I'm out so don't leave on my regard.

Dick. I wish you all the best in shaking up the powers that be. I even understand why you are taking this approach to push it. I just can't morally agree.

I can't understand why anyone would argue about this. East Sale play nicely with VFR transits and it would be great if Willy would too.

As pilots we should all be writing letters, not arguing about it.

I'd like to see it opened for RAA traffic too so as to reduce the transit of tiger country for VFR lighties.

How much detail is required for an ad-hoc clearance ffs? I was in FS back in the day and rego, type, route & level requested were all that was needed to initiate a clearance with ATC if they had no details. It wasn't that hard.

He at least had the option of being full reporting. You got rid of that too Dick.

Missing the point, or more correctly the holes.
 

I am not for one minute critical of the pilot or attacking his integrity. The poor guys is dead as are his passengers and who knows what pressures he was under to complete the flight. I am merely trying to point out that there were several factors leading to this tragedy.
If the story tonight is to be believed the the flight was a Charter flight that appears to have been planned as private (previous post of an extract of the report). It was planned night VFR. So for starters illegal on a couple of grounds.
Hearsay evidence that the aircraft was experiencing technical issues on arrival at OOL let alone on departure. Also pushing onto forecast poor weather. He apparently looked tired on arrival at OOL, no wonder his decision making was impaired, exactly the time to recognize the issues and re assess the situation. He would no -doubt have had to wait til the next day for repairs so that is another factor.
It is oversimplifying the situation to blame, and Dick does use the word, RAAF ATC as the cause of the tragedy.
Yes it would be nice to transit Willamtown or another Defence airspace at will but if the other issues were addressed and they spent the night at OOL it may have been a whole different outcome.
Lets not let these 6 deaths be in vain and recognize the lessons to be learned in stead of being dragged down the blame path to feed an "expert'" agenda.

MDX Night VFR/CHTR Operation?
 

I have to ask a question? why was a single preforming a charter
that a look at the BOM breifing, which in the early 80's were vastly
different products granted, had the potential to become IFR

Was the rule different then as it was 8 years before I had my first licence,
but Night Charter/Commercial Operations are not permitted for single engine
aircraft (Standfast PC12) because of the lack of fall back systems.

Having flown the Centruion II on a number of occasions, are designed for operating IFR, but when the electrics start to fail, which was mentioned on the show, Why was the flight not stopped.

Potential Bad WX down Track. Instrument doubt, Electrical issues. They say it takes 5 things to contribute to an accident. MDX had three, possibly 4 with Push on Itis/PIC Fatiuge.

It is fine to give the RAAF a hard time, and at times they can be difficult, probably like the times you have been required to hold your self? but
I have to ask questions about the operation it self. Now if it was legal to preform a CHTR single engine at night/IFR then that is fine, Also I accept
the media may have gotten the termonology wrong ie if it was just a private operation then I guess it falls in to a different category.

But I would never offer a CHTR Service, to anyone, Single engine, NVFR or
N IFR in a 210. I have to confess, I would rather declair a PAN and just bust the airspace, get the 225, and be alive to receive the summons whilst breathing, than be stuck on a hill/moutian. It sounds like the night mare scenario of CFIT and Instrument failure/Electrical system failure. Also there was a problem with the electrical system, you can hear it on the AM transmissions.

NVFR and Commercial Ops
 

Your point is very valid, I have sent a post a few minutes ago echo'ing
your sentament. I dont know if the rules were different then, as I got my
first Licence in 88' so the rules were probably different in 81.

Single at night VFR Bad WX failing systems. very tragic,
Particularly the last few radio calls. I can only imagine what he was thinking
with the radio call below 5000 when he was told the LSALT was 5500. One call you never want to hear.

Re Programme VH-MDX
 

This programme and Dick Smith's performance were both worthy of an Oscar for [fictional] content and comment. So much missed out. So many inaccuracies. What humbug to lay the blame with the RAAF when it was clearly the pilot who was at fault.


Just what/where did the actions of the RAAF Controller at WLM contribute to this accident. From my years as a private pilot and RAAF Air Traffic Controller this programme has clearly shown me just how media can be manipulated. I served at WLM ATC 1982-3 and I base my comments on what I recall from those days.


Shame on you Dick for blaming the RAAF when as far as I'm concerned it was Pilot Error, possibly aided by mechanical failure. From my time in RAAF ATC we always tried to assist civilian aircraft if at all possible.


On a Sunday night I very much doubt that all the WLM R areas were active. After Base working hours, I remember releasing as much airspace as possible as soon as possible unless we had an inbound IFR flight when we would retain the CTR for positive control. The WLM CTR only extended to 12nm in the northern sectors. TRE is about 60nm to the N of WLM. Controlled airspace beyond 12nm N of WLM commenced at FL125 and belonged to WLM only when R580A was active and from ground level to FL125 when R578B was active. When those areas were not active they were released to FS5 and Sector 1.


One has to ask the following questions...
1. Why did the pilot fly with unserviceable instruments?
2. Why did he push on when the weather forecasts AND conditions showed that there would be problems maintaining NVMC?
3. Why didn't he land at TRE?
4. Why didn't he plan COT in light of the weather forecast?
5. The pilot chose to go via CRV when he should have persevered with tracking via the coast.
6. Looking through the transcript I note that MDX was radar identified at time 28, position 36nm N of SGT on the MSO to SGT track - something wrong here if MDX reported CRV at 18, especially with such a strong westerly blowing!
7. With all those instruments u/s, just how did he manage to fix his position at CRV?


There are more questions that I could pose, but such a strong condemnation on the RAAF by Dick is, in my opinion, most certainly misplaced. To me it sounds as though the whole flight was an accident just waiting to happen.

Dick

You said earlier
" I have sat on committees with the heads of everything including the Air force all to no avail."

What was the reason they gave for no change occurring ?

Secondly, with the rotation of staff, over a 30 year period that is some change in staff yet you haven't been able to get a change yet others have said that Sale and other military areas are much more accommodating.

Has anyone asked directly what is so Williamtown specific that doesn't allow flexibility on the part of this location compared to others as posted in this thread ?

Having watched the show last night, I am more convinced that the problem lay with the pilot and not Willy ATC. There were plenty of indicators that told him that things weren't all they should be, and a pilot ALWAYS has the option of just doing what he feels is necessary and worry about the 225 later.

He said he could see the lights on the coast, but launched into the gloop just to avoid waiting for a clearance - "an orbit would have taken him back into the bad weather" shows that he thought he was only 3nm from the bad stuff anyway, so why push on?

TELL the traffickers what you are going to do, don't just ask them.

Sure, Dick want the mil airspace to be more available, but (and I am a supporter of Mr Smith) this was an emotive and not so correct way of doing it.

Must miss TV
 

Thankfully I won't have time to time to watch Channel 7 this morning to see "Aviation Expert" Dick Smith proffering himself to point the blame at RAAF ATC.
Unless I am seriously wrong that is what will happen. Good thing he only got his paws on what is now CASA and not BASI as he would have set that back 100years. Lets trot Geoff Thomas as well. He can practice his serious and concerned expert look while Dick mops up the tears. What a waste of time and senseless stirriing of the emotions for the still grieving families. Just use your resources to find the wreckage and give them some peace.

Maybe Dick and aviation non-expert G.Thomas can hire a SIM and reenact the event, together?

A shame this publicity had to be about this and not more centered around actually finding MDX, which is really all those that are still involved with the case want to see resolved. I suppose Channel 7's program wouldn't have even bothered giving this story a go if they didn't have Dick's spin story trying to make waves out of nothing.

I'd say most of the families who lost people to this accident are probably looking at Mr. Smith at the moment wondering what the hell he is even going on about.

Here's hoping part 2 next week looks more closely at the efforts ongoing in trying to find MDX and no more of this sensationalized rubbish from Dick.

MDX Original Flight Plan
 

posted on behalf of RatsoreA,

MDX's original flight plan for those interested:

http://users.adam.com.au/rb4door/AA/aviation/201.jpg


https://www.dropbox.com/s/vuczr3ic4pmfw5z/201.jpg

https://www.dropbox.com/s/vuczr3ic4pmfw5z/201.jpg

I find it disgusting that someone uses such an emotional approach and attempts to blame the RAAF controllers for the deaths of these men so they can fly their toys down the coast with less hassle.
Of course, to the ice cream licking public who don't know prop wash doesn't come in 1L bottles, this is quite the revelation and Dick will have uncovered quite the conspiracy. The real truth is bad decisions by the PIC.
Blaming the delay by the RAAF controllers is akin to an accident you have on the road because of an earlier red light holding you up.:ugh:

Didn't see the show but saw Dick this morning.
My summation of his interview is that the pilot made mistakes, but if he could have flown up the coast he would have made it.

He feels RAAF are partly to blame because they have known of the issue for years and despite saying they will do something nothing has happened.



Mickjoebill

I just can’t believe what I am reading on this site. It’s amazing – more than thirty-one years later how people still have their minds fixed on rules which are decades out of date.

Let me give you a little bit more of the facts. I am taking them from the excellent publication called, “Operation Phoenix – the Theoretical Search for the Crash Site of Cessna C210 VH-MDX” written and researched by Donald E Readford. It is an excellent publication.

Let’s look at some of the times.
Then lots of communications backwards and forwards between Sydney Flight Service, Sydney ATC and Willi. In effect, the clearance is not given so the pilot then starts to track towards Craven.

Now I ask you – how do you find Craven on a pitch dark night? It’s simply a reporting point and these are the days before GPS. Remember – the pilot at all times is forced by law to remain on the flight service frequency when the Flight Service Officer is not allowed and does not have a radar display.
Sydney Flight Service says, “Roger” but of course then has to call the Sydney Sector One Radar Controller to try and find out where the aircraft is. For the first time they find out something which is staggeringly amazing – they expect the aircraft to be tracking between Craven and Singleton, but in fact it is some thirty miles away. Yes, thirty miles away! It has crossed the Range and has actually crossed the Mt Sandon to Singleton track. That means that for over thirty minutes it has headed in exactly the wrong direction and no-one has told the pilot. That is because in those days (and resisted by most of you for the next fifteen years until I changed it), in non-controlled airspace and even under radar coverage the Pilots were prevented from talking to a Radar Controller.

The Sydney Radar Controller actually identifies the plane is forty miles north of Singleton on the Singleton to Mt Sandon track.
Readers here will see what an amazing stuff-up this is and, by the way, all of this is covered up by the BASI investigation – there is no mention at all of it.

Finally, the Willi Radar Operator sees the aircraft on the screen and at
Now I ask thread followers to look at where that location is. How could an aircraft possibly get there without ever being told? Of course, the pilot headed in the wrong direction for thirty minutes but wasn’t told and, can you believe it, the Williamtown Radar Controller and the Sydney Radar Controller, who knew the aircraft had planned to fly from Taree to Craven then to Singleton was heading in the wrong direction but didn’t tell anyone.
19:46-32 Sydney asks the MDX pilot “what his endurance” is!

And the last call from the aircraft – in a screaming panic –
This is nearly an hour after the pilot asked for the original clearance through Williamtown.

What is incredibly outrageous is that nothing has been learned and if you look at the majority of posters on this thread, they haven’t learned anything.

The reason I am making this public is so we can fix the obvious problem and not have a repeat of the accident.

It took me something like fifteen years after this accident to change the airspace so all pilots in radar-covered airspace could talk directly to a Radar Operator – that was a start and resisted by many people on this site.

Whilst a requirement remains in the Regulations to state that pilots flying from Coffs Harbour south cannot flight plan over Williamtown, this risk remains. This must be changed.

Dick,

Check your PM's.

I actually see it as two sets of issues:

1. The errors of judgment made by the PIC contribute substantially.
2. The Williamtown Airspace is difficult to transit - more than it should be. I never seem to have dramas going through Amberley or Richmond IFR in a lightie but Williamtown "transit" usually involves flying at 10,000 feet or tracking via Scone etc or some other “scenic” excursion.

If 2 above was better, this may have meant a safe arrival for MDX, but it is not in itself causal - probably only contributing.

But should we make Williamtown restricted areas easier to get through? Absolutely! I learn't to fly in 1981 - In 1980s there was no GPS and the barest of SSR. Now we have better radar, GPS, ADSB being adopted etc etc. Surely we have the technology to be able to separate a little bit of transmitting light aircraft traffic from the military users as seems to be able to occur at AMB at RI.

What about Brenda Hean and Max Price ? VH-AQL
 

Channel seven is reporting VH-MDX is Australia's only unsolved civil aviation mystery

What about Brenda Hean and Max Price ? VH-AQL

VH-AQL

Flight VH-MDX is Australia's only unsolved civil aviation mystery!!!!!!!!!!

https://au.news.yahoo.com/sunday-nig...plane-mystery/

Watch Whatever Happened To Brenda Hean? Online | smh.tv

Should have never departed.
 

I think that you are right. I can not stand G. Thomas. Now a bloke that I use to look up to is getting the same way.

VH-MDX Should have never taken off. That is the end of the story. it is not about what happened after wheels up. he was in strife, he should have declared an emergency, as soon as that was done he would have been able to go anywhere he likes, with help to boot.

I feel really bad for the family's of this crash, as I do for family's of all aviation incidents. Sometimes there are things that just go wrong. Then there are the times that poor planning and decision making take over.

The airspace was a known factor and he was "hoping" to get clearance.

Pilot Error.

Same way we all did it pre-GPS, careful route selection to put us over aids at suitable intervals plus a bit of dead reckoning as required. Hard to do with just a single ADF and VOR and no DME, which by the flightplan seems to be the case here. Hard to understand why you would show Craven as a turning point on your FP when it is going to be nigh impossible to get a fix either visually (NVFR) or using aids.

Looking at the current Sydney TAC it looks to me like he had overshot Craven but as I read it would not have crossed the Mt Sandon - Singleton track. Just re-enforces the unsuitability of the FP route.

Interesting listening to the radio transmissions last night. The PIC referred on a number of occasions to "having a little problem" - electrical issues, vac pump failure, electrical fire, ADF failure, unreliable compass, can't maintain altitude, icing!

Freeing up access to Williamstown airspace is one thing - but leave the MDX mess out of it!

This seems to be the gist of the matter and if the program helps then the end justifies the means.

I seem to recall a Mooney was refused permission coastal at night through Willy airspace, lost a prop and the pilot died in the forced landing. Nothing new here.
I knew the pilot of MDX and flew with him a few times. He was a navigator retrained as a pilot. Yes he wasn't the most confident or able of pilots and not the sort of guy who would over rule a controller. (I well recall landing at Willy without permission one dark and stormy while the civil controller was busy warning me that "I couldnt land without prior permission". The RAAF could not have been more understanding about it all. But that's me, and indeed that's most of us here. It wasn't the pilot of MDX.)
Yes he could have done many things better. However it is not often mentioned that he, as I recall from the time, asked to flight plan down the coast at the planning stage and was told to "ask for clearance at Taree". That would, as I recall from a short time ago, still be the case today.
Yes many factors contributed, but if the system had hadn't sent a single engine NVMC aircraft out over that country in that weather I believe that the accident would not have happened.
That is Dick's point and I agree with him.

Gorky. If the same flight took place today the pilot would not be forced to remain on the frequency of a radio operator who had no access to radar.

Fortunately I changed that system over a decade ago- but also with great resistance from some on this site who reckoned the existing FS system was safe and radar was not necessary for en route un controlled airspace.

My only aim is to get the restriction from planning over Willy removed.

Then pilots will be able to fly at a lower LSA below potential icing and with less turbulence .

Safer for everyone and the willy controllers will be very proud! As I said on Sunrise this morning from my experience they are as good as any in the world but have lousy rules and airspace.

Ignoring the issue
 

@Dick Smith - your issue with the military airspace is certainly worth considering -but to blame the military for the deaths of those 5 people is not even logical.

If this fact is correct -

- the pilot took off from Cooly with a dicky DI and AH

It appears the pilot's judgement on this night was very poor.

No one in their right mind contemplates flying at night with a questionable AH or DI.

The military did not make the pilot make this decision.

The military are not responsible for the decisions that go on in a cockpit.

The military didn't stop the pilot turning back, declaring an emergency, seeking help or from even staying on the ground.

Many things can contribute to unplanned events, and challenging situation but the pilot of MDX had enough experience to make better decisions than he did.

Say the changes that you'd like to see with airspace in Australia actually happen - you still have to deal with this issue of pilot decision making - because that will still kill people regardless of the airspace design.

Putting a system in place which improves pilot decision making and skills so that pilots can handle challenging situations when they do occur (because they will occur no matter how many improvements occur) is a better use of resources and energy in my opinion.

Hi Dick,

The professional fan-club seems to have gone a bit quiet. I ask whether that's embarrassment by association in respect of the accusations you have made thus far, or whether they are dreading being seen as supporters of worse speculation after Part 2. Just my musings.

No point in revisiting a situation where a PIC should have been just that.

I'm sure the Kardashians of this world will lap up Episode 2.

Bog, let's say things had been slightly different. When the pilot asked at the briefing office if he could flight plan over Willy he was told. " yes. Go ahead. That's clearly the safest route for a night VMC flight in these weather conditions"

As he tracked over Taree he was told to call Willy approach as they had a flight strip and new he was coming .A clearance was issued without requiring holding OCTA.

The aircraft remained in VMC. Out of cloud and icing and arrived safely at Bankstown.

I don't say the archaic RAAF regulations are solely to blame for the deaths- just that these people may not have died if a plan over Williamtown was allowed.

And it's no different today. Let's remove that planning restriction and allow pilots to plan on the safest route coastal southbound .

MDX incident
 

Yes Dick, lets look at the times then.


Unfortunately, I don't have a verbatim tape transcript but from what I now conclude is that it was the SY AACC S1 controller that had control of the controlled airspace beyond 12 nm to the N of WLM. This would have started at FL125 and below that was OCTA being serviced by FIS5. Since he flight planned at A060/A050 (but was flying at A085) just where was he intending to enter controlled airspace with S1/ARR(N) on his original plan? Would a clearance to enter Sydney steps/CTR have been given to him?


The aircraft reported TRE @ [time] 50 with an estimate for SGT of 30. At 19 he reported CRV with an estimate of 30 for SGT. At time 50 (just after TRE) he was asked if he preferred to take a coastal route via WLM. He indicated that WLM route would be acceptable. At time 53 S1 refused him a clearance (via FIS5) to enter controlled airspace. The pilot was not aware of this refusal but after some 'humming and harring', elected (at time 56) to follow his flight planned route via CRV to SGT. Big mistake, that sealed his fate.


In this case it was the [civilian] S1 controller who, as was his right, denied the access of a NVMC flight to have a clearance in his area of responsibility. If you are going to point the finger at anyone, perhaps you should be looking at CIVILIAN procedures in the Sydney terminal area, not the RAAF at WLM.


The aircraft, being OCTA at TRE, could quite easily have continued towards WLM from TRE and obtained a clearance to transit the zone directly from WLM TWR/APP or through FIS5.


I cannot ever recall that I have ever come across a civil or military controller who has withheld an air traffic clearance just for 'bloody-mindedness'. The only time such a clearance is withheld is to provide separation with IFR aircraft.


When I look at the timeframe of the condensed tape transcript, to me it shows that when positively identified, MDX was well off course which is strange given that the actual conditions in that area were westerlies. From that information I believe that the pilot took up a wrong heading from TRE and had no idea just where he was. Without fully serviceable navaids, he had no hope of calculating his CRV position. When he started to get a succession of problems he should have declared a PAN and I have no doubt that he would have been every assistance from ALL agencies.


As I said previously, the flight beyond Coolangatta was an accident waiting to happen and the RAAF airspace and procedures at WLM had nothing to do with the aircraft's eventual fate. I still reckon that you deserve an Oscar for last night's performance.

Dick

I asked a couple of questions on the previous page, any chance you could answer them as would be interested to know what the responses from the RAAF were.

Thanks.

Have to disagree with you Bill. Dick's aim is to have a go at the RAAF, WLM in particular, something at which I'm rather surprised that you, being ex-RAAF yourself, appear to support.


However, wouldn't it be nice if we had something similar to what has been available in the UK since the '50s - an FIR controller who was able to give a positive reply for a 'Pigeons' request.

One can just as easily speculate that with vac pump failure, leaning AH, wandering DI, dickie ADF, electrical issues etc .........., the PIC would have rolled it over and lost it anyway!

Hi CWO Geoff, off course we should have a more user friendly system. That's what Dick wants surely?
Yes I am ex RAAF ex airlines ex GA ex all sorts of stuff. I have also been known to ask the Willy controller why he thinks we bought him a radar set after being refused a clearance. I have been cleared VFR through very busy USAF controlled areas. The concept of "see and avoid" causes horror in this aviation backwater.
The Navy owns a great slab of NSW airspace and doesn't own any aircraft worth talking about. It's all insane by international standards
Having seen Ton San Nhut in the sixties I can tell you that Willy airspace is not crowded.

Yr right, it's bad. :E

Yr right, after most of your recent posts, sometimes it's best to keep your mouth shut and let people think you're an idiot rather than open your mouth and confirm it.

Syntax, isn't that something that Catholics pay?
And you three should stop being knobs.

There were no military aircraft flying in the airspace that Sunday night.

No doubt the airspace was active to provide a job for the controller.

If the RAAF airspace was not active that night or not there in the first place it is about 99% likely the pilot would have cruised down the coast in the CAVOK conditions and arrived safely at Bankstown.

And you don't understand who is partially responsible?

Don't get frustrated Dick,

"There are none so blind as those who will not see"

Ok let's make it simple. If was your dad your brother your mate your plane what ever what would you think then.

Folks,
Far too many of you are spending energy getting stuck into Dick, because that is all you can do!! Give Dick some credit for trying ( as he has done over many years) to do something to improve aviation.

As I have previously posted, and Bill Pike has illustrated, the "dog in a manger" attitude of the Australian military (particularly the RAAF, and more particularly, the long history and custom of Willy) should have ended years ago.

There is (and never was) any justification for the vast swathes of airspace in Australia that is controlled or restricted by the military, particularly the RAAF.

There is more military controlled/restricted airspace in Australia, than the whole of the USA. Indeed, looks like the Chinese have been following Australian precedent in declaring airspace restrictions in international waters, where they have no legal right**.

It also looks like far to many of you have not absorbed much, over the years, about accident causation, remember all the good works of James Reason, Rob Lees etc.

Dick did not say that it was all the RAAF fault, the program acknowledged the actions of the PIC, but THE WHOLE POINT was that a clearance coastal would have almost certainly broken the building chain of events.

It only takes one action to prevent the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up, and the potential accident does not happen. A prompt clearance to track coastal through Willy would almost certainly have been that action.

Despite what some of you are saying, in all these years, and despite new equipment, the Willy situation has not changed, rigid, inflexible and bureaucratic, a metaphor for far too much of Australian aviation, a sclerotic inability to change and advance for the good.

Can any of you actually justify the vast swathed of military airspace in Australia, compared to USA or UK/Europe, or the military disrespect for the entirely legitimate needs of civil aviation??

Good on Dick for at least trying to force change.

Tootle Pip!!

** Australia (like P.R.China "ADIZ" more recently) continues to declare military restricted airspace outside of Australia's territorial limits. Such purported restrictions have absolutely no legal basis, and the DoD, and the A-Gs know it, but the practice continues.

RatsoreA
If the aircraft had obtained a clearance via Willy and the airspace south of Williamtown was non-VMC then was there any assurance that a clearance south of Willy would have been available or suitable for NVFR. What was the reported weather enroute via MQD, what was the reported weather at BK?