Well done.

Is not a conclusion, rather, a summation.

InSoMNIac

There is no practical difference to the nav information you get if you activate vectors to final after the IAF. The only thing that changes is the box transitions from terminal to approach mode like it normally would inside the IAF, but does not in this case because of the waypoint inn between the IAF and the FAF

As someone said above, when YSBK is IMC the only form of separation the tower have (being non radar) for IFR aircraft is 1 at a time until the arrival is Visual and within the circuit area. As a result the spacing between arrivals is large enough that #1 should be on short final for 11 or visual d/w for 29 before #2 is cleared for the approach.
The way it works is that when tower is able to separate the next arrival they’ll relay clearance for the approach to SY centre/deps who clear the aircraft for the approach. The intent of the clearance is for the segment into class D, BUT SY ATC are aware that without any VNAVS between RAKSO and WI that once the word ‘cleared’ has been uttered that they might clip C on descent, and therefore they’ll separate any other aircraft in C as necessary.
If an aircraft is conducting a practice RNP in VMC it’s a different story, the pilot will usually explicitly be told to remain OCTA until contacting 132.8 for clearance into D.

Hope that helps.

Excellent, thankyou. Very well communicated.

I don't think that too many SP-IFR pilots are aware of the intent? In my opinion this needs to be communicated to industry somehow. Not just in words but in something like the privately produced IFG (but an ASA document)

(Thanks Captain Bloggs, you're welcome :ok:)

Roger.

Thanks again, alpha.

In the USA, where Garmin comes from, all IFR approaches are in a minimum of class E controlled airspace so there is no such thing as going in and out of controlled airspace when on an IFR approach.

It's clear that Garmin or other manufacturers are not going to do a special design just for Australia.

That's why we decided to go to the US NAS airspace system many years ago!

Now after Mangalore it just may happen.

Just goes to show: There's no fool like an old fool. Even a rich one.

I'm a big fan, Dick. But seriously: Do you not remember what's happened many times before?

Yes. Remember well.

In those days many said that our self separation when IFR was perfectly safe.

After Mangalore there is a changing view.

Remember. They were all professional pilots.

Not...A...Chance...In...Hell...

I have some questions......

What, exactly do you (or they) mean by "perfectly safe"?
Does it mean no accidents, ever?
Does it mean 1 x 10-7 (1 accident 10 million movements)
Does it mean 1 x 10-8 (1 accident 100 million movements)
What if the Mangalore incident was the 1 accident for 10 million movements? ( or even the 100 million). Just because you have an accident, does not mean that the desired risk level has not been achieved.

The missing link in Australia is that we don't have established risk classifications for different operations in different airspace that are published and accepted by industry. So we don't know what target level of safety we are trying to achieve....but I will give you a hint........it cant be zero.......its statistically impossible.

That also means of the options I give you above....you also cannot pick zero......which means you must pick one of the other 2.......which means you must ponder the answer to the last question.

Don't get me wrong, I am not against considering changes to the airspace system. I am against assuming changes to the airspace system will fix the assumed problems. If it can be determined that Mangalore statistically fits the risk model for that operation in that airspace class, then do we actually need to change anything at all?

Alpha

Listened to a close situation in class E only a few weeks ago, where a VFR blasted straight through the approach path of an IFR doing an RNP approach at Avalon. VFR was listening to the wrong frequency so had no idea what was going on, was just aware they didn't need a clearance to transit the E area. The IFR had to discontinue the approach and try to visually identify the VFR traffic, none of it sounded very 'safe'. I think some of the ATS distance were as close as 2nm.

Happens in 'G' quite frequently, too, 43. And I'd be interested to know how the pilots of VFR aircraft in the vicinity of any aerodrome avoid flying through instrument approaches to the aerodrome.But we do know what the political target level of safety in aviation is:

Zero deaths that scare the hell out of punters.

It’s about perception, not reality.

The death of four indulgees in a mid-air at Mangalore doesn’t scare the hell out of punters. Class ‘G’ and the ongoing obligation to maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid neatly justifies the status quo. Had the accident instead involved the same PICs but e.g. two ‘Angel Flight’ passengers, more effort would be needed to justify the status quo.

Every day in Australia, passenger-carrying RPT aircraft fly in uncontrolled airspace and mix it with aircraft that are not certified by CASA and not under the command of pilots licensed by CASA or certified as medically fit by CASA. The level of mid-air collision risk to which those RPT passengers are exposed is not zero. But it is evidently ‘acceptable’ to CASA and, given the number of incidents involving RPT aircraft in proximity to aerodromes in ‘G’ and ATSB’s ‘dare not speak its name’ attitude to mentioning the potential for higher classifications of airspace to reduce the extent of these risks, the ATSB and the operators of the RPT aircraft are untroubled as well.

What do you reckon the response is when I explain this reality to the average punter? Give it a go yourself sometime, and watch their face: “You know that there’s no control tower at (enter name of the place to which the punter's flying).” [Here their eyes usually widen and their brows usually furrow.] “And there’ll be other aircraft flying near you that aren't under air traffic control and aren’t necessarily certified airworthy by CASA.” [Here their head usually pulls back.] “And the pilots of those aircraft won’t necessarily be licensed by CASA or certified as medically fit by CASA.” [And here they usually shake their head and accuse me of making it up.]

The first mid-air involving an RPT aircraft in ‘G’ in Australia will test the comfy CASA/Air Services/ATSB/Operator status quo against the political target level of safety. It will scare the hell out of a lot of punters. My guess is that CASA won’t get away with saying: “It’s the one-in-1XX million movement accident that is a risk that we’re always taking.”

I still don't think an occurrence like this will change anything. Australia will go to extraordinary lengths to avoid building 'permanent' infrastructure, like towers. ASA doesn't want to cop the bills for their construction or staffing costs and they have allies in government who know that it's their budget allocations that fund it in the end. What happens are ridiculous airspace concepts (see Ballina) that can be dropped once the traffic 'normalises.' (if that will ever happen).

When a politicians job is genuinely on the line, if they're ever accountable, thats when things will change i.e. things will never change.

"Ridiculous airspace concepts" like Ballina are themselves changes, but I agree with your underlying point. The usual response is to put more lumps on the camel, rather than to question whether a camel is now the most efficient animal in the circumstances.

Dick gets criticised for using the term "affordable safety", but that is the inescapable reality of the world in which we live. And the answer to a mid-air involving a passenger-carrying RPT aircraft in 'G' will be: That's the level of safety for which you paid.

Sadly this is not the case, accountability just leads to higher levels of corruption, look at CEOs and the golden parachute phenomenon. All that happens is when some force wants something wrong to happen, you pay someone enough to take the fall, while the main perps remain behind the scenes pulling the strings. The shenanigans over the last 20 years of knifing PMs should have shown us all the leader is not the leader, they are the puppet for those on an agenda, when the PM starts wandering from the script they get axed. Yet the average voter is more and more led to believe the name they vote for is in control.

I think reality is the more we can push for systems that give the pilot more awareness and 'smart' aircraft warnings for proximity are far better than any controlled 'airspace system' will afford. By that I mean systems like TCAS displays, so pilots can see everything squawking around them, I use this a lot for situational awareness and it makes a huge difference. OZ runways and similar traffic displays, although some integration with TCAS would be perfect so it comes from transponder feed for local traffic. I personally think Class E is an abomination waiting for a mid air when someone is not paying attention. Letting the lowest trained and least reliable just fly through with the other traffic believing they are being monitored and safe. At least in Class G you know it's the wild west and anyone can come at you from any angle, so you keep the eyes peeled.

Please: No more gadgets.

Focussing on what the gadgets tell you is the traffic is itself a problem. Gadgets have delays, margins of error and sometimes fail.

E is an "abomination" but 'G''s OK, because you know you have to keep your eyes peeled in 'G'? I've some (very old) news for you: You have to keep your eyes peeled in every class of airspace. At least in E there is a 3rd party who has the job of assisting IFR not to collide with whomever. That's what you heard when that VFR "blasted through" Class E airspace while on the "wrong frequency", isn't it?

Problem is those lil private craft are getting faster and harder to see, not long before they climb higher as well with better emerging technologies. That has made it so far that class E is mostly clear of smaller VFR craft, as the airspace populates with more and more and airservices seems to provide less and less, who is really able to be watching. En-route ATS seems overwhelmed with 5 aircraft floating around, let alone monitoring IFR approaches into every field in their area, automation is the only way it can be done safely. So far ATS seems to accurately pass on about half the traffic to me, I've seen RAs due to multiple traffic and ATS only passing on one and the IFR aircraft thinking they are clear after that, then "SUPRISE, I wasn't talking and my transponder is now telling yours to fly up... and you have paperwork to do now"

Then there's the myriad of shonks that don't follow the rules to any particular method, just do their own thing. I'd be happy if they just turn on their transponder so I can see where they are and give em a wide berth.

The other issue in class E is that an IFR aircraft requires a clearance to deviate from cleared track in order to avoid a potential conflict, which in some cases the act of requesting such manuvre would be too long. In class G I could see a potential conflict or be alerted by TCAS TA and change course to avoid immediately, avoiding the possibility of an RA or worse. In class E you can only alter course for an RA, in which case you then need to waste time on paperwork.

If your loved ones are sitting as passengers in an RPT jet descending to land at an aerodrome, would you prefer them to be descending through E all the way to and including circuit height, or in G? In E, those transponder gizmos are compulsory.

Only in Australian aviation could there be any debate about the answer. Only in Australian aviation can there be a weight of opinion to the effect that if we can't have C or D we'll have G, thank you very much.

Lucky the diameter of the roulette wheel involved is very, very large.

The debate is because I've seen a lot of incidents recently around this airspace, in theory it might work, however the recent one I mentioned highlighted when it goes wrong, 2nm separation is not ideal. Once the training factories return to full strength post covid and the city class E areas start to get swamped with solo VFR navigators we will see ATS completely overwhelmed with radar dots, with no control over what the VFRs do in class E. Anyone who has flown in the areas around these facilities would be familiar with the ATS phrase "multiple VFRs" with no possibility of really passing on the information to the IFR except for, "there's too many of them, good luck soldier you're on your own...". Also all this debate over mid airs, we have to remember over the last 20-30 years an equal amount of collisions have happened in controlled airspace and most in radar environments. Mid air collisions are a result of traffic density more than third parties watching, while a 3rd party might be able to intervene all you have to look at is the Benalla Cheyenne crash where ATS didn't even notice the aircraft wasn't on track, let alone prevent a mid air. Or should I even mention Mildura or heavens forbid mention the ditching, where ATS failed to pass on critical information.

As for class D in Australia is a complete joke, install ADSB, radar scopes, train them and make it class C. One IFR aircraft doing an approach blocking out 6000ft x 30nm of airspace is just silly.

BTW ATS do a great job on most occasions, but relying on humans to be infallible while watching multiple dots over hundreds of miles especially when two or more close contacts start to occur and things get out of hand fast.

It looks as if it is time to quote Voices of Reason and Class E airspace again. Here it is, from 22 April 2004: