Who is "everyone"?

Then that is not an air traffic control system is it? If you're denying a clearance because it's all too complex, then whomever designed the the system needs a good hard kick up the arse.

So what? Do what you're paid to do.

Horse****, it's not rapidly ageing.

Valid. Except for the funding pressure from the government, they make a profit.

Who's fault is that?

I don't see too many peeps blaming the controllers. Probably for the 10th time in this thread, it's not the controllers fault, it's the garbage airspace they work.

But I'll tell ya a couple of things, controllers are constantly told (by their employer) they are amongst the best in the world, really? They are told they have the best airspace system in the world, really? Despite this, ASA is petrified of liability, the arseguarding is world's best practice.

There is also a deep culture of 'f@ck VFR, we don't make money out of them, piss off OCTA'

I'd be interested to hear from any ATC around the world if they do this?

One day, ASA will be held to account for this unprofessional practice.

I'd suggest you tell them that you require the protection of controlled airspace.

@Porter...

I think we are getting to the same point but from different paths. The entire system (I mean the Australian Industry, not TAAATS) is broken. ASA definitely believes they are the best, but I reckon that most of their ATC's don't think that. They certainly try the best, but they are stymied by bureaucracy.

Making a profit is the reason for the funding pressures. They sacked so many safety and project staff in the clean out that they can't perform basic functions now. They are creating a profit at the expense of safety. The aging of TAAATS and the reduced staffing are all as a result of trying to run Airservices commercially.

Can't agree more, but in a general sense, not RNAV specific. The way that company is run will one day come back to bite them.

Black Panther, I used to be counselled for 'helping VFR out too much'. The airspace and infrastructure is an absolute joke. ASA looks shiny and new on the outside, like a showbag really, big, fat and full of ****.

I think you will find that a lot of that is tied up in politics, particularly around ASA and CASA saying that they are fostering the general aviation industry because they can have them on surveillance and provide better service.

Absolutely you would, guaranteed.

As has been proven in this accident Sunfish they will know exactly where you crashed when they refuse you clearance through CTA...:}

In saying that, I have ADS-B in my RV and am quite happy to do so. I've had directed traffic information from Center (not just "aircraft 5 miles north Singleton...") several times, and the KRviatrix can track me when I'm airborne, above and beyond what Google Maps and OzRunways offer.

Ditto IFR really. Especially with the woeful cover outside the J curve and below 5,000 ft.

ADSB was to benefit the airlines, reduce AsA's capital costs of radar installations and allow AsA executives to big note themselves at ICAO meetings by being an early adopter.

I'm an ATCO in another part of the world so cannot comment on Oz specific issues, but it's being said that Aireon Alert were able to provide data to OZ SAR via space based ADSB that narrowed the crash site to within 1 square NM. In an accident where there are survivors, this could be the difference between life and death, so there is a benefit there.

The ATSB final report has been released on the Mooney crash with two fatalities west of Coffs Harbour on 20 September 2019. Here is a link: https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/577925...-052-final.pdf

I believe the ATSB is deficient in this report because they don’t mention that the only way to operate Class C airspace satisfactorily in the terminal environment is to use an approach radar facility. The Minister’s directive of 2004 made this quite clear.

It is all very well to blame the air traffic controller and pilot, but to ignore a Minister’s directive with no explanation, and then not even cover it in the ATSB report, shows that something is going on here.

The atsb is not there to comment on ministerial directions. They report on the facts of the case, their opinion on the cause and recommendations. Why should they get involved in political manoeuvring.

And I just knew you'd be here today beating your drum.

He's not the only one apparently! :rolleyes:

There you have it... and who pays their wages?

Before we play the normal "pile on Dick" game. I think the point he is making is that there is a pre-existing directive from the Minister about use of approach radar in the airspace of the accident. If there is a Ministerial directive as Dick asserts and if AsA has not complied with this directive then subsequently there has been an accident that could have been avoided if AsA complied with the Minister's directive, then Dick is absolutely correct in suggesting that the ATSB has been deficient in its investigation.

So Dick, where is evidence of this directive and what does it say

CLEARANCE NOT AVAILABLE is a reply you get from ATC only in Australia..

In five flights around the world I have only heard this terminology in this country.

The ATSB have effectively blamed the pilot and the ATC for this accident.

What is dishonestly not covered is the fact that the ATC was also responsible for aircraft in un controlled airspace at the same time. This clearly was a contributing factor.

A famous poster on this site, namely Bindook called the class C airspace above D “ roadblock airspace” He was correct. And now two lives have been lost.

The ATSB needs to re do this report and stop protecting the minister and AsA.

Iron. See post number 1 on this thread.

The full report makes interesting reading.

• The planned flight path tracked west of Coffs Harbour through the corner of the 5500 step to the north, and the 3500 and 4500 steps to the south.
• The pilot was at 6500 and contacted ATC and requested clearance to track through the corner of the 5500 step (less than 3 minutes transit time).
• The controller (a trainee under supervision) advised clearance in class C was not available due to workload, and suggested transit through the class D airspace. There were no other aircraft in the Coffs Harbour airspace and no expected IFR arrivals or departures, however "controller performance assessment reports and daily training records included debriefing and coaching comments emphasising to trainees and controllers to be cautious with issuing clearances below A080 through the [Coffs Harbour] airspace" and the supervisor judged denying the clearance was conservative but appropriate.
• The pilot contacted the Class D controller, who asked whether he wanted to remain at 6500. The pilot said yes, so the Class D controller said to contact the class C controller for clearance.
• The pilot switches back to the Class C controller, and meanwhile the class D controller has also advised the Class C controller to expect the call.
• The Class C controller sends the pilot back to the Class D controller again. At this point I imagine the pilot stress levels are rising.
• The Class D controller says that clearance would only be available "not above 1000 feet", but doesn’t provide any tracking instructions.
• It appears that the pilot read back "not above 1000 feet" as if it were a clearance, entered the Class C and began descending. Terrain was about 3000-4000 feet.
• Shortly afterward, the pilot reported that they were OCTA at 4100 in clear conditions, and that they would be requesting clearance through the southern steps when they reached them.
• The Class D controller asked them to report entering controlled airspace.
• After a short climb they continued to descend until they crashed.

Communications between the pilot and ATC seem to be important in the context of the report. Did the pilot believe he had received a clearance down to 1000 feet, implying that there was no high ground on track? Did he believe ATC was managing terrain clearance?

A transcript of the actual radio calls would be very helpful. Times are not given for most of the events and they are discussed out of sequence. For example, the report implies that the pilot entered class C immediately after the clearance was denied and presents it as an airspace infringement, but the altitudes in the other requests suggests that it happened after the pilot read back "not above 1000 feet" i.e. he may have thought he had received a clearance requiring a descent.

Important issues are e.g.

• ATC denied clearance due to workload for no obvious reason - there were no other aircraft in the airspace.
• Pilots need to maintain awareness of terrain clearance and not assume that ATC are protecting them even if they have received a clearance or instructions.
• ATC need to be alert for pilots reading back things that are not meant to be clearances or instructions and clarify if necessary.

The big question is whether the presentation in the report (no transcript, events out of order) is deliberate obfuscation to make it difficult to understand the role of ATC in the accident.

So basically according to the Coroner, Airservices murdered the pilot and passenger. Judging by what happened to Glen Buckley, CASA murders the industry and judging by the quality of its reports, ATSB murders the truth.

How can anyone consider anything these institutions do as promoting safe aviation? All of these alleged behaviours encourage industry participants into unsafe behaviours.

My view is that Airservices, ATSB and CASA are now effectively running a mutual protection racket. What’s not said in ATSB reports or not followed up by ATSB speaks volumes.

As another recent example, the ATSB report on the Renmark tragedy says:Well that’s OK then. Nothing more can usefully be done to find the truth. Move on, nothing to see here. Only three dead.

(Perhaps the deceased, including the CASA FOI, were among the critics of CASA identified in Mr Carmody’s ‘research’ as being the kinds of people likely to have accidents. Maybe those involved in the Mangalore tragedy, too...)

ATSB has powers to compel the disclosure of information, and the failure to disclose when compelled to do so is a criminal offence. The only people excused are coroners in their capacity as coroners. Those powers are there precisely to enable ATSB to obtain information when it is not volunteered, and that includes when not volunteered by CASA.

Although the procedure was - according to ATSB - “not necessarily contributory to the accident”, the procedure was - according to ATSB - “inappropriate and, if followed, increased the risk of asymmetric control loss.”

Wouldn’tcha think it might be important to find out whether CASA had insisted on the risk-increasing, folklore-based procedure to be in the operator’s C&T Manual, or whether CASA had overlooked the existence of the risk-increasing, folklore-based procedure in that Manual? If either of those were true, would it not follow that CASA may be part of the problem? And wouldn’tcha think it might be important to make a recommendation - or whatever the weasel word is these days - for CASA to find out whether the risk-increasing, folklore-based procedure is in other T&C Manuals and get the procedure removed?

The “safety issues and management” part of the report focussed on procedures for the safety of CASA personnel! “The [CASA temporary safety instruction’s] intent was to generally provide higher risk protection around operations involving CASA flying operations inspectors (FOIs).” Make CASA FOIs ‘safer’ and the job’s done!

Murder is probably a bit strong. I would say negligence and dereliction of duty though. Air traffic is their job.

Training notes discouraging issuing clearances below 8000 and a controller whose first instinct in their first week of on the job training is to deny a clearance despite zero traffic in the airspace suggest something rotten at Airservices.

It never ceases to amaze me how people will just read what supports their bias in these accident reports. I am very much of the view that a PIC needs to take that responsibility seriously and plan for contingencies that are within their control, fuel, weather navigation etc. Have another read and note what this PIC did not do that had a significant influence on the sequence of events. Did not have a recent BFR

Did not have any charts or EFB available to at least have some understanding of terrain and most likely did not obtain a weather forecast

ATC contributed in part by not providing a clearance but as it states in the report.the PIC could have taken a route that did not put him in the high ground.

I always challenge the assertion that ATC tell pilots what to do. any pilot who thinks that will come unstuck. I have heard it said that ATC will kill you if you let them. In this accident the PIC was along for the ride just as much as his unfortunate passenger was. The Australian system is far from perfect but it is what it is and to operate in it you have to be up to speed on how it works. Transits through coastal CTZ should not be a rarity but denial of a clearance is always a possibility and should be planned for. The lesson out of this report to pilots is stay current. plan your trip and accept your responsibility as PIC. With the information provided in the report this bloke did none of that and the unfortunate confluence of circumstance lead to his death and that of his passenger. If he had got a clearance through Coffs then maybe the accident would not have happened but with such an attitude to his responsibilities it was possibly only a matter of time before it did.

Where's the Coroner's report, Sunfish? I've had good look through their website and stuffed if I can find it online.

I do wonder if Lead Balloon's obvservation could perhaps be further explained by the career path involving all 3 organisations of the current ATSB Commissioner.

May be, maybe not!

CC

The text in my letter to Greg Hood of 18 September 2020 is self-explanatory - see below:

I would like to make it very clear, because I was involved at the time, that the only reason for the Minister’s directive was to prevent accidents such as the Mooney crash west of Coffs Harbour.

It is simply unconscionable that the ATSB does not mention this.

And for decades before, we safely operated non-radar Class C (actually "CTA") over vast enroute nd terminal areas. Just because some yank who hasn't been outside his own backyard thinks something doesn't make it true.

As always, it's about money. A radar approach service at towered airports costs. Stop making AsA "make" money for it's owners and we might get a better service.

Bloggs. Are you suggesting that in this case Airservices are putting profits and management bonuses in front of safety?
Surely not.

Lookleft, you state in your post:

Lookleft, why should they be planned for? Surely you agree that if Airservices had changed the airspace back to Class E, as they had planned to do, and as mentioned in the ATSB report, the pilot and his passenger would most likely be alive today.

If you are suggesting that pilots flying over Class D airspace should do all their planning on the possibility that they may not get a clearance, that is something that would only be required uniquely in Australia. Surely we should follow world’s best practice.

Dick what are your thoughts on a pilot who did not do the legally required BFR? Could you please comment on what you think should be done about pilots who do not do any flight planning or even obtain a weather forecast before they operate? Do you agree that pilots should always plan contingencies for any flight they conduct or that a single plan of action will do? When you flew around the world in a helicopter did you blindly follow what ATC told you to do or did you have a contingency plan/ In this instance ATC definitely influenced the sequence of events but this pilot should not have been flying with their haphazard attitude to flying. Especially in a relatively high performance single such as the Mooney.

I do think Dick has a strong point here, and Airservices do provide a substandard ATC service compared to the US. Some controllers seem to get flustered anytime there is more than a couple of non RPT aircraft in their sector. Only have to look at how restrictive they have been with ILS training in the Melbourne basin over the years. They forget when denying clearances in the modern age we can now see all the same traffic (or more likely lack of) ADS-B returns on our iPads as they see when assessing the traffic load and deciding whether to fit a GA aircraft into the flow or not.

Without doubt the back and forth between the class D & C controllers and the ultimate refusal of the clearance was a contributing factor to the accident (especially with no IFR arrivals or departures at Coffs Harbour at the time). However the pilot only needed to get a forecast including a sat pic and plan his flight coastal seeking a not above clearance/transit through Coffs’ class D to have ensured a totally different outcome. Perhaps filing a flight plan may have also helped with more efficient handling by ATC as well. Very “relaxed” attitude to airmanship by the PIC to put it mildly.

Here is an article from Sydney’s Daily Telegraph headed “Lack of training, GPS behind fatal plane crash.” Notice how the article makes no mention of ATC involvement and the denial of a clearance. It also omits that Airservices had not complied with the safety directive to provide an approach radar facility where Class C above Class D was in use.

Notice that it puts all the blame on the pilot and mentions that the pilot had started to descend near high terrain, without suggesting in any way that a clearance had been refused at the obviously safer level for terrain clearance of 6,500 feet

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....0d07642ccd.jpg

Lookleft, I agree with the drift of your approach and it is clear that the ATSB has made important observations.

However that doesn’t explain why they have decided to leave out the fact that Airservices had been given a directive by the Minister – which if complied with, would have resulted in the airpace being Class E, or an approach radar facility being provided.

In each case, there is less likelihood that the plane would have crashed with the loss of the lives of two people.

I agree that an approach radar at all Class C airports is the safer way to go and I don't disagree that there is less likelihood of this accident occurring if one had been available. If a radar is not available however don't plan or make decisions based on the desire that one should be available. The lack of a radar and a clearance exacerbated the poor airmanship, it didn't cause it.

Melbourne is a shocker. They don’t care for giving you a clearance unless your aircraft has a blue tail on it. I’ve got ADSB in, with OZRunways and Avplan traffic too (arguably I can actually see and identity more traffic than they can) and I’ve recently been denied multiple clearances that would have been a non-event a few years back) when there has been visibly next to zero traffic in the whole Melbourne airspace sector.

When denied a clearance I usually reply and suggest that I can take any altitude of their choice including vectoring. The response usually includes a level of spite that subconsciously suggests how dare I ask again when I’ve already been told no.

I often don’t care if I have to go 30 miles or more out of the way if it means I can avoid some terrible turbulence and near scud-running at the legal minimum altitude over built-up areas.

Perhaps it would be good practice for these pilots flying as students of the blue tail to be denied a clearance on occasion so they can actually learn how to read a map and navigate around Melbourne and learn properly, rather than being guided and babied through airspace by ATC.

Edit: it has occurred to me that those IFR students are paying for the service and as a VFR I am not. I’ve often wondered if that is a factor in all this.