew are *people*, not "self-loading freight" or whatever dehumanising term is in vogue at the moment - it is not acceptable to run on the equivalent of a rally driver sticking some gaffer tape and cable-ties around a broken bit to get to the end of the event (yes, I've done that. You might also infer from previous posts that I've had a lot to do with old Land-Rovers!) And this, to me seems to be where an REC would depart from the air-safety regulator here. Since there is no advantage to the passengers from letting the 787 fly with its "known unknown" battery problem - airlines have other planes with no "known unknowns" which can fulfil the needs of the people to get safely from A to B - we wouldn't let it through.
I am aware that, as a newbie here, I am coming across as a Boeing-hater. This isn't the case. I actually prefer Boeing to Airbus (Boeings seem better screwed together than Airbus'), and I would hate to see Boeing take a hit on this. However, I cannot see how it benefits anyone - Boeing, airlines, safety bodies, or the people that fly on them - to have this plane flying with a huge question-mark over it. I hope that I am wrong in my fears, and that in two or three years I will happily come on here and say so, and that I've just enjoyed my first flight on one. But if there is a loss in flight, and hundreds killed, as a result of a battery issue will reduce passenger - and investor - confidence so much that Boeing may well become just another old name.
Sorry for the long post.
Last edited by peakcrew; 10th Aug 2013 at 13:58. Reason: General tidying up.
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peakcrew Welcome and well done. I think that summed it very well. I, also, hope that no one dies because it will cripple Boeing and we all need competition in this field.
My view on all of this is that Boeing has been introducing too many things at one time: New aircraft AND new work practises. Time will tell.
My view on all of this is that Boeing has been introducing too many things at one time: New aircraft AND new work practises. Time will tell.
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Coincidentally, the rushed DC10 development history involved the extensive use of sub-contractors, and other postings are suggesting that when Boeing and McD merged, it was the McD commercial management that have become the power within Boeing.
