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-   -   Avoiding VFR into IMC accidents (https://www.pprune.org/pacific-general-aviation-questions/629055-avoiding-vfr-into-imc-accidents.html)

no_one 21st Jan 2020 22:22

Avoiding VFR into IMC accidents
 
Hi all,

It seems that every few weeks there is another GA accident in Australia where the likely cause is a planned VFR flight into either night conditions or IMC. I don't have the data analysis to support this but I suspect that the accident rate is getting worse. It seems to me that the concept of "dont fly in IMC as a VFR pilot" is about as effective as the abstinence method of birth control among teenagers. Is there something better that can be done to prevent this type of accident?

With each of these incidents I reflect on what I would have done differently if I were in the same situation. The danger in this thinking is to lump it all into the term "pilot error". It is too easy to dismiss the accident as happening because of some shortcoming in the pilot that crashed. If you find yourself thinking "well I would never do that" then you are probably underestimating the risk. Many of the pilots who crashed were experienced pilots and its not like the pilots that have crashed took off with the intention of crashing on that flight.

I have some thoughts on what we can do to prevent this sort of accident but before I post them it would be good to get some feedback from others on the forum.

It might help to break the thoughts into 3 groups,

1: In the years before up to the crash. eg training, equipment, ...?
2: In the hours before up to the crash. eg planning, weather,
3. In the minutes before... eg pilot actions, ATC help/intervention.

What are your thoughts?

Runaway Gun 22nd Jan 2020 00:44

Students should learn to fly in tough and marginal conditions so that they can be exposed as to what is suitable for operating in, and what diversion weather looks like. Flying in CAVOK only gives them a false sense of security.

Petropavlovsk 22nd Jan 2020 01:06

Wow! every few weeks huh?
I did not know the 'accident' rate was so high!
You have NO data analysis for reference,

What are you doing here???

thorn bird 22nd Jan 2020 01:39

VFR pilots getting themselves trapped in IMC conditions has been a problem since the Wright brothers.
There are many causes, such as press on itis, blatant disregard of rules, or simply unintentionally getting caught out.
Considering the dwindling number of GA pilots in Australia there seems a disproportionate number of these incidents
compared with the massive industry in the USA and our weather conditions are far more benign than theirs.
Our aviation police endeavour to tackle the issue with convoluted draconian regulation and penalties.
In the USA the FAA approach is education and mentoring.
There is also the fact that almost 80% of private pilots in the USA hold instrument certificates.
They do so because sensible regulations make it relatively cheap to obtain a certificate and maintain it,
they are not burdened with the same regulatory cost burden that apply here making aircraft far cheaper to operate thus
increasing participation and therefore recency.
Unlike Australia committing aviation is encouraged in the USA, Inane security requirements just don't exist in the home of 9/11.
Airports are not locked up by local owners with silly restrictions and burdensome costs.
All this aids and encourages participation. A practiced pilot is far safer than an out of practice one.

Lead Balloon 22nd Jan 2020 01:52

There should be a law prohibiting a VFR flight continuing into IMC. Oh wait...

The penalty for breaching a law prohibiting a VFR flight continuing into IMC should be the death penalty. Oh wait....

The price paid for the regulatory ‘reform’ program would have paid for IFR ratings for every Australian pilot. Lucky the money was instead spent on the oh-so-successful regulatory ‘reform’ program.

It should not be so hard to get an IFR rating in Australia. Not only is it made hard by the unnecessarily complex rules imposed by a regulator that overreacts to most perceived risks, the number and location of organisations that have the approvals to deliver the training are slowly dwindling.

CASA’s education program is manifestly inadequate. That’s not a criticism of individuals involved in the program (except for the ones who think it’s a medium for them to promote their pet theories). It’s a criticism of CASA’s abject failure to understand the practical importance of and accordingly properly resource effective education programs.

Falcon99 22nd Jan 2020 02:41

Back in the 1960's I wrote to the then Department, and suggested that at the completion of the Private Pilot Licence flight test the applicant be placed under the hood and be required to make a 180 degree turn without losing altitude. After entering the probable spiral dive the hood could be removed when the examiner considered control had been lost and any continuation would result in an accident. The examiner could reinforce the lesson to be learned after the flight and the new Private Pilot would have seen first hand the results of flight into IMC.

This suggestion was obviously not considered to be very helpful as I never heard of it being implemented and I never had a response from the Department.

I agree a simpler and cheaper IFR rating would help.




Squawk7700 22nd Jan 2020 02:44

USA pilots also get a night rating with their PPL. That might help stop pilots dying from entering NVFR and black holes. Wouldn’t that be nice to have here!

lucille 22nd Jan 2020 03:11


Originally Posted by Falcon99 (Post 10668456)
Back in the 1960's I wrote to the then Department, and suggested that at the completion of the Private Pilot Licence flight test the applicant be placed under the hood and be required to make a 180 degree turn without losing altitude. After entering the probable spiral dive the hood could be removed when the examiner considered control had been lost and any continuation would result in an accident. The examiner could reinforce the lesson to be learned after the flight and the new Private Pilot would have seen first hand the results of flight into IMC.

This suggestion was obviously not considered to be very helpful as I never heard of it being implemented and I never had a response from the Department.

I agree a simpler and cheaper IFR rating would help.

Unless, of course if your shiny new PPL were to get lucky and perform the 180 perfectly with no loss of control or altitude then all you have done is reinforce to him/her that they can cheerfully fly into IMC because they’ve mastered the 180 under the hood.

IFR flying for PPLs work in the USA works because of near universal radar coverage, a particularly helpful ATC and good weather reporting and forecasting. None of which is found here.

machtuk 22nd Jan 2020 03:30

Another consideration here is that today's modern LSA and VH reg kit planes have more fancy gear by way of flight instruments than most basic older Airliners, that alone would entice hapless VFR pilots into non VMC at the drop of a hat! We are fortunate that our WX is generally far more benign than the States where freezing rain/snow etc is a big factor in VFR flight for many accidents! An IFR rating is one thing, having the plane to deal with such WX and remaining proficient is another!
There will always be accidents attributed to poor pilot judgment WX related or not, just a fact of life in the bottom end of the aviation sector!

Squawk7700 22nd Jan 2020 03:32

Dick Smith and I wrote a compelling letter to the director of CASA around 10 years ago about the USA concept of the PPL having a NVFR rating built in. We got a very nice reply from the caretaker director saying that it will be actioned by the new incoming director.

Crickets since then... nada. Tried to follow-up and it fell on deaf ears despite their promise of a reply under their SLA’s.

Sunfish 22nd Jan 2020 04:53

CASA couldn’t give a toss about private pilots killing themselves at all. They are only concerned about the noisier members of the general public giving the Minister a hard time. Witness their treatment of Angel Fight.


As for training????? CASA cheerfully let SOAR remain in operation, so the idea that CASA has any consideration for the well being or safety of pilots is completely alien.

I have yet to witness the slightest concern of CASA for the safety of anyone but the Minister and it’s own staff.

Arm out the window 22nd Jan 2020 05:19

I find there are are generally two schools of thought when this comes up:
1. Don't teach VFR pilots how to fly on instruments because it will lead to a false sense of security and cause them to push on in worse weather than they otherwise would, or
2. Give everyone some basic instrument training so if they happen to be in an aircraft that at least has an AI or AH of some kind, they might have a fighting chance of maintaining control when visual reference is lost.

I believe 2 is best, and am very thankful for my instrument training, the more so because it was old school and covered limited panel (i.e. no attitude instrument) UA recoveries. Make it compulsory, I reckon, particularly as noted above by machtuk that many more modern machines, or old ones with a TV screen added, have a decent AI and compass built in.

And don't only teach how to maintain control on instruments, and climb and turn, but hammer home some scenarios about how to avoid losing visual reference in the first place, but if you do, extending the thought process into 'now how am I going to safely get visual again'.

Checklist Charlie 22nd Jan 2020 05:36

Take 'education' away from CAsA because it only confuses them. Let them stick to all that they are, a regulator, nothing more, nothing less.

My into country (TPNG) brief from Ron Green of DCA was, "stay out of cloud" and "don't make me come looking for you and have to pick up some bits to send home to your Mum". He also mentioned one back door is not enough, 4 or 5 would be good.
Those 3 bits of advice have stuck with me for over 50 years and they seem to work.

The current regulator is far too confused by their own regulations to actually see things as clearly and succinctly.

CC

Frontal Lobotomy 22nd Jan 2020 06:01

Another vote for NVFR training. Saved my bacon after a few poor decisions.

Ascend Charlie 22nd Jan 2020 06:42

Flying schools generally don't take a student out into marginal weather. The flight would be cut short, the operator would not be paid for a completed lesson, and the paid-per-hour instructor would not take much home that week.

Hopeless. I used to try to take students on nav trips where they would HAVE to make a diversion around Cadbury clouds, but the boss didn't like "DNCO" (Duty Not Carried Out) flights. So, Bloggs only ever flew on CAVOK days and the decision-making process wasn't well developed.

Stickshift3000 22nd Jan 2020 07:01


Originally Posted by Ascend Charlie (Post 10668522)
Flying schools generally don't take a student out into marginal weather.

Totally depends on the instructor (& student to an extent). When I recently completed my PPL, if it was VMC, we flew. That wasn’t always pleasant but I didn’t want to be the sucker caught out after only flying in ‘nice’ weather.

ShyTorque 22nd Jan 2020 07:48

I've never seen a 180 turn in IMC as a safe way of regaining VMC, especially so for an inexperienced pilot. As someone wrote earlier, it is likely to end in disorientation and a spiral dive, which will probably end in tears, even if VMC is then regained. I say that after experience of first obtaining an IR for fixed wing in 1978 and rotary wing a year later. These days I regularly operate RW from field locations, flying VFR to an IFR transit (and usually back to VFR).

I've stuck my heretic neck out before in saying that it's often safer to reduce power and descend straight ahead to regain VMC below cloud then to carry out the 180 turn. Obviously, this won't help if the pilot has flown up a blind alley in the hills, but then neither would getting into a spiral dive because if your first visual reference on breaking cloud is the steep side of a valley, you might well find it impossible to quickly re-orientate yourself.

One good example which sticks in my mind: About twenty years ago I was required to operate by night, flying an unstabilised police helicopter at a site with very little helipad lighting (less than that required for public transport) and no cloudbase measuring equipment. For that job, we were not required to hold an IR and we therefore received no recurrent instrument training, so I was mainly out of practice, although to hover at night one does need to scan the flight instruments. One night the met forecaster got it very wrong and an occluded front brought the cloudbase right down to 200 feet agl, rather than the expected 800 to 1,000 feet. We had flown earlier that night before the weather front arrived and the forecast at that time had seemed reasonably accurate. We launched again later to a vehicle pursuit but we hit cloud almost immediately on departure. I descended straight ahead to VMC, carried out a VERY low level circuit and landed safely back at the helipad and went for a cup of tea and informed operations we were offline due to weather (while we recovered our composure). Less than two hours later, the same front caught out another police pilot from an adjacent county force. He also entered very low cloud, but he descended in the turn, became disorientated and hit trees adjacent to the helipad, One occupant was killed in the crash and both others were badly injured.

Runaway Gun 22nd Jan 2020 08:23

I took a buddy up in his aircraft, after he recently gained his Night VFR rating, and he wanted to try some 'under the hood training' for a possible upcoming IF course.

Within 30 minutes of some basic coordination exercises and a few Unusual Attitude recoveries, he called 'Time Out' and we landed.

He commented that he thought it might be easier, given his NVFR rating, but that he didn't appreciate just how demanding Instrument Flying was - and at that time he had no thinking about approaches to do, merely learning to correctly interpret the AI and other instruments in his scan.

End result - he's determined to get his Instrument Rating ASAP. The NVFR can provide overconfidence...

Sunfish 22nd Jan 2020 08:46

As a very inexperienced pilot but one who is experienced in risk management in other pursuits, I believe training is necessary, not necessarily positive “I can do IFR” training but a series of structured “oh s##t!” encounters with flying VFR into IMC with a suitably qualified instructor to recover you. You CANNOT do this artificially with Foggles! You have to cop it full force so to speak.

’The purpose of such training is to:

’(a) recognize the warning signs that you are about to encounter IMC.

(b) respond appropriately to the threat of entering IMC, AND/or recover into VFR.

You cannot do (b) if you are startled, fearful and have never experienced IMC before.

There are a multitude of ways IMC can sneak up on you, just ask me. Luckily for me I once had an instructor who let it happen and we calmly discussed what was happening and what the available options were best.

If all you’ve been taught is “don’t enter IMC’ and don’t know what it feels like, your chances of recovering are not as good. it can sneak up on you and if you don’t know the signs then you are asking for trouble.

While everyone has war stories, some might include:

- gradually deteriorating afternoon light with smoke, fog and haze (even in the circuit at YMMB!).

- gradually decreasing ceiling perhaps with drizzle limiting visibility and surrounding hills - makes navigation very hard.

- “That’s not really a cloud!”

- “ My autopilot will get us through that!”

- “I know the ceilings low but it will get higher as we go north/south/east/west.

etc. etc. I’m sure there are plenty more that I don’t know.


Three escape doors are my minimum, cup of tea and a wait is the best.

Frontal Lobotomy 22nd Jan 2020 08:53

I would suggest if you inadvertently enter IMC in controlled flight the additional training from NVFR may assist you in a positive outcome. If you don’t learn from your misadventure and continue to push the envelope it is probably going to end badly at some stage.

Re overconfidence from the extra training, that is probably an individual personality trait. I like to think additional training/ratings makes me a little safer and hopefully smarter.

The name is Porter 22nd Jan 2020 09:56


So, Bloggs only ever flew on CAVOK days
That's a bit harsh, pretty sure he gets into IMC every now and again.

PerPurumTonantes 22nd Jan 2020 10:33


Originally Posted by Sunfish (Post 10668598)
... a series of structured “oh s##t!” encounters with flying VFR into IMC with a suitably qualified instructor to recover you. You CANNOT do this artificially with Foggles! You have to cop it full force so to speak..

Agreed. The best prevention is sheer terror. Also, never underestimate the detrimental effect of an attractive lady on your decision making.

Having abandoned a sightseeing trip because of weather, I was stuck at the airfield with said disappointed lady. Clouds BKN020, OK let's just go up for a quick circuit instead.

In between taxi and climbout, cloudbase dropped to 600-900ft. Leaving us up in the soup unable to see the ground, at an airfield with no ILS, no diversion planned, sandwiched between Heathrow and Luton airspace, and somewhere underneath us is a 600ft radio transmission tower.

Luckily my FAA PPL training included some real IMC sessions, so my eyes went straight to instruments without thinking. 700ft circuit dipping in and out of the cloudbase. However, lady has declined to fly with me ever again. Quite right.

Lessons:
1) All PPLs must have some real IMC thrown in. Weather is too unpredictable, at some point you're going to be in it.
2) The terror of that event made me revise my planning and minimums. There's no such thing as a simple circuit if there are clouds anywhere near.
3) It doesn't matter how hot your lady friend is. She'll respect you more for saying "no" than for scaring her witless.

Centaurus 22nd Jan 2020 10:33

Most flying schools have a simulator of sorts. They are flight training devices. Before a student's first flight in a real aeroplane he/she/they/should be given several "simulator" sessions in the clear so that when the big day arrives for their first dual flight in the real thing, the student is entirely familiar with terminology and positions and operation of all applicable bits and pieces that form the cockpit. Saves money in taxiing time and holding point time.

Fast forward to their first dual navex. Before that occurs it is back to the FTD and undertake several hours of simulated instrument flight including unusual attitude recovery. No need for a full flight expensive simulator as all you need to learn is instrument flying skill and a standard no motion FTD is good enough. All this unencumbered by an instrument flying hood as the instructor simply selects IMC on the instructor panel.

By the time the student is ready for his first solo cross-country navex he will have at least the rudimentary skills to handle inadvertent flight into IMC safely.
Flight under the hood or using foggles in a Cessna or Warrior is really a waste of time as it is all to easy to peep outside from under the hood. FTD are a relatively cost effective of learning to fly on instruments and can be flown dual or solo. What is needed though are instrument capable instructors who may not necessarily hold an instrument rating but who have the ability to teach instrument flying in a FTD. All grade 3 instructors should have that skill.

It follows that instructor course syllabus must include at least ten hours in a FTD and the demonstrated ability to teach instrument flying in an FTD. With all that basic grounding on instrument flying hopefully it would translate into losing less aircraft accidents due to VMC into IMC flight.

421dog 22nd Jan 2020 11:36


Originally Posted by thorn bird (Post 10668432)
VFR pilots getting themselves trapped in IMC conditions has been a problem since the Wright brothers.
There are many causes, such as press on itis, blatant disregard of rules, or simply unintentionally getting caught out.
Considering the dwindling number of GA pilots in Australia there seems a disproportionate number of these incidents
compared with the massive industry in the USA and our weather conditions are far more benign than theirs.
Our aviation police endeavour to tackle the issue with convoluted draconian regulation and penalties.
In the USA the FAA approach is education and mentoring.
There is also the fact that almost 80% of private pilots in the USA hold instrument certificates.
They do so because sensible regulations make it relatively cheap to obtain a certificate and maintain it,
they are not burdened with the same regulatory cost burden that apply here making aircraft far cheaper to operate thus
increasing participation and therefore recency.
Unlike Australia committing aviation is encouraged in the USA, Inane security requirements just don't exist in the home of 9/11.
Airports are not locked up by local owners with silly restrictions and burdensome costs.
All this aids and encourages participation. A practiced pilot is far safer than an out of practice one.


Would that this were were the case.

There were 163,695 estimated private pilots in the US as of 12/31/18, and, according to the FAA, 47.961 had instrument ratings.

https://www.faa.gov/data_research/av...men-stats.xlsx

jmmoric 22nd Jan 2020 12:36

Some sort of basic IFR training is always good.

Other than that, trust the instruments.... use wing leveler or auto pilots if available.... and take your feet of the pedals. Call ATC if within range, and get their help navigating in the right direction.

But the best is to stay out of it.

old,not bold 22nd Jan 2020 13:09

From my personal experience the biggest single factor in flying in IMC when not trained, qualified or experienced in doing that is huge and unjustified over-confidence in one's own ability. This applies to people under about 40 years old.

Paradoxically, the IMC Rating, in my day, and I guess the IR(R) today, had/have the dual effect of improving PPLs' ability to fly safely in IMC, while increasing their unjustified belief that they can do it perfectly, even when things go slightly wrong.

(In my case, "things going slightly wrong" was an engine failure (of the only engine) while climbing through cloud to "VFR on top" over hills, which was a challenge I felt quite unprepared for, even though I had an IMC Rating.




Flyingbadge 22nd Jan 2020 14:34

I completed my U.K. PPL a few years ago and during training we did a fair bit of 180 turns (2 minute turn?) under foggles and also a full hour of unusual attitude recovery. I was also flown into a cloud to try it out for real.

ShyTorque 22nd Jan 2020 16:14


and take your feet of the pedals.
Don't try that if you are flying a helicopter. Keep the ball in the middle!

visibility3miles 22nd Jan 2020 20:03

Do the fires and extreme levels of smoke have anything to do with this?

I know from personal experience as a VFR PPL that smoke can reduce the visibility well below what is reported just when you'd like to know exactly where you are.

visibility3miles 22nd Jan 2020 20:26

As to flying VFR at night...

(My training included several hours of IFR training under the hood.)

[Edited to add that I've had actual IFR instruction, including flying through clouds, but not enough to try it solo.]

Everywhere I've flown under VFR conditions at night in the USA, there are so many lights on the ground that there's no chance I could confuse which side is up, at least under conditions I'd risk flying.

I can easily imagine that most of Australia is far darker on the ground once you get away from coastal regions, hence far harder to discern a horizon.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F...r._plane_crash


July 16, 1999, John F. Kennedy Jr., son of US president John F. Kennedy, died when the light aircraft he was flying crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts....

The official investigation by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that Kennedy fell victim to spatial disorientation while he was descending over water at night and consequently lost control of his plane. Kennedy did not hold an instrument rating and therefore he was only certified to fly under visual flight rules. At the time of the crash, the weather and light conditions were such that all basic landmarks were obscured, making visual flight challenging, although legally still permissible...

jonkster 22nd Jan 2020 20:53

my 2c, as others have said, VFR into IMC has been a problem forever. I do not know if it is more prevalent now, suspect it is not but do not have evidence to categorically say.

I seem to remember an article in one of the old Aviation Safety Digests lamenting how regularly they reported the same VFR->IFR story over and over again and seem to recall(?) the writer asking whether reporting the stories in ASD really made any difference because it kept happening.

The idea students should have instrument training so they can simply do a 180 on instruments and get clear of IMC seems a bit trite to me. I suspect a lot of VFR into IMC happens more gradually and people get suckered into IFR like the frog in boiling water. By the time they go on instruments a 180 turn into the clear is not going to be available.

Sometimes I worry students get over confident about their ability to handle the aircraft on instruments if they have a high natural aptitude and their PPL BIF training goes well. Doesn't mean we should abandon that training but it is not a cure and sometimes can give people a false sense of their ability. Do not abandon that but it is not a cure, it just helps mitigate bad outcomes in some cases.

I worry that the proliferation of GPS solutions and EFBs and panel GPS's means people are more confident about pushing on because they feel confident of navigating where in the 'old' days the fear of losing contact with the ground or having limited vis meant they were more reluctant to press on. It may save the day as well but also may cause situations to occur that didn't in the past.

Ultimately I see it is a human factors issue. Teaching human factors (in the sense of teaching people to not be human!) is I believe one of the hardest tasks of instructors and one I feel we do not really have a good grasp on how best to do it yet.

No simple answers.

Squawk7700 22nd Jan 2020 21:47

Perhaps an instructor can answer.... how long does it usually take a student to get used to flying off the AH in IMC by hand?

Surely it’s not that hard for a student to learn to climb and descend under the hood in order to simply immediately climb (if the aircraft is equipped) and to be able to descend into a known safe area by gps.

How much hood time is genuinely being taught these days, is it realistically 2 hours? Are the students ok with this at the time and then forgetting how to soon after? Are instructors doing AFR’s covering off under the hood to reinforce those skills? I know my AFR’s haven’t except for one of them which include recovering from unusual attitudes.

I guess this doesn’t help the guy who is scud running above a mountain range who runs out of options and can’t turn around as the mountains head up into the clouds. I’ve been there before myself. Committing to a climb through cloud in that situation feels as bad legally as blasting off from your local and heading through a few thousand feet of cloud. Human factors indeed...

wheels_down 22nd Jan 2020 21:49

Perhaps a government subsidy for those wishing to self fund a IF rating?

Not only could it save your arse, a CPL with a IF rating, and not many have that combo, obviously stands out more than the others to prospective employers for the first few jobs.

What’s the ratio of PPL pilots with a IF rating? 5%?

Frontal Lobotomy 22nd Jan 2020 21:53

Jonkster I think it is the centre page of ASD #82 from November 1972 to which you are referring:

"What More Can We Say

WITH one exception, every Aviation Safety Digest produced in the past two years, this one included, has dealt at length with the unhappy results of attempted visual operations in "Below VMC" weather. The one exception is more than offset by the fact that last year's March issue was given wholly to a detailed study of accidents in this category. In addition, nearly all these issues have included editorial and technical comment on the attitudes of mind and the operational circumstances that combine to produce accidents of this type. In this two year period, 17 accidents of this type have been studied in the Digest. All but three of these were fatal and, in total, they cost a staggering 52 lives.

Eight years ago, a similar "Below VMC" accident trend, though on a much smaller scale, developed during the winter months of 1964. Some very forceful Departmental publicity followed, including a personal letter to all general aviation pilots from the Director-General, as well as a detailed analysis of each of the accidents in the Aviation Safety Digest. It was subsequently most encouraging to find that, despite the steady growth in general aviation activity that followed this time, there was only one further fatal accident of this type in Australia for almost five years. Unfortunately as it turned out, this proved to be only the calm before the storm, for in the latter part of 1969 and throughout 1970, there was a veritable spate of accidents, most of them fatal, in the same category. It was these that prompted the very emphatic treatment of the subject in our March issue last year.

To judge from our 1964 experience and what followed, it seemed reasonable to suppose that this further publicity in the Digest might prove similarly efficacious in averting future potential accidents of this type. Regrettably, the issues that have followed tell quite a different story and any such pious hopes have been well and truly shattered.Now, having examined all these further accidents at length, and having considered and discussed in depth the reactions and motives that combined to bring them about, we must confess to having almost scraped the bottom of the safety education barrel on the subject. So what more can we say about this seemingly elementary problem which yet continues to be responsible for such a high proportion of our general aviation fatalities?

Much of the trouble associated with unforeseen disasters of this type seems to be that their symptoms are so very subtle; Flying is such an enjoyable and effortless way of getting from A to B; To a qualified pilot, even if not greatly experienced, a modern, comfortable and speedy light aeroplane is so easy and satisfying to handle; On the other hand, it can be so very frustrating when unexpected cloud or poor visibility dictates that this desirable means of transport should be turned back and landed at some "alternate" aerodrome to wait hours, or even overnight, for some improvement in the weather.Indeed, it is the very performance of our machine itself, that makes it all the more frustrating, for we know that we could be through that "little area of dirty weather" in only a few minutes. And our aircraft seems so safe, solid and reliable - surely it is worth "giving it a go". After all, we can still turn back if we find the going too tough, so where's the problem?

The whole trouble with this reasoning is that, by the time the pilot has learnt to his horror that there is indeed a problem, it is already too late - more often than not the aeroplane is completely out of control in a screaming spiral dive! It's not good enough to say "it won't happen to me!" Pilots who are not instrument trained but who insist on pressing their luck in marginal weather, even "cautiously'', will sooner or later find this out for themselves. And what of those pilots who have the ability to fly on instruments,but who yet, in their own wisdom, choose to compromise the very terrain clearance standards that hard-won experience has consistently shown to be vital to safe flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions? when their moment of truth comes, they probably won't have enough time to reason why!

Sceptical readers need not take our word for these claims - intelligent study of all material referred to will establish the facts clearly enough. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of it all is that some of the victims caught in these situations are not the swashbuckling, press-on-regardless, accident-going-somewhere-to-happen types we might expect. They are quite often ordinary, normally careful and responsible private pilots, who simply don't recognise their limitations.

All that needs to be said about the mechanics of these accidents has been repeated ad nauseam in the Digest over the past two years. We make no apology for having continued to cover this subject - the need for repetition is not of our making and, in fact, we would like to be able to devote space to other air safety problems. We therefore earnestly suggest that you re-read what has been said on the subject in the Digest over the past two years - it could literally mean the difference between life and death - YOURS! ...,."

jonkster 22nd Jan 2020 22:24


Originally Posted by Frontal Lobotomy (Post 10669051)
Jonkster I think it is the centre page of ASD #82 from November 1972 to which you are referring:

"What More Can We Say

WITH one exception, every Aviation Safety Digest produced in the past two years, this one included, has dealt at length with the unhappy results of attempted visual operations in "Below VMC" weather
...
[snipped/]
...
Regrettably, the issues that have followed tell quite a different story and any such pious hopes have been well and truly shattered.
Now, having examined all these further accidents at length, and having considered and discussed in depth the reactions and motives that combined to bring them about, we must confess to having almost scraped the bottom of the safety education barrel on the subject. So what more can we say about this seemingly elementary problem which yet continues to be responsible for such a high proportion of our general aviation fatalities?
...
[snipped/]
"

yep, pretty sure that is the one, thanks FL
:(

Lead Balloon 22nd Jan 2020 22:24


Originally Posted by 421dog (Post 10668701)
Would that this were were the case.

There were 163,695 estimated private pilots in the US as of 12/31/18, and, according to the FAA, 47.961 had instrument ratings.

https://www.faa.gov/data_research/av...men-stats.xlsx

You seem to be misreading the tables. Table 11 says that (as at the 2018 period) 68% of US pilots have instrument ratings. Sensibly and appropriately, that table ignores holders of licences that authorise operations only in VMC.

It is true that thorny’s ‘nearly 80%’ is an exaggeration of the actual 68%, but so is your implied suggestion that the percentage is only around 30%.

421dog 22nd Jan 2020 23:20

Nope. Table 10, I believe, enumerates the number of Ppls who have instrument ratings. It doesn’t make any sense to look at all pilots, because more than half are cpl/atp types, who overwhelmingly are instrument rated.

my numbers are, I believe, correct, and extracted from the data supplied.

an instrument rating over here involves essentially as much training (hour wise) as a ppl. The vast majority of private pilots are not so rated.

poteroo 22nd Jan 2020 23:47

Is Prevention better than Cure?

If education and recurrent awareness and training is what 'prevention' offers - then Yes!

It is very helpful to students if the instructor is able to introduce them to deteriorating conditions of both forward visibility, and lowering cloud ceiling. Until a student can actually see for themselves what we are all talking about, and they can match the published VMC minima to what's in front of them - as instructors we are not helping to minimise this all too common way of becoming a statistic.

Forward visibility estimation is only possible where the distance between certain landmarks is already known, eg, 3nm, 5nm etc. GPS distance from a 'going to' location also helps with becoming familiar with what visibility is actually being seen. With cloud ceiling, it also helps if you actually have a good GPS with a reasonably accurate database to help with height above ground estimates, but this can also be done safely by simply using the altimeter and flying over a location of known height amsl in VMC.

The above only 'works' when you have a good VMC fallback position for 180 degrees of horizon, which allows for skirting of poor weather with clear cut escape direction. But, I have found it useful.

For what it's worth......

Lead Balloon 23rd Jan 2020 00:48


Originally Posted by 421dog (Post 10669081)
Nope. Table 10, I believe, enumerates the number of Ppls who have instrument ratings. It doesn’t make any sense to look at all pilots, because more than half are cpl/atp types, who overwhelmingly are instrument rated.

my numbers are, I believe, correct, and extracted from the data supplied.

an instrument rating over here involves essentially as much training (hour wise) as a ppl. The vast majority of private pilots are not so rated.

I see the point you are making, but I still disagree with your conclusion.

You will see from the notes that the categorisation is by reference to the ‘highest’ qualification held, and therefore the holder of both commercial and private pilot certificates is counted in the statistics only as a commercial certificate holder. Those persons can (and do) still engage in private flying.

GAGuy 23rd Jan 2020 03:03

When I was earning my instrument rating and after I had become pretty cocky on my ability to fly the gauges, my instructor took me up into a layer of thick stratus. I'm hooded, climbing out and before we hit the clouds, my instructor said to take the hood off and look around. I did. Nice view. Then suddenly we're in a bowl of cotton candy. Old crappy trainer, the air vents start leaking water. My heart rate went up times two. I'll never forget that day and how true IMC felt the first time.

This October past I earned my CFI. It's not in the syllabus, but I would love to give my students a flight into real IMC. Of course they wouldn't pay for it.


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