Hoosten,
I worked Approach for 21 years and we would regularly pass traffic info on behalf of adjoining sectors - both on our own initiative and on request of the adjoining sectors.

No you don't. You don't know what calls were made on the CTAF or if all the required DTI was provided and acknowledged.

What I do know is that safety dropped markedly when "close-in" CTAFs replaced the bigger MBZs. Having to operate on two radios at the same time can result in comm overload is not good and, I believe, will be a major contributing factor in this accident.

In any case, show us the money.

Two aircraft collided mid air. The system failed.

OK then, what "system"?

That's a good topic for a review into airspace in Australia.

Or rather someone within the system failed - commonly known as human error which we all realise, that despite the best of intentions, cannot be completely eliminated. Sad but true and not to make light of it.

People are part of the system; a failure of a human is a failure of the system.

That's why atsb reports and such examine the human factors at play to try to build more robust procedures.

And as human error can never be eliminated, no matter how hard you try, no system will ever be faultless.
Stay alert everyone.

But it can be reduced. That's why pilots participate in cyclic check and training, flight reviews etc. It's why we have developed checklists and crosschecking etc. All these came through studies and and research leading to redesigning of systems based around human factors. It's the basis for why T.E.M is now a mandatory competency for pilots.

Yes we know all that - so who f****d up this time ?

Tell that to the Renmark pilots operating a periodic review under supervision of a CASA FOI.

James Reason himself details the limits of process based safety in his books. In many ways Tony Kerns work takes over from James Reason. But personal responsibility doesn't fit well with a regulators mind set.

This forum is good at being unforgiving of pilots. But this accident had 4 very well qualified pilots with very good recency flying well equipped aircraft. Both had active IFR flight plans. Both were flying consistent with their flight plans. Personally, I cannot point to anything that would give me any comfort that the same thing would not have happened to me.

The ATSB report acknowledges that both aircraft were identified via ADS-B returns received by the AsA system (as opposed for F24 etc). The ATSB preliminary report acknowledges that the AsA system had the information that indicated a traffic conflict (note that I say system, not controller. Its unknown what the controller was presented). ATSB have departed from typical practice by not making any comment on the recorded radio transmissions in its preliminary report, nor presenting any transcripts. Which is curious.

This is going to be a complex report and I'll put money on the ATSB not publishing a final report for 3 years after the accident. But I'm pretty sure that airspace design (ie class E, CATAF and control step location), radio frequency boundaries, radio procedures and the concept of aircraft self separating in IMC are all likely to feature in the final report. These are all systems based issues.

This says a lot about what might be coming later.

No takers here, that's a sure thing.

I have the solution. Class c sfc -180 then class A above that. Ok let's do it

The bottom line is this.
Four people are dead because ATC could have separated them but did not.
Why not?
Because the level of service in any airspace is decided by the Office of Airspace Regulation which is required by Ministerial Direction to implement international best practice in airspace management.

VERY PLAINLY any system of airspace administration that is able to separate IFR aircaft but does not do so, in the full knowledge that those aircraft may be operating in conditions where they can not visually separate themselves is NOT applying any form of international best practice nor proven international systems.

No matter who overseas the OAR - it is their responsibility to carry out the Ministerial Direction and they have failed to do so.


Now let us make sure the Coroner and other investigative bodies are aware of the aspects of Aviation Legislation that you can bet nobody in CASA or AA will point them to.

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What law says the OAR must comply with ‘Ministerial Directions’, and where is the Ministerial Direction that says the OAR must implement international best practice in airspace management?

It might be worth having a look at what the Airspace Act actually says (here: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016C00178 )

Or ... and hear me out. When you're given traffic you could self separate. I think of the traffic at places like caboolture and know there is no way people are going to want to wait while soomeone else is doing an approach.

In a perfect world that can work well.

However I often rent an aircraft fitted with only a single radio; it's not possible to hear all relevant broadcasts when switching between the CTAF, AWIS and Centre (and other) frequencies.

But if cta then you will need to be on centre not the ctaf otherwise how do they seperate?

That's my point; one is not necessarily always on CTR with a single radio.

Son you don't want cta. You want g airspace.

How is G any more ‘effective’ than controlled airspace in solving the problem of needing to listen for potentially-relevant information on multiple frequencies in a single radio aircraft?

I can’t imagine why any IFR pilot would ‘want’ G airspace in preference to E (or D or C or B or A), but some apparently do.

With a single radio I have the same problem, if not worse problems, in G.

Easy fix, hire an aircraft with two radios!

Oh wait, you can’t, because over 70% of the GA fleet in this country are pre 1975 models!

(well not really, but you get the point)

Ah, the Good Ole Days ..

Before CTAFs MTAFs MBZs etc, if you were in Class G (OCTA) it was only the relevant FIA frequency to be monitored and communicated on.

:):)

I think a fairly big point is being missed here. If it is VMC you don't need to sit on the ground waiting for an approach to terminate. If it was VMC both the IFR aircraft can cancel IFR and continue their airwork while 30 hundred aircraft depart the aerodrome. It happens on CTAF's in VMC every day between IFR training aircraft. 'Are you happy if we separate visually?' 'Yep'

If you are at Caboolture you're not waiting for anyone, there's no approach there. If there's an IFR doing some sort of let down procedure to LSALT and you had to 'wait' then I'd suggest there's a bigger problem, like, maybe your eyes are painted on? It won't be Class E that forces you to 'wait'

How many days a year at these places are you weathered in, forcing you to wait on the ground until an approach becomes visual? Yet again, it shouldn't be Class E that delays your departure. It will be Class E that stops you welding your aircraft to another.

Why would you cancel IFR? Operating visually clear of terrain and traffic is a perfectly acceptable IFR procedure. Hell, you can even request a VFR climb through class E if you have VMC. No need to throw away your surveillance and SARwatch services.

The important thing that’s relevant to this accident and class E is that the Seminole would not have been given a clearance on the ground to depart if there was overlying class E. In class G they should’ve been given traffic but they weren’t.

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Why would you cancel IFR? Operating visually clear of terrain and traffic is a perfectly acceptable IFR procedure. Hell, you can even request a VFR climb through class E if you have VMC. No need to throw away your surveillance and SARwatch services.

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Don't cancel it, no problem. You can still operate in the way I laid out.

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The important thing that’s relevant to this accident and class E is that the Seminole would not have been given a clearance on the ground to depart if there was overlying class E. In class G they should’ve been given traffic but they weren’t.

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'would not' not necessarily. Depends if a procedural clearance could have been issued.

'but they weren't' oh yes they were given traffic. It's the timing of the traffic delivery and the airspace limitations that will be subject to a fair amount of scrutiny in the investigation. You'll just have to wait until 2023-ish to find out.

You can’t depart IFR unless you are cleared to LSALT as a minimum. And you won’t get a clearance if that level is occupied.

Same thing in class G except that they didn’t get the traffic on the ground, they got it on departure. At which point the option to stay on the ground was gone.

you can’t depart in to IMC and then decide to level off below LSALT or MSA because of traffic. Do you see what I’m saying?

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You can’t depart IFR unless you are cleared to LSALT as a minimum. And you won’t get a clearance if that level is occupied.

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You CAN depart if it's a procedural clearance which includes climb above LSALT.

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Same thing in class G except that they didn’t get the traffic on the ground, they got it on departure. At which point the option to stay on the ground was gone.

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So now you're saying they did get traffic? Changing your story? Or just refraining from manipulating the facts of what actually happened to suit your agenda?

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you can’t depart in to IMC and then decide to level off below LSALT or MSA because of traffic. Do you see what I’m saying?

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Yes, as an IFR rated pilot I'm aware of that. Beside the fact none of what I've posted suggests that you do that.

Bodie. That is outrageous if the final report takes until 2003 to come out.

There could be further deaths in that time.

The ATSB would have enough information now to issue an emergency advice.

ATSB report will take a considerable time to prepare and release. What about the ASA report, has that been released?

Dick, what would this advice say?

Bodie, I said they didn’t get traffic on the ground. I was talking about how if there was CTA they would’ve been denied a clearance on the ground. Read it.

They got traffic on departure. 2 minutes before they collided. and they collided at what was essentially LSALT. So even if they got the traffic right after takeoff, they still had no opportunity to do anything. That’s the issue here. Nothing to do with playing VFR and visually separating as you seemed to think that everyone was missing.

My story is exactly that from the preliminary report, I suggest you read it so that you know what everyone else here is talking about.

My only agenda Is uncovering why so much known information was omitted from the preliminary report.

Sunny. A recommendation that AsA look at providing a class E service to low level at the airport because of the density of IFR traffic.

If they can do it for every IFR approach in the USA you would think we could do it at least at the busy airports.

This is a warning of what could happen at Ballina.

Nomde plume, no, you specifically said that traffic wasn't given. Not that traffic wasn't given on the ground. If that's what you meant how about you construct the sentence accordingly.

I'll say it again, they may NOT have been denied a clearance in Class E if a procedural clearance could have been issued.

I've read the preliminary report, it means 2 tenths of sweet **** all. It has NO information in it that you can construct a cause from. There's nothing to 'uncover' from a preliminary report. In fact I don't know why they're published, it serves no purpose.

Dick, the Renmark accident accident took 3 years, so has every other major accident report. This won't be any different.

Ballina is not a question of if, it's a question of when.

SunnySA, I don't know anything about ASA or their investigation process. Traffic was given.

The important thing that’s relevant to this accident and class E is that the Seminole would not have been given a clearance on the ground to depart if there was overlying class E. In class G they should’ve been given traffic but they werent.

Paragraphs: for when you have something to say that fits in two or more sentences. Not sure why you’re fighting that battle mate. No one is arguing they never got traffic. Look at my posts earlier in the thread, I said the exact same thing.

So you’re suggesting SIDs and STARs for all of these airports? Great idea. Good luck with that.

You can construct that JQF was first given traffic info no more than 2 minutes before the two aircraft collided. It explicitly states that.

What I want to know is exactly what was said, and where were the two aircraft relative to each other when the calls were made. It would be very easy to construct by comparing the radar data vs ATC tapes.