Suicide explosion at Moscow Domodedovo
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WHBM has stated the blindingly obvious. If security can detect, and contain the threat to the physical location where they're stoped, then these places HAVE to be of low people density. Keep the genuine passengers moving, and therefore the numbers of people queing down, until they've crossed into a secure area.
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When it's your time, it's your time.
Nobody can legislate for self-exploding nutters.
Nobody can legislate for self-exploding nutters.
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It's the system, not the individual service. Any bottleneck prior to security screening has to be a potential target. Get rid of the bottlenecks and you instantly reduce the number of potential targets.
I do find it extraordinary that the Russian government is blaming the DME operators for this act. Security against terrorism is a national government responsibility, pure and simple, and it is up to them, through their agents in the security services and the police, and with appropriate guidance to airports, airlines and others, to control this as best they are able.
It comes just a few weeks after there was a huge blame against the airport operators for disorganisation after power failures. Prime Minister Putin cancelled the New Year holidays for all the staff of the Moscow airport operators until they got things back to normal again. With this level of political interference and blame, someone at the Moscow airports must have done something very bad to upset The Kremlin.
I do fear that the "seen to do something" approach will prevail, and Moscow will now have more queues, and more massing of travellers, while bureaucrats nitty-pick through everyone's documentation, exactly the opposite of what is required to minimise the target. But will the masses of mafia-controlled taxi touts who crowd the arrivals point at DME trying to charge US $300 for a trip to the city be eliminated ? Of course not.
It comes just a few weeks after there was a huge blame against the airport operators for disorganisation after power failures. Prime Minister Putin cancelled the New Year holidays for all the staff of the Moscow airport operators until they got things back to normal again. With this level of political interference and blame, someone at the Moscow airports must have done something very bad to upset The Kremlin.
I do fear that the "seen to do something" approach will prevail, and Moscow will now have more queues, and more massing of travellers, while bureaucrats nitty-pick through everyone's documentation, exactly the opposite of what is required to minimise the target. But will the masses of mafia-controlled taxi touts who crowd the arrivals point at DME trying to charge US $300 for a trip to the city be eliminated ? Of course not.
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Hi,
Gesticulations ... the russian intelligence services and FSB are the culprits
Terrorists must be not allowed to entry a airport (any in the world)
Intelligence ( by infiltration .. etc ..) collected in terrorists organizations is the key
When terrorist cross a airport entry door .. nobody can stop it ( even Putin with a Kalashnikov ) to make his job
Period
I do find it extraordinary that the Russian government is blaming the DME operators for this act. Security against terrorism is a national government responsibility, pure and simple, and it is up to them, through their agents in the security services and the police, and with appropriate guidance to airports, airlines and others, to control this as best they are able.
Gesticulations ... the russian intelligence services and FSB are the culprits
Terrorists must be not allowed to entry a airport (any in the world)
Intelligence ( by infiltration .. etc ..) collected in terrorists organizations is the key
When terrorist cross a airport entry door .. nobody can stop it ( even Putin with a Kalashnikov ) to make his job
Period
Last edited by jcjeant; 26th Jan 2011 at 12:51.
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you know, in retrospect, they/we got off easy!
Seriously, i dont know what the damn fuss is all about, really
* Intelligence? check - there was, I understand, intelligence that indicated that there may be an attack on the airport area.
* Interception? Again, the couple were intercepted by patrols and detonated themselves (or were remotely triggered) during the challenge.
* Loss of life?
Regrettable but, compared with possible outcomes, best case scenario from a worst case event?
This to me was an aborted or failed attack.
Basically all they did was blow themselves up.
What if they were able to separate, with the first operator hitting a checkpoint and then the other, in the carnage/confusion, being able to penetrate further to God knows where?
To date, we have yet to see an actual ATTACK on an airport, another sign that this "terrorist under every bed" presentation from our governments is wildly overblown.
Seriously, who needs ManPADS? The approach vector for many airports often has you seeing passengers faces while you sit in nearby cafes, you could easily toss your waiter at landing planes.
* Intelligence? check - there was, I understand, intelligence that indicated that there may be an attack on the airport area.
* Interception? Again, the couple were intercepted by patrols and detonated themselves (or were remotely triggered) during the challenge.
* Loss of life?
Regrettable but, compared with possible outcomes, best case scenario from a worst case event?
This to me was an aborted or failed attack.
Basically all they did was blow themselves up.
What if they were able to separate, with the first operator hitting a checkpoint and then the other, in the carnage/confusion, being able to penetrate further to God knows where?
To date, we have yet to see an actual ATTACK on an airport, another sign that this "terrorist under every bed" presentation from our governments is wildly overblown.
Seriously, who needs ManPADS? The approach vector for many airports often has you seeing passengers faces while you sit in nearby cafes, you could easily toss your waiter at landing planes.
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I think there may have been the odd attack on an airport already!
I seem to remember it wasn't that long ago that Glasgow airport was attacked when a jeep tried to drive into the departure building with propane bottles in the back.
I've also been on the receiving end of a mortar attack from the IRA at Heathrow's Terminal 4 which I can assure you was rather upsetting at the time!
I've also been on the receiving end of a mortar attack from the IRA at Heathrow's Terminal 4 which I can assure you was rather upsetting at the time!
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You are right.
The areas of vulnerability are obvious.
If one wanted to attack people at an airport, there is plenty of opportunity to do so.
On recent travels, the security line itself represents an area of great vulnerability, as does the check-in area, as well as the baggage claim area, for which most airports I have flown through have no access control.
If someone is willing to trade their life or lives for a target, as the people who carried out the assault at Domodedovo were, they are then very hard to stop.
We will never have perfect security.
We can only rely upon intelligence to alert us to likely threats.
Think of all of the crowds in various venues who could be targeted by attackers.
Our cowardly attackers already have.
I call them cowards because an attack against a collection of unarmed and unassuming people is in no way brave or honorable, even though the assailants are willing to die in the attempt.
The areas of vulnerability are obvious.
If one wanted to attack people at an airport, there is plenty of opportunity to do so.
On recent travels, the security line itself represents an area of great vulnerability, as does the check-in area, as well as the baggage claim area, for which most airports I have flown through have no access control.
If someone is willing to trade their life or lives for a target, as the people who carried out the assault at Domodedovo were, they are then very hard to stop.
We will never have perfect security.
We can only rely upon intelligence to alert us to likely threats.
Think of all of the crowds in various venues who could be targeted by attackers.
Our cowardly attackers already have.
I call them cowards because an attack against a collection of unarmed and unassuming people is in no way brave or honorable, even though the assailants are willing to die in the attempt.
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WHBM states : Why do you assume that there MUST be queues, of large numbers of people in close proximity ? The ONLY reason for queues is providing insufficient staff for security, immigration checks, etc. If there were more security resources, maybe even if only 50% of the security stations provided were actually staffed and in use, then there would be no queueing required. There are a significant number of airports around the world that manage to organise themselves in this way.
If a huge queue forms by opening time then the answer is painfully obvious - open earlier !
So queues for check-in can be reduced to one person simply by having the same number of check-in desks as there are passengers at any particular time? Sadly, we live in a real, post 9/11 and 7/7, world here and now.
Have you been in T2 or T3 at LHR lately? The pre-queue for the check-in desks is sometimes several hundreds of people and every check-in desk is open. It is simply not feasible to reduce the queues any further unless we have several hundred check-in desks for each flight. Are you going to pay WHBM? Even T4 is not immume at times. As for airports where there is no queue, I surmise they have very few passengers compared to the busy airports we generally refer to when discussing this problem.
I presume this last was tongue in cheek, it being blindingly obvious that bringing forward the opening time will simply bring the formation of the same queue even earlier and the problem stays exactly the same. Just means the terrorist has to get up an hour or two earlier.
If a huge queue forms by opening time then the answer is painfully obvious - open earlier !
So queues for check-in can be reduced to one person simply by having the same number of check-in desks as there are passengers at any particular time? Sadly, we live in a real, post 9/11 and 7/7, world here and now.
Have you been in T2 or T3 at LHR lately? The pre-queue for the check-in desks is sometimes several hundreds of people and every check-in desk is open. It is simply not feasible to reduce the queues any further unless we have several hundred check-in desks for each flight. Are you going to pay WHBM? Even T4 is not immume at times. As for airports where there is no queue, I surmise they have very few passengers compared to the busy airports we generally refer to when discussing this problem.
I presume this last was tongue in cheek, it being blindingly obvious that bringing forward the opening time will simply bring the formation of the same queue even earlier and the problem stays exactly the same. Just means the terrorist has to get up an hour or two earlier.
Last edited by rubik101; 28th Jan 2011 at 11:32.
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It is an extremely difficult situation to manage. When someone is willing to kill themselves & others in an entirely indiscriminate manner, I'm not sure what can realistically be done.
Deeper surveillance and intelligence operations are probably the only way to go, but this means further intrusion of civil rights. Crowds are everywhere; if not an airport then a park, a bus station, or a shopping mall. If some Johnny wants to blow themselves up, what on earth can you do?
Deeper surveillance and intelligence operations are probably the only way to go, but this means further intrusion of civil rights. Crowds are everywhere; if not an airport then a park, a bus station, or a shopping mall. If some Johnny wants to blow themselves up, what on earth can you do?
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Have you been in T2 or T3 at LHR lately? The pre-queue for the check-in desks is sometimes sevel hundreds of people and every check-in desk is open. It is simply not feasible to reduce the queues any further unless we have several hundred check-in desks for each flight. Are you going to pay WHBM? Even T4 is not immume at times. As for airports where there is no queue, I surmise they have very few passengers compared to the busy airports we generally refer to when discussing this problem.
Airport security should never be the first line of defence, but the last. When it is, legislative security policy has failed. Miserably.
TailstrikeCharles:
"To date, we have yet to see an actual ATTACK on an airport...."
Lod Airport massacre - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
As it happens, that event was before most modern security measures were in place, so the attackers were able to bring automatic weapons into the airport via an incoming flight, rather than the front door. But the concept has been "available" for nearly 40 years.
Also note the use of Japanese operatives to defeat "ethnic profiling" by security.
"To date, we have yet to see an actual ATTACK on an airport...."
Lod Airport massacre - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
As it happens, that event was before most modern security measures were in place, so the attackers were able to bring automatic weapons into the airport via an incoming flight, rather than the front door. But the concept has been "available" for nearly 40 years.
Also note the use of Japanese operatives to defeat "ethnic profiling" by security.
Last edited by pattern_is_full; 30th Jan 2011 at 06:28. Reason: spelling
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Well, as predicted by some on this thread.Yesterday afternoon came through DME on way home and there were at least 50 people, crammed in to a small space just inside the door waiting to put their bags throughtwo X-ray machines.Beautiful target, walk straight in off the street, in to the middle of the crowd and....Or just stand on the outside up against the large plate glass wall and detonate...glass shrapnel to go with the nails from close range.Anyone feels like making a "loose lips sink ships comment" at this point, please stow it. Terrorists will be able to make walk and drive by assessments all on their own without anyone noticing.
Have you been in T2 or T3 at LHR lately? The pre-queue for the check-in desks is sometimes several hundreds of people and every check-in desk is open. It is simply not feasible to reduce the queues any further unless we have several hundred check-in desks for each flight. Are you going to pay WHBM?
Do you feel that the regular holding and inbound delays of incoming flights to Heathrow can only be overcome by having "several hundred runways" ?
The bulk of passenger queueing for check-in, security, etc is overcome within the existing hard resources of desks etc, by just staffing up what is already there instead of absolute minimalist staff levels. You can have 4 security points staffed with 20-minute queues, whereas having 6 of them staffed will eliminate almost all of this at all times. Anyone who has studied Queueing Theory at university can explain the calculation. So this security hazard is brought principally by beancounters determined to shave yet another 5% off costs year after year.
A further cause of the hazard is management, and staff, fixation with "targets" nowadays, such as "90% of passengers must get through security within 20 minutes". After a while this 20 minutes becomes a target in people's minds rather than a limit. The management know where the 20 minute line typically is in the queue, and as long as people are joining the queue just inside that point, they now feel it is Job Done. The staff themselves will be hanging back looking on, and only when the queue once again reaches back to the 20 minute point will they be told by the supervisor to go in and open up another station.
By the way, I haven't been "in T2 at LHR lately", and nor do I think have many other people. It was closed a couple of years ago and is now demolished.
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A couple of comments on check-in queues:
1/ Experience of checking in on Easyjet flights (unless for eg the baggage belt breaks down) at Easy bases, always seems to involve short queues with a very short dwell time at the actual check-in desk - so how do they do it ? Note however, that at none-bases, the check-in lines can be just as long as for charter flights. And why does it take longer by and large to check-in charters vs scheduled ?
2/ Not airline, but transport related: Swiss Federal Railways have a simple rule at main ticketing offices - if there are more than three pax groups at any ticket window, they open another one, and most of the time, they actually achieve that.
Finally, getting back to the Domodedovo situation, I can remember the old days at Dublin, when there were always several Gardai at every entrance to the terminal building who gave you a quick scan with some electronic device. As far as I can tell, the purpose was to catch bombers looking to bomb the building itself, not get on the plane. The perceived threat was somebody (not necessarily suicidal) aiming to bring an explosive device into the terminal to cause mayhem there. Airport security now seems to be 100% focussed on the suicide bomber aiming to do mid-air mischief, and has forgotten about the more traditional terrorist aim of causing mayhem in crowds.
1/ Experience of checking in on Easyjet flights (unless for eg the baggage belt breaks down) at Easy bases, always seems to involve short queues with a very short dwell time at the actual check-in desk - so how do they do it ? Note however, that at none-bases, the check-in lines can be just as long as for charter flights. And why does it take longer by and large to check-in charters vs scheduled ?
2/ Not airline, but transport related: Swiss Federal Railways have a simple rule at main ticketing offices - if there are more than three pax groups at any ticket window, they open another one, and most of the time, they actually achieve that.
Finally, getting back to the Domodedovo situation, I can remember the old days at Dublin, when there were always several Gardai at every entrance to the terminal building who gave you a quick scan with some electronic device. As far as I can tell, the purpose was to catch bombers looking to bomb the building itself, not get on the plane. The perceived threat was somebody (not necessarily suicidal) aiming to bring an explosive device into the terminal to cause mayhem there. Airport security now seems to be 100% focussed on the suicide bomber aiming to do mid-air mischief, and has forgotten about the more traditional terrorist aim of causing mayhem in crowds.
