Yeah that's my understanding of it, had just taken off wreckage located 4 km's west of runway centreline, "if" a simulated engine failure it would still be in the second segment there.

http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/s...7eb6fd3705c05b

Of course this f%¥king idiot pipes up when there's an accident with his utter tripe which somehow passes as 'journalism'.

I have a medical next week.... I wish I hadn't read that cr@p from that oxygen thieving baggage handler, it's sent my BP through the roof.

My understanding is that the flight was possibly an assessment by CASA on the CP to issue him with check approval for the type within the Rossair training and checking system. This assessment was being conducted concurrently with the assessment of a new pilot to the company or similar.

If that is the case, then I feel that the challenge here is less about the risks associated with multi-engine training and more about the merits of a (technically) unqualified check pilot being assessed by a pilot (from CASA no less) who is not in a control seat, on a pilot who is undergoing a "live" check. "Check-itis" is heavy enough without the added layer of having two check pilots watching on, one who is under real professional pressure...

I've seen this before, and I reckon it can make for a very difficult cockpit environment, regardless of the experience of the personnel involved.

Finally, if the check pilot candidate sets an emergency scenario up incorrectly, who is going to fix it? The candidate undertaking the live check?? Certainly not the guy in the back, he has no flight controls...

Bear, I agree with you, I have seen it before as well but without such a tragic outcome. Our industry must learn to find better ways of doing things like this, albeit harder on older types with limited sim availability.

You're right Flying Bear, I have personally experienced this too and it's hard work, having said that I don't think this applies in this case. Paul was in fact quite experienced on the aircraft type and had in fact flown for Rossair before over a long period of time, he was simply going back after a long break. All of those on board were well known to each other, therefore the check environment would have been quite relaxed.

Vale, Steve. Rest in peace.

Not ideal!
In fact often no-one will say anything - when it goes pear shaped.

Someone asked before if there would be a CVR/FDR. Not required so almost certainly not.


Casa - video with audio works fine for what you are checking - that is procedures followed only.

To me, Xeptu, this too is ripe with danger.
I didn't know anyone on that aircraft beyond occasional phone conversations. Nothing in the following points a finger or casts aspertions upon the 3 flight crew - but following from Flying Bear's comments, I have questions.

What had Paul flown in the intervening years? What were the power lever arrangements in those aircraft?
What had Martin flown in the last 10 years?
How much C441 time had Guerin flown in the last 3-5 years?
How much training had Martin received prior to this flight in his role as ME Instructor/Check pilot?

Was the power lever lifted over the gate and the Start locks engaged?
Did the pilot in the RHS pull the power lever back hard to flight idle?
Where were the hands? Who was holding what? what does the Rossair C&T manual say about who does what and with which and to whom?
Did someone fumble and **** up?
What other multi-faceted ****ups could have caused the holes to line up?

There are a huge number of questions raised by this one. 3 x very experienced pilots means that it could be a VERY interesting event.

A CASA FOI onboard gives us call to closely watch the ATSB investigation, especially in the light of the Norfolk Island investigation in which CASA was implicated and it appears ATSB acted to protect the Minister.

Vale.

All very valid questions Leafblower and something I have looked at over the years, how do we minimise risk while still achieving the objectives. One of the issues I have identified is that once a company has its delegations internally it becomes very insulated and over time think they are the best or at least pretty good at what they do, when in fact nothing could be further from the truth, who's going to tell them, their own line pilots, "not" I believe a good approach is to have these checkies inducted into other operators traing organisation to learn, share and develop methods and knowledge. Only then do we become worlds best practice.

Xeptu

Great point.

We have used Flying Bear and others. I look forward to Flying Bear's next visit to the (y)East, it is overdue :E

I get the feeling that there will be some massive f@ckups identified in this investigation. I look forward to 2021 when the report comes out.

I've got 3 students in the middle of MEIR, they look to their instructors for answers in these scenarios. You have your suspicions and I always say 'wait for the report' but when it comes out years later memories have faded and valuable recency of thought has been lost.

RIP Steve G.


We shared many an hour on the (Kendell Airlines) M23 together.


One of the "old school" good fella's gone.


You will be remembered.

To demonstrate competency in handling simulated EFATO, or any other emergency in the book, is not that complex or demanding. (It's not space-shuttle.) The dangerous , and in this case fatal, problem is not in any sense procedural . It lies in the embedded fraught issue of complicating the business of check and training with an underlay of unrealistic expectations. You have to consider the mindsets at work.
First impressions , what may have happened here, from reading the foregoing posts, is that there was a mix of competent but somehow distracted parties on board, not sharp enough at that time, on that day, in the prevailing circumstances, to foresee the hidden trap that was their undoing.

Whatever the final report comes up with, we may be sure that there will a significant element of conjecture. (Like the RAAF 707 off Sale, no one survived to add first-hand veracity to the conclusions.)

CASA inspectors are just that - for the most part, they will not be current on type as in the context of someone who flies the aircraft regularly. Having done this role in a seat behind the crew, it also removes the inspector from the overall situation awareness.

One thing I always used to insist on during the briefing for these scenarios was a discussion on zero thrust, negative torque sensing and VMCA. I had speed and altitude margins that were conveyed to the crew members. Delaying initiation of throttle/thrust lever reduction by a few hundred feet and ensuring a speed margin provided an elevated safety margin (in my view anyway) and the trainee still got the intended training benefit.

As has been mentioned elsewhere, a real NTS event will result in rapid feathering and in many ways is less hazardous than a check pilot heads down at low level trying to set zero thrust.

This is not a criticism of what happened, but a reflection of the reality of checking and training where simulator support is not available.

My condolences to all those affected by this tragic accident.

Just goes to show there are no new ways to kill yourself in aviation.

People just keep repeating the same old ones... :ugh:

Let's just leave the speculative dribble to Geoffrey Thomas. I can't believe channel 7 persist with this guy.

There are no guarantees at this stage it was a VMCA incident. Let the ATSB do their thing and give the families and friends some space before we all go pontificating on wild guesses.

But the problem is that even if ATSB's competence and credibility had not been so compromised by events and reports over the last decade or so, it will still take years for a report to be produced.

Even if it's not out of its depth, it's stretched way too thin.

Out of interest, how did Geoffrey Thomas become an "aviation expert"? What is his actual background in aviation?