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US vs Australian airspace
In the USA ALL IFR aircraft are separated by ATC.
Dick Smith has been trying to bring Australian safety standards up for at least 30 years by insisting on the same ATC separation here. The ATSB report confirms what this forum has known for some time => both aircraft were visible to ATC via ADS-B tracking. Airservices have a flow chart that demonstrates the workload of providing separation is LESS than the workload of only providing traffic. WHY? Each task requires ATC considering the trajectory of every aircraft in the sector. To separate aircraft, the ATC makes a decision and issues an instruction. If the ATC passes traffic then the pilot may respond with his decision to change altitude or track or otherwise avoid the conflict BUT then the ATC has to assess this change to determine if a different conflict will occur and perhaps pass further traffic. So let us stop accepting the nonsense argument that it costs more to provide separation compared to traffic information - it does not. What is the total cost of this accident going to be? Almost two decades ago Dick organised a trip by both Airservices and CASA staff to the United States with flights arranged to demonstrate the ease of use and safety of Class E airspace. A very experienced US ATC from the Southern California Terminal Radar Control Unit addressed the team and pointed out how easy it was to provide separation and how safe the result. John and Martha King of King schools tried very hard to educate the team on why US airspace is as safe as Australian airspace in terms of collisions per flight hour but has so much greater traffic density and thus greater actual safety. A lot of very experienced pilots and controllers in this country know Dick was right back then and he is proven right again by this accident. CAN WE LEARN FROM IT THIS TIME??? |
The timing of the traffic being issued to AEM needs to be put in context. The En-Route ATC has very little time to issue the traffic statement from when it's transferred from Departures. The aircraft is transitioning from CTA, obtaining weather information whilst still in CTA, briefing the approach whilst in CTA etc, etc. It then changes frequency to Centre, then changes to the CTAF. It's a very high workload, let alone it being a training flight.
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Why wouldn’t ATS give conflicting traffic at 6000’ when JQF called taxi for departure at 7000’?
AIP GEN 3.3 2.16.1.1 An IFR flight reporting taxiing or airborne at a non-controlled aerodrome will be advised of conflicting IFR traffic which is not on the CTAF. |
They were given traffic, under the limitations of the airspace setup. Don't blame the ATC, if you want to blame, blame the airspace setup, both the Class and the boundaries.
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Originally Posted by Nomde plume
(Post 10760066)
Why wouldn’t ATS give conflicting traffic at 6000’ when JQF called taxi for departure at 7000’?
AIP GEN 3.3 2.16.1.1 An IFR flight reporting taxiing or airborne at a non-controlled aerodrome will be advised of conflicting IFR traffic which is not on the CTAF. MATS Criteria for traffic at taxi call is anyone within 10mins. Report doesn’t mention whether or not additional attempts were made to contact JQF for a traffic update prior to departure or whether AEM reported changing to the CTAF and had established 2 way comms? Would be good to know if either occured. What can often happen is outbound aircraft taxies, gets told no ifr traffic as next inbound is 15 odd mins away, takes longer than expected to depart (10 mins after taxi call is when sar alerting process begins) inbound aircraft gets given traffic on pending departure, told they are on the CTAF and not aware of you inbound.. then outbound aircraft gives departure call and says we copied inbound aircraft on the CTAF.. |
WhisprSYD, 10 mins isn’t based on when the call was made, it’s based on estimated departure and arrival times. Which obviously were coincident. Per AIP:
2.16.4 Traffic information will be provided in accordance with the preceding paragraphs whenever there is a possibility of confliction between aircraft in the following situations: a. aircraft that climb, descend or operate with less than 1,000FT vertical spacing and less than 15NM lateral or longitudinal spacing; b. overtaking or opposite direction aircraft on the same or reciprocal tracks with less than 1,000FT vertical spacing and less than 10 minutes longitudinal spacing based on pilot estimates; c. more than one aircraft arriving at, or departing from, the same aerodrome with less than 10 minutes between arrival and/or departure and falling within these guidelines. |
Great to see Australia has again failed to learn from overseas. Here is proof that the ADS-B mandate was a complete waste of everyone’s money because the airspace structure wasn’t updated to reflect the improvements in the surveillance.
I was part of the NAS team all those years ago. The arguments thrown at us back then as to why the US NAS wouldn’t work here, specifically low level E and the US CTAF, was because of their better radar coverage at low level. Well now we have the improved surveillance without any other upgrades and what’s the result?? No change. What a surprise. |
Originally Posted by Nomde plume
(Post 10760911)
WhisprSYD, 10 mins isn’t based on when the call was made, it’s based on estimated departure and arrival times. Which obviously were coincident. Per AIP:
1114? 1117? 1119? 1130? or do you want traffic information based on Flight plan etd? see the issue - only reliable times the controller has for basing the assessment are time at taxi, inbound pilot estimate or radar verified system estimate, and ATD when it’s given. Usual procedure is give traffic to anyone within 10 mins at time of taxi (plus a minute or two for mum) - then update if necessary on departure which is what appears to have happened here.. At 14 mins prior to the collision the inbound aircraft may still have been air working at another aerodrome with a 30 minute delay set.. we don’t know any of that The important thing is that the inbound aircraft is aware of the pending departure, which it was here. |
Originally Posted by WhisprSYD
(Post 10760932)
At 14 mins prior to the collision the inbound aircraft may still have been air working at another aerodrome with a 30 minute delay set.. we don’t know any of that
We know AEM gave their intentions to conduct airwork at Mangalore to the surface yet they weren’t given JQF until 2 minutes after they had left 6000’. If AEM had passed 5000’ at this point (likely), JQFs ability to separate at 4000’, the lowest possible level was gone. Both aircraft potentially in IMC. It was too late, the traffic had to be passed on earlier. The traffic was known at taxi, why wasn’t it passed on to either aircraft until it got this far? |
From the interim Report (my underlining):
The investigation is continuing and will include further examination and analysis of:
Come on ATSB, should a critical safety issue be identified - FOUR PEOPLE DIED! Why is this not a safety problem when it could have been prevented with an airspace model and ATC services that were accepted by CASA back in the '90s? Why was the Federal Government provider of ATS allowed to then argue with the regulator and have the plan overturned? (At a time when it was managing the FAA Pacific Towers that used exactly the separation services they were rejecting for Australia!) Even the State Safety Programme starts off with complacency: "Australia has an enviable record in aviation safety, among the best in the world, which has been built on a strong safety governance system, forged over many years." That's OK then we don't really have to try any harder, do we? I believe I could guarantee that if the two aircraft at Mangalore had been airliners, with or without passengers, then action would have been taken. There is a better way, Minister! For the sake of a few dollars and a few more controllers, those four men need not have died. |
Responsibility in ATC
Let me prefix these remarks by saying I lay no blame at the foot of the unfortunate ATC who had to sit and watch two blips merge and vanish.
That person was doing precisely what they were paid to do and acting in accordance with both training and written instructions. On 5th October 1999, a train went through a red light at Ladbroke Grove near Paddington London. 31 dead, 417 injured. This signal was known to be problematic - it had been passed eight times in six years though the driver had not been told of this. This particular signal was almost impossible to see with the sun behind it, and on curved lines, it was not immediately obvious which of a myriad of signals related to the particular line this train was on. All of this was known to management but nothing was done to rectify the safety deficiencies. Other known but not corrected safety issues came out at the inquiry. This is one of the major contributing factors to the UK enacting the offence of Corporate Manslaughter.“Section1. The offence
So far as I know we do not have an equivalent offence in Australia - yet - but let me tiptoe very gently here. Airservices is an organisation that provides a service known as Air Traffic Control whose function is to prevent collisions between aircraft............... CASA has an Office of Airspace Regulation which is required to operate in accordance with a policy statement issued by Michael McCormack and Para 47 reads: The Government expects CASA to adopt international best practice in airspace administration. This includes adopting proven international systems that meet our airspace requirements. The Government’s airspace strategy recognises that international airspace systems include a range of characteristics to be considered, and implemented as appropriate. Aviation has two sets of rules; VISUAL for those who can see other aircraft and visually separate themselves from others, and INSTRUMENT for those who may not be able to see other aircraft as they are permitted to operate in cloud and conditions where visual separation is not possible. VERY PLAINLY any system of airspace administration that is able to separate IFR aircaft but does not do so, in the full knowledge that those aircraft may be operating in conditions where they can not visually separate themselves is NOT applying any form of international best practice nor proven international systems. The CEO of Airservices and the Manager of the OAR are both controllers and should both be thinking very carefully about their responsibility as individuals, let alone as the persons responsible for their respective organisational functions. May I also most respectfully commend the Chief Commissioner of ATSB, himself an ex-controller and ex Safety Manager of Melbourne Center to consider whether this ongoing unsafe mode of airways operation be permitted to continue or is deserving of an immediate safety recommendation to both CASA and AA. |
The ATSB Commissioner was not Safety Manager of Melbourne Centre, he was Centre Manager. And a good one too.
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You guys can argue about the rules for when ATC are supposed to advise traffic all you want...
BUT, why did ATC wait soooo long to tell AEM about JQF and also to tell JQF about AEM when they should have realized it could be a separation issue quite a while earlier? JQF taxied at 1111 but AEM wasn’t advised at all until 1119......8 minutes later JQF taxied at 1111 while AEM was inbound but they weren’t advised of AEM until they became airborne at 1122 .....2 minutes before impact.....why did ATC wait 11 minutes to advice them of AEM descending inbound across their departure track... So experts can quote required times all you want but to me THEY WERE BOTH ADVISED WAY TOO LATE..... AEM had a whopping 5 minutes notice of JQF before the impact JQF had a whopping 2 minutes notice before the impact. That’s supposed to be the whole idea of calling on the ground, you get given traffic so you can plan BEFORE getting airborne.....otherwise why bother... |
Yep, they were advised way too late.
But we’ll now have to sit through a few years of the unedifying and expensive pantomime of the conflicted ATSB coming up with a report as to why the tragedy was not a consequence of anything other than pilot error. So very ... Australian. |
BUT, why did ATC wait soooo long to tell AEM about JQF and also to tell JQF about AEM when they should have realized it could be a separation issue quite a while earlier? The sector boundaries do not allow traffic to be passed any earlier to AEM than it was. This accident is a combination of airspace classification and airspace (sectorisation) boundary issues. - The Departures North Controller would have handed the aircraft off to Dookie Sector as soon as Dep North had no separation issues, AEM would have been in controlled airspace when this hand off had taken place. The rules of a handover of aircraft are many. You can't just hand an aircraft off to another controller on a whim. Nine times out of ten the Dookie Controller will launch straight into the traffic statement. 9 times out of 10 the aircraft will acknowledge the traffic and advise the airwork details then switch straight to the CTAF. - When it is busy at MNG it is virtually impossible to monitor both fequencies when you are conducting an IFR training flight. - It doesn't matter how many times you say 'they should have had traffic earlier' it CANNOT change unless there is a sector boundary change (virtually impossible given that the terminal needs the boundary where it is to process traffic into ML, AV & EN). Stomping your feet and demanding that traffic be given earlier is analogous to a 6 year old child asking her mother why she can't go to the pub. OR - There is an airspace classification change that would have seen these two aircraft positively separated. |
Hoosten we have a problem exactly as your last line identifies.
Thanks |
Originally Posted by Hoosten
(Post 10761490)
Stomping your feet and demanding that traffic be given earlier is analogous to a 6 year old child asking her mother why she can't go to the pub. 4 people aren’t dead because a 6 year old couldn’t go to the pub. JQF needed that traffic info at taxi because that’s when they had an opportunity to do something about it. The moment you take off and enter IMC you can do nothing other than climb to LSALT/MSA at an absolute minimum. That’s exactly all they did. The only thing (sans TCAS) that stops an IFR-IFR collision in IMC in class G airspace is accurate, clear and timely traffic information. The report offers nothing to the first two parameters but is damning of the third. People are rightfully upset about this. Many pilots on here have lost friends and mentors in this accident. Go and jump in the driver’s seat of your car on a rainy night with a blindfold on and think about who you’re going to ask to sit in the passengers seat giving you directions. Don’t try and play down the seriousness of this accident and say all pilots here are 6 year olds. We place an incredible amount of trust in ATC. I have no problem placing my trust in the guys and girls on the other end of the radio. I will continue to place my trust in them. But something happened here that let them down. It’s not going to be put down to the fact that a CTA boundary 20nm away meant it was all too hard. |
Nomde plume, I think you need to go back to the start of this thread, read it all the way through. I was accused of being too emotional as I lost a friend and acquaintances as well.
The only thing (sans TCAS) that stops an IFR-IFR collision in IMC in class G airspace is accurate, clear and timely traffic information. The report offers nothing to the first two parameters but is damning of the third. You are blaming the controllers when you should be blaming a third world airspace system. You are blaming the controllers when you should be blaming the inability of aviators and public servants in this country to see past their egos and jingoistic belief that we have 'one of the best safety records in the world' so let's just leave things the way they are, the way things were done 20 years ago. Cos nothing has changed right? Oh, except the traffic levels right? You don't know how a traffic assessment is done by an ATC, you don't know how and when that information is displayed and just when it becomes available. And you most certainly won't get all of that information in the accident report in 2023 sometime. Yes, we do trust the ATC's. I do too, any time I head up that way. But I also know what goes on on the other side of the mike. So I can give you a heads-up, you are focusing on one part, a small part in the great scheme of things here. |
Traffic information couldn’t be given any earlier is complete nonsense. Yes AEM at the time could have been with different controller to JFQ. However the controllers are very capable of communicating with each other. Everywhere else in the country you can and will be given conflicting traffic information even if one of the other aircraft is on a seperate approach/area frequency. To be given traffic well after your descent and only 1000fr above the MSA is just ridiculous.
Hopefully some serious procedure and airspace changes come from this. |
Traffic information couldn’t be given any earlier is complete nonsense. Hopefully some serious procedure and airspace changes come from this. |
Love the attitude Hooters. Iv flown around the area enough to know that it is possible and the limiting issue is Airservices internal procedures in for Melbourne airspace. Everywhere else in the country traffic statements form a controller down stream is never an issue. On a daily basis I get traffic statements issued by approach for the next area, Center issuing a tragic statement from Moresby FIR, centre for an approach area. Controllers are capable of talking to each other and do it thousands of times a day.
It was made even more obvious that’s this is the case as the day after the accident traffic statements and alerts started to be issues in a much more timely manner. |
CAVOK92, you don't know what you're talking about. Simple. If that is attitude, so be it.
So, you get traffic on a daily basis from Approach for the next area? That is the single greatest load of bull**** I think I've read on this site. Another effing Australian airspace expert. |
Hooters. Thanks for the bout of confidence.
Every time I have been dropped out of CTA laterally or vertically I have been given a traffic statement even when the airspace is on seperate controller to who is underneath or next to. |
CAVOK92, I call bull**** on you being given traffic by an approach controller for the next sector you're dropping into 'on a daily basis'
Does not happen, if an approach controller wanted to give traffic, they would have stayed on sectors. I worked the MNG sector as an ATC for 18 years, I'm now teaching (and have done for years) IFR as an instructor into that airspace. You don't know what you are talking about in this accident scenario. |
Every time It has been warranted anywhere else I the country the traffic has been given to me. Your right, defiantly wouldn’t be daily as I would be working way to hard.
looking at this scenario also with significant IFR examining experience and significant experience in the area. The traffic information was not adequate. If I was in JQF and lived to tell the tale I would be ropable. Now we have established some inside knowledge. Could you please enlighten the rest of us as to why the traffic information was so poorly handled? Why Melbourne ATC’s procedures can’t be changed to provide traffic information at an appropriate time to inbound aircraft (at TOD)? |
HOOSTEN......Argue all you want and make excuses.....THE SYSTEM FAILED MISERABLY AND 4 PEOPLE ARE DEAD......
This should have been preventable, they weren’t doing 400 kts either and the system should have advised them in plenty of time to take appropriate action to avoid each other. Remember we had 3 very experienced Pilots ( no offense to the Thai trainee ) in those two Aircraft operating in a known environment with probably excess capacity available and they were still let down..... Now stop making excuses..... |
Hang about ACMS
I do not know Hooters but he is advocating change to the airspace classification, just as I am. The system is broken - but not at the workface level. It is broken at the management level in both OAR and Airservices. By definition, IFR aircraft can not separate themselves visually and giving them traffic does NOT solve the problem. IFR aircraft are frequently constrained to fly one flight path and one only - they have no choice; consider an instrument approach for example. Your are right to this extent: FOUR PEOPLE ARE DEAD because the SYSTEM IS A FAILURE. Fix the system not blame the worker who is only permitted to dish out traffic information. |
CAVOK92 & ACMS,
I have pointed out several times that the airspace set up, both boundaries and classification are deficient, I have gone into a bit of detail regarding the workload required from both sides of the fence in this scenario. You are both banging on about 'why wasn't traffic given sooner' I've pointed it out to you. To continue on about the timeliness of the delivery is to overlook the cause, it's a contributory factor yes, but it not the cause. Having an extra 5 minutes to consider the traffic may not have prevented this accident. Class E Airspace would have given these aircraft a much greater safety factor with positive separation. IFR traffic in high density Class G Australian airspace is archaic. I can have a conversation with either of you or anybody else about just what happens in this scenario, it is just too lengthy to 'back and forth' on a bulletin board. But to target an ATC in this instance is stupidly misguided and wrong. |
I’m not actually blaming the ATCO either......As a dumb Pilot I expect better of the system to protect us, is that too much to ask?.
and yes 5 minutes more would have made a big difference......Especially to the crew of JQF..... |
You won't be getting any better while there's a reliance on DTI in high density Class G.
You won't be getting any better when ADSB surveillance is 'there' and it's not used for CTA service. Better requires a fundamental shift from those that have the 'power' to mandate airspace change. |
Another weak report from the ATSB. It is dramatically late and despite the fact that they have (Area) had radio transcripts for weeks, there is scant reference to them in the preliminary report.
The report does however confirm that both aircraft had ADS-B which was being received by ATC. The preliminary report also confirms that neither aircraft was in in VFR conditions. The system that we have all had to invest large amounts in equipment upgrades in our aircraft and it would appear to have not given the safety improvement we were promised. Hootsen suggests that both boundaries and classification are deficient Cavok suggests that " Airservices internal procedures in for Melbourne airspace" are to blame. Advance says "The system is broken - but not at the workface level. It is broken at the management level in both OAR and Airservices. By definition, IFR aircraft can not separate themselves visually and giving them traffic does NOT solve the problem. IFR aircraft are frequently constrained to fly one flight path and one only - they have no choice; consider an instrument approach for example." Either way, the cause of this accident lies at the feet of AsA and / or OAR. And I think if previous submissions were reviewed, it would be found that they had warnings. There is not the faintest hint in the preliminary report that either aircraft crew has contributed as was speculated by many on this forum immediately after the accident. 4 people are dead because they put their trust in a deficient system that failed them. Compare the attention that 4 police officers who died on the Eastern freeway is getting. It would appear that at least 1 person will go to jail for a long time for the Eastern Freeway incident. This is an event of greater significance and should get the same attention. |
ACMS and CAVOK92,
If you are happy that four people died because of a broken system and are content to just whinge on a bulletin board then that is your right. BUT if you want to change the system then recognise what serious experts are telling you is true. Get on to Worksafe, the Victorian Police, the AFP, your local MPs and point out that the Airservices organisation responsible for separating aircraft had the means to do so but did not; that the CASA OAR organisation charged with implementing international best practice in airspace administration has failed to do so. If you simply criticise how the ATC did the job you will find he/she did exactly what they are paid to do - nothing will change. A Ministerial question in Parliament is just a tiny annoyance to a public servant but imagine if a homicide detective or coronial investigator walks in to their office.......... that might get their attention! Get AOPA or AFAP or any organisation you are a member of behind you. And it would be really great if Civil Air (the ATC union) started telling their employer that change must happen to protect their members against possible criminal charges. |
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Originally Posted by thorn bird
(Post 10786500)
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Folks - It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade, so please read the Minister's Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) and reflect on the fact that, regardless of his words, we do not provide Class E airspace for any uncontrolled airports with RPT services, never mind those that do not have RPT:
Mr Jim Wolfe General Manager Air Traffic Policy Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development GPO Box 594 CANBERRA CITY 2601 Phone: (02) 6274 7611 Fax: (02) 6274 7804 |
Originally Posted by Meester App
It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade
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Originally Posted by Mr Approach
(Post 10787392)
Folks - It is great to see some hitherto unknown names joining this crusade, so please read the Minister's Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) and reflect on the fact that, regardless of his words, we do not provide Class E airspace for any uncontrolled airports with RPT services, never mind those that do not have RPT:
Mr Jim Wolfe General Manager Air Traffic Policy Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development GPO Box 594 CANBERRA CITY 2601 Phone: (02) 6274 7611 Fax: (02) 6274 7804 Part 2—Australian Airspace Policy Statement 8 Minister must make Australian Airspace Policy Statement (1) The Minister must make a statement (the Australian Airspace Policy Statement). Note: Generally, CASA must exercise its powers and perform its functions in a manner consistent with the statement: see section 11A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988. Contents of statement (2) The statement must: (a) specify and describe the classifications to be used to administer Australian‑administered airspace; and (b) specify and describe the designations to be used for the purposes of restricting access to, or warning about access to, particular volumes of Australian‑administered airspace; and (c) describe the processes to be followed for changing the classifications or designations of particular volumes of Australian‑administered airspace; and (d) outline the Commonwealth Government’s policy objectives for the administration and use of Australian‑administered airspace; and (e) include a strategy for the administration and use of Australian‑administered airspace in the future. (3) The statement may also include any other matter the Minister thinks appropriate. Consistency with Chicago Convention (4) The statement must be consistent with the Chicago Convention. However, if Australia has notified differences under Article 38 of that Convention, the statement must be consistent with those differences. Legislation Act 2003 (5) A statement made under subsection (1) is a legislative instrument, but section 42 (disallowance) of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply to the statement. Note: Part 4 of Chapter 3 (sunsetting) of the Legislation Act 2003 does not apply to the statement: see regulations made for the purposes of paragraph 54(2)(b) of that Act. 9 Consultation before making Statement (1) Before making the Australian Airspace Policy Statement, the Minister must consult: (a) CASA; and (b) Airservices Australia. (2) The Minister may also consult any other person or body the Minister thinks appropriate. 10 Statement must be reviewed every 3 years The Minister must cause the Australian Airspace Policy Statement to be reviewed at least once in each of the following periods: (a) the period of 3 years after it is made; (b) the period of 3 years after the completion of the last review. |
As mentioned previously, readers of this thread may be interested in the article I wrote in The Australian newspaper four years ago.
It is interesting that it was ignored by all the CASA people and the people at Airservices. I suppose the Board members of each organisation will say it is nothing to do with them and the Minister will say he knows nothing about airspace so it isn’t his responsibility. If I were a relative of one of the four pilots who lost their lives, I would be quite angry. |
Having operated in the lowered E over the last few days, and considering various traffic scenarios I was put in by fate, Dick, you will have to show us the money because Class E will NOT be cost-free.
BTW, I am disappointed you appear to be trying to leverage an agenda when you don't even know if the current system failed... |
I do know that the current system failed.
So does CASA , AsA and the ATSB. It’s all about delaying the truth so no one from these organisations will be held responsible. Imagine the situation for the poor controller. Seeing the aircraft disappear but knowing that the current regulations do not allow a control service to be provided. Complete madness. |
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